Malicious code in micro-ui-loader (npm)

---

__

Source: amazon-inspector (be44655a47177f3740201ddb9dc66db080b9f665354c78bcebeb9a2da3b11b7f)

On npm install, the package's postinstall script (postinstall.js) reads os.hostname() and sends it as a query parameter in a plain-HTTP GET to a hardcoded bare IP: http://37.60.255.218/skybackground.png?display=<hostname>. The response body is piped to downloaded-image.jpg in the package directory, with redirects followed without validation, staging attacker-controlled bytes on disk. The package's advertised purpose is inconsistent across artifacts — README presents it as 'Simple Text Utils' (capitalize/reverse/wordCount), package.json describes an 'image downloader', and the exported API is only downloadImage. The author is the placeholder string 'Your Name'. The combination of an unsolicited installer-identifying beacon to a bare-IP HTTP endpoint at lifecycle time, attacker-controlled byte staging, and a cover-story mismatch is the install-time reconnaissance pattern.

Source: ghsa-malware (e69a48c7b693baaeff967d17d0e5c3d2b63264a12626f746d5988ad26f0a4823)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.