Vendure vulnerable to timing attack that enables user enumeration in NativeAuthenticationStrategy
GHSA-6f65-4fv2-wwch · CVE-2026-25050
Published · Modified
AI SAST
Find this class of vulnerability in your own code
Corgea's AI-native static analysis detects vulnerabilities like this one across your repositories, ranks them by exploitability, and returns review-ready fixes.
Description
Summary
The NativeAuthenticationStrategy.authenticate() method is vulnerable to a timing attack that allows attackers to enumerate valid usernames (email addresses).
Details
In packages/core/src/config/auth/native-authentication-strategy.ts, the authenticate method returns immediately if a user is not found:
const user = await this.userService.getUserByEmailAddress(ctx, data.username);
if (!user) {
return false; // Instant return (~1-5ms)
}
const passwordMatch = await this.verifyUserPassword(ctx, user.id, data.password);
// Password check takes ~200-400ms with bcrypt (12 rounds)
The significant timing difference (~200-400ms for bcrypt vs ~1-5ms for DB miss) allows attackers to reliably distinguish between existing and non-existing accounts.
Impact
- Attackers can enumerate valid user accounts
- Enables targeted brute-force or phishing attacks
- Information disclosure (account existence)
Recommended Fix
Perform a dummy bcrypt check when user is not found to ensure consistent response times.
References
- WEB https://github.com/vendurehq/vendure/security/advisories/GHSA-6f65-4fv2-wwch
- ADVISORY https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25050
- WEB https://github.com/vendurehq/vendure/commit/7f0c5556ecddb44a5d5208677a45fdd5923b0cc9
- PACKAGE https://github.com/vendurehq/vendure
- WEB https://github.com/vendurehq/vendure/releases/tag/v3.5.3
Ready to move
Start Securing
Free, no credit card | First findings in minutes