CVE
CVE-2026-115731, CVE-2026-115732
CWE
CWE-502, CWE-94, CWE-863
Affected Surface
- Puppet Enterprise 2023.8.0 to before 2023.8.13, 2025.0.0 to before 2025.12.1, and 2026.0.0 to before 2026.0.1
- Puppet Core before 9.1.3 and 8.22.1
- OpenVox agent before 9.3.0 and 8.32.0, OpenVox Server before 9.2.0 and 8.18.0, OpenVoxDB before 9.2.0 and 8.18.0
- Open-source Puppet and Puppet Server, including the `puppet` gem on RubyGems (all releases through 8.10.0; Neodyme confirmed the RCE on 6.24.0 from July 2021)
- Red Hat Satellite and other products that bundle Puppet Server
TL;DR
Puppet agents send a JSON report to the Puppet Server after every run. The server turns each event in that report back into Ruby objects with Puppet’s rich-data deserializer, which honors a __ptype key. An attacker can put a complete Pcore object type definition in __ptype, including a RubyMethod annotation whose body string is pasted into a generated class and run through class_eval. Ruby executes backticks in a class body at definition time, so the shell command runs as soon as the server parses the report.
Neodyme found the bug while preparing a red team engagement and reported it to Perforce and the OpenVox project in October. Fixes shipped on 3 November 2026 as CVE-2026-115731 (CVSS 4.0 9.4). On 17 November CISA added it to the KEV catalog, which means CISA has evidence of exploitation. The federal due date is 1 December. CISA does not say who is exploiting it.
The report endpoint needs a client certificate signed by the Puppet CA. That’s a lower bar than it sounds. Every managed node already has one, including CI runners, build agents and developer workstations, and many fleets autosign new certificate requests. In that setup an attacker with network access to port 8140 can enroll a certificate and then run code on the server. From there the CA private key is readable, and with it the attacker can mint certificates for any node.
Neodyme reported a second bug at the same time. CVE-2026-115732 (CVSS 4.0 9.0) is in trapperkeeper-authorization, the library that enforces auth.conf. Its exact-hostname rules matched like prefix wildcards, so a certificate for evil.target.example.com passed a rule written for target.example.com.
What to do now:
- Upgrade the server first: Puppet Enterprise 2023.8.13, 2025.12.1 or 2026.0.1; Puppet Core 9.1.3 or 8.22.1; OpenVox Server 9.2.0 or 8.18.0 together with OpenVox agent 9.3.0 or 8.32.0 and OpenVoxDB 9.2.0 or 8.18.0.
- If you run community open-source Puppet, there is no patched release. Perforce moved Puppet off its open-source license in 2025, and Vox Pupuli says the open-source builds will not receive security updates. Migrate to OpenVox or Puppet Core.
- Until you’ve patched, turn off naive autosign (
autosign = trueor broad globs inautosign.conf) and limit who can reach TCP 8140. - If the server accepted reports from untrusted networks or ran autosign, treat the CA key as exposed (see remediation below).
Affected packages and projects
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected versions | Fixed or safe version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Puppet Enterprise | Puppet Enterprise (both CVEs) | 2023.8.0 to before 2023.8.13; 2025.0.0 to before 2025.12.1; 2026.0.0 to before 2026.0.1 | 2023.8.13, 2025.12.1, 2026.0.1 |
| Puppet Core (Perforce) | Puppet Core agent and server (both CVEs) | Before 9.1.3 and 8.22.1 | 9.1.3, 8.22.1 |
| RubyGems / OS packages | openvox / openvox-agent (CVE-2026-115731) | 9.2.1 and earlier on 9.x; 8.31.2 and earlier on 8.x | 9.3.0, 8.32.0 |
| OS packages / containers | openvox-server (both CVEs) | 9.1.1 and earlier on 9.x; 8.17.1 and earlier on 8.x | 9.2.0, 8.18.0 |
| OS packages / containers | openvoxdb (CVE-2026-115732) | 9.1.0 and earlier; 8.17.0 and earlier (per the advisory) | 9.2.0, 8.18.0 |
| Clojars | trapperkeeper-authorization (OpenVox fork, CVE-2026-115732) | 2.4.1 and earlier | 2.5.0 |
| RubyGems | puppet (community open-source Puppet) | All releases through 8.10.0 (Neodyme reproduced the RCE back to 6.24.0) | None. Migrate to openvox 8.32.0+ or Puppet Core |
The OpenVox advisories list the vulnerable ranges as ”<= 9.2.0 and <= 8.31.1” for the agent and ”<= 9.1.0 and <= 8.17.0” for the server. OpenVox also published agent 9.2.1 (23 October) and 8.31.2 (29 October) and server 9.1.1 and 8.17.1 (29 October) before the fix landed. We checked the 8.31.2 and 9.2.1 tags, and both still call FromDataConverter in lib/puppet/transaction/event.rb. The table above uses the first fixed release as the boundary.
