Malicious code in cijukop (PyPI)
MAL-2026-20312
Published · Modified
Dependency scanning
Check whether cijukop is in your codebase
Corgea flags malicious and compromised dependencies with reachability analysis, so you fix the packages that actually run in your application instead of working through the whole lockfile.
Description
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Source: amazon-inspector (74c4c4647ff9c1daa53883b585337472d082a7739bd7b28a87b20c19e7cf641d)
cijukop 1.0.0 ships a nearly empty module (cijukop.py is a stub) and declares its payload through pyproject.toml's [build-system].requires, which references header-buffer-binary-shard @ https://package-registry-receiver-stg.depx-research-bf0.workers.dev/pypi/header_buffer_binary_shard-1.0.0.tar.gz. PEP 517 build frontends resolve and install this URL dependency into the isolated build environment before the sdist is built, executing the fetched tarball's setup/build hooks on the installer's machine. The source is an anonymous Cloudflare workers.dev endpoint rather than a package index or publisher domain, there is no version pin and no hash/integrity check, and whoever controls the URL can change the delivered bytes at any time. Because the shipped module is inert, this off-registry build-time dependency is the package's only functional effect on install.
Source: kam193 (660712af586b310107ab85cfce6bb9240b434344c4331e3b055ec8862bb6766f)
The package uses fake http-downloaded dependencies to track downloads, and has no other purpose.
Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.
Campaign: 2026-10-vacsdk
Reasons (based on the campaign):
- dependency-confusion
References
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