CVE
CVE-2026-122302, CVE-2026-122303, CVE-2026-122304, CVE-2026-122310, CVE-2026-122311, CVE-2026-122313, CVE-2026-122321, CVE-2026-121417
CWE
CWE-269, CWE-863, CWE-22, CWE-347, CWE-416, CWE-400, CWE-444
Affected Surface
- CNCF Kyverno (`github.com/kyverno/kyverno`) versions `< 1.19.2` (`CVE-2026-122302`, `CVE-2026-122303`, `CVE-2026-122304`, `CVE-2026-122310`, `CVE-2026-122311`, `CVE-2026-122313`, and `CVE-2026-122321`, plus companion CVEs up to `CVE-2026-122323`; 24 GitHub Security Advisories in total, fixed in `v1.19.2`)
- Rust crates `surrealdb` `< 3.3.0` (`CVE-2026-121417` / `RUSTSEC-2026-0453` / `GHSA-pm86-cc75-q463`), `surrealdb-core` with `reblessive 0.4.3` (`RUSTSEC-2026-0454` / `GHSA-m9qr-4rcq-3jhc`; listed as `< 4.0.0` in one source and `<= 3.3.0` in the other), and `surrealkv` `< 1.2.0` (`RUSTSEC-2026-0452` / `GHSA-9fm9-c4h4-8g93`)
- Rust crates `actix-http` `< 3.20.3` (`RUSTSEC-2026-0446` / `GHSA-2q7f-mf9f-5qhr`, `RUSTSEC-2026-0448` / `GHSA-qph8-7859-gq2f`, `RUSTSEC-2026-0455` / `GHSA-7p9w-p5qm-5gc5`), `actix-web` `< 4.18.2` (`RUSTSEC-2026-0447`), and `actix-files` `< 0.7.4` (`RUSTSEC-2026-0443` / `GHSA-8hcm-m7r7-frwc`)
- Rust crate `vodozemac` `<= 0.11.1` (`RUSTSEC-2026-0445` / `GHSA-mxcm-mrw6-c446` and `RUSTSEC-2026-0451` / `GHSA-v27v-f96q-qhjq`, fixed in `0.11.2`)
- Rust crates `ocipkg` `<= 0.4.0` (`RUSTSEC-2026-0450`, fixed in `0.4.1`) and `azure_security_keyvault_*` `0.10.0`..`1.0.0` (`RUSTSEC-2026-0437` to `0439`, fixed in `1.0.1`)
TL;DR
On 5 and 6 November 2026, NVD, the GitHub Advisory Database, and the RustSec Advisory Database published fixes that matter for multi-tenant Kubernetes clusters and Rust backend services:
-
Kyverno
< 1.19.2: namespace escapes and an image-verification bypass. Kyvernov1.19.2fixes 24 GitHub Security Advisories. The matching CVEs run fromCVE-2026-122302toCVE-2026-122323(see the note on counts below). In clusters where namespace admins can create namespaced Kyverno policies (Policy,CleanupPolicy,NamespacedValidatingPolicy,NamespacedMutatingPolicy), six CVSS9.8to9.9Critical flaws let a tenant read, mutate, or generate resources in other namespaces or cluster-wide, using Kyverno’s privileged controllerServiceAccounts:CVE-2026-122310(andCVE-2026-122312):apiCall.urlPathwas checked afterpath.Cleanbut sent raw, so?and#fragments hid../traversal.CVE-2026-122311:..segments in CELresource.get()/resource.post()escaped the namespace throughpath.Join.CVE-2026-122303andCVE-2026-122313:NamespacedMutatingPolicytargets could name another namespace.CVE-2026-122304: the cleanup controller loaded context with anilpolicy, soCleanupPolicyhad no namespace confinement.CVE-2026-122302:generaterules checked the controller’s RBAC, not the policy author’s.
