critical

CVE

CVE-2026-122302, CVE-2026-122303, CVE-2026-122304, CVE-2026-122310, CVE-2026-122311, CVE-2026-122313, CVE-2026-122321, CVE-2026-121417

CWE

CWE-269, CWE-863, CWE-22, CWE-347, CWE-416, CWE-400, CWE-444

Affected Surface

  • CNCF Kyverno (`github.com/kyverno/kyverno`) versions `< 1.19.2` (`CVE-2026-122302`, `CVE-2026-122303`, `CVE-2026-122304`, `CVE-2026-122310`, `CVE-2026-122311`, `CVE-2026-122313`, and `CVE-2026-122321`, plus companion CVEs up to `CVE-2026-122323`; 24 GitHub Security Advisories in total, fixed in `v1.19.2`)
  • Rust crates `surrealdb` `< 3.3.0` (`CVE-2026-121417` / `RUSTSEC-2026-0453` / `GHSA-pm86-cc75-q463`), `surrealdb-core` with `reblessive 0.4.3` (`RUSTSEC-2026-0454` / `GHSA-m9qr-4rcq-3jhc`; listed as `< 4.0.0` in one source and `<= 3.3.0` in the other), and `surrealkv` `< 1.2.0` (`RUSTSEC-2026-0452` / `GHSA-9fm9-c4h4-8g93`)
  • Rust crates `actix-http` `< 3.20.3` (`RUSTSEC-2026-0446` / `GHSA-2q7f-mf9f-5qhr`, `RUSTSEC-2026-0448` / `GHSA-qph8-7859-gq2f`, `RUSTSEC-2026-0455` / `GHSA-7p9w-p5qm-5gc5`), `actix-web` `< 4.18.2` (`RUSTSEC-2026-0447`), and `actix-files` `< 0.7.4` (`RUSTSEC-2026-0443` / `GHSA-8hcm-m7r7-frwc`)
  • Rust crate `vodozemac` `<= 0.11.1` (`RUSTSEC-2026-0445` / `GHSA-mxcm-mrw6-c446` and `RUSTSEC-2026-0451` / `GHSA-v27v-f96q-qhjq`, fixed in `0.11.2`)
  • Rust crates `ocipkg` `<= 0.4.0` (`RUSTSEC-2026-0450`, fixed in `0.4.1`) and `azure_security_keyvault_*` `0.10.0`..`1.0.0` (`RUSTSEC-2026-0437` to `0439`, fixed in `1.0.1`)

TL;DR

On 5 and 6 November 2026, NVD, the GitHub Advisory Database, and the RustSec Advisory Database published fixes that matter for multi-tenant Kubernetes clusters and Rust backend services:

  1. Kyverno < 1.19.2: namespace escapes and an image-verification bypass. Kyverno v1.19.2 fixes 24 GitHub Security Advisories. The matching CVEs run from CVE-2026-122302 to CVE-2026-122323 (see the note on counts below). In clusters where namespace admins can create namespaced Kyverno policies (Policy, CleanupPolicy, NamespacedValidatingPolicy, NamespacedMutatingPolicy), six CVSS 9.8 to 9.9 Critical flaws let a tenant read, mutate, or generate resources in other namespaces or cluster-wide, using Kyverno’s privileged controller ServiceAccounts:

    • CVE-2026-122310 (and CVE-2026-122312): apiCall.urlPath was checked after path.Clean but sent raw, so ? and # fragments hid ../ traversal.
    • CVE-2026-122311: .. segments in CEL resource.get() / resource.post() escaped the namespace through path.Join.
    • CVE-2026-122303 and CVE-2026-122313: NamespacedMutatingPolicy targets could name another namespace.
    • CVE-2026-122304: the cleanup controller loaded context with a nil policy, so CleanupPolicy had no namespace confinement.
    • CVE-2026-122302: generate rules checked the controller’s RBAC, not the policy author’s.

    Separately, CVE-2026-122321 (CVSS 9.1 Critical) let an attacker who can move a registry tag bypass verifyImages signature and attestation checks, because Kyverno keyed its verification cache on the tag instead of the verified digest.

