critical

CVE

CVE-2026-122302, CVE-2026-122303, CVE-2026-122304, CVE-2026-122305, CVE-2026-122306, CVE-2026-122307, CVE-2026-122308, CVE-2026-122309, CVE-2026-122310, CVE-2026-122311, CVE-2026-122312, CVE-2026-122313, CVE-2026-122314, CVE-2026-122315, CVE-2026-122316, CVE-2026-122318, CVE-2026-122319, CVE-2026-122320, CVE-2026-122321, CVE-2026-122322, CVE-2026-122323, CVE-2026-124440, CVE-2026-124441, CVE-2026-123570, CVE-2026-123571, CVE-2026-123572, CVE-2026-123573, CVE-2026-123574, CVE-2026-123580, CVE-2026-123587, CVE-2026-123595, CVE-2026-123596, CVE-2026-123601, CVE-2026-123605, CVE-2026-123609, CVE-2026-123610, CVE-2026-123611, CVE-2026-123612, CVE-2026-123613, CVE-2026-121417, CVE-2026-119375, CVE-2023-49092

CWE

CWE-863, CWE-22, CWE-347, CWE-444, CWE-400, CWE-416, CWE-362, CWE-125, CWE-908, CWE-203

Affected Surface

  • Kubernetes clusters running Kyverno versions `< 1.19.2` (`CVE-2026-122302` through `CVE-2026-122323`, `CVE-2026-124440`, and `CVE-2026-124441`, 23 CVEs including seven Critical CVSS `9.1` to `9.9` advisories)
  • Rust applications and DNS resolvers/servers using `hickory-proto` (`0.26.3` current), `hickory-net`, `hickory-resolver`, `hickory-recursor`, or `hickory-server` versions `< 0.26.2` (`CVE-2026-123570` through `CVE-2026-123608`, 39 CVEs including `RUSTSEC-2026-0487` to `0491`, `GHSA-588m-chg6-8jqj`, `GHSA-qw83-5pm2-ggp5`, `GHSA-2vgh-3wfw-qj7c`, and `GHSA-p2jv-r3m3-7wf4`)
  • Rust web services using `actix-http` `< 3.20.3` (`RUSTSEC-2026-0446`, `0448`, `0455`), `actix-web` `< 4.18.2` (`RUSTSEC-2026-0447`), or `actix-files` `< 0.7.4` on Windows (`RUSTSEC-2026-0443`)
  • Rust TLS clients and servers using `rustls` `< 0.23.46` (`CVE-2026-123609` through `CVE-2026-123613`), SurrealDB (`surrealdb < 3.3.0`, `surrealdb-core < 4.0.0`, `surrealkv < 1.2.0`, `RUSTSEC-2026-0452` to `0454`), `libsqlite3-sys` `>= 0.6.0, < 0.39.0` with `bundled` feature (`RUSTSEC-2026-0459` / `CVE-2026-119375`), `sqlcipher-src` `>= 419.0.3, < 420.0.0` (`RUSTSEC-2026-0502` / `CVE-2026-119375`), `rsa` `< 0.10.0` (`RUSTSEC-2023-0071` / `CVE-2023-49092`), Matrix `vodozemac` `<= 0.11.1` (`RUSTSEC-2026-0445`, `0451`), and Azure Key Vault Rust SDK crates (`RUSTSEC-2026-0437` to `0439`)