Separately,
CVE-2026-122321(CVSS9.1Critical) let an attacker who can move a registry tag bypassverifyImagessignature and attestation checks, because Kyverno keyed its verification cache on the tag instead of the verified digest. -
SurrealDB
3.3.0/4.0.0and SurrealKV1.2.0: memory corruption from safe Rust. RustSec published three advisories on 6 November. None needsunsafeat the call site. Lifetime erasure inaffinitypool 0.7.0causes a use-after-free on atokio::sync::Mutexwhen a future is leaked (CVE-2026-121417/RUSTSEC-2026-0453). UnsoundSend/Syncinreblessive 0.4.3causes double frees (RUSTSEC-2026-0454). Adebug_assert!(encoded.len() >= 16)that release builds strip out lets SSTable key decoding read 8 bytes before the heap buffer (RUSTSEC-2026-0452). -
Actix Web
4.18.2,actix-http3.20.3, andactix-files0.7.4(RUSTSEC-2026-0443,0446,0447,0448,0455). Inactix-http < 3.20.3, which Actix Web uses by default, a single 850-byte Brotli request could allocate ~1 GiB before extractor limits or route authentication ran (RUSTSEC-2026-0455). Inactix-http < 3.20.2, a bare\nafter the final0\r\nchunk enabled HTTP request smuggling (RUSTSEC-2026-0446). On Windows,actix-files < 0.7.4served.envand.git/configthrough 8.3 short names (ENV~1,GIT~1,RUSTSEC-2026-0443). -
Other Rust advisories in the same window.
vodozemac <= 0.11.1(RUSTSEC-2026-0445,RUSTSEC-2026-0451),ocipkg <= 0.4.0(RUSTSEC-2026-0450), andazure_security_keyvault_*0.10.0..1.0.0(RUSTSEC-2026-0437to0439).
What to do now: Upgrade Kyverno to >= v1.19.2, surrealdb to >= 3.3.0, surrealdb-core to >= 4.0.0 (see the version note in section 2), surrealkv to >= 1.2.0, actix-web to >= 4.18.2, actix-http to >= 3.20.3, actix-files to >= 0.7.4, vodozemac to >= 0.11.2, ocipkg to >= 0.4.1 (or move to oci-client, because ocipkg is now archived), and the azure_security_keyvault_* crates to >= 1.0.1.
A note on the Kyverno counts. The two research sweeps behind this roundup disagree. One counts 21 CVEs, CVE-2026-122302 through CVE-2026-122323, though the IDs it lists cover all 22 numbers in that range. The other counts 24 GitHub Security Advisories and gives the CVE range as CVE-2026-122302 through CVE-2026-122321. Both agree that v1.19.2 closes 24 GitHub Security Advisories. Some CVEs map to more than one GHSA (CVE-2026-122304 has two). The Kyverno v1.19.2 release notes hold the authoritative list.
Affected packages and advisories
| Ecosystem | Package / Project | Advisory / CVE | Severity | Affected versions | Fixed version | Summary |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Go / Kubernetes | github.com/kyverno/kyverno | CVE-2026-122303 (GHSA-jcw5-3wcg-fqx5), CVE-2026-122313 (GHSA-f96w-622v-rqpq) | CVSS 9.9 Critical | >= 1.17.0, < 1.19.2 | 1.19.2 | NamespacedMutatingPolicy targetMatchConstraints.expression CEL map literal overwrites or mutates resources in any namespace |
| Go / Kubernetes | github.com/kyverno/kyverno | CVE-2026-122304 (GHSA-p58h-r4j3-h5vx, GHSA-rcxg-3f92-3mgr) | CVSS 9.9 Critical | >= 1.17.0, < 1.19.2 | 1.19.2 | Cleanup controller calls ctxFactory(nil, ...), so namespaced CleanupPolicy apiCall / globalReference escape namespace confinement |
