obsidian-tc tokens can access arbitrary configured vaults
GHSA-84c9-qqpq-2pq5 · CVE-2026-77366
Published · Modified
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Description
Impact
Tool dispatch did not check the caller-supplied input.vault against the caller's bound vault (ctx.vaultId); the folder ACL was a single global instance and the JWT carried no vault claim. As a result, any valid token could read, write, or delete any configured vault by passing input.vault, defeating multi-tenant isolation across ~90 tool sites. (resources/read was the only surface that already guarded this.)
Patches
Fixed in 1.3.1 (the fix was developed on the v1.3.0 tag, which never published to npm; 1.3.1 is the first published release with the fix). Upgrade to >= 1.3.1.
Workarounds
Run a single vault per server process, or isolate each tenant on a separate process/credential.
Fix
A central input.vault === ctx.vaultId guard was added in dispatch before the scope check.
References
- WEB https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/security/advisories/GHSA-84c9-qqpq-2pq5
- WEB https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/pull/72
- WEB https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/commit/38b4992e87dc2715564236e1a42d005ab05a0194
- PACKAGE https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc
- WEB https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/releases/tag/v1.3.1
- ADVISORY https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2026-77366
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