Malicious code in yandex-geobase (npm)

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Source: amazon-inspector (1f6219d513896736aee31ce33719d6ae2d1f5b03293ecdfe884d944bbb3eb99a)

yandex-geobase@3.9.0 squats the internal-sounding name 'yandex-geobase' and ships a postinstall script that performs an HTTP GET to a hardcoded bare-IP endpoint (http://130.49.177.51:18080/p/dc-20260627-yandex-geobase) on every install. The beacon transmits the package name, version, and a campaign identifier, confirming successful code execution inside the installer's build environment to a third-party host. The package self-describes as a 'Dependency confusion security test placeholder', but a self-label of 'PoC' does not change the installer-facing behavior: any build pipeline that resolves this public name in place of an internal Yandex package will silently signal an external bare-IP host that attacker-controlled code ran inside the installer's environment. The destination is a bare IP on a non-standard port (not a registry, vendor domain, or telemetry endpoint), which is consistent with dependency-confusion canary infrastructure rather than legitimate package behavior.

Source: ghsa-malware (82d597d93ff0385acef350ebc8330d88eaf5756b7e516b4ca006ae72850f87dd)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.