| Go / Kubernetes | github.com/kyverno/kyverno | CVE-2026-122310 (GHSA-3xfv-vq8x-qhg4), CVE-2026-122312, CVE-2026-122311 (GHSA-4pqm-wqq6-h9q2) | CVSS 9.9 Critical | >= 1.16.0, < 1.19.2 (122310 in 1.19.1) | 1.19.2 | context.apiCall.urlPath #/? fragment ../ differential; resource.get()/resource.post() .. traversal in namespaced CEL policies |
| Go / Kubernetes | github.com/kyverno/kyverno | CVE-2026-122302 (GHSA-q62c-r9v2-cf64) | CVSS 9.8 Critical | < 1.19.2 | 1.19.2 | Generate-rule admission checks controller RBAC instead of author RBAC |
| Go / Kubernetes | github.com/kyverno/kyverno | CVE-2026-122321 (GHSA-2r43-6962-xcw5) | CVSS 9.1 Critical | >= 1.18.0, < 1.19.2 | 1.19.2 | verifyImages cache keyed by mutable image tag instead of digest |
| Go / Kubernetes | github.com/kyverno/kyverno | CVE-2026-122305..122309, 122314..122320, 122322, 122323 | CVSS 7.5 to 8.5 High | < 1.19.2 | 1.19.2 | SAN-less certificate bypass (CVE-2026-122318), attestation zip bombs (122322 / 122323), and type-assertion panics |
| crates.io (Rust) | surrealdb | CVE-2026-121417 (RUSTSEC-2026-0453 / GHSA-pm86-cc75-q463) | High | < 3.3.0 | 3.3.0 (commit 8156ff691b18) | Use-after-free on TransactionInner through a leaked affinitypool::spawn_local future |
| crates.io (Rust) | surrealdb-core | RUSTSEC-2026-0454 (GHSA-m9qr-4rcq-3jhc) | High | < 4.0.0 per one source; <= 3.3.0 with reblessive 0.4.3 per the other | 4.0.0 (commit 75407c4bccc6) | Data race and double free through unsound Send/Sync in reblessive |
| crates.io (Rust) | surrealkv | RUSTSEC-2026-0452 (GHSA-9fm9-c4h4-8g93) | High | < 1.2.0 | 1.2.0 | Release-build usize underflow (len - 8) and 8-byte out-of-bounds heap read in InternalKeyRef::from_encoded and BlockIterator on keys shorter than 16 bytes |
| crates.io (Rust) | actix-http, actix-web | RUSTSEC-2026-0446 (GHSA-2q7f-mf9f-5qhr), RUSTSEC-2026-0455 (GHSA-7p9w-p5qm-5gc5), RUSTSEC-2026-0447 / 0448 (GHSA-qph8-7859-gq2f) | High | actix-http < 3.20.3, actix-web < 4.18.2 | actix-http 3.20.3, actix-web 4.18.2 | Bare-LF chunked trailer request smuggling; 1 GiB large-window Brotli allocation from an 850-byte payload; unbounded decompression before extractor limits |
| crates.io (Rust) | actix-files | RUSTSEC-2026-0443 (GHSA-8hcm-m7r7-frwc) | High | < 0.7.4 | 0.7.4 | Hidden dotfile (.env, .git/config) disclosure on Windows through 8.3 short names (ENV~1, GIT~1) |
| crates.io (Rust) | vodozemac | RUSTSEC-2026-0445 (GHSA-mxcm-mrw6-c446), RUSTSEC-2026-0451 (GHSA-v27v-f96q-qhjq) | Medium | <= 0.11.1 | 0.11.2 | Missing HKDF output zeroization in the Olm root key ratchet; default zeroize features disabled in chacha20poly1305 / sha2 / hmac |
| crates.io (Rust) | ocipkg | RUSTSEC-2026-0450 | High / Medium | <= 0.4.0 | 0.4.1 | index.json ref.name ".." allows arbitrary directory deletion and write |
| crates.io (Rust) | azure_security_keyvault_* | RUSTSEC-2026-0437..0439 | High / Medium | 0.10.0..1.0.0 | 1.0.1 | A rejected WWW-Authenticate challenge poisons the scope cache |
The source that covered ocipkg and the Azure crates gave one combined “High / Medium” severity for both and did not say which applies to which.
