CRITICAL 9.9 npm

obsidian-tc tokens can access arbitrary configured vaults

GHSA-84c9-qqpq-2pq5 · CVE-2026-77366

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Description

Impact

Tool dispatch did not check the caller-supplied input.vault against the caller's bound vault (ctx.vaultId); the folder ACL was a single global instance and the JWT carried no vault claim. As a result, any valid token could read, write, or delete any configured vault by passing input.vault, defeating multi-tenant isolation across ~90 tool sites. (resources/read was the only surface that already guarded this.)

Patches

Fixed in 1.3.1 (the fix was developed on the v1.3.0 tag, which never published to npm; 1.3.1 is the first published release with the fix). Upgrade to >= 1.3.1.

Workarounds

Run a single vault per server process, or isolate each tenant on a separate process/credential.

Fix

A central input.vault === ctx.vaultId guard was added in dispatch before the scope check.

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