CVE
CVE-2026-119977
CWE
CWE-367, CWE-330
Affected Surface
- WordPress Core versions `4.7.0` through `7.1.3` across all branches (`< 4.7.39`, `< 4.8.34`, `< 4.9.35`, `< 5.0.31`, `< 5.1.28`, `< 5.2.30`, `< 5.3.27`, `< 5.4.25`, `< 5.5.24`, `< 5.6.23`, `< 5.7.21`, `< 5.8.19`, `< 5.9.20`, `< 6.0.18`, `< 6.1.16`, `< 6.2.15`, `< 6.3.14`, `< 6.4.14`, `< 6.5.14`, `< 6.6.11`, `< 6.7.11`, `< 6.8.12`, `< 6.9.11`, `< 7.0.8`, `< 7.1.4`)
- Internet-facing WordPress servers where `/wp-content/upgrade/` is directly reachable over HTTP/HTTPS during manual, WP-CLI, control-panel, or automatic core upgrades
TL;DR
On 3 November 2026, CISA added CVE-2026-119977 (CVSS 3.1 8.1 High, CWE-367 Time-of-check Time-of-use Race Condition, reported by Umut Bayram of Picus Security) to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog with a 6 November 2026 remediation due date and a Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 26-04 forensic triage mandate.
The bug affects WordPress Core 4.7.0 through 7.1.3. When a site runs a full-package core upgrade, WP_Upgrader::unpack_package() extracts the downloaded release archive into a predictable directory inside wp-content/upgrade/ (derived directly from the package filename, such as wp-content/upgrade/wordpress-7.1.4/) before update_core() copies the extracted tree over the live installation and deletes the staging directory. Because a full WordPress release ZIP includes wp-admin/setup-config.php and does not include wp-config.php, an unauthenticated attacker who polls the predictable staging URL while the extraction is on disk can hit the staged setup-config.php installer directly over HTTP, write an attacker-controlled wp-config.php inside the staging directory, or execute arbitrary PHP before cleanup finishes.
Wordfence (the assigning CNA) reported that automated polling began immediately after the patch shipped: its firewall rule recorded its first match 9 minutes after deployment and blocked more than 18,500 requests targeting staged installer paths under wp-content/upgrade/ in the first 21 hours, with individual scanning sources polling target sites continuously for up to 14.5 hours to catch an upgrade window.
What to do now:
- Block external HTTP access to
/wp-content/upgrade/at Nginx, Apache, or your CDN/WAF BEFORE running the upgrade. Because the currently installed (<= 7.1.3)WP_Upgrader::unpack_package()code is what unpacks the7.1.4release archive, the upgrade that installs the patch still uses the old predictable directory name on disk. - Upgrade WordPress Core to
7.1.4(or the corresponding security release on your branch,4.7.39through7.0.8). - Audit web access logs and host files for any HTTP
200orPOSTrequests to/wp-content/upgrade/*.php(especiallysetup-config.php), unexpected administrator accounts, modifiedwp-config.phpfiles, or rogue PHP files created since 28 October 2026.
