CVE
CVE-2026-121971, CVE-2026-118513, CVE-2026-121802, CVE-2026-111751, CVE-2026-111752, CVE-2026-121424, CVE-2026-121425, CVE-2026-121426, CVE-2026-118391, CVE-2026-108147, CVE-2026-111362, CVE-2026-114582, CVE-2026-111211, CVE-2026-113593, CVE-2026-113733
CWE
CWE-200, CWE-290, CWE-346, CWE-918, CWE-400, CWE-20, CWE-770
Affected Surface
- Packagist `symfony/http-client`, `symfony/security-http`, and `symfony/symfony` `< 5.4.56`, `6.x < 6.4.50`, `7.x < 7.4.23`, and `8.x < 8.1.11` (`CVE-2026-121971` / `GHSA-gq53-v8w2-gjhj`, `CVE-2026-118513` / `GHSA-5w3m-mfwg-9f8r`)
- npm `@better-auth/expo` (`>= 1.4.0-beta.6, < 1.7.16` and `1.8.0-beta.0..1.8.0-beta.4`) and `better-auth` (`< 1.7.16` and `1.8.0-beta.0..1.8.0-beta.4`) (`CVE-2026-121802` / `GHSA-4wq4-2ppv-q3hg`, CVSS 9.1 Critical)
- PyPI `Django` `6.1 < 6.1.3`, `6.0 < 6.0.10`, and `5.2 < 5.2.19` (`CVE-2026-108147`, `CVE-2026-111211`, `CVE-2026-111362`, `CVE-2026-113593`, `CVE-2026-113733`, `CVE-2026-114582`)
- npm `@angular/router` (`< 20.3.33`, `21.x < 21.2.25`, `22.x < 22.2.1`), `nodemailer` (`>= 3.0.0, < 10.1.4`), and Hex `ecto` (`>= 3.4.0, < 3.14.3`)
TL;DR
On 3 and 4 November 2026, six core application frameworks across PHP, TypeScript/Node.js, Python, and Elixir shipped coordinated security updates addressing 15 CVEs:
- Symfony
5.4.56,6.4.50,7.4.23, and8.1.11(CVE-2026-121971, CVSS 8.2 High;CVE-2026-118513, CVSS 7.7 High): Insymfony/http-client,ScopingHttpClientmerged the default scope’sauth_bearer,auth_basic,headers, andlocal_certoptions into a request before resolving relative URLs againstbase_uri. Passing a network-path reference such as//evil.example/stealresolved to an external origin while keeping the default scope’s bearer token. Insymfony/security-http,X509AuthenticatorandX509AuthenticationListenersuffered an incomplete fix forCVE-2026-45063: because the regex#(?:^|[,/])\s*(?:emailAddress|...)=...#was not escape-aware, a client certificate whoseCNcontainedjdoe,emailAddress=admin@example.com(serialized under RFC 2253 asCN=jdoe\,emailAddress=admin@example.com,...) orjdoe/emailAddress=admin@example.comauthenticated asadmin@example.com. @better-auth/expoandbetter-auth1.7.16/1.8.0-beta.5(CVE-2026-121802/GHSA-4wq4-2ppv-q3hg, CVSS 9.1 Critical): Registering theexpo()plugin exposed a public authorization-proxy endpoint that signed caller-supplied request values with the server’s application secret and returned the signature in a cookie. Because Better Auth uses that same application secret for email-verification/email-change tokens and the session cookie cache, an unauthenticated attacker who knew a victim’s email address (or user ID) could take over the account without user interaction. Applications that exposed@better-auth/expomust rotate their Better Auth secret after upgrading.- Django
6.1.3,6.0.10, and5.2.19(6 CVEs):CVE-2026-108147fixesMultiPartParserbuffering entireContent-Transfer-Encoding: base64uploads in memory regardless ofFILE_UPLOAD_MAX_MEMORY_SIZE;CVE-2026-111362andCVE-2026-114582block SSRF and local file reads in GeoDjango (OGRGeometryGeoJSONcrsURLs andSpatialReferencestring inputs on GDAL>= 3.9);CVE-2026-113593separates absent from empty headers inVarycache keys;CVE-2026-113733masks password hashes in read-only admin forms for non-AUTH_USER_MODELor multi-table-inherited user models; andCVE-2026-111211escapes invalid geometry values before logging. - Angular SSR (
CVE-2026-111751,CVE-2026-111752, CVSS 8.2 High), Nodemailer10.1.4(CVE-2026-121424,CVE-2026-121425,CVE-2026-121426, CVSS 8.3 High), and Elixir Ecto3.14.3(CVE-2026-118391, CVSS 8.9 High):@angular/router20.3.33,21.2.25, and22.2.1prevent Node.js SSR workers from crashing with V8 heap OOMs viaRouterLink_urlTreesignal retention and unmatched empty-path auxiliary outlets (a/(detail:1///...));nodemailer10.1.4fixes three RFC 5322 parser differentials inaddressparserthat let nested comments, group semicolons, and quoted>characters redirect mail past domain allowlists; and Elixirecto3.14.3stops caching queries with interpolatedjson_extract_path/2,field[^key],splice/1, andconstant/1expressions.