The GitHub Advisory Database carries both CVEs only as unreviewed records (GHSA-4pxx-8frq-9r4j, GHSA-5jqj-9p78-vmh3) with no package attached. Dependabot and most SCA tools will not flag a Gemfile.lock that pins puppet or openvox.
EPSS on 17 November was 0.00366 (31st percentile) for CVE-2026-115731 and 0.00745 (55th percentile) for CVE-2026-115732. That score predates the KEV listing.
Technical analysis
1. Where the report data goes
The agent sends its report with PUT /puppet/v3/report/<certname>?environment=<env>. The body includes resource_statuses, and each resource status has a list of events. The server rebuilds each event with Puppet::Transaction::Event.from_data_hash, which calls this method (OpenVox 9.2.1, lib/puppet/transaction/event.rb):
def initialize_from_hash(data)
data = Puppet::Pops::Serialization::FromDataConverter.convert(data, {
:allow_unresolved => true,
:loader => Puppet::Pops::Loaders.static_loader
})
@audited = data['audited']
@property = data['property']
@previous_value = data['previous_value']
@desired_value = data['desired_value']
FromDataConverteris Puppet’s “rich data” decoder. When it sees a hash with a__ptypekey, it parses that value as a Puppet type expression withTypes::TypeParser.singleton.parse(type_value, @loader)and then builds an instance of that type from__pvalue.:allow_unresolved => truemeans a type name the loader doesn’t recognize is tolerated rather than rejected.- A type expression is a small language. It can name an existing type like
Timestamp, but it can also define a new one inline:Object[{name => 'X', functions => {...}}].
Look at the same file’s serializer a few lines further down (line 104 in 9.2.1). It writes events with ToStringifiedConverter, which only emits plain data. Puppet wrote events as plain data and read them back as rich data. That asymmetry is the bug.
2. From a type definition to class_eval
When the converter builds a value of an inline Object type, PObjectType#implementation_class finds no registered Ruby class for it and asks RubyGenerator to create one (lib/puppet/pops/types/ruby_generator.rb):
def create_class(obj)
@dynamic_classes ||= Hash.new do |hash, key|
cls = key.implementation_class(false)
if cls.nil?
rp = key.resolved_parent
parent_class = rp.is_a?(PObjectType) ? rp.implementation_class : Object
class_def = ''.dup
class_body(key, EMPTY_ARRAY, class_def)
cls = Class.new(parent_class)
cls.class_eval(class_def)
class_body builds class_def as a string of Ruby source. For each function on the type, it checks for a RubyMethod annotation and copies its body into the method definition without any escaping:
obj.functions(false).each_value do |func|
code_annotation = RubyMethod.annotate(func)
if code_annotation
body = code_annotation.body
params = code_annotation.parameters
bld << "\n def " << rname(func.name)
unless params.nil? || params.empty?
bld << '(' << params << ')'
end
bld << "\n " << body << "\n"
RubyMethod annotations exist so Puppet modules can ship Ruby implementations for Pcore types. They were meant to come from trusted module code on the server. Report events come from agents, and nothing on this path kept the two apart.
3. The payload
This is the event from the OpenVox advisory, trimmed to the important field:
"events": [
{
"__ptype": "Object[{name => 'PEP', functions => {'test' => {type => Callable, annotations => {RubyMethod => {'body' => \"1\\n end\\n `/bin/sh -c 'touch /tmp/pwned'`\\n def d2\\n 1\"}}}}}]",
"__pvalue": "x"
}
]
Object[{name => 'PEP', ...}]defines a new Pcore object type namedPEP.functions => {'test' => {type => Callable, ...}}gives it one function, soclass_bodyreaches the loop above.- The
RubyMethodbodyis1, a newline,end, a backtick shell command, thendef d2and1. Spliced into the generator’s template, the class source becomes:
def test
1
end
`/bin/sh -c 'touch /tmp/pwned'`
def d2
1
end
- The injected
endclosestestearly. The backtick line now sits at class-body level, and the generator’s own trailingendcloses the dummyd2. - Ruby runs class-body statements when the class is defined, so the command fires inside
cls.class_eval. Nothing ever has to calltest. __pvalue: "x"is a string, which sends the converter downpcore_type.create(value)and forces the class to be generated.
