UNKNOWN Go

k8s-mcp-server: Missing authentication on default SSE/HTTP transport allows unauthenticated Kubernetes tool execution

GHSA-m932-63jc-4jqq · CVE-2026-130007

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Description

Summary

When k8s-mcp-server runs in its default SSE transport mode, the MCP tools/call
endpoint is dispatched with no authentication, session token, or Origin check.
Any client that can reach the listening port can enumerate and invoke the
server's Kubernetes tools (including destructive/write tools) without credentials,
executing with the server's configured cluster privileges.

Affected

Commit be87a6dd72bb6ec1d4886b8548843b99a4638b12 (Merge PR #130)
MCP library: github.com/mark3labs/mcp-go v0.57.0
Default mode: sse (SERVER_MODE default), default port 8080, bind 0.0.0.0

Root cause (static trace: handleSSE -> handleMessage -> tools/call)

  • main.go L129: server.NewSSEServer(s) is created with no auth option and no
    contextFunc; L130 sse.Start(":"+port) binds all interfaces (0.0.0.0).
  • mcp-go sse.go handleSSE (GET /sse): no auth header check; the server mints a
    sessionId for any caller. The sessionId is a correlation value, not a credential.
  • handleMessage (POST /message): the only gates are method==POST and a loadable
    sessionId. No Authorization/Bearer/token/Origin/CSRF check before
    s.server.HandleMessage(ctx, rawMessage) dispatches to the tools/call handler.
  • Only Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * is present (CORS relaxation, not auth).
    Write tools (Create/Delete/RolloutRestart, Helm Install/Upgrade/Uninstall/Rollback)
    are all registered unless -read-only is set (default readOnly=false).

Runtime reproduction (no auth headers on any request)

Started: k8s-mcp-server -mode sse -port 8080 with a dummy non-routable
KUBERNETES_SERVER=https://127.0.0.1:1 (no real cluster touched).

GET /sse -> HTTP 200; server mints /message?sessionId=93b3...
POST /message initialize -> HTTP 202; result returned over SSE
POST /message tools/list -> HTTP 202; FULL tool list returned (incl. destructive)
POST /message tools/call getAPIResources -> HTTP 202; handler EXECUTED:
error -32603 "... Get https://127.0.0.1:1/api...: dial tcp 127.0.0.1:1: connect"

The tools/call response is NOT HTTP 401/403 but an in-handler cluster-connection
error, proving the RPC passed any authorization gate and reached the
getAPIResources handler. With a valid kubeconfig, the same path returns real
cluster data. ss -ltnp confirms LISTEN *:8080 (all interfaces, externally exposed).

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker with network reach to the port can enumerate tools and
invoke Kubernetes operations with the server's privileges — cluster read and,
with default readOnly=false, state-changing operations (Create/Delete/Helm).
CWE-306 (Missing Authentication for Critical Function).

Why this is a defect, not by-design

Default mode is HTTP (sse) on 0.0.0.0:8080, containerized deployment is the normal
scenario, and there is no "trusted client only" / auth-required note in the docs.
MCP HTTP transports are expected to be loopback-only or gated; this one is neither.

Suggested fix

  • Add an authorization gate before tools/call on the HTTP transports: e.g.
    WithSSEContextFunc to validate an Authorization bearer/token, or fail-closed
    when no token is configured in HTTP mode.
  • Default the bind to 127.0.0.1 and require explicit opt-in for external binding.
  • Document that HTTP mode must sit behind an authenticating proxy; recommend STDIO
    by default.

Reproduction was done against the actual built binary and the shipped SSE path
(not an extract).

Credit

bebold6133

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