HIGH 7.0 Go

fzf: Arbitrary command execution via bash arithmetic expansion on unvalidated layout size in fzf-tmux (-l/-u attached value)

GHSA-w6x2-f5m4-xw82 · CVE-2026-121716

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Description

Summary

bin/fzf-tmux fails to validate layout size values given in the attached form (e.g. -l50). For -l/-u these values reach bash arithmetic expansion ($(( max - size ))), where an operand like a[$(cmd)] executes cmd as the invoking user during option parsing — before any tmux interaction and even outside tmux. A second sink embeds unvalidated popup geometry (-x/-y/-w/-h/-p) into an unquoted tmux popup ... $opt ... invocation, allowing injection of tmux flags such as -e BASH_ENV=<path> (command execution via non-interactive bash sourcing $BASH_ENV).

Reporter / Credits:

Sai Sreewathsa Kovalluri, Shon Babu and Kannan K (Researchers), Innspark Solutions https://innspark.in/

Details

In bin/fzf-tmux (tag 0.74.4, commit a140afeb), the option parser validates size values with a regex (^[0-9%,]+$ / ^[A-Z]$) only for the separate-argument form (line 82). The attached form is captured unvalidated at line 80:

if [[ ${#arg} -gt 2 ]]; then
  size="${arg:2}"                       # no validation
else
  if [[ $1 =~ ^[0-9%,]+$ ]] || [[ $1 =~ ^[A-Z]$ ]]; then   # only separate form validated

For -l and -u, swap is non-empty (lines 68/75), so size reaches arithmetic evaluation:

  • line 120: size=$((max - size)) (non-percent values)
  • line 102: opt="$opt -l $((100 - size))%" (percent, tmux >= 3.2)
  • line 108: opt="$opt -p $((100 - size))" (percent, tmux < 3.2)

Bash arithmetic expands array subscripts, so a[$(command)] runs command. Verified end-to-end against the unmodified script (see PoC).

Second sink (same root cause): opt is used unquoted at line 236 (tmux popup -d "$PWD" $opt "bash $argsf") and line 249, so a geometry value containing spaces injects extra tmux flags, e.g. -e BASH_ENV=/path/to/script.

PoC

Verified on 0.74.4 (no tmux or fzf binary needed — a stub fzf on PATH suffices because the sink fires during bash argument parsing):

$ bash bin/fzf-tmux '-l a[$(id > /tmp/pwn1)]'      # line 120 sink (non-percent)
$ bash bin/fzf-tmux '-u a[$(id > /tmp/pwn2)]%'     # line 102/108 sink (percent)

$ cat /tmp/pwn1 /tmp/pwn2
uid=1001(sb) gid=1001(sb) groups=...
uid=1001(sb) gid=1001(sb) groups=...

A self-contained reproducer was provided by email (poc-t03-arithmetic.sh). Popup flag-injection variant (tmux >= 3.2): bash bin/fzf-tmux -p '-x0 -e BASH_ENV=/path/to/evil.sh'.

Impact

Local command injection (CWE-78). fzf-tmux argv is commonly assembled by third-party scripts and editor plugins (e.g. fzf-tmux -l "${height}%"); any layout value influenced by less-trusted data (project-local config, wrapper scripts) yields arbitrary command execution as the invoking user. Suggested fixes: apply the regex validation to the attached form, constrain size to [0-9]+ before any $((...)), and build the tmux invocation as an array ("${opt_parts[@]}") instead of unquoted $opt.

Reported privately to the maintainer by email; fixes prepared for the next release.

Exploitability in practice

Impact is high (command execution as the invoking user), but a real attack requires attacker-controlled data to reach the fzf-tmux layout arguments (-l/-u). In normal use these values are set by the user or by trusted, hardcoded configuration, so a vulnerable data flow is uncommon. The issue is local-only, requires the victim to run fzf-tmux with the poisoned value, and bin/fzf-tmux has been superseded by the built-in --tmux/--popup option since 0.53.0.

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