Technical analysis
1. Kyverno < 1.19.2: how namespaced policies escaped to cluster-admin and bypassed verifyImages
Kyverno’s admission, background, and cleanup controllers hold broad cluster RBAC so they can validate, mutate, generate, and clean up resources. For multi-tenancy to be safe, every context lookup, CEL call, and mutation target in a namespaced policy has to stay inside that policy’s namespace. In Kyverno < 1.19.2, several gaps between validation and execution broke that rule:
- Path-parser mismatch in
APICall.Fetch()(CVE-2026-122310, CVSS 9.9, andCVE-2026-122312). To stop a namespacedPolicyfrom reading cluster-wide secrets throughcontext[].apiCall.urlPath, Kyverno matchedurlPathagainst^/api(s)?/.*?/namespaces/([^/]+)/?.*$. Butpath.Clean()treats?and#as ordinary filename characters and folds../segments across them.client-goparses the URI and drops fragments or splits queries before it sends the request. After checking the cleaned path,Fetch()executed the rawurlPath. So paths such as/api/v1/namespaces/tenant-a/pods?#../../../../secretsor/api/v1/namespaces/tenant/pods#../../secretspassed the namespace regex and reached cluster-wide endpoints.Fetch()also failed to block/api/v1/namespaces/<name>, which is the cluster-scopedNamespaceobject itself. In PR#17984,pkg/engine/apicall/path.goaddscanonicalizeURLPath()so validation and execution use the same parsed path.apiCall.goaddsnamespaceObjectPathRegex(^/api/[^/]+/namespaces/[^/]+(/(status|finalize))?/?$) to rejectNamespaceobjects. path.Jointraversal in CELresource.get()andresource.post()(CVE-2026-122311, CVSS 9.9). Inpkg/cel/libs/context.go,GetResource(),ListResources(), andPostResource()passed policy-suppliedapiVersion,resource, andsubresourcesstrings straight toclient-go’s dynamic client.(*rest.Request).AbsPath()joins path segments withpath.Join(), so..or/insideresource(for example in aNamespacedValidatingPolicy, versions1.16.0through1.19.1) left/namespaces/<tenant>/and read or created arbitrary cluster resources as the admission controller’sServiceAccount. PR#17984addspkg/clients/dclient/path_segment.go(ValidatePathSegment), which rejects.,.., and/in every GVR, namespace, resource, and subresource segment.- Nil policy in
CleanupPolicycontext loading (CVE-2026-122304, CVSS 9.9; PRs#17984and#18021). Inpkg/controllers/cleanup/controller.go,cleanup()built its context loader withnilinstead ofpolicy:
--- a/pkg/controllers/cleanup/controller.go
+++ b/pkg/controllers/cleanup/controller.go
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ func (c *controller) cleanup(ctx context.Context, logger logr.Logger, policy kyv
}
enginectx := enginecontext.NewContext(c.jp)
ctxFactory := factories.DefaultContextLoaderFactory(c.cmResolver, factories.WithGlobalContextStore(c.gctxStore))
- loader := ctxFactory(nil, kyvernov1.Rule{})
+ loader := ctxFactory(policy, kyvernov1.Rule{})
With policy set to nil, the loader treated every namespaced CleanupPolicy as cluster-scoped. A namespace admin could use context.apiCall or globalReference to read Secrets in other namespaces, or mutate validatingwebhookconfigurations, with the cleanup controller’s ServiceAccount.
- Fabricated
metadata.namespaceinNamespacedMutatingPolicytargets (CVE-2026-122303andCVE-2026-122313, CVSS 9.9). When aNamespacedMutatingPolicymutate-existingrule usedtargetMatchConstraints.expression, a tenant could return a CEL map literal with"namespace": "kube-system"or another tenant’s namespace, for example to target aSecretorRoleBindingthere. The background controller applied the mutation or overwrite without checking that the target was in the policy’s namespace. - Controller RBAC checked instead of author RBAC in
generaterules (CVE-2026-122302, CVSS 9.8). Admission checked the Kyverno controller’s permissions to create the generated resource, not the policy author’sUserInfo, and accepted dynamic variables ingenerate.kindandgenerate.namespace. - Tag-keyed
verifyImagescache (CVE-2026-122321, CVSS 9.1). In Kyverno1.18.0through1.19.1,generateKey()inpkg/image/verification/cache/client.go(PR#17994) keyed cached verdicts onimageRef, even whenimageRefwas a mutable tag such asregistry.example.com/app:latest. After a signed image warmed the cache for a tag, an attacker who pushed an unsigned image to the same tag before the entry expired hit the cache, skipped Cosign/Notary signature and attestation checks, and hadmutateDigestpin the unverified digest into the admitted Pod. PR#17994addsisDigestRef()so only digest-pinned references (repo@sha256:...) are cached:
// pkg/image/verification/cache/client.go in Kyverno 1.19.2 (PR #17994)
// isDigestRef reports whether imageRef is pinned to a digest (either
// "repo@sha256:d" or "repo:tag@sha256:d"). Only such references are immutable
// enough to key a verification verdict; a bare tag can be moved by the
// registry after the entry is written.
