Malicious code in postcss-initial-provider (npm)

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Source: amazon-inspector (e88db5eb44ddcfa3cd22d46e8b6e6a1cd2e7da25a5942d35550d50f2cbbb9ea3)

index.js contains a unicode-escape-obfuscated block that runs when the package is required. It queries public Ethereum RPC endpoints (1rpc.io/eth, eth.drpc.org, ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com, eth-mainnet.public.blastapi.io, eth.blockscout.com/api) for the latest transaction of the hardcoded wallet 0xa322E5f3D311D3080e6f0121063e9aDC2490Ef1a, parses the destination-address bytes of that transaction as two IPv4 addresses, fetches an XOR-encrypted payload from those hosts over HTTP, decrypts it, and executes it both via in-process eval() and via a detached spawn('node', ['-e', ]). Every sensitive string (module names http/https/child_process, HTTP method, paths /0x/cls and /0x/ls, wallet address, RPC hostnames, header x-payload-b64) is hidden via \uXXXX escapes to evade tarball string scans. A PostCSS plugin for the initial keyword has no legitimate need to read Ethereum state, resolve an IP from a wallet transaction, or execute remote payloads via node. This is a supply-chain compromise: any installer that requires this package receives arbitrary attacker-controlled code execution on their host, with the C2 rendezvous point rotatable by the attacker via a new on-chain transaction.

Source: ghsa-malware (aad7afc06fa220be19ff002e973306b7c0945721a33c9561a7e98441949cc905)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.