  2. SurrealDB 3.3.0 / 4.0.0 and SurrealKV 1.2.0: memory corruption from safe Rust. RustSec published three advisories on 6 November. None needs unsafe at the call site. Lifetime erasure in affinitypool 0.7.0 causes a use-after-free on a tokio::sync::Mutex when a future is leaked (CVE-2026-121417 / RUSTSEC-2026-0453). Unsound Send/Sync in reblessive 0.4.3 causes double frees (RUSTSEC-2026-0454). A debug_assert!(encoded.len() >= 16) that release builds strip out lets SSTable key decoding read 8 bytes before the heap buffer (RUSTSEC-2026-0452).

  3. Actix Web 4.18.2, actix-http 3.20.3, and actix-files 0.7.4 (RUSTSEC-2026-0443, 0446, 0447, 0448, 0455). In actix-http < 3.20.3, which Actix Web uses by default, a single 850-byte Brotli request could allocate ~1 GiB before extractor limits or route authentication ran (RUSTSEC-2026-0455). In actix-http < 3.20.2, a bare \n after the final 0\r\n chunk enabled HTTP request smuggling (RUSTSEC-2026-0446). On Windows, actix-files < 0.7.4 served .env and .git/config through 8.3 short names (ENV~1, GIT~1, RUSTSEC-2026-0443).

  4. Other Rust advisories in the same window. vodozemac <= 0.11.1 (RUSTSEC-2026-0445, RUSTSEC-2026-0451), ocipkg <= 0.4.0 (RUSTSEC-2026-0450), and azure_security_keyvault_* 0.10.0..1.0.0 (RUSTSEC-2026-0437 to 0439).

What to do now: Upgrade Kyverno to >= v1.19.2, surrealdb to >= 3.3.0, surrealdb-core to >= 4.0.0 (see the version note in section 2), surrealkv to >= 1.2.0, actix-web to >= 4.18.2, actix-http to >= 3.20.3, actix-files to >= 0.7.4, vodozemac to >= 0.11.2, ocipkg to >= 0.4.1 (or move to oci-client, because ocipkg is now archived), and the azure_security_keyvault_* crates to >= 1.0.1.

A note on the Kyverno counts. The two research sweeps behind this roundup disagree. One counts 21 CVEs, CVE-2026-122302 through CVE-2026-122323, though the IDs it lists cover all 22 numbers in that range. The other counts 24 GitHub Security Advisories and gives the CVE range as CVE-2026-122302 through CVE-2026-122321. Both agree that v1.19.2 closes 24 GitHub Security Advisories. Some CVEs map to more than one GHSA (CVE-2026-122304 has two). The Kyverno v1.19.2 release notes hold the authoritative list.

