critical

CVE

CVE-2026-119623, CVE-2026-119622, CVE-2026-119621, CVE-2026-125159, CVE-2026-125160, CVE-2026-125161, CVE-2026-125162, CVE-2026-125163, CVE-2026-125164, CVE-2026-125165

CWE

CWE-306, CWE-862, CWE-22, CWE-434, CWE-184, CWE-209, CWE-601, CWE-770, CWE-639, CWE-918

Affected Surface

  • TYPO3 CMS 10.0.0-10.4.62, 11.0.0-11.5.56, 12.0.0-12.4.51, 13.0.0-13.4.39 and 14.0.0-14.3.11 (all advisories except SA-2026-034)
  • TYPO3 CMS 14.0.0-14.3.11 (dashboard RSS widget SSRF, SA-2026-034)
  • Composer packages `typo3/cms-install`, `typo3/cms-backend`, `typo3/cms-core`, `typo3/cms-impexp`, `typo3/cms-form`, `typo3/cms-frontend`, `typo3/cms-dashboard` in those ranges

TL;DR

TYPO3 shipped security releases for every supported branch on 17 November 2026: 14.3.12 LTS, 13.4.40 LTS, and 12.4.52, 11.5.57 and 10.4.63 ELTS. The release covers ten advisories, TYPO3-CORE-SA-2026-025 through -034.

The worst two chain together. TYPO3’s install wizard decides that a site is “not installed yet” if a file named FIRST_INSTALL exists in the web root or project root. Before this release it accepted any file whose name merely started with FIRST_INSTALL, and it did so even on a fully configured site. Once re-enabled, the wizard runs without authentication and lets the visitor point TYPO3 at a different database and create a new administrator and system maintainer. That is CVE-2026-119623, rated critical (CVSS 4.0 9.4).

CVE-2026-119622 supplies the file. The backend endpoint for adding YouTube or Vimeo videos took a target folder from the request and accepted the fallback storage (uid 0), which maps to the public web root and skips file mount and permission checks. Any logged-in backend user, even one with no file mounts or module access, could write an online media file with a partly controlled name into the web root. TYPO3 says that was enough to re-enable the installer. Together, the two bugs take a low-privileged editor to admin and then to code execution.

TYPO3 also says CVE-2026-125160 is being actively exploited. It’s a medium-severity Form Framework bug that leaks the secret upload folder path in an error message. Combined with CVE-2026-125163 (empty allowedMimeTypes meant “allow anything”), it lets anonymous visitors upload HTML or SVG files and get stored XSS on sites that don’t apply TYPO3’s recommended Content-Security-Policy to the upload folder.

What to do now:

  1. Update to 14.3.12, 13.4.40, 12.4.52, 11.5.57 or 10.4.63 (composer update "typo3/cms-*" -W).
  2. Look in the web root and project root for files whose name starts with FIRST_INSTALL and delete them (commands below).
  3. Review backend administrators and the systemMaintainers list for accounts you didn’t create.
  4. Give every Form Framework FileUpload and ImageUpload element an explicit allowedMimeTypes list (empty lists now refuse uploads), and serve the upload folder with TYPO3’s CSP. Apache gets this from the shipped fileadmin/.htaccess, but nginx needs it configured by hand.
  5. Read SA-2026-028 and SA-2026-034 before you close the ticket. Both need configuration changes after the update.

Affected packages and projects

EcosystemPackageAdvisory / CVESeverityAffected versionsFixed version
Packagisttypo3/cms-installSA-2026-027 / CVE-2026-119623 (installer re-enabled, no auth)Critical10.0.0-10.4.62, 11.0.0-11.5.56, 12.0.0-12.4.51, 13.0.0-13.4.39, 14.0.0-14.3.1110.4.63, 11.5.57, 12.4.52, 13.4.40, 14.3.12
Packagisttypo3/cms-backendSA-2026-026 / CVE-2026-119622 (online media into fallback storage)HighSameSame
Packagisttypo3/cms-impexpSA-2026-025 / CVE-2026-119621 (import path traversal to file write)HighSameSame
Packagisttypo3/cms-coreSA-2026-028 / CVE-2026-125159 (ImageMagick/GraphicsMagick MVG file read)HighSameSame, plus config review
Packagisttypo3/cms-frontendSA-2026-031 / CVE-2026-125162 (cHash array cache flooding)HighSameSame
Packagisttypo3/cms-formSA-2026-029 / CVE-2026-125160 (upload path disclosure, exploited)MediumSameSame
Packagisttypo3/cms-formSA-2026-032 / CVE-2026-125163 (empty MIME allow list)MediumSameSame (breaking change)
Packagisttypo3/cms-coreSA-2026-030 / CVE-2026-125161 (sanitizeLocalUrl open redirect, incomplete fix of SA-2026-009)MediumSameSame
Packagisttypo3/cms-coreSA-2026-033 / CVE-2026-125164 (eID=dumpFile token reuse)MediumSameSame
Packagisttypo3/cms-dashboardSA-2026-034 / CVE-2026-125165 (RSS widget SSRF)Medium14.0.0-14.3.1114.3.12, plus allowed_hosts config

