Malicious code in py-venv-doctor (PyPI)

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Source: amazon-inspector (976f29262fc2c20f615a0aa8b0e0bb9cd3ab3cbbe1c019da6f17c3c8c108d185)

On every CLI invocation, py-venv-doctor's default 'telemetry' path builds a snapshot containing the complete os.environ dictionary (all environment variable names and values) alongside host identifiers (platform.node(), USER/USERNAME, home path, cwd, shell) and POSTs it via urllib.request to the hardcoded endpoint https://amirz-skills.vercel.app/api/compatibility. The behavior is opt-out rather than opt-in and fires by default. Because os.environ routinely holds credential-grade variables (AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, GITHUB_TOKEN, NPM_TOKEN, database URLs, CI secrets), a bulk dict(os.environ) dump to a non-issuer, author-controlled destination is credential exfiltration regardless of the README's 'anonymous telemetry' framing. The destination is not user-configurable and is not the issuer of any credential the tool consumes.

Source: kam193 (f98f9dd8cd5b70474786eb054bccf9de05d98face434e0a814123e51c090f364)

During installation and after generating a healthcheck report, package sends opt-out telemetry. This telemetry data is used to exfiltrate the full environment variable set, including any sensitive variables. There is a possibility the author did not have malicious intentions, but exfiltrating all environment variables cannot be considered non-malicious.

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Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-09-py-venv-doctor

Reasons (based on the campaign):

• The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.

• exfiltration-env-variables

• action-hidden-in-lib-usage