func isDigestRef(imageRef string) bool {
_, err := name.NewDigest(imageRef)
return err == nil
}
2. SurrealDB 3.3.0 / 4.0.0 and SurrealKV 1.2.0 (CVE-2026-121417 / RUSTSEC-2026-0453, RUSTSEC-2026-0454, RUSTSEC-2026-0452)
surrealkv < 1.2.0 (RUSTSEC-2026-0452 / GHSA-9fm9-c4h4-8g93). Every internal key in an LSM SSTable block ends with an 8-byte trailer: a 7-byte sequence number and a 1-byte kind. InternalKeyRef::from_encoded() only checked debug_assert!(encoded.len() >= 16), which is compiled out of --release builds. It then passed len - 8 or len - 16 to read_u64_be(), which did raw pointer arithmetic: unsafe { u64::from_be_bytes(*(buffer.as_ptr().add(offset) as *const [u8; 8])) }. BlockIterator::seek_next_entry() never checked that a decoded key was at least 8 bytes long. On a corrupted or crafted block with a key shorter than 8 bytes, len - 8 wrapped around to near usize::MAX, and buffer.as_ptr().add(offset) read 8 bytes before the heap allocation. Commit ac642f945d63 (PR #497) replaces the pointer read with bounds-checked slice indexing and rejects keys shorter than INTERNAL_KEY_TRAILER_SIZE (8) during block iteration:
--- a/src/lib.rs
+++ b/src/lib.rs
@@ -983,12 +983,22 @@
+pub(crate) const INTERNAL_KEY_TRAILER_SIZE: usize = 8;
+
#[inline(always)]
fn read_u64_be(buffer: &[u8], offset: usize) -> u64 {
- // SAFETY: Caller must ensure buffer has at least offset + 8 bytes
- unsafe { u64::from_be_bytes(*(buffer.as_ptr().add(offset) as *const [u8; 8])) }
+ match buffer.get(offset..).and_then(|rest| rest.get(..8)) {
+ Some(bytes) => u64::from_be_bytes(bytes.try_into().expect("slice of 8 bytes")),
+ None => 0,
+ }
}
surrealdb < 3.3.0 (CVE-2026-121417 / RUSTSEC-2026-0453 / GHSA-pm86-cc75-q463). The kv-mem, kv-surrealkv, and kv-rocksdb backends sent closures that borrowed non-'static transaction state (tokio::sync::MutexGuard<Option<TransactionInner>>, &Transaction, and rocksdb_snapshot_t*) to worker threads through affinitypool::spawn_local. In affinitypool 0.7.0, spawn_local erased the lifetime with async_task::Builder::spawn_unchecked. It relied on the returned future’s Drop to block until the worker finished. If safe code leaked that future (mem::forget, Box::leak, or a reference cycle), the caller’s stack frame freed the Transaction and the Mutex while the worker was still reading and unlocking them. SurrealDB 3.3.0 (commit 8156ff691b18) upgrades affinitypool to 0.8.0.
surrealdb-core (RUSTSEC-2026-0454 / GHSA-m9qr-4rcq-3jhc). reblessive 0.4.3 declared Stack, TreeStack, and Runner as unsafe impl Send and Sync while storing non-Send futures in a bump allocator. Concurrent polling (for example concurrent drive_top_task calls) or moving them across threads could run pop_dealloc() twice, a double free, from safe code. Commit 75407c4bccc6 removes reblessive from surrealdb-core.
Version note. The two sweeps disagree on which surrealdb-core release carries this fix. One lists affected versions as < 4.0.0 and the fix as 4.0.0, citing the RUSTSEC-2026-0454 advisory file. The other lists affected versions as <= 3.3.0 (with reblessive 0.4.3) and the fix as “3.3.0 / commit 75407c4bccc6”. Its <= 3.3.0 range means 3.3.0 itself is still affected, which fits 4.0.0. This article follows the advisory: use surrealdb-core >= 4.0.0 for RUSTSEC-2026-0454. surrealdb >= 3.3.0 is enough for RUSTSEC-2026-0453.