Affected packages and branches
| Ecosystem / Component | Affected versions | Patched version (released 28 Oct 2026) | Vulnerable files |
|---|---|---|---|
WordPress Core (7.1 branch) | 7.1.0 to 7.1.3 | 7.1.4 | wp-admin/includes/class-wp-upgrader.php, wp-admin/includes/update-core.php |
WordPress Core (7.0 branch) | 7.0.0 to 7.0.7 | 7.0.8 | wp-admin/includes/class-wp-upgrader.php, wp-admin/includes/update-core.php |
WordPress Core (6.6 to 6.9 branches) | 6.6.0..6.6.10, 6.7.0..6.7.10, 6.8.0..6.8.11, 6.9.0..6.9.10 | 6.6.11, 6.7.11, 6.8.12, 6.9.11 | wp-admin/includes/class-wp-upgrader.php, wp-admin/includes/update-core.php |
WordPress Core (6.0 to 6.5 branches) | 6.0.0..6.0.17, 6.1.0..6.1.15, 6.2.0..6.2.14, 6.3.0..6.3.13, 6.4.0..6.4.13, 6.5.0..6.5.13 | 6.0.18, 6.1.16, 6.2.15, 6.3.14, 6.4.14, 6.5.14 | wp-admin/includes/class-wp-upgrader.php, wp-admin/includes/update-core.php |
WordPress Core (4.7 to 5.9 branches) | 4.7.0..4.7.38 through 5.9.0..5.9.19 | 4.7.39 through 5.9.20 | wp-admin/includes/class-wp-upgrader.php, wp-admin/includes/update-core.php |
Technical analysis
1. Why the upgrade staging directory was both predictable and executable
When WordPress performs a core update (Core_Upgrader::upgrade()), it downloads the release ZIP and calls WP_Upgrader::unpack_package(). Prior to WordPress 7.1.4 (commit b625b2d49c6a), unpack_package() did two things that exposed the unpacked core files to unauthenticated HTTP requests during the extraction-and-copy window:
- It deleted every file inside
wp-content/upgrade/at the start of the run, including anyindex.phpguard, leaving directory listing enabled on servers withoutOptions -Indexesorautoindex off. - It constructed
$working_dirdeterministically by stripping.tmpand.zipfrom the downloaded archive basename (basename( basename( $package, '.tmp' ), '.zip' )), producing a predictable path underwp-content/upgrade/.
When the update uses a full release package, the unpacked tree under wp-content/upgrade/<working_dir>/wordpress/ contains a fresh copy of wp-admin/setup-config.php. In a normal installed site, wp-admin/setup-config.php refuses to run because it checks file_exists( ABSPATH . 'wp-config.php' ) || file_exists( dirname( ABSPATH ) . '/wp-config.php' ). Inside the staged subdirectory (wp-content/upgrade/<working_dir>/wordpress/wp-admin/setup-config.php), however, ABSPATH resolves to the staged wordpress/ directory, and dirname( ABSPATH ) resolves to wp-content/upgrade/<working_dir>/. Neither directory contains a wp-config.php file.
As a result, an unauthenticated request hitting the staged setup-config.php?step=2 during the few seconds that the unpacked files sit in wp-content/upgrade/ passes the wp-config.php existence check and writes a new wp-config.php into the staged tree (or injects PHP code into the configuration constants). Worse, in wp-admin/includes/update-core.php, update_core() only skipped wp-content and wp-includes/version.php when copying the staged tree over the live site root ($from -> $to), so a wp-config.php created inside the staging directory during the race window would be copied straight over the live site’s wp-config.php.
2. The WordPress 7.1.4 fix diff (b625b2d49c6a)
Commit b625b2d49c6ad3abfe8ca884e5453966d05790fd closes both the predictable staging path and the wp-config.php promotion sink across wp-admin/includes/class-wp-upgrader.php and wp-admin/includes/update-core.php:
--- a/wp-admin/includes/class-wp-upgrader.php
+++ b/wp-admin/includes/class-wp-upgrader.php
@@ -343,6 +343,21 @@ public function download_package( $package, $check_signatures = false, $hook_ext
return $download_file;
}
+ /**
+ * Builds an unpredictable name for the directory a package is unpacked into.
+ *
+ * @since 7.1.4
+ *
+ * @param string $package The full local path or URI of the package.
+ * @return string The directory name, without a path.
+ */
+ private function get_working_dir_name( $package ) {
+ // Strip off any .tmp or .zip suffixes.
+ $name = basename( basename( $package, '.tmp' ), '.zip' );
+
+ return $name . '-' . wp_generate_password( 16, false );
+ }
+
/**
* Unpacks a compressed package file.
@@ -366,16 +381,32 @@ public function unpack_package( $package, $delete_package = true ) {
$upgrade_folder = $wp_filesystem->wp_content_dir() . 'upgrade/';
- // Clean up contents of upgrade directory beforehand.
+ // Clean up contents of upgrade directory beforehand, keeping its index.php.
