CRITICAL 10.0 PyPI

Phoenix: Format String Injection in applyChatTemplate

GHSA-gfv3-m769-5xm3 · CVE-2026-53998

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Description

  • Summary

A format string injection vulnerability in the applyChatTemplate GraphQL endpoint allows an attacker to read server-side environment variables, cryptographic secrets, and internal module attributes directly from the API response. On default Phoenix installations where authentication is disabled the endpoint is reachable with no credentials. On auth-enabled deployments, any account regardless of privilege level is sufficient to exploit it.

  • Impact
    Server filesystem paths, loaded Python module names, and internal configuration constants are fully disclosed, an attacker with network access can read the full server os.environ including the admin credentials hardcoded in phoenix.auth.

Successful exploitation allows an attacker to extract PHOENIX_SECRET, the master key used to sign all JWTs and derive the Fernet encryption key protecting stored credentials (LLM API keys, OAuth tokens). With this key, an attacker can forge admin-level session tokens and decrypt all secrets stored in the database.

  • Affected Versions

First vulnerable release: arize-phoenix-v13.0.0 (2026-02-13)
Latest confirmed vulnerable release: arize-phoenix-v14.8.0 (2026-04-17)

  • Affected Component
    applyChatTemplate GraphQL query endpoint (src/phoenix/server/api/queries.py:1638)
    FStringTemplateFormatter._format() template rendering function (src/phoenix/utilities/template_formatters.py:272)
    DotDict.__getattr__() ineffective attribute access control (src/phoenix/utilities/template_formatters.py:90)

  • Proof of Concept
    payload as txt with an image performing the exploit below.

PoC-Phoenix - Payload:
{
  "query": "query($t: PromptChatTemplateInput!, $o: PromptTemplateOptions!) { applyChatTemplate(template: $t, templateOptions: $o) { messages { content { ... on TextContentPart { text { text } } } } } }",
  "variables": {
    "t": { "messages": [{ "role": "USER", "content": [{ "text": { "text": "{u.__class__.__bases__[0].__init__.__globals__[_os].environ}" } }] }] },
    "o": { "format": "F_STRING", "variables": { "u": { "x": 1 } } }
  }
}
  • Suggested Fix

Three mitigations are recommended in combination: restrict attribute traversal at the Formatter.get_field() level (not the wrapper class), add IsAuthenticated permission to the applyChatTemplate resolver, and limit F_STRING format to trusted system-defined templates only.

Best Regards,
Omar

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