3. Actix Web 4.18.2, actix-http 3.20.3, and actix-files 0.7.4 (RUSTSEC-2026-0446, 0455, 0447, 0448, 0443)
Bare-LF chunked smuggling, actix-http < 3.20.2 (RUSTSEC-2026-0446 / GHSA-2q7f-mf9f-5qhr). After reading the terminating 0\r\n of a chunked body, ChunkedState::read_end_cr() in actix-http/src/h1/chunked.rs checked whether the next byte was \r, meaning an empty trailer block (\r\n). Anything else matched _ => Poll::Ready(Ok(ChunkedState::Trailer)), including a bare \n. Behind a reverse proxy that reuses backend connections, an attacker could send 0\r\n\n followed by a pipelined request. actix-http then consumed the second request’s headers as chunk trailers, up to the next \r\n\r\n, and parsed its body as a new HTTP request. Commit feed12e9ec59 rejects a bare \n:
--- a/actix-http/src/h1/chunked.rs
+++ b/actix-http/src/h1/chunked.rs
@@ -217,6 +217,10 @@ impl ChunkedState {
fn read_end_cr(rdr: &mut BytesMut) -> Poll<Result<ChunkedState, io::Error>> {
match byte!(rdr) {
b'\r' => Poll::Ready(Ok(ChunkedState::EndLf)),
+ b'\n' => Poll::Ready(Err(io::Error::new(
+ io::ErrorKind::InvalidData,
+ "Invalid chunk end CR",
+ ))),
_ => Poll::Ready(Ok(ChunkedState::Trailer)),
}
}
Large-window Brotli, actix-http < 3.20.3 (RUSTSEC-2026-0455 / GHSA-7p9w-p5qm-5gc5). The compress-brotli feature is on by default in actix-web. Decoder set up brotli::Decompressor with large-window Brotli enabled. An 850-byte Content-Encoding: br request whose Brotli header declares a large-window distance made brotli allocate a ~1 GiB internal ring buffer. That happened before body extractors (Bytes, String, Json, Form), route handlers, or authentication ran, and before enough decompressed output existed to trip the body limit. Commit 41b54d23ea04 (actix-http 3.20.1 / actix-web 4.18.2, for RUSTSEC-2026-0447 / 0448) wired extractor limits into Decoder::limit(). That was not enough on its own. Commit 61c6a15c1c0e (actix-http 3.20.3) turns off large-window Brotli decoding.
Windows 8.3 short names, actix-files < 0.7.4 (RUSTSEC-2026-0443 / GHSA-8hcm-m7r7-frwc). On Windows, actix-files did not resolve 8.3 short-name aliases such as ENV~1 and GIT~1. Requests using them got .env and .git/config even with hidden files disabled. The fix is commit f2c83122d244.
4. Other Rust advisories: vodozemac, ocipkg, and Azure Key Vault
vodozemac <= 0.11.1(Matrix’s cryptographic library;RUSTSEC-2026-0445/GHSA-mxcm-mrw6-c446andRUSTSEC-2026-0451/GHSA-v27v-f96q-qhjq, Medium): HKDF output in the Olm root key ratchet was not zeroized, and the defaultzeroizefeatures were disabled inchacha20poly1305,sha2, andhmac. Fixed in0.11.2.ocipkg <= 0.4.0(RUSTSEC-2026-0450): aref.nameof".."inindex.jsonallows arbitrary directory deletion and writes. Fixed in0.4.1. The project is archived, so moving tooci-clientis the longer-term option.azure_security_keyvault_*0.10.0..1.0.0(azure_security_keyvault_secrets,_keys,_certificates;RUSTSEC-2026-0437to0439): a rejectedWWW-Authenticatechallenge poisons the scope cache. Fixed in1.0.1.
