sqlite-mcp: Read-only mode bypass via statement chaining and SQL injection in describe_table
GHSA-q433-mp6c-8v4f · CVE-2026-130008
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Description
Summary
In read-only mode (the default), a client that can call the MCP tools can write to the database the server is meant to expose read-only, read other SQLite files, and create new SQLite files anywhere the server process can write. There are two ways in: statement chaining through execute_query, and SQL injection through describe_table.
Details
- Statement chaining in
execute_query. The only check was that the query starts withSELECT. Themodernc.org/sqlitedriver runs every;-separated statement in one call, so anything afterSELECT 1;ran unchecked. - SQL injection in
describe_table. Thetable_nameargument was interpolated intoPRAGMA table_info(%s)with no guard. - Escaping read-only mode. Through either path,
ATTACH DATABASEopens a file read-write regardless of the main connection'smode=ro. Attaching the protected database itself made it writable. Attaching another path read that file, or created it if it did not exist.
Read-write mode is not affected beyond its intended capabilities, apart from ATTACH reaching files other than the configured database.
Impact
- Modify the database that read-only mode is meant to protect.
- Read any SQLite database file the server process can read.
- Create new SQLite-format files anywhere the server process can write, or write to existing SQLite or empty files. Existing non-empty files that are not SQLite databases are refused and left unchanged.
The server has no built-in authentication and, by default, listens on :8080 on all interfaces. Unless it is deployed behind an authenticating proxy, anyone who can reach that port can exploit this.
Patches
Fixed in v0.1.2:
ATTACHis disabled in the engine (SQLITE_LIMIT_ATTACHEDset to 0) on every connection that runs a statement.- Read-only connections set
query_only. execute_queryrejects input that contains more than one statement.describe_tablepasses the table name as a bound parameter.
Workarounds
Upgrade to v0.1.2. If you cannot upgrade, don't expose the server to untrusted clients: keep it on a loopback or private interface, or run it behind an authenticating proxy such as ToolHive. Mount only the database you intend to expose, read-only at the filesystem or container level.
Credits
Reported by @bebold6133.
References
- WEB https://github.com/StacklokLabs/sqlite-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-q433-mp6c-8v4f
- ADVISORY https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-130008
- WEB https://github.com/StacklokLabs/sqlite-mcp/pull/112
- WEB https://github.com/StacklokLabs/sqlite-mcp/commit/1da5a6582a4f9d90c778db5687ddcd0c39d2c1ec
- WEB https://github.com/StacklokLabs/sqlite-mcp/commit/3c244d61cc0a9c0cc5e4d74719c1dc83edcfa339
- PACKAGE https://github.com/StacklokLabs/sqlite-mcp
- WEB https://github.com/StacklokLabs/sqlite-mcp/releases/tag/v0.1.2
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