Malicious code in mc-provider (npm)

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Source: amazon-inspector (e494af2871662b1b342a26141de010623484dfef353b505805f4b41d85d775c1)

Package metadata describes mc-provider as 'Theta chain registry ⚛️' and the README is a verbatim copy of the hyperweb-io/chain-registry README instructing consumers to import { assets, chains, ibc } from 'mc-provider'. The actual main entry does not export any of those symbols. Instead, index.js dynamically loads an unrelated runtime dependency named supersig (providerPromise = import('supersig').then((mod) => mod.HttpProvider)) and re-exports supersig's HttpProvider under this package's name; esm/index.mjs does the same via import { HttpProvider } from 'supersig'; export { HttpProvider };. Bundled chains/assets/IBC JSON files are present as decoys but are not reachable through the package's exports. Consumers following the README end up with a supersig-backed HTTP/RPC provider handling their Cosmos JSON-RPC and signing traffic — code they never chose to install, sourced from a package whose contents are outside this record. The impersonation of a well-known Cosmos registry package combined with silent resolution to an unrelated third-party provider is the standard shape used to insert attacker-controlled RPC/signing code into a wallet or dApp dependency tree.

Source: ghsa-malware (ac62fe6861e22d38e3535f3b52aca2397c8f82eb5fd778d6a863a6cfc92ef8b9)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.