CRITICAL npm Malware

Malicious code in vreqtx-b5w3n-testmetest (npm)

MAL-2026-20305

Published · Modified

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Description


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Source: amazon-inspector (fd8b0671f1c77b8c7d843dce49845750fd043f50f20c92a4677d1c117b98c00c)

On require(), index.js loads a platform-specific native N-API addon (native.napi.node / native_win.node). The addon reads a 1.19 MB sibling file .napi_cache at the package root — a file with no printable strings consistent with encrypted/packed executable content — writes derived bytes to a hidden temp path, and spawns them as a detached process: on Linux via fork/setsid/execlp staging to /tmp/.<uid> with chmod and an __IS_DAEMON marker, and on Windows via CreateProcessA invoking node "%TEMP%\...nc<pid>.js" using GetTempPathA. The dropper is gated by extensive anti-analysis evasion: enumeration of CI env vars (GITHUB_ACTIONS, GITLAB_CI, TRAVIS, CIRCLECI, JENKINS_URL, BUILDKITE, CODEBUILD_BUILD_ID, APPVEYOR, SEMAPHORE, TEAMCITY_VERSION, BITBUCKET_BUILD_NUMBER, NETLIFY, VERCEL, CF_BUILD_ID, SCREWDRIVER, SANDBOX), container markers (/proc/1/cgroup for docker/containerd/kubepod/podman, /proc/1/cmdline dockerinit), ptrace detection (/proc/self/status TracerPid, /proc/self/maps), and Windows debugger/analysis tool checks (IsDebuggerPresent, CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent, Process32First, wireshark, x64dbg, procmon). Package metadata is disposable (name vreqtx-b5w3n-testmetest, description "test", no repository/author/homepage), consistent with a staging artifact. The .napi_cache naming disguises the primary executable payload as a build cache; the entire JS-visible surface is a thin loader for the opaque blob.

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