The command runs as the puppet service user. That user can read the CA signing key, which is how Neodyme minted a certificate with serverAuth and clientAuth and then used Puppet Enterprise’s PXP orchestration broker on port 8142 to run commands as root on managed nodes. On OpenVox, the follow-on options depend on whether Choria orchestration is set up and whether the puppet user can write to code or catalogs.
4. The fix (16920fe, 3 November 2026)
def initialize_from_hash(data)
- data = Puppet::Pops::Serialization::FromDataConverter.convert(data, {
- :allow_unresolved => true,
- :loader => Puppet::Pops::Loaders.static_loader
- })
+ # Read with the stringifying converter, the same one #to_data_hash writes with.
+ # Event values contain no rich data downstream, so there is nothing to reconstruct.
+ data = Puppet::Pops::Serialization::ToStringifiedConverter.convert(data, :message_prefix => 'Event')
The reader now uses the same converter as the writer. ToStringifiedConverter never resolves types, so a __ptype key is renamed and kept as plain data. The new specs check that RubyGenerator#create_class is never called for an inline Object[...] type or an embedded Pcore::ObjectType description. One side effect: a rich-typed value from a Puppet 5 agent now arrives as a hash instead of an object.
5. CVE-2026-115732: prefix matching in auth.conf (335e64f)
trapperkeeper-authorization splits a certname on dots and reverses it, so target.lab.local becomes ("local" "lab" "target"). Wildcard rules like *.lab.local were stored as :string rules with the star dropped. To make that work, the matcher compared only as many labels as the rule had:
(let [match-split-domain (split-domain to-match)]
- (if (= :regex match)
- (boolean (re-find (re-pattern value) to-match))
- (every? (fn [[a b]] (= a b)) (map vector value match-split-domain)))))
+ (case match
+ :regex (boolean (re-find (re-pattern value) to-match))
+ :wildcard (= value (take (count value) match-split-domain))
+ (= value match-split-domain))))
map vector stops at the shorter list, so every exact rule also accepted longer names. An attacker who autosigns evil.target.lab.local passes any rule written for target.lab.local and can fetch that node’s catalog. Catalogs often contain secrets: Neodyme pulled PostgreSQL credentials and admin API tokens from one during their engagement. The attacker can also submit facts or reports as that node. The fix gives wildcards their own :wildcard match type and makes plain rules compare the full label list. Vox Pupuli warns that custom auth.conf rules which relied on the old behavior may stop matching after the upgrade.
IOCs
CISA has not published exploitation details, attacker infrastructure or payloads, and we found no public attack reports. Hunt for the technique:
- Report bodies containing
__ptypewithObject[,RubyMethodorannotations. Ordinary agent reports almost never carry inline object type definitions. PUT /puppet/v3/report/<certname>from certnames that were signed recently, that you don’t recognize, or that have no matching node in your inventory.- Child processes of the Puppet Server JVM (
java ... puppetserver) or thepuppetuser runningsh,bash,curl,wget,pythonornc. - Reads or copies of
ca_key.pem, files in the filebucket that you didn’t put there, and certificates you didn’t sign. - Certnames that are a known node name with an extra leading label (
x.web01.example.comnext toweb01.example.com), which point atCVE-2026-115732.
Detection and remediation
Check what you run:
# Server and agent versions
puppetserver --version 2>/dev/null; puppet --version
rpm -q openvox-server openvox-agent openvoxdb puppetserver puppet-agent 2>/dev/null
dpkg -l | grep -E 'openvox|puppet(server|-agent|db)' 2>/dev/null
# Ruby projects and tooling that vendor Puppet
grep -nE '^\s+(puppet|openvox) \(' Gemfile.lock
gem list '^(puppet|openvox)$'
On servers, any openvox-server below 9.2.0 or 8.18.0, any puppetserver from the community repositories, or any Puppet Enterprise build below the fixed releases is exposed. A puppet or openvox gem in a developer’s Gemfile.lock (PDK, rspec-puppet, onceover) only matters if that code processes reports from other hosts.
Check whether certificates are free to get:
puppet config print autosign --section server
cat "$(puppet config print autosign --section server)" 2>/dev/null
puppetserver ca list --all | tail -n 50
true or a broad glob in autosign.conf means anyone who can reach port 8140 can get a client certificate. Switch to policy-based autosigning that checks a pre-shared challenge password in the CSR, or sign by hand until you’ve patched.
