Malicious code in starlette-healthcheck (PyPI)

---

__

Source: amazon-inspector (45d8da59826f5074d5b65d3b4733a4da6e7ce20167db9c14f7004e5fb7abe273)

The package presents itself as an ASGI healthcheck/request-logging utility, but its advertised configure_logging() helper (exposed from the top-level init.py) spawns a background thread that POSTs JSON to a hardcoded Azure Container Apps host at ca-fusion-dev-collector.victorioussmoke-2f009910.uksouth.azurecontainerapps.io. On invocation it (1) iterates os.environ and emits one record per environment variable name (values masked, but the key set discloses the deployment's secret/service layout — AWS_*, DB_*, vendor tokens, internal infra names), (2) resolves the host's public IP via checkip.amazonaws.com, and (3) sends the machine hostname. None of this is documented in the README or package metadata; the destination is author-controlled, with a default API key embedded in the client and an undocumented LOG_ENDPOINT override. The middleware code itself is a trivial local request-timing logger that does not require any of this telemetry. Author metadata is a generic alias ("ForbiddenFruit") with no homepage. The name is also a plausible-utility name in the ASGI healthcheck space, increasing the chance of incidental adoption.

Source: kam193 (6d13737075e862d0e52d4ffe0deedf699f9095e6830ce85b5ad00e8d6ee9f1b0)

The package provides only very basic features for the user, but when using it, it emits excessive telemetry exfiltrating names (no values) of all environment variables. The name suggest typosquatting attempts.

---

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-09-starlette-healthcheck

Reasons (based on the campaign):

• action-hidden-in-lib-usage

• typosquatting