Update, 12 November 2026 (RUSTSEC-2026-0487..0491 assigned, six hickory-net / hickory-proto DNSSEC advisories merged, and sqlcipher-src RUSTSEC-2026-0502): On 12 November 2026 (07:16 to 09:31 UTC), the RustSec Advisory Database assigned RUSTSEC-2026-0487 (CVE-2026-123572 / GHSA-hx8c-fjhc-hmf5), RUSTSEC-2026-0488 (CVE-2026-123571 / GHSA-x962-5xwx-fr8x), RUSTSEC-2026-0489 (CVE-2026-123573 / GHSA-wgfr-mphw-j5g4), RUSTSEC-2026-0490 (CVE-2026-123574 / GHSA-4rph-pmrw-mwpw), and RUSTSEC-2026-0491 (CVE-2026-123570 / GHSA-67wc-6jq8-ghrc) to the five hickory-proto advisories below, merged six DNSSEC validation advisories across hickory-net (< 0.26.2) and hickory-proto (where DNSSEC validation moved to hickory-net in 0.26.0 with no fix in hickory-proto itself): GHSA-588m-chg6-8jqj / CVE-2026-123601 (inverted NSEC3 wraparound comparison letting the last NSEC3 record in a chain “prove” almost any name does not exist, commits 52f201239c and 11aa0f4025), GHSA-p2jv-r3m3-7wf4 / CVE-2026-123580 (NSEC3 owner zone names not checked against the queried zone, commits 52566db8d6 and 95ee99cfb0), GHSA-qw83-5pm2-ggp5 / CVE-2026-123587 (NSEC wraparound detection trusting an unvalidated SOA record in the response, commit 06d498483e), and GHSA-2vgh-3wfw-qj7c / CVE-2026-123605 (RRSIG signer name not checked against the RRset zone, commit 09844efd80), and published RUSTSEC-2026-0502 (CVE-2026-119375) for sqlcipher-src (>= 419.0.3, < 420.0.0, fixed in 420.0.0 which bundles SQLCipher 4.20.0 / SQLite 3.54.0).

Update, 11 November 2026 (five hickory-proto advisories added to RustSec): On 11 November 2026 (12:08:20 UTC), the RustSec Advisory Database merged five hickory-proto < 0.26.2 advisories so cargo audit flags vulnerable versions directly: GHSA-67wc-6jq8-ghrc (CVE-2026-123570, DNS header ANCOUNT/NSCOUNT/ARCOUNT Vec::with_capacity memory amplification in >= 0.18.0, < 0.26.2, commit 2c684a5d67), GHSA-x962-5xwx-fr8x (CVE-2026-123571, TSIG decode integer underflow panic in >= 0.26.0, < 0.26.2, commit f4f614dcfe), GHSA-4rph-pmrw-mwpw (zone-file lexer assert! panic on tokens of 4,096+ characters in >= 0.24.0, < 0.26.2, commit 45fa0fb940), GHSA-wgfr-mphw-j5g4 (SVCB/HTTPS single-quote parameter value panic in >= 0.20.1, < 0.26.2, commit 44d60d3362), and GHSA-hx8c-fjhc-hmf5 (SVCB/HTTPS alpn parameter parse panic in >= 0.20.1, < 0.26.2, commit 8b9bc20ac9).

TL;DR

Between 5 and 8 November 2026, NVD and the RustSec Advisory Database published a wave of high-impact advisories across Kubernetes policy enforcement and core Rust networking, TLS, web, and database crates:

  1. Kyverno 1.19.2 (23 CVEs published 5 and 8 November, including seven Critical CVSS 9.1 to 9.9 advisories): Multi-tenant Kubernetes clusters that allow namespace admins to author Policy, NamespacedMutatingPolicy, or CleanupPolicy objects were exposed to full cluster escalation through four distinct paths:
    • CVE-2026-122310 (CVSS 9.9 Critical), CVE-2026-124440 (CVSS 9.9 Critical, published 8 November), and CVE-2026-122312 (CVSS 7.7 High): context.apiCall checked namespace confinement against a path.Clean() string that treated ?, #, and malformed percent-escapes (%) as literal path characters, and then executed the raw URLPath. Planting a decoy /namespaces/<tenant>/ segment in a query parameter, fragment, or trailing malformed percent-escape (such as /apis/admissionregistration.k8s.io/v1/mutatingwebhookconfigurations?x=/namespaces/tenant-a/y) passed the namespace clamp and sent the request to a cluster-scoped API endpoint under the admission controller’s ClusterRole.
    • CVE-2026-122311 (CVSS 9.9 Critical): Namespaced CEL policies calling resource.get(), resource.post(), or resource.list() passed unvalidated resource, subresource, and name arguments into client-go’s (*rest.Request).AbsPath(), which resolves .. segments and let policies escape their namespace.
    • CVE-2026-122303 (CVSS 9.9 Critical), CVE-2026-122313 (CVSS 9.9 Critical), CVE-2026-122316 (CVSS 8.5 High), CVE-2026-122302 (CVSS 9.8 Critical), CVE-2026-124441 (CVSS 8.8 High, published 8 November), and CVE-2026-122304 (CVSS 9.9 Critical): Cross-namespace resource overwrites in NamespacedMutatingPolicy, generate-rule admission RBAC privilege escalation (including templating generate.kind and generate.namespace with JMESPath variables under CVE-2026-124441), and CleanupPolicy namespace escapes.
    • CVE-2026-122321 (CVSS 9.1 Critical) and CVE-2026-122318 (CVSS 7.7 High): verifyImages keyed its verification cache on the mutable image tag string instead of the resolved SHA-256 digest (CVE-2026-122321) and skipped subject / subjectRegExp checks when a signing certificate had an empty SAN extension (CVE-2026-122318).
  2. Hickory DNS 0.26.2 (39 CVEs CVE-2026-123570 through CVE-2026-123608 published 8 November): Fixes three CVSS 8.8 High DNSSEC validation bypasses where the validating recursor accepted parent-side ancestor delegation NSEC/NSEC3 records as proof of non-existence in a child zone (CVE-2026-123595, CVE-2026-123596) or failed to verify that an RRSIG Signer’s Name matched the RRset’s zone (CVE-2026-123605), alongside wire-format ANCOUNT/NSCOUNT/ARCOUNT preallocation memory amplification (CVE-2026-123570), TSIG RDATA integer underflow panics (CVE-2026-123571), and DoH/DoQ stream exhaustion.
  3. Actix Web 4.18.2, actix-http 3.20.1 to 3.20.3, and actix-files 0.7.4 (RUSTSEC-2026-0443, 0446, 0447, 0448, 0455 published 6 November): actix-http’s HTTP/1.1 chunked decoder treated a bare \n after the final 0 chunk as the start of a trailer section instead of a framing error, enabling HTTP request smuggling (RUSTSEC-2026-0446 / GHSA-2q7f-mf9f-5qhr); compress-brotli accepted non-standard large-window Brotli streams that allocate ~1 GiB internally from an 850-byte payload before body size limits apply (RUSTSEC-2026-0455 / GHSA-7p9w-p5qm-5gc5); and actix-files on Windows served dot-prefixed hidden files (.env, .git) via 8.3 short-name aliases (ENV~1, GIT~1, RUSTSEC-2026-0443 / GHSA-8hcm-m7r7-frwc).
  4. rustls 0.23.46 (CVE-2026-123609 to 123613) and SurrealDB 3.3.0 / surrealdb-core 4.0.0 / surrealkv 1.2.0 (RUSTSEC-2026-0452 to 0454): rustls fixes acceptance of TLS 1.3 handshake messages across encryption-level boundaries within a single record (CVE-2026-123613), unauthenticated ServerHello key-exchange group downgrade caching (CVE-2026-123611), and Brotli certificate decompression OOM (CVE-2026-123610). SurrealDB fixes a use-after-free in affinitypool::spawn_local across its KV backends (RUSTSEC-2026-0453 / CVE-2026-121417), a data race and double free from an unsound Send/Sync implementation in reblessive 0.4.3 (RUSTSEC-2026-0454), and an out-of-bounds read on < 16-byte keys in surrealkv (RUSTSEC-2026-0452).

What to do now: Upgrade Kyverno Helm charts and manifests to >= 1.19.2, hickory-proto / hickory-net / hickory-resolver / hickory-server to >= 0.26.2, actix-web to >= 4.18.2 and actix-http to >= 3.20.3 (actix-files >= 0.7.4), rustls to >= 0.23.46, and surrealdb to >= 3.3.0 (surrealdb-core >= 4.0.0, surrealkv >= 1.2.0).

