CVE
CVE-2026-104692, CVE-2026-104007, CVE-2026-104920, CVE-2026-101892, CVE-2026-84443, CVE-2026-101930, CVE-2026-101352, CVE-2026-100101, CVE-2026-108169, CVE-2026-101353, CVE-2026-87932, CVE-2026-104933, CVE-2026-18564, CVE-2026-18563, CVE-2026-101929, CVE-2026-101933, CVE-2026-97892, CVE-2026-97894, CVE-2026-97999, CVE-2026-98100, CVE-2026-18566, CVE-2026-84234, CVE-2026-106535, CVE-2026-101351, CVE-2026-18565
CWE
CWE-470, CWE-829, CWE-183, CWE-693, CWE-357, CWE-78, CWE-179, CWE-73, CWE-184, CWE-787, CWE-125, CWE-416, CWE-338
Affected Surface
- LibreOffice 26.2.x before 26.2.7 and 26.8.x before 26.8.2 (26.8.1 for CVE-2026-87932, CVE-2026-84234 and CVE-2026-18565; 26.2.6 for CVE-2026-18564 and CVE-2026-18566)
- Server-side document conversion that runs `soffice --headless --convert-to`, unoconv, or a UNO/JODConverter wrapper, especially images that also ship a Java runtime
- libvisio before 0.1.11 (CVE-2026-106535), used by LibreOffice and other VSD/VSDX importers
TL;DR
The Document Foundation published 25 LibreOffice CVEs on 16 November 2026. The fixes are not new. They shipped in LibreOffice 26.8.2 on 29 October and 26.2.7 on 3 November, and the advisories followed once both releases were out. Most of the reports came from Anthropic with Ada Logics, Codean Labs, Atredis Partners, V12 and the TrendAI Zero Day Initiative. Caolán McNamara of Collabora wrote almost all of the fixes.
The serious ones are nine code-execution bugs, most of them ways around macro security. On the same day the researcher ii4gsp published a working exploit that chains two of them, CVE-2026-104692 (HSQLDB’s Java method allowlist was never enforced) and CVE-2026-104007 (a database document could choose where the JDBC driver is loaded from). With that chain, a spreadsheet runs the attacker’s code on Windows, macOS or Linux as soon as it is opened. No macro warning appears. The one precondition is that LibreOffice has a Java runtime installed and enabled.
AppSec teams should care because LibreOffice is also the conversion engine behind many “upload a DOCX, get a PDF” features. Four advisories say outright that conversion or export is enough: CVE-2026-84443 (Base document macros run when the document is opened or converted), CVE-2026-87932 (a file write during DOCX export, including command-line conversion), CVE-2026-104933 (local file contents drawn into exported previews on Linux) and CVE-2026-18563 (a memory write during PDF export).
What to do now: move desktops and conversion images to LibreOffice 26.8.2 or later (26.8.3 is current), or to 26.2.7 if you must stay on 26.2, which reaches end of life on 30 November 2026. Remove the Java runtime from conversion images that don’t need it. Check whether your distribution’s libreoffice package has backported the fixes. Debian, Ubuntu and Red Hat had no entries for these CVEs on the evening of 16 November.
Affected packages and projects
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected versions | Fixed or safe version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Upstream (TDF) | LibreOffice 26.8 | 26.8.0 to 26.8.1 | 26.8.2 (most CVEs), 26.8.1 for CVE-2026-87932, CVE-2026-84234, CVE-2026-18565 |
| Upstream (TDF) | LibreOffice 26.2 | 26.2.0 to 26.2.6 | 26.2.7 (26.2.6 for CVE-2026-18564 and CVE-2026-18566) |
| Upstream (TDF) | libvisio | before 0.1.11 | 0.1.11 (CVE-2026-106535) |
| Linux distributions | libreoffice / libreoffice-core | Distribution builds based on the lines above | No distribution advisories yet. Check your vendor’s changelog for the CVE IDs |
The CVE records list only the 26.2 and 26.8 lines. They do not say whether older branches are affected, so treat anything older as unpatched.