What to do now: Upgrade Symfony to 5.4.56, 6.4.50, 7.4.23, or 8.1.11; better-auth and @better-auth/expo to 1.7.16 (and rotate your Better Auth secret); Django to 6.1.3, 6.0.10, or 5.2.19 (with GDAL >= 3.9 for GeoDjango); @angular/router to 20.3.33, 21.2.25, or 22.2.1; nodemailer to 10.1.4; and ecto to 3.14.3.
Affected packages
| Ecosystem | Package | CVE / Advisory | Severity | Affected versions | Fixed versions | Summary |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Packagist | symfony/http-client, symfony/symfony | CVE-2026-121971 (GHSA-gq53-v8w2-gjhj) | High (8.2) | < 5.4.56, 6.x < 6.4.50, 7.x < 7.4.23, 8.x < 8.1.11 | 5.4.56, 6.4.50, 7.4.23, 8.1.11 | ScopingHttpClient sends default-scope auth_bearer / auth_basic credentials to external origins on //host URLs |
| Packagist | symfony/security-http, symfony/symfony | CVE-2026-118513 (GHSA-5w3m-mfwg-9f8r) | High (7.7) | < 5.4.56, 6.x < 6.4.50, 7.x < 7.4.23, 8.x < 8.1.11 | 5.4.56, 6.4.50, 7.4.23, 8.1.11 | X509Authenticator and X509AuthenticationListener Subject DN RDN-boundary bypass (\, and /) |
| npm | @better-auth/expo, better-auth | CVE-2026-121802 (GHSA-4wq4-2ppv-q3hg) | Critical (9.1) | < 1.7.16, >= 1.8.0-beta.0, < 1.8.0-beta.5 | 1.7.16, 1.8.0-beta.5 | Expo authorization proxy signs arbitrary caller-supplied state with the app secret, enabling account takeover |
| PyPI | Django | CVE-2026-108147, CVE-2026-111362, CVE-2026-114582, CVE-2026-111211, CVE-2026-113593, CVE-2026-113733 | Medium / Low (2.1 to 6.9) | 6.1 < 6.1.3, 6.0 < 6.0.10, 5.2 < 5.2.19 | 6.1.3, 6.0.10, 5.2.19 | Base64 multipart RAM exhaustion, GeoDjango CRS/SRS SSRF & file read, Vary cache collision, and admin hash leak |
| npm | @angular/router | CVE-2026-111751 (GHSA-57xq-rjx2-v5xh), CVE-2026-111752 (GHSA-62vg-58rm-qff7) | High (8.2) | < 20.3.33 (111752), 21.x < 21.2.25, 22.x < 22.2.1 | 20.3.33, 21.2.25, 22.2.1 | Node.js SSR V8 heap exhaustion via RouterLink _urlTree retention and unmatched empty-path outlets |
| npm | nodemailer | CVE-2026-121424, CVE-2026-121425, CVE-2026-121426 | High (8.3) | >= 3.0.0, < 10.1.4 | 10.1.4 | RFC 5322 addressparser recipient smuggling via nested ), group ;, and quoted > |
| Hex (Elixir) | ecto | CVE-2026-118391 (GHSA-cxjx-vmm2-qr8r) | High (8.9) | >= 3.4.0, < 3.14.3 | 3.14.3 | Unbounded ETS query cache and DB prepared-statement exhaustion via interpolated json_extract_path/2 and splice/1 |
Technical analysis
1. Symfony CVE-2026-121971 (ScopingHttpClient) and CVE-2026-118513 (X509Authenticator)
In Symfony\Component\HttpClient\ScopingHttpClient (used whenever an application calls HttpClient::createForBaseUri() or configures framework.http_client.scoped_clients), request() previously merged $this->defaultOptionsByRegexp[$this->defaultRegexp] into $options before resolving a relative $url against $options['base_uri'].
