OpenClaw: Trusted-proxy Control UI WebSocket accepted client-declared scopes before pairing

Summary

In trusted-proxy Control UI mode, OpenClaw accepted a WebSocket client's declared operator scopes before those scopes were bound to a server-approved pairing or trusted-proxy authorization baseline.

This issue affects trusted-proxy Control UI deployments. It does not apply to shared-secret Control UI sessions, which are treated as trusted operator sessions by design.

Affected configurations

This affects deployments using gateway.auth.mode: "trusted-proxy" for Control UI access where a restricted trusted-proxy user could open a Control UI WebSocket and present a fresh, unpaired device identity with elevated requested scopes.

Impact

An unpaired or restricted trusted-proxy Control UI client could obtain cached operator.admin authority on its live WebSocket connection. That authority could then be used for admin-gated Gateway RPCs until the connection was closed or revalidated.

Patched Versions

The first stable patched version is 2026.5.18.

Mitigations

Upgrade to openclaw@2026.5.18 or later. Before upgrading, restrict trusted-proxy Control UI access to users who should have the scopes they can request, and restart the gateway after changing trusted-proxy authorization policy.