The 25 CVEs, grouped
| Group | CVEs (CVSS 4.0) | Precondition |
|---|---|---|
| Code execution through Java | CVE-2026-104692 HSQLDB Java calls (8.5), CVE-2026-104007 JDBC driver path from the document (8.5), CVE-2026-104920 remote JDBC driver via Calc data links (8.5) | Java runtime enabled |
| Macro security bypass | CVE-2026-84443 Base document events (8.5), CVE-2026-101930 HTML document events (8.5), CVE-2026-101352 document shortcuts, menus and toolbars (8.5, needs the user to press or click) | None beyond opening the file, except where noted |
| Other code execution | CVE-2026-101892 non-form component created from a form control (8.5), CVE-2026-100101 shell injection through the file name in File > Send > Email Document on Unix (8.4), CVE-2026-108169 .iqy web query files passed on the command line (7.3) | Varies |
| File write or disclosure | CVE-2026-101353 embedded HSQLDB creates files outside the document (6.8), CVE-2026-87932 arbitrary file write during DOCX export (6.8), CVE-2026-104933 GStreamer draws a local file into a video preview and its PDF export (6.7, Linux) | Opening or exporting |
| Memory safety | CVE-2026-18563 CFF font conversion in PDF export, CVE-2026-97892 PDF signature check, CVE-2026-84234 PDF image masks, CVE-2026-101929 and CVE-2026-101933 protected Basic libraries, CVE-2026-97894 UTF-16 text and DIF, CVE-2026-97999 HSQLDB to Firebird migration, CVE-2026-98100 HWP pictures, CVE-2026-18566 EMF/WMF, CVE-2026-106535 libvisio VSDX (all 5.4), CVE-2026-101351 PICT uninitialized memory (1.9) | Opening or exporting |
| Crypto and privacy | CVE-2026-18564 PDF 2.0 encryption keys from a non-cryptographic RNG (6.9), CVE-2026-18565 linked HTML background fetched in stealth mode (1.1) | PDF export with a password, or stealth mode on |
None of the 25 are on CISA’s KEV list, and there are no reports of exploitation in the wild. EPSS had no scores for them yet on 16 November.
Technical analysis
CVE-2026-104692: HSQLDB’s method allowlist defaulted to “allow everything”
LibreOffice bundles the HSQLDB 1.8 Java database. HSQLDB lets SQL call static Java methods through CALL, and HsqlDatabaseProperties.supportsJavaMethod() is supposed to restrict that to the classes named in the hsqldb.method_class_names system property. In the bundled copy, the set behind that check started out as null, and a null set meant every method was allowed. ii4gsp’s write-up quotes the decompiled logic:
// org/hsqldb/persist/HsqlDatabaseProperties.java (bundled HSQLDB, before the fix)
private static HashSet accessibleJavaMethodNames = null; // never initialised unless the property is set
public static boolean supportsJavaMethod(String name) {
if (accessibleJavaMethodNames == null) {
return true; // no property -> every Java method is callable
}
if (name.startsWith("org.hsqldb.Library.")) return true;
if (name.startsWith("java.lang.Math.")) return true;
...
}
LibreOffice never set the property, so any document that reached HSQLDB through the generic JDBC driver could CALL an arbitrary static method. The fix comes in two parts. 90c3fd97cd patches the bundled HSQLDB so that the set starts out empty:
- private static HashSet accessibleJavaMethodNames;
+ private static HashSet accessibleJavaMethodNames = new HashSet();
static {
try {
String prop = System.getProperty(hsqldb_method_class_names);
if (prop != null) {
- accessibleJavaMethodNames = new HashSet();
-
String[] names = StringUtil.split(prop, ";");
cfd5b86b5e covers distributions that build against a system HSQLDB. It starts the JVM with an explicitly empty property:
+ // HSQLDB allows calls only to the Java methods named in this list, which starts empty.
