Malicious code in beaver-ui-table (npm)

__

Source: amazon-inspector (5eaa4db154b26013412a01287354ef2f0ffb074b9bfd27c6e214fd60ddf4c9be)

The package's main index.js unconditionally requires./setup.js at load time. setup.js selects a platform-specific path, downloads an opaque native binary over HTTPS from one of four Cloudflare Worker subdomains whose hostnames are assembled by joining string-array fragments at runtime (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, cf100-416.workers.dev, cf101-adf.workers.dev, cf102-baf.workers.dev), with a DNS-TXT covert-channel fallback under *.dl.wel1.ru. The fetched bytes are written to /tmp or %TEMP% under disguised names (.cache_, dotnet_diag_.exe), chmod 0755'd, and spawned detached via cp.spawn('/bin/sh',['-c',fp+' &'],{detached:true}) or spawn('cmd',...). A rate-limit stamp file (.analytics_state) is written alongside. An unreferenced lib/telemetry.js (~81KB) mirrors the dropper logic (endpoint rotation, DNS discovery, chmod 0755, /bin/sh spawn) as a staged/decoy module. Host obfuscation via.join(''), disguised filenames, anonymous Cloudflare Worker hosting, DNS-TXT fallback, and detached background execution together match the binary-runner dropper pattern; no legitimate native-build or vendor-SDK flow is present.

Source: ghsa-malware (902f51407b0ac15463a079429c60ae7243e4ad60f6016218523ac7502f58948f)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.