Affected packages and advisories

EcosystemPackage / ProjectAdvisory / CVESeverityAffected versionsFixed versionSummary
Go / Kubernetesgithub.com/kyverno/kyvernoCVE-2026-122303 (GHSA-jcw5-3wcg-fqx5), CVE-2026-122313 (GHSA-f96w-622v-rqpq)CVSS 9.9 Critical>= 1.17.0, < 1.19.21.19.2NamespacedMutatingPolicy targetMatchConstraints.expression CEL map literal overwrites or mutates resources in any namespace
Go / Kubernetesgithub.com/kyverno/kyvernoCVE-2026-122304 (GHSA-p58h-r4j3-h5vx, GHSA-rcxg-3f92-3mgr)CVSS 9.9 Critical>= 1.17.0, < 1.19.21.19.2Cleanup controller calls ctxFactory(nil, ...), so namespaced CleanupPolicy apiCall / globalReference escape namespace confinement
Go / Kubernetesgithub.com/kyverno/kyvernoCVE-2026-122310 (GHSA-3xfv-vq8x-qhg4), CVE-2026-122312, CVE-2026-122311 (GHSA-4pqm-wqq6-h9q2)CVSS 9.9 Critical>= 1.16.0, < 1.19.2 (122310 in 1.19.1)1.19.2context.apiCall.urlPath #/? fragment ../ differential; resource.get()/resource.post() .. traversal in namespaced CEL policies
Go / Kubernetesgithub.com/kyverno/kyvernoCVE-2026-122302 (GHSA-q62c-r9v2-cf64)CVSS 9.8 Critical< 1.19.21.19.2Generate-rule admission checks controller RBAC instead of author RBAC
Go / Kubernetesgithub.com/kyverno/kyvernoCVE-2026-122321 (GHSA-2r43-6962-xcw5)CVSS 9.1 Critical>= 1.18.0, < 1.19.21.19.2verifyImages cache keyed by mutable image tag instead of digest
Go / Kubernetesgithub.com/kyverno/kyvernoCVE-2026-122305..122309, 122314..122320, 122322, 122323CVSS 7.5 to 8.5 High< 1.19.21.19.2SAN-less certificate bypass (CVE-2026-122318), attestation zip bombs (122322 / 122323), and type-assertion panics
crates.io (Rust)surrealdbCVE-2026-121417 (RUSTSEC-2026-0453 / GHSA-pm86-cc75-q463)High< 3.3.03.3.0 (commit 8156ff691b18)Use-after-free on TransactionInner through a leaked affinitypool::spawn_local future
crates.io (Rust)surrealdb-coreRUSTSEC-2026-0454 (GHSA-m9qr-4rcq-3jhc)High< 4.0.0 per one source; <= 3.3.0 with reblessive 0.4.3 per the other4.0.0 (commit 75407c4bccc6)Data race and double free through unsound Send/Sync in reblessive
crates.io (Rust)surrealkvRUSTSEC-2026-0452 (GHSA-9fm9-c4h4-8g93)High< 1.2.01.2.0Release-build usize underflow (len - 8) and 8-byte out-of-bounds heap read in InternalKeyRef::from_encoded and BlockIterator on keys shorter than 16 bytes
crates.io (Rust)actix-http, actix-webRUSTSEC-2026-0446 (GHSA-2q7f-mf9f-5qhr), RUSTSEC-2026-0455 (GHSA-7p9w-p5qm-5gc5), RUSTSEC-2026-0447 / 0448 (GHSA-qph8-7859-gq2f)Highactix-http < 3.20.3, actix-web < 4.18.2actix-http 3.20.3, actix-web 4.18.2Bare-LF chunked trailer request smuggling; 1 GiB large-window Brotli allocation from an 850-byte payload; unbounded decompression before extractor limits
crates.io (Rust)actix-filesRUSTSEC-2026-0443 (GHSA-8hcm-m7r7-frwc)High< 0.7.40.7.4Hidden dotfile (.env, .git/config) disclosure on Windows through 8.3 short names (ENV~1, GIT~1)
crates.io (Rust)vodozemacRUSTSEC-2026-0445 (GHSA-mxcm-mrw6-c446), RUSTSEC-2026-0451 (GHSA-v27v-f96q-qhjq)Medium<= 0.11.10.11.2Missing HKDF output zeroization in the Olm root key ratchet; default zeroize features disabled in chacha20poly1305 / sha2 / hmac
crates.io (Rust)ocipkgRUSTSEC-2026-0450High / Medium<= 0.4.00.4.1index.json ref.name ".." allows arbitrary directory deletion and write
crates.io (Rust)azure_security_keyvault_*RUSTSEC-2026-0437..0439High / Medium0.10.0..1.0.01.0.1A rejected WWW-Authenticate challenge poisons the scope cache

The source that covered ocipkg and the Azure crates gave one combined “High / Medium” severity for both and did not say which applies to which.

Technical analysis

1. Kyverno < 1.19.2: how namespaced policies escaped to cluster-admin and bypassed verifyImages

Kyverno’s admission, background, and cleanup controllers hold broad cluster RBAC so they can validate, mutate, generate, and clean up resources. For multi-tenancy to be safe, every context lookup, CEL call, and mutation target in a namespaced policy has to stay inside that policy’s namespace. In Kyverno < 1.19.2, several gaps between validation and execution broke that rule:

  1. Path-parser mismatch in APICall.Fetch() (CVE-2026-122310, CVSS 9.9, and CVE-2026-122312). To stop a namespaced Policy from reading cluster-wide secrets through context[].apiCall.urlPath, Kyverno matched urlPath against ^/api(s)?/.*?/namespaces/([^/]+)/?.*$. But path.Clean() treats ? and # as ordinary filename characters and folds ../ segments across them. client-go parses the URI and drops fragments or splits queries before it sends the request. After checking the cleaned path, Fetch() executed the raw urlPath. So paths such as /api/v1/namespaces/tenant-a/pods?#../../../../secrets or /api/v1/namespaces/tenant/pods#../../secrets passed the namespace regex and reached cluster-wide endpoints. Fetch() also failed to block /api/v1/namespaces/<name>, which is the cluster-scoped Namespace object itself. In PR #17984, pkg/engine/apicall/path.go adds canonicalizeURLPath() so validation and execution use the same parsed path. apiCall.go adds namespaceObjectPathRegex (^/api/[^/]+/namespaces/[^/]+(/(status|finalize))?/?$) to reject Namespace objects.
  2. path.Join traversal in CEL resource.get() and resource.post() (CVE-2026-122311, CVSS 9.9). In pkg/cel/libs/context.go, GetResource(), ListResources(), and PostResource() passed policy-supplied apiVersion, resource, and subresources strings straight to client-go’s dynamic client. (*rest.Request).AbsPath() joins path segments with path.Join(), so .. or / inside resource (for example in a NamespacedValidatingPolicy, versions 1.16.0 through 1.19.1) left /namespaces/<tenant>/ and read or created arbitrary cluster resources as the admission controller’s ServiceAccount. PR #17984 adds pkg/clients/dclient/path_segment.go (ValidatePathSegment), which rejects ., .., and / in every GVR, namespace, resource, and subresource segment.
  3. Nil policy in CleanupPolicy context loading (CVE-2026-122304, CVSS 9.9; PRs #17984 and #18021). In pkg/controllers/cleanup/controller.go, cleanup() built its context loader with nil instead of policy:
--- a/pkg/controllers/cleanup/controller.go
+++ b/pkg/controllers/cleanup/controller.go
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ func (c *controller) cleanup(ctx context.Context, logger logr.Logger, policy kyv
 	}
 	enginectx := enginecontext.NewContext(c.jp)
 	ctxFactory := factories.DefaultContextLoaderFactory(c.cmResolver, factories.WithGlobalContextStore(c.gctxStore))
-	loader := ctxFactory(nil, kyvernov1.Rule{})
+	loader := ctxFactory(policy, kyvernov1.Rule{})

With policy set to nil, the loader treated every namespaced CleanupPolicy as cluster-scoped. A namespace admin could use context.apiCall or globalReference to read Secrets in other namespaces, or mutate validatingwebhookconfigurations, with the cleanup controller’s ServiceAccount.

  1. Fabricated metadata.namespace in NamespacedMutatingPolicy targets (CVE-2026-122303 and CVE-2026-122313, CVSS 9.9). When a NamespacedMutatingPolicy mutate-existing rule used targetMatchConstraints.expression, a tenant could return a CEL map literal with "namespace": "kube-system" or another tenant’s namespace, for example to target a Secret or RoleBinding there. The background controller applied the mutation or overwrite without checking that the target was in the policy’s namespace.
  2. Controller RBAC checked instead of author RBAC in generate rules (CVE-2026-122302, CVSS 9.8). Admission checked the Kyverno controller’s permissions to create the generated resource, not the policy author’s UserInfo, and accepted dynamic variables in generate.kind and generate.namespace.
  3. Tag-keyed verifyImages cache (CVE-2026-122321, CVSS 9.1). In Kyverno 1.18.0 through 1.19.1, generateKey() in pkg/image/verification/cache/client.go (PR #17994) keyed cached verdicts on imageRef, even when imageRef was a mutable tag such as registry.example.com/app:latest. After a signed image warmed the cache for a tag, an attacker who pushed an unsigned image to the same tag before the entry expired hit the cache, skipped Cosign/Notary signature and attestation checks, and had mutateDigest pin the unverified digest into the admitted Pod. PR #17994 adds isDigestRef() so only digest-pinned references (repo@sha256:...) are cached:
// pkg/image/verification/cache/client.go in Kyverno 1.19.2 (PR #17994)
// isDigestRef reports whether imageRef is pinned to a digest (either
// "repo@sha256:d" or "repo:tag@sha256:d"). Only such references are immutable
// enough to key a verification verdict; a bare tag can be moved by the
// registry after the entry is written.
func isDigestRef(imageRef string) bool {
	_, err := name.NewDigest(imageRef)
	return err == nil
}