When an attacker controlled the leading characters of a relative path passed to $client->request('GET', $path) and supplied a network-path reference (//evil.example/steal) or a different port/userinfo on the same host, self::resolveUrl() resolved the target outside the base URI’s authority while retaining the already-merged auth_bearer, auth_basic, headers, and local_cert options. Commit 64c34e85bd03 restores the original $requestOptions whenever the resolved scheme and authority differ from base_uri:
--- a/src/Symfony/Component/HttpClient/ScopingHttpClient.php
+++ b/src/Symfony/Component/HttpClient/ScopingHttpClient.php
@@ -73,12 +73,20 @@ public function request(string $method, string $url, array $options = []): Respo
+ $requestOptions = $options;
$defaultOptions = $this->defaultOptionsByRegexp[$this->defaultRegexp];
$options = self::mergeDefaultOptions($options, $defaultOptions, true);
if (\is_string($options['base_uri'] ?? null)) {
$options['base_uri'] = self::parseUrl($options['base_uri']);
}
$url = implode('', self::resolveUrl($url, $options['base_uri'] ?? null, $defaultOptions['query'] ?? []));
+
+ // A network-path reference can point outside of the base URI's authority: the options of the default scope must not follow it
+ $resolvedUrl = self::parseUrl($url);
+ if ($resolvedUrl['scheme'].$resolvedUrl['authority'] !== $options['base_uri']['scheme'].$options['base_uri']['authority']) {
+ $options = $requestOptions;
+ $e = null;
+ }
}
In Symfony\Component\Security\Http\Authenticator\X509Authenticator (CVE-2026-118513, commit 0f5e26b664d1), the earlier fix for CVE-2026-45063 matched #(?:^|[,/])\s*(?:emailAddress|1\.2\.840\.113549\.1\.9\.1)=([^,/@]++@[^,/]++)# against the serialized $_SERVER['SSL_CLIENT_S_DN'] string. Because (?:^|[,/]) ignored escaping and treated both , and / as RDN separators regardless of whether the web server used RFC 2253 (CN=jdoe\,emailAddress=admin@example.com,emailAddress=jdoe@example.com) or OpenSSL’s legacy X509_NAME_oneline() format (/CN=jdoe,emailAddress=admin@example.com), a client holding a valid CA-signed certificate with a crafted CN could impersonate admin@example.com. The patch adds self::splitDn($dn) to split the DN on unescaped format-specific separators and unescape each RDN before matching ^\s*(?:emailAddress|...)=...$.
