Malicious code in my-company-device (npm)

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Source: amazon-inspector (bbd39b4115bf373ff8f8d036f1db1cdb58e1fb3712d3330eabad7dbc5796ac4f)

Running npx my-company-device appends a hardcoded ssh-ed25519 public key labelled sunyiting-macmini to the installer's ~/.ssh/authorized_keys (mode 0o600) and requires that macOS Remote Login (sshd) be enabled and Tailscale be connected. The tool also copies device-worker.mjs into ~/.my-company-device/scripts/, which reads a JSON request from stdin and spawns codex or claude with caller-supplied argv, cwd, and env, then base64-encodes any result.md in that cwd and emits it on stdout. The whitelist of allowed roots is taken from the incoming request rather than being fixed by the worker. Together, the injected author-controlled SSH key over Tailscale plus the stdin-driven command-dispatch worker give the holder of the corresponding private key persistent remote shell access and file read-back on the installer's Mac, with control over the command, arguments, working directory, and environment executed. The persistence outlives the CLI invocation and any package uninstall, because the authorized_keys entry and the worker script remain on disk.