2. SurrealDB 3.3.0 / 4.0.0 and SurrealKV 1.2.0 (CVE-2026-121417 / RUSTSEC-2026-0453, RUSTSEC-2026-0454, RUSTSEC-2026-0452)

surrealkv < 1.2.0 (RUSTSEC-2026-0452 / GHSA-9fm9-c4h4-8g93). Every internal key in an LSM SSTable block ends with an 8-byte trailer: a 7-byte sequence number and a 1-byte kind. InternalKeyRef::from_encoded() only checked debug_assert!(encoded.len() >= 16), which is compiled out of --release builds. It then passed len - 8 or len - 16 to read_u64_be(), which did raw pointer arithmetic: unsafe { u64::from_be_bytes(*(buffer.as_ptr().add(offset) as *const [u8; 8])) }. BlockIterator::seek_next_entry() never checked that a decoded key was at least 8 bytes long. On a corrupted or crafted block with a key shorter than 8 bytes, len - 8 wrapped around to near usize::MAX, and buffer.as_ptr().add(offset) read 8 bytes before the heap allocation. Commit ac642f945d63 (PR #497) replaces the pointer read with bounds-checked slice indexing and rejects keys shorter than INTERNAL_KEY_TRAILER_SIZE (8) during block iteration:

--- a/src/lib.rs
+++ b/src/lib.rs
@@ -983,12 +983,22 @@
+pub(crate) const INTERNAL_KEY_TRAILER_SIZE: usize = 8;
+
 #[inline(always)]
 fn read_u64_be(buffer: &[u8], offset: usize) -> u64 {
-	// SAFETY: Caller must ensure buffer has at least offset + 8 bytes
-	unsafe { u64::from_be_bytes(*(buffer.as_ptr().add(offset) as *const [u8; 8])) }
+	match buffer.get(offset..).and_then(|rest| rest.get(..8)) {
+		Some(bytes) => u64::from_be_bytes(bytes.try_into().expect("slice of 8 bytes")),
+		None => 0,
+	}
 }

surrealdb < 3.3.0 (CVE-2026-121417 / RUSTSEC-2026-0453 / GHSA-pm86-cc75-q463). The kv-mem, kv-surrealkv, and kv-rocksdb backends sent closures that borrowed non-'static transaction state (tokio::sync::MutexGuard<Option<TransactionInner>>, &Transaction, and rocksdb_snapshot_t*) to worker threads through affinitypool::spawn_local. In affinitypool 0.7.0, spawn_local erased the lifetime with async_task::Builder::spawn_unchecked. It relied on the returned future’s Drop to block until the worker finished. If safe code leaked that future (mem::forget, Box::leak, or a reference cycle), the caller’s stack frame freed the Transaction and the Mutex while the worker was still reading and unlocking them. SurrealDB 3.3.0 (commit 8156ff691b18) upgrades affinitypool to 0.8.0.

surrealdb-core (RUSTSEC-2026-0454 / GHSA-m9qr-4rcq-3jhc). reblessive 0.4.3 declared Stack, TreeStack, and Runner as unsafe impl Send and Sync while storing non-Send futures in a bump allocator. Concurrent polling (for example concurrent drive_top_task calls) or moving them across threads could run pop_dealloc() twice, a double free, from safe code. Commit 75407c4bccc6 removes reblessive from surrealdb-core.

