Prototype pollution in @feathersjs/commons _.merge via JSON-parsed __proto__

Impact

The _.merge(target, source) utility exported by @feathersjs/commons recursively merges source into target by iterating Object.keys(source). When source was produced by JSON.parse and contains a __proto__ (or constructor / prototype) key, that key is returned as an own-enumerable property. The recursive merge then resolves target['__proto__'] to Object.prototype and writes the attacker-supplied properties onto it, polluting the prototype for all plain objects in the process for the lifetime of the Node process.

Scope of real-world risk is limited. No first-party Feathers package routes input — trusted or untrusted — through commons._.merge. The @feathersjs/authentication package, which does merge request-influenced data, uses lodash/merge (prototype-pollution-safe since 4.17.12), not this utility. Exploitation therefore requires a downstream plugin or application to pass JSON-parsed, attacker-controlled input directly through the exported _.merge.

Patches

Fixed in @feathersjs/commons@5.0.45. The fix skips __proto__, constructor, and prototype keys during iteration — the standard remediation used by lodash and others.

Workarounds

Avoid passing JSON-parsed untrusted input through commons._.merge. Freezing Object.prototype or validating/sanitizing keys upstream also mitigates.

Credit

Reported responsibly by Andrew Ridings (@ridingsa).