OmniFaces: Forged combined-resource IDs and related output/push boundaries
GHSA-fp43-vj7g-pg92 · CVE-2026-102695
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Description
1. Forged combined-resource IDs
CombinedResourceInfo accepts a path-derived ID without an authenticity check,
inflates it without an output limit, converts it to attacker-selected resource
identifiers, and retains unique IDs in an unbounded static cache. In bounded
tests, 20,754 encoded bytes inflated to 16,000,000 characters (about 770:1;
about 49 MB observed heap delta), and 200 unique IDs added 200 permanent cache
entries. A legitimately shaped short ID remained about 1:1, while malformed
input was rejected; the missing distinction is between a server-issued ID and
an attacker-minted but structurally valid ID.
The minimal application also confirmed three sink tails from the same forged-ID
root:
- A wildcard CDN mapping performed a server-side fetch and relayed the exact
loopback-canary body. This requires the documented combined-resource and
wildcard-CDN configuration. - A forged inner
.xhtmlresource bypassed the excluded-resource boundary and
returned its raw content. - A forged
omnifaces.graphicinner resource plus a canaryHostheader caused
an outbound GET to that host. This result is blind and deployment-dependent;
I am not claiming arbitrary-scheme or arbitrary-destination SSRF.
These behaviors reproduce after the fix for CVE-2026-41883 /
GHSA-vp6r-9m58-5xv8. That advisory concerned EL evaluation order in the wildcard
CDN path. This report has a different root: unsigned combined IDs and missing
decode/cache bounds, with separately demonstrated residual sink behavior.
2. Source-map cache
With the documented optional source-map handler above a synthetic resource
handler, 40 unique missing combined-resource requests grew the process-wide
source-map cache from 13 to 92 entries. It has no size or eviction bound. This
has a separate cache, configuration prerequisite, and fix from family 1.
3. HashParam callback output
A URL-fragment value containing a single-quote JavaScript payload was stored byo:hashParam and later written unescaped into the Ajax callback script. On the
follow-up Ajax render, real Chrome executed the canarywindow.__omniXss=1337. This requires a page using o:hashParam and the
follow-up Ajax render.
4. Session/view push-channel replay
A fresh WebSocket client with no HTTP cookie connected using a victim's
session-scoped channel ID and received the victim's subsequent push. The code
checks application-wide ID existence but does not bind the handshake to the
current HTTP session, despite the documented current-session guarantee. The
UUID remains an unguessable bearer-token prerequisite; this is replay after
token exposure, not brute force.
5. Push idle-connection and fanout behavior
Twelve independent clients joined one application-scoped channel and all 12
received the same push. Current code sets every accepted session's maximum idle
timeout to zero, retains sessions in an unbounded per-channel queue, and walks
the full queue on each push. I am reporting the demonstrated mechanism as a
bounded design weakness: container connection limits remain an outer bound,
and I am not claiming unbounded heap growth from the 12-client test.
Intentionally excluded leads
- A duplicate-Range response-amplification lead was disproved. Twenty-four
ranges produced only one response body because the stream wrapper closes
after the first range. I am not reporting it as a security issue. - The older
Servlets.facesRedirectXML issue is fixed on the current branch.
I am not reporting it as a new current-upstream issue.
Expected invariants
- Only server-issued combined IDs should be accepted; decoding and caches
should be bounded; excluded resources and dynamic handlers should not become
attacker-selected inner resources. - Dynamic URLs should not derive an outbound destination from an untrusted
Hostheader. - Source-map lookups should not create unbounded process-lifetime state.
HashParamvalues must be escaped for a JavaScript string inside an XML
CDATA callback.- Session/view push subscriptions should be bound to the owning HTTP session or
authenticated principal; idle limits and per-channel caps should remain
operator-controllable.
Suggested fixes and available evidence
- Authenticate generated combined IDs with a per-deployment secret, cap
inflated output, bound the combined cache, and avoid caching failed loads. - Require an existing/registered inner resource before wildcard remapping and
reject excluded resource types at serve time. - Derive dynamic-resource origins from trusted configuration rather than the
requestHostvalue. - Bound or evict the source-map cache.
- Apply JavaScript-string plus CDATA-safe encoding to
HashParamcallback
values. - Capture and verify HTTP-session or principal ownership during the WebSocket
handshake; retain a finite idle timeout and configurable per-channel limits.
Daniel Birtwhistle
References
- WEB https://github.com/omnifaces/omnifaces/security/advisories/GHSA-fp43-vj7g-pg92
- WEB https://github.com/omnifaces/omnifaces/commit/59d6c5188c39418546fe500d05036645987a77d1
- WEB https://github.com/omnifaces/omnifaces/commit/a52b92461cf39d983f51ce8724fe7e6b944073e4
- WEB https://github.com/omnifaces/omnifaces/commit/aa42da361821ddfbb85b126564e71587347d2786
- WEB https://github.com/omnifaces/omnifaces/commit/c43eef01174a4dc09cec44eff553ff6284150af7
- WEB https://github.com/omnifaces/omnifaces/commit/d5cae243c4692555efaa4ba774e0f8f60e3f4db5
- PACKAGE https://github.com/omnifaces/omnifaces
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