2. @better-auth/expo 1.7.16 (CVE-2026-121802) and Django 6.1.3 / 6.0.10 / 5.2.19
- Better Auth (
CVE-2026-121802/GHSA-4wq4-2ppv-q3hg): In@better-auth/expo(>= 1.4.0-beta.6, < 1.7.16), the public Expo authorization proxy signed a caller-supplied state parameter using the server’s main Better Auth secret and returned that HMAC signature in a cookie. Because Better Auth reused the same signing key across email-verification tokens, email-change tokens, and the session cookie cache, an unauthenticated attacker could use the Expo proxy as a signing oracle to mint valid verification signatures for any target email address or session cookie cache entry. Commitf25081ac0476(PR #12198, released inv1.7.16) binds email-change and verification tokens to their purpose and requesting account, restricts the Expo proxy to configured OAuth/SSO endpoints, and enforces server-side session checks before passkey, 2FA, phone-number, or social-linking mutations. - Django
6.1.3,6.0.10, and5.2.19:- In
django/http/multipartparser.py(CVE-2026-108147, commit4bd1f59a80ad), when a multipart part declaredContent-Transfer-Encoding: base64, the inner loopwhile stripped_length % 4 != 0: over_chunk = field_stream.read(self._chunk_size)kept reading and appending chunks intostripped_partsin memory whenever an attacker padded chunks sostripped_length % 4remained non-zero until EOF, bypassingFILE_UPLOAD_MAX_MEMORY_SIZE. The fix carries the 1 to 3 trailing remainder bytes (base64_remainder) into the next iteration without reading ahead. - In GeoDjango (
CVE-2026-111362, commit31bef742da01, andCVE-2026-114582, commit1c980729e53e), GDAL resolves URL-based GeoJSONcrsmembers and spatial reference strings over the network or local filesystem. Django now runsExternalCRSBlocker.check(geom_input)beforeOGRGeometry._from_json()and usesOSRSetFromUserInputEx(available on GDAL>= 3.9) to disable file and network access when parsing spatial references.
- In
3. Angular SSR (CVE-2026-111751, CVE-2026-111752), Nodemailer 10.1.4 (CVE-2026-121424..121426), and Elixir Ecto 3.14.3 (CVE-2026-118391)
- Angular SSR V8 heap crashes (
CVE-2026-111751,CVE-2026-111752): In@angular/router(21.2.0to< 21.2.25and22.0.0to< 22.2.1),RouterLinkcached a computed signal_urlTree()on every rendered link instance for the duration of an SSR request (CVE-2026-111751, fixed in commit319a3c4f3268); withqueryParamsHandling: 'merge'or'preserve', an oversized query string multiplied acrossNlinks exhausted the V8 old-space heap. Separately (CVE-2026-111752, affecting< 20.3.33,< 21.2.25, and< 22.2.1, fixed in commita83f8119acd4),Recognizerevaluated unconfigured empty-path auxiliary outlet segments such asa/(detail:1//x0:/(detail:2)//x1:/(detail:3)), duplicatingActivatedRouteSnapshottrees and repeatedly invokingcanMatchguards and resolvers on a single request. - Nodemailer
addressparserrecipient smuggling (CVE-2026-121424,CVE-2026-121425,CVE-2026-121426): Prior tonodemailer10.1.4(commits0a8761762ac7and1cd57d2b8c49),Tokenizerinsrc/addressparser/index.tstracked only a single active delimiter without tracking nested comments or inner quotes:Victim (x(y) <evil@evil.com>) <v@victim.com>(CVE-2026-121424): closed the outer comment at the first)aftery, delivering mail toevil@evil.comwhile RFC 5322 validators approvedv@victim.com.G: (a; <evil@evil.com>) <v@victim.com>;(CVE-2026-121425): closed the RFC 5322 group at the;inside the comment or quoted string, promoting<evil@evil.com>to a top-level recipient.<"a@evil.com>"@good.com>(CVE-2026-121426): closed theangle-addrat the>inside the quoted local part, routingRCPT TOtoevil.comafter domain validation sawgood.com.
- Elixir Ecto
3.14.3query cache exhaustion (CVE-2026-118391): Inecto>= 3.4.0, < 3.14.3(commitd0e97d8a6e27), interpolating user-controlled JSON path keys intojson_extract_path(field, ^path)orfield[^key], or passing variable-length lists intosplice(^list), embedded the keys or placeholder counts into the query AST cached in Ecto’s unbounded per-repo ETS table (and created a new PostgreSQL prepared statement per entry inecto_sql). Ecto3.14.3marks queries with:inlineJSON paths, constants, or:spliceparameters ascacheable? = false.