Search for past exploitation attempts:
# Report PUTs by certname, with request counts
grep -h 'PUT /puppet/v3/report/' /var/log/puppetlabs/puppetserver/puppetserver-access.log* \
| awk '{print $7}' | cut -d'?' -f1 | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn | head -50
# Stored reports or server logs that mention inline types or RubyMethod
grep -rlE 'RubyMethod|Object\[\{name' /opt/puppetlabs/server/data/puppetserver/reports/ \
/var/log/puppetlabs/puppetserver/ 2>/dev/null
# Processes spawned by the server user
ps -u puppet -o pid,ppid,lstart,cmd | grep -vE 'java|ruby'
Not every report processor stores the raw event, so finding nothing in reports/ doesn’t clear the host. Process history from EDR or auditd is a better signal.
If the server was exposed (autosign on, or reachable from networks you don’t control) while vulnerable:
- Preserve logs, the CA directory and a disk snapshot.
- Upgrade, then rebuild the CA. Generate a new CA key, reissue every agent certificate and revoke the old ones. A leaked CA key means anyone can impersonate the server or any node, and upgrading doesn’t change that.
- Rotate every secret the server can read or hand out: Hiera eyaml or other backend keys, values embedded in catalogs (database passwords, API tokens), PuppetDB credentials, r10k or Code Manager deploy keys, and cloud credentials on the server host.
- Review the control repository and recent catalog changes for anything you didn’t commit. In Puppet Enterprise, review PXP and orchestrator job history for tasks you didn’t run.
- After upgrading, test custom
auth.confrules, since exact-match rules are stricter now.
Timeline
- 2021-07: Open-source Puppet 6.24.0 is released. Neodyme later confirmed it is exploitable, so the bug is at least this old.
- 2026-10 (mid-month): Neodyme reports both issues to Perforce and the OpenVox project, per Vox Pupuli.
- 2026-10-23 and 2026-10-29: OpenVox agent 9.2.1 and 8.31.2 and server 9.1.1 and 8.17.1 ship without the fix.
- 2026-11-03 16:29 to 17:07 UTC: OpenVox commits the event deserialization fix (
16920feon main,2ffe97aon 8.x) and the hostname matching fix (335e64f). - 2026-11-03 17:00 UTC: Coordinated release. OpenVox agent 9.3.0 and 8.32.0, server 9.2.0 and 8.18.0,
trapperkeeper-authorization2.5.0, Puppet Enterprise 2023.8.13, 2025.12.1 and 2026.0.1, and Puppet Core 9.1.3 and 8.22.1 ship. Neodyme publishes its write-up. - 2026-11-03 20:04 UTC: OpenVox publishes
GHSA-ffr6-rwpm-p5wqandGHSA-q4hm-33rc-572g, and posts to oss-security at 20:09 UTC. - 2026-11-03 21:17 UTC: NVD publishes
CVE-2026-115731andCVE-2026-115732(CNA: Perforce). - 2026-11-17: CISA adds
CVE-2026-115731to the KEV catalog with a 1 December due date.
From research to remediation
Check whether this pattern exists in your codebase
Turn this research into a remediation workflow. Scan dependencies and package manifests for similar supply-chain risk, then prioritize fixes with reachability context.
References
- CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: CVE-2026-115731 (added 17 November 2026)
- Neodyme (3 November 2026): Pulling the right strings for RCE on a Puppet
- OpenVox advisory GHSA-ffr6-rwpm-p5wq: Authenticated RCE on OpenVox server via Event Deserialization
- trapperkeeper-authorization advisory GHSA-q4hm-33rc-572g: Flawed Hostname Check allows Puppet Client Impersonation
- Fix: OpenVoxProject/openvox commit 16920fe, Read event data hashes with the stringifying converter (9.x)
- Fix: OpenVoxProject/openvox commit 2ffe97a (8.x backport)
- Fix: OpenVoxProject/trapperkeeper-authorization commit 335e64f, Re-factor domain name matching
- Vox Pupuli (3 November 2026): Critical CVE Updates in all known versions of Puppet and OpenVox
- oss-security (3 November 2026): OpenVox Server RCE and client impersonation vulnerabilities
- Puppet: Updates and Releases for Puppet Enterprise and Puppet Core
- Red Hat: CVE-2026-115731
- NVD: CVE-2026-115731
- NVD: CVE-2026-115732