Detection and remediation
# 1. Check Kyverno controller image versions (< v1.19.2)
kubectl get deploy -n kyverno -o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.metadata.name}{"\t"}{.spec.template.spec.containers[*].image}{"\n"}{end}' 2>/dev/null || true
# 2a. Flag suspicious namespaced policies (fragments, queries, or ".." in paths; mutate-existing targets)
kubectl get policies,cleanuppolicies,namespacedvalidatingpolicies,namespacedmutatingpolicies -A -o yaml 2>/dev/null | \
rg -n 'urlPath:.*[?#]|\.\.|mutateExisting|targetMatchConstraints' || true
# 2b. List every namespaced policy that uses apiCall, globalReference, or CEL resource lookups
kubectl get policies,cleanuppolicies,namespacedvalidatingpolicies,namespacedmutatingpolicies -A -o yaml 2>/dev/null | \
rg -n 'apiCall|globalReference|urlPath|targetMatchConstraints|resource\.(get|post)' || true
# 3. Check Cargo.lock for the affected Rust crates
rg -n -A 2 'name = "(surrealdb|surrealdb-core|surrealkv|affinitypool|reblessive|actix-http|actix-web|actix-files|vodozemac|ocipkg|azure_security_keyvault_(secrets|keys|certificates))"' Cargo.lock 2>/dev/null
- Upgrade Kyverno to
>= v1.19.2(Helm chart>= 3.9.2) through your Helm release or manifests. Audit existing namespacedPolicy,CleanupPolicy,NamespacedValidatingPolicy, andNamespacedMutatingPolicyobjects in tenant namespaces for..,?, or#inapiCall.urlPathor CELresource.*calls. Make sureverifyImagespolicies usemutateDigest: trueor digest-pinned image references. Untilv1.19.2is running, limit RBAC permission to create namespaced policies to trusted operators. - Upgrade Actix:
actix-web >= 4.18.2,actix-http >= 3.20.3, andactix-files >= 0.7.4. If you cannot redeploy right away, blockContent-Encoding: brat your reverse proxy (nginx, Envoy, Cloudflare) to stop the 1 GiB large-window Brotli allocation (RUSTSEC-2026-0455). - Upgrade SurrealDB:
surrealdb >= 3.3.0(affinitypool >= 0.8.0) forRUSTSEC-2026-0453,surrealdb-core >= 4.0.0forRUSTSEC-2026-0454, andsurrealkv >= 1.2.0. - Upgrade the other crates:
vodozemac >= 0.11.2,ocipkg >= 0.4.1(or migrate tooci-client), andazure_security_keyvault_secrets/_keys/_certificates>= 1.0.1.
Timeline
- 2026-10-20 (
23:50 UTC): Kyverno tagsv1.19.2ahead of coordinated disclosure, with fixes for 24 GitHub Security Advisories across PRs#17937,#17938,#17984,#17987,#17989,#17991,#17994,#17996,#18014, and#18021. - 2026-11-03: SurrealDB and SurrealKV merge fixes for
RUSTSEC-2026-0452(ac642f945d63) andRUSTSEC-2026-0454(75407c4bccc6). - 2026-11-04 to 2026-11-05: GitHub publishes the Kyverno security advisories. RustSec publishes
RUSTSEC-2026-0437..0439for the Azure Key Vault Rust crates. - 2026-11-05 (
03:17 UTC): NVD publishes the Kyverno CVEs (see the note on counts in the TL;DR). - 2026-11-06 (
12:43to15:30 UTC): Actix merges and releasesactix-http 3.20.1to3.20.3,actix-web 4.18.2, andactix-files 0.7.4. (One sweep lists onlyactix-http 3.20.2and3.20.3in this window.) RustSec assignsRUSTSEC-2026-0443throughRUSTSEC-2026-0455across Actix, SurrealDB,ocipkg, andvodozemac.
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References
- Kyverno v1.19.2 Release Notes and Security Advisories (GHSA-jcw5-3wcg-fqx5, GHSA-p58h-r4j3-h5vx, GHSA-3xfv-vq8x-qhg4, GHSA-4pqm-wqq6-h9q2, GHSA-f96w-622v-rqpq, GHSA-q62c-r9v2-cf64, GHSA-2r43-6962-xcw5)
- NVD: CVE-2026-122303, CVE-2026-122304, CVE-2026-122310, CVE-2026-122311, CVE-2026-122313, CVE-2026-122302, and CVE-2026-122321
- Kyverno PR #17984 and PR #17994: API path validation, namespace confinement, and verifyImages digest-keyed cache
- RustSec Advisory RUSTSEC-2026-0453 / CVE-2026-121417 (surrealdb)
- RustSec Advisory RUSTSEC-2026-0454 (surrealdb-core) in rustsec/advisory-db
- SurrealKV fix commit ac642f945d63c9c9f7ad35f480995fd516f83fb6 (PR #497) and SurrealDB commits 8156ff691b18 and 75407c4bccc6
- RustSec Advisories RUSTSEC-2026-0443 (actix-files), RUSTSEC-2026-0446, RUSTSEC-2026-0447, RUSTSEC-2026-0448, and RUSTSEC-2026-0455 (actix-http / actix-web)
- RustSec Advisory RUSTSEC-2026-0455 (actix-http) in rustsec/advisory-db
- actix-web commit feed12e9ec59 (bare LF chunked trailer smuggling)
- actix-web commit 61c6a15c1c0e (large-window Brotli)