UNKNOWN PyPI

openssl-encrypt has CORS wildcard with allow_credentials=True in standalone servers

GHSA-c65f-x25w-62jv · CVE-2026-74881 · PYSEC-2026-3977

Published · Modified

AI SAST

Find this class of vulnerability in your own code

Corgea's AI-native static analysis detects vulnerabilities like this one across your repositories, ranks them by exploitability, and returns review-ready fixes.

Description

Summary

Both standalone servers configure CORS with allow_origins=["*"], allow_credentials=True, allow_methods=["*"], and allow_headers=["*"].

Affected Code

# server/key-server/app/main.py:86-92
# server/telemetry-server/app/main.py:23-29
app.add_middleware(
    CORSMiddleware,
    allow_origins=settings.cors_origins,  # defaults to ["*"]
    allow_credentials=True,
    allow_methods=["*"],
    allow_headers=["*"],
)

The docker-compose file (openssl_encrypt_server/docker-compose.yml:75) also defaults CORS_ORIGINS to *, and .env.example ships with CORS_ORIGINS=*.

Impact

This is the most permissive CORS configuration possible, allowing any website to make fully credentialed cross-origin requests to the API. An attacker's website could make authenticated API calls on behalf of any user who visits it.

Recommended Fix

  • Remove wildcard defaults — require explicit origin configuration
  • Never combine allow_origins=["*"] with allow_credentials=True
  • Update .env.example with placeholder domains instead of *

Fix

Fixed in commit 809416b on branch releases/1.4.x — changed CORS default from ["*"] to [] in both key-server and telemetry-server; added validation rejecting wildcard when debug=False.

Ready to move

Start Securing

Free, no credit card | First findings in minutes