openssl-encrypt has CORS wildcard with allow_credentials=True in standalone servers
GHSA-c65f-x25w-62jv · CVE-2026-74881 · PYSEC-2026-3977
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Description
Summary
Both standalone servers configure CORS with allow_origins=["*"], allow_credentials=True, allow_methods=["*"], and allow_headers=["*"].
Affected Code
# server/key-server/app/main.py:86-92
# server/telemetry-server/app/main.py:23-29
app.add_middleware(
CORSMiddleware,
allow_origins=settings.cors_origins, # defaults to ["*"]
allow_credentials=True,
allow_methods=["*"],
allow_headers=["*"],
)
The docker-compose file (openssl_encrypt_server/docker-compose.yml:75) also defaults CORS_ORIGINS to *, and .env.example ships with CORS_ORIGINS=*.
Impact
This is the most permissive CORS configuration possible, allowing any website to make fully credentialed cross-origin requests to the API. An attacker's website could make authenticated API calls on behalf of any user who visits it.
Recommended Fix
- Remove wildcard defaults — require explicit origin configuration
- Never combine
allow_origins=["*"]withallow_credentials=True - Update
.env.examplewith placeholder domains instead of*
Fix
Fixed in commit 809416b on branch releases/1.4.x — changed CORS default from ["*"] to [] in both key-server and telemetry-server; added validation rejecting wildcard when debug=False.
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