+ arOpt[index].optionString = const_cast<char *>("-Dhsqldb.method_class_names=");
The commit message gives the reason: a build that uses a system HSQLDB instead of the bundled jar never gets the first patch, so it needs the default set from the LibreOffice side.
CVE-2026-104007: the document chose the driver’s class path
An .odb database document can name a JDBC driver class and a class path (db:java-classpath) to load it from. Before 26.8.2, ODBFilter::setPropertyInfo() merged every setting from the document into the data source, class path included. Fix 4146790943 removes it, and 5985a32364 also removes SystemProperties. Without that second change, a document could set hsqldb.method_class_names itself and undo the HSQLDB fix:
void ODBFilter::setPropertyInfo()
{
...
- aDataSourceSettings.merge( ::comphelper::NamedValueCollection( aInfo ), true );
+ ::comphelper::NamedValueCollection aDocumentSettings( aInfo );
+ // The Java class path of a driver and the Java system properties come from the driver
+ // configuration, not the document.
+ aDocumentSettings.remove( u"JavaDriverClassPath"_ustr );
+ aDocumentSettings.remove( u"SystemProperties"_ustr );
+ // CreateDatabase asks the driver for a new database, which only the user does from the UI.
+ aDocumentSettings.remove( u"CreateDatabase"_ustr );
+ aDataSourceSettings.merge( aDocumentSettings, true );
A third commit, a888812b63 (part of the CVE-2026-104920 fix), makes jvmaccess::ClassPath::translateToUrls() reject any class path entry that isn’t a local file: URL. That rules out jar:http://...!/, file://host/share and paths that start with //, which Java treats as a network share.
How the public chain uses the two bugs
ii4gsp’s exploit is a spreadsheet with an ODF form whose data source is a URL:
- When the spreadsheet opens, LibreOffice loads the form and fetches
payload.odbfrom the attacker’s server over HTTP. No prompt appears. - The
.odbnames a JDBC driver class and adb:java-classpaththat points at an attacker JAR. Because ofCVE-2026-104007, that class path reachesJConnection::construct()and goes into aURLClassLoader. - On Linux the driver’s own
Driver.connect()runs the payload. That step alone is code execution and never touches HSQLDB. - On Windows and macOS the form sends a SQL
CALLto the bundled HSQLDB with query validation turned off. Because ofCVE-2026-104692, HSQLDB invokes the attacker’s static method (evil.Driver.pwn()in the PoC).
The write-up includes a builder script and demo videos for all three operating systems. Cyber Kendra notes one network signal defenders can look for: the soffice process making an outbound HTTP request for an .odb (and then a .jar) right after a document opens.
This is the same family as CVE-2026-63277, which LibreOffice fixed in 26.2.5 and 26.8.0 on 5 October. That bug loaded a remote JDBC driver through an auto-refreshing Calc database range. CVE-2026-104007 and CVE-2026-104920 are new routes past that October fix.
CVE-2026-84443: Base documents decided their macro mode too late
Writer, Calc and Impress decide whether a document’s macros may run while the document loads. According to the fix’s commit message, Base decided only when the first controller (view) connected, which is later than any other document type. Macros bound to Base document events could therefore run before macro security had been applied. The advisory states the impact directly: “opening or converting a crafted database document could run a macro and, through it, any command.” The fix in 7c07330f5a moves the decision ahead of the first event:
_rDocGuard.clear();
// <- SYNCHRONIZED
+
+ // decide the macro mode while the load arguments still hold the interaction handler
+ m_pImpl->checkMacrosOnLoading();
+
m_aEventNotifier.notifyDocumentEvent( u"OnLoadFinished"_ustr, nullptr, Any() );
CVE-2026-101930 is the HTML version of the same gap. Macros bound to document-level events in an HTML file opened in Writer were not recorded as macro content during import, so the security check never considered them. The fix, bdf91c70cb, is a one-line NotifyMacroEventRead() call in SwHTMLParser::InsertBasicDocEvent().