Version note. The two sweeps disagree on which surrealdb-core release carries this fix. One lists affected versions as < 4.0.0 and the fix as 4.0.0, citing the RUSTSEC-2026-0454 advisory file. The other lists affected versions as <= 3.3.0 (with reblessive 0.4.3) and the fix as “3.3.0 / commit 75407c4bccc6”. Its <= 3.3.0 range means 3.3.0 itself is still affected, which fits 4.0.0. This article follows the advisory: use surrealdb-core >= 4.0.0 for RUSTSEC-2026-0454. surrealdb >= 3.3.0 is enough for RUSTSEC-2026-0453.

3. Actix Web 4.18.2, actix-http 3.20.3, and actix-files 0.7.4 (RUSTSEC-2026-0446, 0455, 0447, 0448, 0443)

Bare-LF chunked smuggling, actix-http < 3.20.2 (RUSTSEC-2026-0446 / GHSA-2q7f-mf9f-5qhr). After reading the terminating 0\r\n of a chunked body, ChunkedState::read_end_cr() in actix-http/src/h1/chunked.rs checked whether the next byte was \r, meaning an empty trailer block (\r\n). Anything else matched _ => Poll::Ready(Ok(ChunkedState::Trailer)), including a bare \n. Behind a reverse proxy that reuses backend connections, an attacker could send 0\r\n\n followed by a pipelined request. actix-http then consumed the second request’s headers as chunk trailers, up to the next \r\n\r\n, and parsed its body as a new HTTP request. Commit feed12e9ec59 rejects a bare \n:

--- a/actix-http/src/h1/chunked.rs
+++ b/actix-http/src/h1/chunked.rs
@@ -217,6 +217,10 @@ impl ChunkedState {
     fn read_end_cr(rdr: &mut BytesMut) -> Poll<Result<ChunkedState, io::Error>> {
         match byte!(rdr) {
             b'\r' => Poll::Ready(Ok(ChunkedState::EndLf)),
+            b'\n' => Poll::Ready(Err(io::Error::new(
+                io::ErrorKind::InvalidData,
+                "Invalid chunk end CR",
+            ))),
             _ => Poll::Ready(Ok(ChunkedState::Trailer)),
         }
     }

Large-window Brotli, actix-http < 3.20.3 (RUSTSEC-2026-0455 / GHSA-7p9w-p5qm-5gc5). The compress-brotli feature is on by default in actix-web. Decoder set up brotli::Decompressor with large-window Brotli enabled. An 850-byte Content-Encoding: br request whose Brotli header declares a large-window distance made brotli allocate a ~1 GiB internal ring buffer. That happened before body extractors (Bytes, String, Json, Form), route handlers, or authentication ran, and before enough decompressed output existed to trip the body limit. Commit 41b54d23ea04 (actix-http 3.20.1 / actix-web 4.18.2, for RUSTSEC-2026-0447 / 0448) wired extractor limits into Decoder::limit(). That was not enough on its own. Commit 61c6a15c1c0e (actix-http 3.20.3) turns off large-window Brotli decoding.

Windows 8.3 short names, actix-files < 0.7.4 (RUSTSEC-2026-0443 / GHSA-8hcm-m7r7-frwc). On Windows, actix-files did not resolve 8.3 short-name aliases such as ENV~1 and GIT~1. Requests using them got .env and .git/config even with hidden files disabled. The fix is commit f2c83122d244.

4. Other Rust advisories: vodozemac, ocipkg, and Azure Key Vault

  • vodozemac <= 0.11.1 (Matrix’s cryptographic library; RUSTSEC-2026-0445 / GHSA-mxcm-mrw6-c446 and RUSTSEC-2026-0451 / GHSA-v27v-f96q-qhjq, Medium): HKDF output in the Olm root key ratchet was not zeroized, and the default zeroize features were disabled in chacha20poly1305, sha2, and hmac. Fixed in 0.11.2.
  • ocipkg <= 0.4.0 (RUSTSEC-2026-0450): a ref.name of ".." in index.json allows arbitrary directory deletion and writes. Fixed in 0.4.1. The project is archived, so moving to oci-client is the longer-term option.
  • azure_security_keyvault_* 0.10.0..1.0.0 (azure_security_keyvault_secrets, _keys, _certificates; RUSTSEC-2026-0437 to 0439): a rejected WWW-Authenticate challenge poisons the scope cache. Fixed in 1.0.1.

