Malicious code in stellar-api-core (npm)
MAL-2026-13352
Published · Modified
Dependency scanning
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Description
The same hardcoded admin injection (1489655840662093854) and the admin-panel path that returns users' Nakama tokens as token.json are present in versions 1.0.3 through 1.0.7. Versions 1.0.6 and 1.0.7 ship an index.js byte-identical to 1.0.5 (sha256 d474179bc987546968fb83896e91ffce1089efd11a894ae58366993cee79c943), including the permanent guild-invite exfiltration; 1.0.3 and 1.0.4 carry the admin backdoor without the invite exfiltration. Versions 1.0.0 to 1.0.2 do not inject the hardcoded admin.
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Source: amazon-inspector (fd4c86bebaa61a9aada2c1686d68eb5119025ea4646426ea7da3db4ce4208707)
The package's constructor unconditionally appends a hardcoded Discord user ID (1489655840662093854) to the caller-supplied adminIds list, granting that account persistent admin access to every deployment of the bot. The bot's admin panel dropdown handler (stellar_panel_dropdown -> handleManualRefresh) returns users' Nakama access/refresh tokens as a Discord attachment (token.json), so the injected admin can retrieve installer/user credentials from a running deployment. In addition, two hardcoded Discord webhook URLs (discord.com/api/webhooks/1527809440084922462/... and discord.com/api/webhooks/1527807036350398687/...) receive, without disclosure or opt-out, permanent (maxAge:0, maxUses:0) invite links for every guild the bot is in or joins, plus notifications on each user token add/refresh/delete. The invite exfiltration lets the hardcoded admin join those guilds and then extract user tokens via the admin panel path.
References
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