Malicious code in chain-async-dom (npm)

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Source: amazon-inspector (54cd392461a3d805dd24f6bc67d354498531f9b42352e8e0c17205351dcccf0b)

The package presents itself as a pino-compatible logger (lib/ directory mirrors pino's internal file layout — proto.js, levels.js, redaction.js, multistream.js, transport.js, tools.js, symbols.js, worker.js; keywords 'fast,logger,stream,json'; module.exports.pino alias) but its main entry index.js exports a middleware-style check function that, when invoked, spawns a detached node lib/vcall.js subprocess with stdio:'inherit' and child.unref() so the loader survives the parent process. lib/vcall.js retrieves JavaScript from a hardcoded IPFS gateway URL (https://emerald-accurate-urial-9.mypinata.cloud/ipfs/bafkreify2ijjvromekknzxzvqaopft6muwlpl37mvmpdeazwzzkbjzkuxm) via axios and executes the response body with new Function.constructor('require', src)(require) in a 5-retry loop, giving the fetched code full access to the consumer's Node runtime, filesystem, network, and environment. lib/const.js additionally ships a base64-encoded jsonkeeper paste URL (decodes to https://jsonkeeper.com/b/ZK45J) and a.env with DEV_API_CHECK_DOMAIN=http://vercel-five-coral.vercel.app/, staging additional mutable payload channels. The IPFS-served content is attacker-mutable and opaque; consumers who install and invoke this package as advertised (as a logger/middleware) receive arbitrary remote code execution.