The 12.4, 11.5 and 10.4 fixes are ELTS (extended long-term support) releases, which TYPO3 distributes to ELTS subscribers. The 14.3.12 packages reached Packagist at 10:54 UTC on 17 November.

Technical analysis

1. How the installer decided it was a first install

The install middleware only takes over a request if EnableFileService::isFirstInstallAllowed() returns true. Before the fix (13.4.39), the check was just “does a marker file exist”:

public static function isFirstInstallAllowed(): bool
{
    $files = self::getFirstInstallFilePaths();
    if (!empty($files)) {
        return true;
    }
    return false;
}

protected static function getFirstInstallFilePaths(): array
{
    // Check in public path
    $files = scandir(Environment::getPublicPath() . '/');
    $files = is_array($files) ? $files : [];
    $files = array_filter($files, static function ($file) {
        return @is_file(Environment::getPublicPath() . '/' . $file) && preg_match('~^' . self::FIRST_INSTALL_FILE_PATH . '.*~i', $file);
    });
  • preg_match('~^FIRST_INSTALL.*~i', $file) matches any name that starts with FIRST_INSTALL, case-insensitively, whatever follows.
  • Nothing checks whether config/system/settings.php already exists. A marker file on a live site re-opened the wizard.
  • The wizard’s steps include setting the database connection and creating an admin user, and none of them asks for credentials.

2. The fix (0f0a1ca)

     public static function isFirstInstallAllowed(): bool
     {
-        $files = self::getFirstInstallFilePaths();
-        if (!empty($files)) {
+        if (empty(self::getFirstInstallFilePaths())) {
+            return false;
+        }
+        $configurationManager = new ConfigurationManager();
+        if (!@is_file($configurationManager->getSystemConfigurationFileLocation())) {
             return true;
         }
-        return false;
+        try {
+            return (bool)$configurationManager->getLocalConfigurationValueByPath('SYS/isInstalling');
+        } catch (MissingArrayPathException) {
+            return false;
+        }
     }
+        $isFirstInstallFile = static fn(string $file): bool
+            => strcasecmp($file, self::FIRST_INSTALL_FILE_PATH) === 0
+            || strcasecmp($file, self::FIRST_INSTALL_FILE_PATH . '.txt') === 0;
  • A marker file is now only honored when there’s no system configuration yet, or when the new SYS/isInstalling flag is true. The installer sets that flag while a fresh install runs and clears it in markInstallationFinished().
  • Upgraded sites don’t have the flag at all, and the MissingArrayPathException branch treats that as “not installing”. That’s the safe default.
  • Only the exact names FIRST_INSTALL and FIRST_INSTALL.txt count now, not any prefix match.

3. Getting a file into the web root (25cb4a8)

OnlineMediaController::addMediaFromUrl() resolved the target folder from the request’s targetFolder identifier. An identifier like 0:/ points at the fallback storage, which is the public web root, and TYPO3 doesn’t apply file mounts or permissions there. The fix rejects it and falls back to the user’s default upload folder:

             } catch (\Exception $e) {
                 $targetFolder = null;
             }
+            // Media must not be added outside the configured file storages
+            if ($targetFolder?->getStorage()->isFallbackStorage()) {
+                $targetFolder = null;
+            }
         }
         if ($targetFolder === null) {
             $targetFolder = $this->uploadFolderResolver->resolve($this->getBackendUser());

TYPO3’s advisory says the file name is partly attacker controlled and that this was enough to re-enable the installer. Every backend user can reach the online media endpoint, so on an unpatched site an editor account (or a phished one) is enough to take over. The advisory also points out other ways the marker can get there: leftover marker files from the original install, files restored from backups, or any other file-write bug.