Affected packages and components

EcosystemPackage / ProjectAdvisory / CVE IDsSeverityAffected versionsFixed versions
Kubernetes / Gogithub.com/kyverno/kyvernoCVE-2026-122302..122316, 122318..122323, CVE-2026-124440, CVE-2026-124441 (GHSA-q62c-r9v2-cf64, GHSA-3xfv-vq8x-qhg4, GHSA-4pqm-wqq6-h9q2, GHSA-2r43-6962-xcw5, GHSA-39w8-hv5g-f73w, GHSA-vjfx-fp68-rh4v, et al.)Critical (9.9) / High< 1.19.21.19.2
crates.iohickory-proto, hickory-net, hickory-resolver, hickory-recursor, hickory-serverCVE-2026-123570 through CVE-2026-123608 (GHSA-624w-vvww-xvpw, GHSA-3r6v-f3jh-vvqm, GHSA-2vgh-3wfw-qj7c, et al.)High (8.8) / Medium< 0.26.20.26.2
crates.ioactix-http, actix-web, actix-filesRUSTSEC-2026-0446 (GHSA-2q7f-mf9f-5qhr), 0455 (GHSA-7p9w-p5qm-5gc5), 0448 / 0447 (GHSA-qph8-7859-gq2f), 0443 (GHSA-8hcm-m7r7-frwc)High / Mediumactix-http < 3.20.3; actix-web < 4.18.2; actix-files < 0.7.4actix-http 3.20.3; actix-web 4.18.2; actix-files 0.7.4
crates.iorustlsCVE-2026-123609, 123610, 123611, 123612, 123613 (GHSA-2mjx-qc3c-rqvc, RUSTSEC-2026-0285)Medium (5.3) / Low< 0.23.46 (123613 fixed in 0.23.45)0.23.46
crates.iosurrealdb, surrealdb-core, surrealkvRUSTSEC-2026-0453 (CVE-2026-121417, GHSA-pm86-cc75-q463), RUSTSEC-2026-0454 (GHSA-m9qr-4rcq-3jhc), RUSTSEC-2026-0452 (GHSA-9fm9-c4h4-8g93)High / Mediumsurrealdb < 3.3.0; surrealdb-core < 4.0.0; surrealkv < 1.2.0surrealdb 3.3.0; surrealdb-core 4.0.0; surrealkv 1.2.0
crates.iovodozemac, azure_security_keyvault_*, ocipkgRUSTSEC-2026-0445, 0451; RUSTSEC-2026-0437..0439; RUSTSEC-2026-0450Mediumvodozemac <= 0.11.1; azure_security_keyvault_* < 1.0.1; ocipkg <= 0.4.0vodozemac 0.11.2; azure_security_keyvault_* 1.0.1; ocipkg 0.4.1 (now unmaintained)
crates.iolibsqlite3-sys, rsaRUSTSEC-2026-0459 (CVE-2026-119375, GHSA-72w2-rjgg-q729); RUSTSEC-2023-0071 (CVE-2023-49092, updated 8 Nov 2026)Mediumlibsqlite3-sys >= 0.6.0, < 0.39.0 (bundled); rsa < 0.10.0libsqlite3-sys 0.39.0 (rusqlite 0.41.0); rsa 0.10.0

Technical analysis

1. Kyverno 1.19.2: context.apiCall query/fragment decoys, CEL .. path traversal, and verifyImages tag caching

In multi-tenant Kubernetes clusters, Kyverno allows namespace administrators to create namespace-scoped Policy, NamespacedMutatingPolicy, and CleanupPolicy resources whose actions are supposed to stay strictly inside the policy’s own namespace. Commit f67231def576 (PR #17984) shows how two URL-handling discrepancies let a namespaced policy break out to cluster-scoped resources using the Kyverno admission or background controller’s privileged ServiceAccount:

  1. context.apiCall urlPath query-string, fragment, and percent-escape decoys (CVE-2026-122310 / GHSA-3xfv-vq8x-qhg4, CVE-2026-124440 / GHSA-39w8-hv5g-f73w, and CVE-2026-122312 / GHSA-pcx2-xcq4-65vf): To ensure a namespaced policy only called /api/v1/namespaces/<policy-ns>/..., pkg/engine/apicall/apiCall.go ran path.Clean() on urlPath and checked that the string contained /namespaces/<policy-ns>/. However, Go’s path.Clean() treats ?, #, and malformed % sequences as ordinary filename characters, whereas the Kubernetes client-go HTTP transport splits on ? (query string) and strips # (fragment). A policy in namespace tenant-a specifying:
    context:
      - name: escalate
        apiCall:
          method: POST
          urlPath: "/apis/admissionregistration.k8s.io/v1/mutatingwebhookconfigurations?x=/namespaces/tenant-a/y"
    satisfied the /namespaces/tenant-a/ regex on the combined string while issuing a POST to the cluster-scoped mutatingwebhookconfigurations endpoint. Even worse, Execute() previously passed the raw, uncleaned URLPath rather than the validated path to the Kubernetes client. Commit f67231def576 parses urlPath with net/url, rejects fragments, malformed escapes, and absolute URLs, validates namespace confinement strictly against the canonical path component (excluding the query string and rejecting /api/v1/namespaces/<name> when targeting the cluster-scoped Namespace object itself), and executes that canonical path.
  2. CEL resource.get() and resource.post() path traversal (CVE-2026-122311 / GHSA-4pqm-wqq6-h9q2) and variable-templated generate targets (CVE-2026-124441 / GHSA-vjfx-fp68-rh4v): In pkg/cel/libs/context.go, CEL policies read and create Kubernetes resources via resource.Get, resource.List, and resource.Post. The apiVersion, resource, namespace, and name arguments were forwarded directly to client-go’s dynamic client, which builds the request URI via (*rest.Request).AbsPath(). Because AbsPath() joins segments with path.Join(), passing ".." as a resource, subresource, or name segment walked up the URL hierarchy out of /namespaces/<policy-ns>/. Similarly, under CVE-2026-124441, templating generate.kind and generate.namespace with JMESPath variables bypassed admission-time RBAC and namespace checks, letting the background controller write arbitrary kinds into kube-system or other namespaces. Kyverno 1.19.2 validates every dynamic-client path segment through dclient.ValidatePathSegment (built on apimachinery’s IsValidPathSegmentName) and re-enforces namespace and RBAC checks after variable substitution.
  3. verifyImages tag-keyed cache bypass (CVE-2026-122321 / GHSA-2r43-6962-xcw5): In Kyverno 1.18.0 through 1.19.1, the verifyImages result cache keyed verified entries by the image reference string (such as registry.example.com/app:latest or :v1) rather than the immutable image digest (@sha256:...). Once a signed image with a given tag passed verification and populated the cache, an attacker who pushed an unsigned or tampered image to the same mutable tag bypassed signature verification for the duration of the cache TTL unless mutateDigest: true replaced the reference first.

2. Actix Web 4.18.2 and actix-http 3.20.3: bare-LF chunked trailer smuggling and 1 GiB Brotli bombs

In actix-http < 3.20.2 (commit feed12e9ec59, RUSTSEC-2026-0446 / GHSA-2q7f-mf9f-5qhr), ChunkedState::read_end_cr() in actix-http/src/h1/chunked.rs read the byte immediately following the terminating 0\r\n chunk size line:

--- a/actix-http/src/h1/chunked.rs
+++ b/actix-http/src/h1/chunked.rs
@@ -217,6 +217,10 @@ impl ChunkedState {
     fn read_end_cr(rdr: &mut BytesMut) -> Poll<Result<ChunkedState, io::Error>> {
         match byte!(rdr) {
             b'\r' => Poll::Ready(Ok(ChunkedState::EndLf)),
+            b'\n' => Poll::Ready(Err(io::Error::new(
+                io::ErrorKind::InvalidData,
+                "Invalid chunk end CR",
+            ))),
             _ => Poll::Ready(Ok(ChunkedState::Trailer)),
         }
     }

When a client sent 0\r\n\n (a bare LF \n instead of \r\n after the final chunk), an upstream proxy that accepts bare LF as a line terminator treated the chunked body as complete and forwarded the subsequent bytes on the keep-alive connection as the next HTTP request (GET /admin HTTP/1.1\r\n...). In actix-http < 3.20.2, however, b'\n' hit the wildcard _ => Poll::Ready(Ok(ChunkedState::Trailer)) arm, causing actix-http to swallow the first line of the second pipelined request as a chunked trailer header and desynchronize the HTTP/1.1 stream.

