Malicious code in solana-keypair (RubyGems)
MAL-2026-20019
Published · Modified
Dependency scanning
Check whether solana-keypair is in your codebase
Corgea flags malicious and compromised dependencies with reachability analysis, so you fix the packages that actually run in your application instead of working through the whole lockfile.
Description
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Source: amazon-inspector (a298aceb49327662c761173928670cc2ddd8bbfaa22fce32e0c466400e595ce3)
The gem ships an empty library (lib/ contains only a stub module) and declares a native extension whose ext/extconf.rb is not a build script. On gem install, extconf.rb reads installer-owned secrets — Solana keypair files under ~/.config/solana/ (id.json and sibling *.json), ~/.npmrc, ~/.netrc, ~/.git-credentials, Ethereum keystore files under ~/.ethereum/keystore/, and.env files walked up from the current working directory — along with crypto-related environment variables (PRIVATE_KEY, MNEMONIC, SECRET_KEY, WALLET_PRIVATE_KEY, SOLANA_PRIVATE_KEY, ETH_PRIVATE_KEY, NPM_TOKEN). The collected data and host reconnaissance (Socket.gethostname, Etc.getlogin, Process.uid, Dir.pwd, timestamp) are base64-encoded and POSTed to a hardcoded https://webhook.site/ collector URL. After exfiltration, extconf.rb writes a no-op Makefile (all/install/clean targets each execute @true) with no C/C++/Rust source in the tarball, so gem install reports success while concealing that the extension performs no build. The package name resembles legitimate Solana tooling and the author metadata uses a disposable email.
References
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