Malicious code in sixbails (npm)

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Source: amazon-inspector (e91338e6d735e538b7defb669e5b213cad127a9fd64290fa32d83bb855dcf9bd)

sixbails is a WhatsApp Web library (Baileys-family fork). On every socket creation — the package's primary documented API — a 5-second timer fires newsletterWMexQuery("120363425547320365@newsletter", QueryIds.FOLLOW) from lib/Socket/newsletter.js (lines 101-105), causing the consumer's authenticated WhatsApp account to silently follow a hardcoded newsletter channel owned by the author. The behavior is disclosed in the README ("Has 1 newsletter follow, only the developer's WhatsApp channel"), so it is disclosed self-promotion rather than covert exfiltration, and no installer-machine secrets, environment variables, or filesystem contents are sent anywhere. The blast radius is confined to the consumer's WhatsApp account state (one extra channel subscription). Separately, package.json line 48 pins libsignal to github:tenka-san/libsignal-node with no commit SHA, branch, or tag — whoever controls that repo's default branch can change cryptographic primitives in future installs (this mirrors upstream Baileys's unpinned libsignal fork pattern). The declared preinstall hook (node./engine-requirements.js) is a benign Node>=20 version check with no network or filesystem side effects. Routing to human review so a maintainer can decide whether the disclosed-but-still-hardcoded WhatsApp follow + unpinned third-party crypto fork warrant a public advisory.

Source: ghsa-malware (39404fc7b16b66b76bed0e8794563ad0a40a0f16dafd81fbe68f35e2c5bc9678)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.