$upgrade_files = $wp_filesystem->dirlist( $upgrade_folder );
if ( ! empty( $upgrade_files ) ) {
foreach ( $upgrade_files as $file ) {
+ if ( 'index.php' === $file['name'] ) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
$wp_filesystem->delete( $upgrade_folder . $file['name'], true );
}
}
- // We need a working directory - strip off any .tmp or .zip suffixes.
- $working_dir = $upgrade_folder . basename( basename( $package, '.tmp' ), '.zip' );
+ if ( ! $wp_filesystem->is_dir( $upgrade_folder ) ) {
+ $wp_filesystem->mkdir( $upgrade_folder, FS_CHMOD_DIR );
+ }
+ if ( ! $wp_filesystem->exists( $upgrade_folder . 'index.php' ) ) {
+ $wp_filesystem->put_contents( $upgrade_folder . 'index.php', "<?php\n// Silence is golden.\n", FS_CHMOD_FILE );
+ }
+
+ // We need a working directory.
+ $working_dir = $upgrade_folder . $this->get_working_dir_name( $package );
--- a/wp-admin/includes/update-core.php
+++ b/wp-admin/includes/update-core.php
@@ -1545,8 +1545,9 @@ function update_core( $from, $to ) {
/*
* Don't copy wp-content, we'll deal with that below.
* We also copy version.php last so failed updates report their old version.
+ * Never copy a wp-config.php, which could have been written to the working directory.
*/
- $skip = array( 'wp-content', 'wp-includes/version.php' );
+ $skip = array( 'wp-content', 'wp-includes/version.php', 'wp-config.php' );
$check_is_writable = array();
3. The bootstrap trap when upgrading from <= 7.1.3 to 7.1.4
Pay close attention to how WordPress core updates execute:
- The already-installed (
<= 7.1.3)WP_Upgrader::unpack_package()runs first to extract the7.1.4ZIP archive intowp-content/upgrade/. Because that step uses the old code in memory, the final upgrade that takes a site from7.1.3to7.1.4still unpacks into the predictable staging directory name. - Once unpacked, WordPress loads the newly extracted
wp-admin/includes/update-core.phpfrom the staging folder and callsupdate_core( $from, $to ). Because the newupdate_core.phpincludes'wp-config.php'in$skip, it refuses to copy a stagedwp-config.phpover the live root, but the stagedsetup-config.phpis still briefly reachable on disk unless/wp-content/upgrade/is blocked at the web server or WAF before the upgrade runs. - Also note that plugin-based WordPress WAFs running in standard mode are not loaded when an attacker requests
/wp-content/upgrade/.../wp-admin/setup-config.phpdirectly, becausesetup-config.phpdefinesWP_INSTALLINGand never loads active plugins (wp-settings.phpis only loaded after configuration). Only web-server rules (Nginx/Apache), edge WAFs, or PHPauto_prepend_filefirewalls intercept direct requests to the staged installer.
