KubeVirt virt-api port-forward handler vulnerable to SSRF via guest-controlled VMI IP address

A server-side request forgery (SSRF) flaw was found in KubeVirt's virt-api port-forward handler. When processing a port-forward request to a VirtualMachineInstance (VMI), virt-api reads the target IP from vmi.Status.Interfaces[0].IP and passes it directly to net.Dial() without validation. For VMIs using non-masquerade network bindings (bridge or secondary-only), this IP is reported by the QEMU guest agent running inside the VM and is fully controllable by the VM owner. An attacker with kubevirt.io:edit permissions can create a VM with a modified guest agent that reports an arbitrary IP address, then request port-forward to establish a bidirectional TCP tunnel from virt-api's cluster-internal network position to any routable destination, bypassing NetworkPolicy isolation.