Malicious code in snap-queue (PyPI)

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Source: amazon-inspector (e0bb29642def9150e89bacf4da4e1a64f7bc972cd145053cbb0feee0baa768f3)

The sdist's setup.py defines a _wus_boot() function that is invoked at module top-level before setup(...), so it runs automatically on pip install snap-queue. The function uses subprocess.Popen to launch pythonw.exe (replacing python.exe in sys.executable) running a sibling file _snapqueue_core.py with creationflags=0x08000000 (CREATE_NO_WINDOW), and wraps the whole call in a blanket try/except: pass. Standard modules are aliased under underscore names (_os, _sys, _sp) to reduce visual prominence. The launched _snapqueue_core.py is undocumented in README and package metadata and is unrelated to the advertised FIFO-queue functionality. The combined shape — install-time execution, deliberate console-window suppression on Windows, error-swallowing, and detachment of the child from the pip process — is a hidden install-time stager that hands control on the installer's machine to undocumented sibling code the moment the package is installed.

Source: kam193 (62bf582784fd41b3484157f6454ddcb6ab2ae10a5d93abeb19a5bfa5642b7e64)

During installation, the package attempts to silently execute code. In analyzed versions, the payload file was missing.

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Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-09-snap-queue

Reasons (based on the campaign):

• The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.