CVE-2026-100101: shell injection in senddoc.sh
On Linux and the BSDs, File > Send > Email Document runs shell/source/unix/misc/senddoc.sh. For xdg-email and generic mailto clients, the script built a string from the attachment path and ran it through eval, so a file name containing " and $(...) became shell code. Fix 5e77819a4c builds the argument list with set -- and drops the eval:
- ATTACH="${ATTACH:+${ATTACH} }--attach \"$2\""
+ set -- "$@" --attach "$2"
...
- eval "${MAILER} ${ATTACH} \"${MAILTO}\"" &
+ ${MAILER} "$@" "${MAILTO}" &
It needs a user to email a file whose name the attacker picked, so the risk is low for servers. It is the most direct shell injection in the batch, though.
Other code-execution fixes worth knowing
CVE-2026-101892(ecb82763fb):form:control-implementationin ODF could name any UNO service, and the importer created it and applied the stored properties to it. That let a document change LibreOffice’s configuration. The fix only creates services undercom.sun.star.form.or the olderstardiv.one.form.namespaces.CVE-2026-108169(43e060474d): a.iqyfile passed on the command line was read and its contents used as the URL to open, without the checks that apply to a URL given on the command line directly. Now onlyhttpandhttpsare accepted. This matters for any service that hands user-supplied files straight tosofficeby path.CVE-2026-87932(26.8.1, commits46bae1ab8b,4feacc20a5,b27032b40a): DOCX export wrote content-control values into custom XML without escaping them, so a crafted document could write a file of its choosing anywhere the user can write, including during command-line conversion. The export now sets the values through XPath, and the XSLT transformations LibreOffice runs can no longer write files or use the network.
IOCs
This is a batch of vulnerabilities, not a malware campaign, so there are no attacker domains or hashes. These indicators come from the public chain and the advisories:
soffice.binorsofficemaking outbound HTTP or HTTPS requests for*.odbor*.jarright after opening a document- ODF documents (
.ods,.odt,.fods) whosecontent.xmlhas aform:datasourceorxlink:hrefpointing at a remote.odb .odbfiles withdb:java-classpathcontainingjar:,http:,https:or//, or data-source settings namedJavaDriverClassPathorSystemProperties- HSQLDB
CALLstatements that name non-HSQLDB classes (the PoC usesevil.Driver.pwn()) - Unexpected child processes of
soffice.bin(sh,bash,cmd.exe,powershell.exe,osascript) on conversion hosts
Detection and remediation
# 1. Which LibreOffice are you running? Fixed: 26.8.2+ or 26.2.7+
soffice --version
dpkg -l 'libreoffice-core*' 2>/dev/null | awk '/^ii/{print $2, $3}'
rpm -q libreoffice-core 2>/dev/null
# 2. The same check inside conversion images (Gotenberg, unoconv, JODConverter, custom workers)
docker run --rm --entrypoint soffice <image> --version
# 3. Is a Java runtime available to LibreOffice? The JDBC/HSQLDB chain needs one.
docker run --rm --entrypoint sh <image> -c 'command -v java && java -version 2>&1 | head -1'
ls ~/.config/libreoffice/4/user/config/javasettings_*.xml 2>/dev/null
# 4. Did your distribution backport the fixes?
apt changelog libreoffice-core 2>/dev/null | grep -m3 -E 'CVE-2026-(104692|104007|84443|101892)'
rpm -q --changelog libreoffice-core 2>/dev/null | grep -m3 -E 'CVE-2026-(104692|104007|84443|101892)'
To triage suspicious uploads without opening them in LibreOffice:
# Spreadsheets or text documents that pull a remote database document
unzip -p suspicious.ods content.xml | grep -oE '(form:datasource|xlink:href)="[^"]*\.odb[^"]*"'
# Database documents that set their own driver class path or Java system properties
unzip -p suspicious.odb content.xml settings.xml 2>/dev/null \
| grep -iE 'java-classpath|JavaDriverClassPath|SystemProperties|jar:https?:'
# Documents that carry Basic or script macros at all
unzip -l suspicious.odt | grep -E 'Basic/|Scripts/'
What to change:
- Upgrade. Use 26.8.2 or later; 26.8.3 came out on 12 November. Stay on 26.2.7 only as a stopgap, because 26.2 gets no fixes after 30 November 2026. On distributions, wait for (or request) a package that names these CVEs. Don’t assume a version string is enough, because distributions often backport.