IOCs and in-the-wild telemetry
Neither CISA nor Wordfence published attacker IP lists, as scanning is distributed across opportunistic polling infrastructure. Instead, detection relies on HTTP request telemetry and filesystem artifacts:
- HTTP URI patterns polled in the wild (observed by Wordfence across 18,500+ blocked requests in the first 21 hours):
- Direct
GETandPOSTrequests to/wp-content/upgrade/*.php, specifically targeting/wp-content/upgrade/<package-name>/wordpress/wp-admin/setup-config.phpand/wp-content/upgrade/<package-name>/wp-admin/setup-config.php - High-frequency polling from a single source IP against
/wp-content/upgrade/over multi-hour windows (up to 14.5 hours per target group in Wordfence telemetry)
- Direct
- Filesystem indicators of compromise:
- Any leftover directory or
.phpfile insidewp-content/upgrade/other than the 30-byteindex.php(<?php // Silence is golden.) - Modification timestamp (
mtime/ctime) changes on the livewp-config.phpmatching the timestamp of a recent core upgrade (auto_core_update_notifiedoption)
- Any leftover directory or
Detection and remediation
1. Check installed WordPress versions and hunt for /wp-content/upgrade/ exploitation in logs
# 1. Check WordPress versions across all sites on the host
for dir in /var/www/*/ /srv/www/*/; do
[ -f "${dir}wp-includes/version.php" ] && \
printf "%-40s %s\n" "$dir" "$(grep -ho "\$wp_version = '[^']*'" "${dir}wp-includes/version.php")"
done
# 2. Search Nginx / Apache access logs for any HTTP requests to /wp-content/upgrade/
rg -n '/wp-content/upgrade/' /var/log/nginx/*access*.log /var/log/apache2/*access*.log /var/log/httpd/*access*.log 2>/dev/null
# 3. Inspect wp-content/upgrade/ contents, wp-config.php mtime, and core checksums (via WP-CLI)
ls -la wp-content/upgrade/ 2>/dev/null
stat wp-config.php
wp core verify-checksums --include-root
wp user list --role=administrator --fields=ID,user_login,user_email,user_registered
find wp-content -name '*.php' -newermt '2026-10-28' -ls 2>/dev/null
If access logs show any HTTP 200 or 302 responses for /wp-content/upgrade/.*\.php (especially setup-config.php), treat the WordPress instance and database as compromised: preserve wp-content/upgrade/ and web logs for forensic triage, rebuild from a known-good backup, and rotate database credentials, wp-config.php authentication salts, administrator passwords, and any API keys stored in the WordPress database or environment.
2. Block /wp-content/upgrade/ at the web server, then update to 7.1.4
Do not place a .htaccess file inside wp-content/upgrade/ itself, because WP_Upgrader::unpack_package() deletes every file inside wp-content/upgrade/ except index.php at the start of each upgrade. Apply the block in the parent configuration before running wp core update:
Nginx (inside the server block, using ^~ so regex .php$ FastCGI locations cannot match):
location ^~ /wp-content/upgrade/ {
deny all;
return 403;
}
Apache (in the VirtualHost config or root .htaccess above # BEGIN WordPress):
<IfModule mod_rewrite.c>
RewriteEngine On
RewriteRule ^wp-content/upgrade/ - [F,L]
</IfModule>
Verify that curl -I https://example.com/wp-content/upgrade/index.php returns 403 Forbidden, and then apply the core update:
wp core update
wp core version
Timeline
- 2026-10-28 (
17:13 UTC): WordPress releases7.1.4and backports commitb625b2d49c6ad3abfe8ca884e5453966d05790fdacross all branches down to4.7.39. - 2026-10-28 (
20:30 UTC): Wordfence deploys a WAF rule forCVE-2026-119977and records the first live exploitation attempt 9 minutes later. - 2026-10-29 (
21:58 UTC): Wordfence reports more than 18,500 blocked requests targeting staged installer paths under/wp-content/upgrade/in the first 21 hours. - 2026-10-31 (
05:33to06:16 UTC): Wordfence and NVD publishCVE-2026-119977(CVSS 8.1 High). - 2026-11-03: CISA adds
CVE-2026-119977to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog with a 6 November 2026 remediation deadline; the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (AV26-1117) and Centre for Cybersecurity Belgium issue national alerts.
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References
- CISA Alert (3 November 2026): CISA Adds One Known Exploited Vulnerability to Catalog (CVE-2026-119977)
- Wordfence Threat Intelligence: WordPress Core 4.7.0 - 7.1.3 Unauthenticated Upgrade-Window Staged-Installer RCE (CVE-2026-119977)
- WordPress Core 7.1.4 fix commit b625b2d49c6ad3abfe8ca884e5453966d05790fd (Upgrade/Install: Improve the handling of the upgrade working directory)
- Canadian Centre for Cyber Security Advisory AV26-1117 (3 November 2026): WordPress security advisory
- Centre for Cybersecurity Belgium (3 November 2026): Warning on remote command execution in WordPress Core during upgrade window (CVE-2026-119977)
- Ciphers Security (4 November 2026): WordPress CVE-2026-119977: Exploited Upgrade-Window RCE, Patch and Detect