Malicious code in qzi2v-tttf1-testmetest (npm)
MAL-2026-20304
Published · Modified
Dependency scanning
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Description
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Source: amazon-inspector (b99ca6a65bd9e71ec0333a05a272ad0b11773ca20630f9d02ad79345a64b8fdc)
The package presents itself as a utility library but exports nothing (index.js is 188 bytes and only require()s a platform-specific native addon). Three precompiled native binaries are shipped (native_win.node, native_mac.node, native.napi.node) alongside a 1,192,296-byte opaque .napi_cache blob with zero printable strings and no native source. Strings in the binaries show the addon reads .napi_cache, writes a staged JS file matching %s.nc%lu.js (Linux/mac also /tmp/.%u), and executes it via node "%s" using CreateProcessA on Windows and fork/execlp on Linux/mac. The loader is gated on CI environment variables (GITHUB_ACTIONS, GITLAB_CI, CIRCLECI, JENKINS_URL, BUILDKITE, CODEBUILD) and includes anti-analysis checks (CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent, process enumeration via Process32First, strings referencing wireshark and httpdebug, container/daemon detection via /proc/1/cgroup and dockerinit, setsid + __IS_DAEMON). Any require() of this package on a matching CI host decrypts and executes attacker-controlled code from the shipped blob under the installer's build identity. The package metadata is a thin stub (random-looking name, no author, no repository, description utility library) consistent with a disposable build-system targeting dropper rather than a real library.
References
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