Detection and remediation
# 1. Check Symfony, Better Auth, Angular, Nodemailer, Django, and Ecto versions across lockfiles
rg -n '"(symfony/http-client|symfony/security-http|symfony/symfony|@better-auth/expo|better-auth|@angular/router|nodemailer)"' \
composer.lock package.json package-lock.json pnpm-lock.yaml yarn.lock 2>/dev/null
rg -n -i '^(django|ecto)\b' requirements*.txt pyproject.toml poetry.lock uv.lock mix.lock 2>/dev/null
# 2. Check GeoDjango hosts for GDAL < 3.9 (required by CVE-2026-114582) and Ecto apps for interpolated json_extract_path / splice
gdalinfo --version 2>/dev/null || true
rg -n 'json_extract_path\(|splice\(\^' lib/ 2>/dev/null
- Upgrade affected dependencies:
- Symfony:
composer update symfony/http-client symfony/security-httpto>= 5.4.56,>= 6.4.50,>= 7.4.23, or>= 8.1.11. - Better Auth: Upgrade both
better-authand@better-auth/expoto>= 1.7.16(or>= 1.8.0-beta.5) and rotateBETTER_AUTH_SECRETimmediately so any signatures previously minted via the Expo proxy are invalidated. - Django: Upgrade to
>= 6.1.3,>= 6.0.10, or>= 5.2.19, and ensure GeoDjango deployments run GDAL>= 3.9(gis.W001system check). - Angular, Nodemailer, and Ecto: Upgrade
@angular/routerto>= 20.3.33,>= 21.2.25, or>= 22.2.1;nodemailerto>= 10.1.4; and Elixirectoto>= 3.14.3.
- Symfony:
Timeline
- 2026-11-03 (
15:17to21:37 UTC): NVD and GitHub publishCVE-2026-121424throughCVE-2026-121426(Nodemailer10.1.4),CVE-2026-108147throughCVE-2026-114582(Django6.1.3,6.0.10,5.2.19),CVE-2026-111751andCVE-2026-111752(Angular20.3.33,21.2.25,22.2.1), andGHSA-4wq4-2ppv-q3hg(@better-auth/expo1.7.16). - 2026-11-04 (
03:17to18:17 UTC): NVD and GitHub publishCVE-2026-121802(@better-auth/expo),CVE-2026-118391(GHSA-cxjx-vmm2-qr8r, Elixir Ecto3.14.3),CVE-2026-118513(GHSA-5w3m-mfwg-9f8r, SymfonyX509Authenticator), andCVE-2026-121971(GHSA-gq53-v8w2-gjhj, SymfonyScopingHttpClient).
From research to remediation
Check whether this pattern exists in your codebase
Turn this research into a remediation workflow. Scan dependencies and package manifests for similar supply-chain risk, then prioritize fixes with reachability context.
References
- GitHub Advisories GHSA-gq53-v8w2-gjhj (CVE-2026-121971) and GHSA-5w3m-mfwg-9f8r (CVE-2026-118513): Symfony 5.4.56 / 6.4.50 / 7.4.23 / 8.1.11
- Symfony fix commits 64c34e85bd03 (ScopingHttpClient) and 0f5e26b664d1 (X509Authenticator splitDn)
- GitHub Advisory GHSA-4wq4-2ppv-q3hg / CVE-2026-121802: @better-auth/expo authorization proxy signing oracle (v1.7.16)
- Django Weblog and oss-security (2026/11/03/8): Django security releases 6.1.3, 6.0.10, and 5.2.19 (6 CVEs)
- GitHub Advisories GHSA-57xq-rjx2-v5xh (CVE-2026-111751) and GHSA-62vg-58rm-qff7 (CVE-2026-111752): @angular/router SSR heap exhaustion
- GitHub Advisories GHSA-8c8m-p3m8-cjg8 (CVE-2026-121424), GHSA-m943-m63m-w62w (CVE-2026-121425), and GHSA-85x2-q946-cp5h (CVE-2026-121426): Nodemailer 10.1.4
- GitHub Advisory GHSA-cxjx-vmm2-qr8r / CVE-2026-118391: Elixir Ecto 3.14.3 unbounded query cache growth