In the next release, actix-http 3.20.3 (commit 61c6a15c1c0e, RUSTSEC-2026-0455 / GHSA-7p9w-p5qm-5gc5) disabled large-window Brotli decoding in the compress-brotli feature after finding that an 850-byte compressed request carrying a non-standard large-window Brotli header forced the decoder to allocate an ~1 GiB internal ring buffer before yielding enough decoded bytes to trip actix-web’s payload size limit (PayloadConfig).

3. Hickory DNS 0.26.2 DNSSEC bypasses (CVE-2026-123595, CVE-2026-123596, CVE-2026-123605), rustls 0.23.46 (CVE-2026-123613), and SurrealDB (RUSTSEC-2026-0453, 0454)

  • Hickory DNS 0.26.2 (CVE-2026-123595, CVE-2026-123596, CVE-2026-123605): In hickory-proto and hickory-net < 0.26.2, verify_rrsets() verified the cryptographic signature of an RRSIG record without checking that the RRSIG’s Signer’s Name actually matched the zone of the RRset being validated (CVE-2026-123605, CVSS 8.8), and the validating recursor accepted ancestor delegation NSEC and NSEC3 records (which have the NS bit set and the SOA bit clear at the parent zone cut) as authoritative proof that names inside the delegated child zone did not exist (CVE-2026-123595 and CVE-2026-123596, CVSS 8.8). In addition, hickory-proto preallocated Vec capacities directly from the untrusted 16-bit ANCOUNT, NSCOUNT, and ARCOUNT header fields of a 12-byte DNS packet before reading the records (CVE-2026-123570).
  • rustls 0.23.46 (CVE-2026-123613 / GHSA-2mjx-qc3c-rqvc): In rustls >= 0.23.13, < 0.23.45, Deframer did not reject coalesced TLS 1.3 handshake messages that followed a key-changing handshake message (such as ServerHello or Finished) inside the same TLS record, allowing post-key-change messages to be accepted at the prior encryption level. Version 0.23.46 also patches CVE-2026-123610 (Brotli CompressedCertificate uncompressed_length preallocation up to 4 GiB), CVE-2026-123611 (unauthenticated ServerHello poisoning the per-SNI key-exchange group cache), and CVE-2026-123609 (Debug formatting exposing TLS session secrets).
  • SurrealDB 3.3.0 and surrealdb-core 4.0.0 (RUSTSEC-2026-0453 and RUSTSEC-2026-0454), libsqlite3-sys 0.39.0 (RUSTSEC-2026-0459), and rsa 0.10.0 (RUSTSEC-2023-0071): In surrealdb < 3.3.0, the kv-mem, kv-surrealkv, and kv-rocksdb backends passed non-'static borrowed references into affinitypool::spawn_local futures (affinitypool 0.7.0) that could outlive the caller’s stack frame when cancelled (CVE-2026-121417, fixed by upgrading to affinitypool 0.8.0 in commit 8156ff691b). In surrealdb-core < 4.0.0, dbs::Executor ran SurrealQL statements on reblessive::tree::TreeStack (reblessive 0.4.3), whose unsound Send/Sync implementation caused concurrent data races and double frees across worker threads (fixed in commit 75407c4bcc by removing reblessive). On 8-9 November, RustSec also published RUSTSEC-2026-0459 (CVE-2026-119375 / GHSA-72w2-rjgg-q729) for libsqlite3-sys 0.6.0 through 0.38.2 when built with the bundled feature (bundling SQLite < 3.54.0, where opening a database alongside a -wal file with a different page size leaks uninitialized page-cache memory; fixed in libsqlite3-sys 0.39.0 / rusqlite 0.41.0), and updated RUSTSEC-2023-0071 (CVE-2023-49092) to record that rsa >= 0.10.0 resolves the Marvin Attack RSA timing side-channel via its crypto-bigint migration and implicit rejection.

