Claude Code: Plugin Hash Pin Bypass Allows Bypass of Hash Pinning

The plugin install flow in Claude Code and Claude Desktop checked out a marketplace's pinned commit SHA using git checkout without verifying that the resulting HEAD matched the pinned SHA. An attacker controlling a plugin's upstream repository could create a branch named identically to the pinned 40-character SHA, causing the checkout to silently resolve to the attacker's branch tip instead of the reviewed commit, resulting in attacker-controlled code being installed bypassing the pinned hash. Exploitation required a user to install a malicious plugin, pin to a safe hash, and for the plugin source to be hosted on a git host that permitted SHA-shaped branch names.

Users on standard Claude Code auto-update have received this fix already. Users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version.

Thank you to Or Nevo Michrowski of Air Security for reporting this issue.