HIGH 7.5 PyPI

mail-parser is vulnerable to polynomial ReDoS in email header parsing

GHSA-r7w7-vpq8-c5vv · CVE-2026-129295

Published · Modified

AI SAST

Find this class of vulnerability in your own code

Corgea's AI-native static analysis detects vulnerabilities like this one across your repositories, ranks them by exploitability, and returns review-ready fixes.

Description

Summary

Two regular expressions used while parsing email headers backtrack
polynomially on attacker-controlled input. Parsing a single small, well-formed
email can consume minutes to hours of CPU, denying service to any process that
parses untrusted mail.

Both are reachable from an ordinary parse_from_string(), parse_from_bytes()
or parse_from_file() call — no special API, option, or malformed structure is
required by the victim.

Details

1. Address-header fallback regex (src/mailparser/utils.py)

get_addresses() falls back to _ADDR_FALLBACK_RE whenever
email.utils.getaddresses(strict=True) yields no usable address. The
alternative ([^<,]*?)\s*<([^>]+)> overlaps a lazy quantifier with an adjacent
\s* — a space matches both. Driven by finditer, which retries at every
offset and rescans the remainder, matching degrades to quadratic on <
padding and cubic on whitespace padding.

The fallback engages on the feature's own happy path, e.g.
From: alice@example.com <bob@example.com>.

Measured (4.6.0, CPython 3.14, macOS arm64; reproduced identically on Linux and
on CPython 3.9, 3.11, 3.12, 3.13):

Padding Parse time
valid address + 750 sp 0.38 s
+ 1500 sp 2.97 s
+ 3000 sp 23.4 s (×7.9/2×)
+ 6 KB sp 185 s
~100 KB sp hours

Fully RFC 5322-compliant folded headers (all lines ≤ 71 octets) trigger the same
blowup, so the input passes normal MTA and library checks. ~100 KB of headers is
within Postfix's default header_size_limit = 102400.

All six address headers parsed by the library (From, To, Cc, Bcc,
Reply-To, Delivered-To) are affected and their cost adds up linearly.

2. Received-header clause splitter (src/mailparser/const.py)

parse_received() splits on _CLAUSE_SPLITTER,
(?:^|\s+)(from|by|via|with|id|for|envelope-from)\s+. Under re.split this
backtracks quadratically over any whitespace run that is not followed by a
clause keyword. The pre-existing normalization collapsed only [\t\n], so
literal spaces — including folded-header padding — reached the splitter intact.

Measured: 24 000 spaces in one Received: header → 22 s; ~100 KB → minutes.

Impact

Availability. A handful of small emails keeps every parsing worker of a mail
gateway, ticketing system, quarantine UI, or archiving pipeline permanently
busy. No confidentiality or integrity impact.

Anyone who parses email they did not author is affected — which is the library's
purpose.

Patches

Fixed in 4.6.1.

  • The address fallback is now a linear scan: the header is split into
    comma-separated items (quote-aware, in Python), then each item is matched
    against a bounded angle-address <([^<>\s]+)> with the display name derived
    in Python, falling back to a bare-email match. Each pattern has a single
    non-nested quantifier over a negated character class → O(n).
    2000 padding spaces: 3.5 s → <0.01 s. 256 KB padding: hours → 0.087 s.
    Output is preserved on every previously supported shape.
  • parse_received() collapses whitespace runs to a single space before
    splitting, so the splitter's \s+ only ever matches one character → O(n).
    The date is extracted from the raw header beforehand, so date formatting is
    unaffected. 24 000 spaces: 22 s → 0.003 s; 200 000 spaces: 0.004 s.

Regression tests assert linear-time behaviour for both paths.

Workarounds

None within the library. Upgrade to 4.6.1.

Users who cannot upgrade immediately should cap total header size before
parsing and enforce a wall-clock timeout around each parse.

Ready to move

Start Securing

Free, no credit card | First findings in minutes