IOCs

For these Kubernetes policy and Rust crate vulnerabilities, audit cluster admission resources and build manifests for the following indicators:

  • Kyverno policy indicators (CVE-2026-122310, CVE-2026-124440, CVE-2026-122311, CVE-2026-124441): Namespaced Policy or NamespacedMutatingPolicy objects containing ?, #, or % inside context[].apiCall.urlPath, ".." path segments inside CEL resource.get() / resource.post() / resource.list() calls, or {{ ... }} JMESPath expressions inside generate.kind or generate.namespace.
  • Dependency lockfile indicators: Cargo.lock entries resolving hickory-proto / hickory-net / hickory-resolver / hickory-server < 0.26.2, actix-http < 3.20.3, actix-web < 4.18.2, actix-files < 0.7.4, rustls < 0.23.46, surrealdb < 3.3.0, surrealdb-core < 4.0.0, reblessive <= 0.4.3, or affinitypool < 0.8.0.

Detection and remediation

# 1. Check running Kyverno image versions in Kubernetes clusters
kubectl get pods -n kyverno -o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.metadata.name}{"\t"}{range .spec.containers[*]}{.image}{" "}{end}{"\n"}{end}' 2>/dev/null

# 2. Audit existing namespaced Kyverno policies for apiCall query/fragment decoys, '..' CEL paths, or globalReference
kubectl get policy,namespacedmutatingpolicy,cleanuppolicy -A -o yaml 2>/dev/null | \
  rg -n 'urlPath:.*[?#%]|resource\.(get|post|list)\(.*\.\.|globalReference:'

# 3. Audit Rust Cargo.lock files for vulnerable crate versions
rg -n -A 2 'name = "(hickory-proto|hickory-net|hickory-resolver|hickory-recursor|hickory-server|actix-http|actix-web|actix-files|rustls|surrealdb|surrealdb-core|surrealkv|vodozemac|reblessive|affinitypool)"' Cargo.lock 2>/dev/null
  1. Upgrade Kyverno to v1.19.2 (helm upgrade kyverno kyverno/kyverno -n kyverno --version 3.7.2 or image tag v1.19.2) and review all namespace-scoped Policy, NamespacedMutatingPolicy, and CleanupPolicy objects created by non-cluster-admin tenants.
  2. Update Rust dependencies in Cargo.toml / Cargo.lock:
    cargo update -p hickory-proto -p hickory-net -p hickory-resolver -p hickory-server \
      -p actix-http -p actix-web -p actix-files -p rustls -p surrealdb -p surrealdb-core -p surrealkv

Timeline

  • 2026-09-03 to 2026-10-20: Hickory DNS tags v0.26.2, and Kyverno tags v1.19.2 (PR #17984 merged 20 October).
  • 2026-11-05 (03:17 UTC): NVD publishes 21 CVEs (CVE-2026-122302 through CVE-2026-122323) for Kyverno < 1.19.2.
  • 2026-11-06 (12:43 to 15:30 UTC): RustSec publishes RUSTSEC-2026-0443 through RUSTSEC-2026-0455 covering actix-http, actix-web, actix-files, vodozemac, surrealdb, surrealdb-core, and surrealkv.
  • 2026-11-08 (02:16 to 14:18 UTC): NVD publishes 39 CVEs (CVE-2026-123570 through CVE-2026-123608) for Hickory DNS < 0.26.2, five CVEs (CVE-2026-123609 through CVE-2026-123613) for rustls < 0.23.46, and two additional CVEs (CVE-2026-124440 and CVE-2026-124441) for Kyverno < 1.19.2.

From research to remediation

Check whether this pattern exists in your codebase

Turn this research into a remediation workflow. Scan dependencies and package manifests for similar supply-chain risk, then prioritize fixes with reachability context.

References