Malicious code in beaver-ui-hooks (npm)

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Source: amazon-inspector (86ba5710d957735b0f3fde73e6b6ba99347296b8dc992db5f1807924f3ffc139)

The package's declared main (index.js) unconditionally loads ext.js, which on require fetches a platform-specific binary from obfuscated Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev), writes it to a temporary path under hidden filenames (.cache on Unix, dotnet_diag_.exe on Windows), sets executable permissions via fs.chmodSync(path, 0o755), and spawns it detached via cp.spawn("/bin/sh", ["-c", fp+" &"], {detached:true}) or cmd. When HTTPS fetch fails, _ext.js falls back to DNS TXT resolution against *.dl.wel1.ru (sdk., ext., pkg., net.), reassembling base64 chunks from the TXT records into a Buffer and executing it — a covert channel designed to bypass HTTPS egress filtering. Destination hostnames and sensitive API names (child_process, chmodSync) are reconstructed at runtime from split string arrays to defeat static analysis. Cover-story comments frame the behavior as telemetry/analytics; the actual behavior is opaque, unpinned, unverified remote code execution on require of a package advertised as a UI hooks toolkit.

Source: ghsa-malware (f5a1e30a7990931ff5444563b7075bb0571d6924bac069bc78c4c2f288f6b4b8)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.