4. The other RCE and file-read paths

  • SA-2026-025, CVE-2026-119621: The Import/Export module built a temporary file path from the file hash in a T3D or XML import without validating it. A crafted import can write a PHP file anywhere the web server can write. It needs an admin, or a non-admin with options.impexp.enableImportForNonAdminUser.
  • SA-2026-028, CVE-2026-125159: TYPO3 picked the ImageMagick/GraphicsMagick coder from the detected content type whenever it started with image/. A file containing MVG instructions but named .png was rendered with the MVG coder, which can read local files into the output image. If an attacker can upload without a MIME check (see SA-2026-032), config/system/settings.php and its database credentials end up in a public processed image. After updating, content-detected types are only used for allowed raster formats. Formats like psd or ppm now have to be listed in $GLOBALS['TYPO3_CONF_VARS']['SYS']['FileInfo']['fileExtensionToMimeType'].
  • SA-2026-029 and SA-2026-032 (exploited): If storing an upload failed, for example because the file name was too long, the Form Framework showed the raw error, including the “unguessable” per-session upload folder. Empty allowedMimeTypes lists accepted anything except PHP extensions. Together, an anonymous visitor can upload an HTML or SVG file and learn its URL.

IOCs

TYPO3 has not published attacker infrastructure for the exploited Form Framework bug. Look for:

  • Files in the public web root or project root whose name starts with FIRST_INSTALL (any case, any suffix).
  • .youtube or .vimeo online media files directly in the public web root rather than under fileadmin/.
  • Requests to /typo3/install.php or the install tool from unknown IPs, especially ones that reach database or admin-creation steps.
  • New be_users rows with admin = 1, new entries in $GLOBALS['TYPO3_CONF_VARS']['SYS']['systemMaintainers'], or a changed database connection in config/system/settings.php.
  • Form upload folders (default fileadmin/user_upload/) containing .html, .htm, .svg or .xhtml files, and frontend error pages that showed paths containing form_ upload folders.
  • Uploaded files named with image extensions whose content begins with MVG instructions such as viewbox or push graphic-context.

Detection and remediation

Check installed versions:

composer show 'typo3/cms-*' | awk '{print $1, $2}'
grep -A2 '"name": "typo3/cms-core"' composer.lock | grep '"version"'

Anything below 14.3.12, 13.4.40, 12.4.52, 11.5.57 or 10.4.63 is affected.

Look for marker files and stray online media files:

find "$(pwd)" "$(pwd)/public" -maxdepth 1 -type f -iname 'FIRST_INSTALL*' -ls
find "$(pwd)/public" -maxdepth 1 -type f \( -name '*.youtube' -o -name '*.vimeo' \) -ls

Review privileged backend accounts:

SELECT uid, username, admin, FROM_UNIXTIME(crdate) AS created, FROM_UNIXTIME(lastlogin) AS last_login
FROM be_users WHERE admin = 1 AND deleted = 0 ORDER BY crdate DESC;
grep -n "systemMaintainers" -A5 config/system/settings.php

Search web server logs for installer access:

zgrep -hE '"(GET|POST) /typo3/install\.php' /var/log/nginx/access.log* /var/log/apache2/access.log* 2>/dev/null \
  | awk '{print $1}' | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn | head

Find browser-executable files in form upload folders:

find public/fileadmin -type f \( -iname '*.html' -o -iname '*.htm' -o -iname '*.svg' -o -iname '*.xhtml' \) -newermt '2026-10-01' -ls

If you find a marker file you didn’t create, a new administrator, or a changed database connection:

  1. Take the site offline or block /typo3/install.php, and preserve logs and a filesystem snapshot.
  2. Update TYPO3, delete the marker files and unknown accounts, and compare config/system/settings.php against version control or a backup.
  3. Look for PHP files in public/ and fileadmin/ that aren’t in your deployment, because both chains end in arbitrary file write.
  4. Rotate the database password, the encryptionKey in settings.php, the install tool password, SMTP and API credentials in TYPO3 configuration, and any credentials in files the web server user could read.
  5. For nginx, add a CSP for the upload folder, for example location ^~ /fileadmin/user_upload/ { add_header Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; script-src 'none'; style-src 'none'; object-src 'none';" always; }.

Timeline

  • 2026-11-17 10:30 to 10:56 UTC: The [SECURITY] Lock installer on already configured instances commits land on the TYPO3 GitHub mirror across the release branches.
  • 2026-11-17 10:54 UTC: typo3/cms-* 14.3.12 is published on Packagist.
  • 2026-11-17: TYPO3 publishes the release announcement and advisories SA-2026-025 to SA-2026-034. SA-2026-029 says the Form Framework issue is known to be actively exploited. Credits for the installer chain go to 0xkidz.
  • 2026-11-17 11:11 UTC: ENISA publishes EUVD-2026-126975 for CVE-2026-119623.
  • 2026-11-17 11:17 UTC: NVD publishes all ten CVE records (CNA: TYPO3).

From research to remediation

Check whether this pattern exists in your codebase

Turn this research into a remediation workflow. Scan dependencies and package manifests for similar supply-chain risk, then prioritize fixes with reachability context.

References