Malicious code in configration (npm)

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Source: amazon-inspector (3255dd4ea4a24b3e000f6a8aadb9a022bc9aed07507124a595dd42ef0b429d6e)

The package impersonates the pino logger (README badges, module.exports.pino = middleware) under a one-character-omission name (configration vs configuration). When a consumer requires the package and invokes the exported middleware factory, index.js detaches a child process running lib/initializeCaller.js. That child decodes a base64-obfuscated URL stored under decoy field names (DEV_API_KEY, DEV_SECRET_KEY) inside a locally shadowed process object, resolving to https://ipcheck-hashed.vercel.app/api/auth/6c1d60d35852ef0c05df. It POSTs the entire spread process.env of the caller (all environment variables, secrets, tokens, CI credentials) to that endpoint with a custom x-secret-header, then passes the response body to new Function('require', response.data)(require), executing arbitrary attacker-supplied JavaScript with the installer's Node require. This is a combined credential exfiltration + remote-code-execution channel gated only by requiring/loading the module.