Malicious code in tcb-web-copy-to-clipboard (npm)

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Source: amazon-inspector (e17b4feb97874ea6bf112238baf911ef3ebb815f12034b726c8b1a5d1705adbb)

The package advertises itself as a clipboard SDK, but index.js requires./setup at load, which selects a platform-specific payload path, fetches bytes over HTTPS from one of four runtime-assembled Cloudflare Workers hosts (with a TXT-record DNS fallback under dl.well1.site), writes the response to /var/tmp or %TEMP% under a disguised name (Unix:.cache_; Windows: dotnet_diag_.exe mimicking a Microsoft diagnostic tool), chmods 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c ' &'. Both the HTTPS hostnames and DNS domains are assembled by joining split string fragments (e.g. ['oob-worker.','cf101-','adf.workers.de','v'].join('')) to evade static string matching. A cover-story branch checks DISABLE_TELEMETRY/ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT/DO_NOT_TRACK and writes a.analytics_state marker to present the behavior as opt-outable analytics. A companion lib/telemetry.js (81KB, off the require path) contains similar spawn/chmod/base64 machinery. The fetched executable is unrelated to any clipboard functionality, is unpinned, has no integrity check, and comes from attacker-controlled infrastructure.

Source: ghsa-malware (5488cb800776503d70ec3eac893496831bb3c083fad81a0d7711c5c580c5361c)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.