- Remove Java from conversion hosts. Three of the nine code-execution bugs need a JRE. Most conversion pipelines don’t use Base or JDBC, so if your conversion image ships a JRE, it’s attack surface you probably don’t need. Removing it or unticking “Use a Java runtime environment” also disables embedded HSQLDB in Base.
- Isolate the converter. Run
sofficeas an unprivileged user with no network egress, a throwaway profile (-env:UserInstallation=file:///tmp/lo-$RANDOM) and a read-only filesystem apart from its output directory. Egress filtering alone breaks the public chain, because the exploit has to fetch the.odband the JAR. Filesystem isolation limitsCVE-2026-87932andCVE-2026-101353. - Restrict input types. If you only convert DOCX, XLSX and PPTX, reject
.odb,.iqy,.fodsand HTML before they reach LibreOffice, and pass an explicit import filter (--infilter=) so that the file extension doesn’t choose the code path.
No credentials leak just by having a vulnerable version installed. If a conversion host shows the indicators above, treat it as compromised. Rotate whatever the soffice user could read: object-storage keys used to fetch uploads, queue credentials, and any tokens in the worker’s environment.
Timeline
- 2026-09-01 to 2026-10-19: Caolán McNamara lands the fixes on the 26.8 and 26.2 release branches. They include
7c07330f5a(Base macro mode, 1 September),5e77819a4c(senddoc.sh, 16 September),4146790943andcfd5b86b5e(JDBC class path and HSQLDB default, 1 October) and5985a32364(SystemProperties, 9 October). - 2026-10-05: LibreOffice 26.2.5 and 26.8.0 fix the earlier Calc JDBC flaw
CVE-2026-63277. - 2026-10-22: The
libreoffice-26.8.2.2release tag is cut. - 2026-10-29: LibreOffice 26.8.2 is released. The release notes mention stability and compatibility fixes, not security.
- 2026-11-03: LibreOffice 26.2.7 is released. Cyber Kendra describes it as the final 26.2 release.
- 2026-11-12: LibreOffice 26.8.3 is released.
- 2026-11-16: The Document Foundation publishes 25 advisories, and the CVE records reach NVD at
17:17 UTC. Cyber Kendra reports on ii4gsp’sCVE-2026-104692/CVE-2026-104007exploit write-up (the post itself carries a 17 November date). Debian, Ubuntu and Red Hat have no tracker entries yet. - 2026-11-30: The LibreOffice 26.2 line reaches end of life.
From research to remediation
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References
- LibreOffice security advisories (all 25 entries announced 16 November 2026)
- ii4gsp: CVE-2026-104692 / CVE-2026-104007, LibreOffice RCE via ODF form datasource JDBC code execution (write-up and exploit)
- Cyber Kendra (16 November 2026): CVE-2026-104692, LibreOffice RCE on opening a spreadsheet
- LibreOffice/core 90c3fd97cd: hsqldb, treat an unset hsqldb.method_class_names like an empty one (CVE-2026-104692)
- LibreOffice/core 4146790943: dbaccess, take JavaDriverClassPath only from the driver configuration (CVE-2026-104007)
- LibreOffice/core 7c07330f5a: dbaccess, decide the macro execution mode during load (CVE-2026-84443)
- LibreOffice/core 5e77819a4c: senddoc, pass the mail client its arguments directly (CVE-2026-100101)
- TDF blog: LibreOffice 26.8.2 released (29 October 2026)
- TDF blog: LibreOffice 26.2.7 is available (3 November 2026)
- NVD: CVE-2026-104692
- The Hacker News (6 October 2026): earlier Calc JDBC flaw CVE-2026-63277