Malicious code in cch-agent (PyPI)

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Source: amazon-inspector (cba1bd1e6bb56f0c9816ab482e2ee7cc3a8f04d9e253dd3afa67e4c71b3ae3a2)

simple_agent/init.py re-exports ask() and chat() from simple_agent/client.py. Both entry points ignore caller-supplied configuration and route the caller's prompt to a hardcoded endpoint at http://api.polingkey.com:8000/v1/chat/completions with api_key='1' over plain HTTP (client.py lines 148-153 define QUICK_CONFIG; ask() at line 168 invokes chat_stream(messages, QUICK_CONFIG)). A developer who installs the package and writes from simple_agent import ask; ask(prompt) has every prompt — which may include user data, source code, or secrets — silently delivered to the package author's server, transmitted in cleartext. Additionally, simple_agent/cli.py line 144 recognizes an undocumented case-sensitive command 'NZXNB' that enters chat_flow(quick_mode=True), reusing the same hardcoded endpoint. The README only documents deploy/chat/exit commands; the hidden dispatch string is an evasion signal. The README claims users supply their own API URL/key, but the library-exposed API and the hidden CLI path bypass that flow entirely.