Detection and remediation

# 1. Check Kyverno controller image versions (< v1.19.2)
kubectl get deploy -n kyverno -o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.metadata.name}{"\t"}{.spec.template.spec.containers[*].image}{"\n"}{end}' 2>/dev/null || true

# 2a. Flag suspicious namespaced policies (fragments, queries, or ".." in paths; mutate-existing targets)
kubectl get policies,cleanuppolicies,namespacedvalidatingpolicies,namespacedmutatingpolicies -A -o yaml 2>/dev/null | \
  rg -n 'urlPath:.*[?#]|\.\.|mutateExisting|targetMatchConstraints' || true

# 2b. List every namespaced policy that uses apiCall, globalReference, or CEL resource lookups
kubectl get policies,cleanuppolicies,namespacedvalidatingpolicies,namespacedmutatingpolicies -A -o yaml 2>/dev/null | \
  rg -n 'apiCall|globalReference|urlPath|targetMatchConstraints|resource\.(get|post)' || true

# 3. Check Cargo.lock for the affected Rust crates
rg -n -A 2 'name = "(surrealdb|surrealdb-core|surrealkv|affinitypool|reblessive|actix-http|actix-web|actix-files|vodozemac|ocipkg|azure_security_keyvault_(secrets|keys|certificates))"' Cargo.lock 2>/dev/null
  1. Upgrade Kyverno to >= v1.19.2 (Helm chart >= 3.9.2) through your Helm release or manifests. Audit existing namespaced Policy, CleanupPolicy, NamespacedValidatingPolicy, and NamespacedMutatingPolicy objects in tenant namespaces for .., ?, or # in apiCall.urlPath or CEL resource.* calls. Make sure verifyImages policies use mutateDigest: true or digest-pinned image references. Until v1.19.2 is running, limit RBAC permission to create namespaced policies to trusted operators.
  2. Upgrade Actix: actix-web >= 4.18.2, actix-http >= 3.20.3, and actix-files >= 0.7.4. If you cannot redeploy right away, block Content-Encoding: br at your reverse proxy (nginx, Envoy, Cloudflare) to stop the 1 GiB large-window Brotli allocation (RUSTSEC-2026-0455).
  3. Upgrade SurrealDB: surrealdb >= 3.3.0 (affinitypool >= 0.8.0) for RUSTSEC-2026-0453, surrealdb-core >= 4.0.0 for RUSTSEC-2026-0454, and surrealkv >= 1.2.0.
  4. Upgrade the other crates: vodozemac >= 0.11.2, ocipkg >= 0.4.1 (or migrate to oci-client), and azure_security_keyvault_secrets / _keys / _certificates >= 1.0.1.

Timeline

  • 2026-10-20 (23:50 UTC): Kyverno tags v1.19.2 ahead of coordinated disclosure, with fixes for 24 GitHub Security Advisories across PRs #17937, #17938, #17984, #17987, #17989, #17991, #17994, #17996, #18014, and #18021.
  • 2026-11-03: SurrealDB and SurrealKV merge fixes for RUSTSEC-2026-0452 (ac642f945d63) and RUSTSEC-2026-0454 (75407c4bccc6).
  • 2026-11-04 to 2026-11-05: GitHub publishes the Kyverno security advisories. RustSec publishes RUSTSEC-2026-0437..0439 for the Azure Key Vault Rust crates.
  • 2026-11-05 (03:17 UTC): NVD publishes the Kyverno CVEs (see the note on counts in the TL;DR).
  • 2026-11-06 (12:43 to 15:30 UTC): Actix merges and releases actix-http 3.20.1 to 3.20.3, actix-web 4.18.2, and actix-files 0.7.4. (One sweep lists only actix-http 3.20.2 and 3.20.3 in this window.) RustSec assigns RUSTSEC-2026-0443 through RUSTSEC-2026-0455 across Actix, SurrealDB, ocipkg, and vodozemac.

From research to remediation

Check whether this pattern exists in your codebase

Turn this research into a remediation workflow. Scan dependencies and package manifests for similar supply-chain risk, then prioritize fixes with reachability context.

References