CVE
CVE-2026-123158, CVE-2026-109518, CVE-2026-85091, CVE-2026-107891, CVE-2026-4738, CVE-2026-122054, CVE-2016-6210, CVE-2019-5021
CWE
CWE-287, CWE-367, CWE-59, CWE-787, CWE-190
Affected Surface
- Portable OpenSSH (`openssh-portable` / `sshd`) versions `7.3p1` through `10.6p1` running on Linux with `musl` libc and `UsePAM no` (including Alpine Linux, OpenWrt, Buildroot, and Yocto images where `/etc/shadow` contains `'*'` entries alongside at least one `$5$` or `$6$` password hash, `CVE-2026-123158`, CVSS 8.1 High, fixed in `10.6p2`)
- Debian, Ubuntu, and derivative `apt` package manager versions `< 3.0.4` (`trixie`), `< 2.6.1+deb12u2` (`bookworm`), and `< 2.2.4+deb11u2` (`bullseye`) (`CVE-2026-109518`, `DSA-6607-1` / `DLA-4855-1` / `APT-2026-11-01`)
- C / C++ compression library `zlib` (`madler/zlib`) and bundled `minizip` versions `< 1.4` (`CVE-2026-85091` / `TOB-ZLIB-003`, `THM-ZLIB-001` in `1.3.1` and `1.3.2`, `TOB-ZLIB-004`, `TOB-ZLIB-013`, `TOB-ZLIB-014`, `CVE-2026-4738`, fixed in `zlib 1.4`)
- `musl` libc versions `< 1.2.7` (`CVE-2026-107891`, CVSS 8.1 High, `regcomp` integer overflows leading to heap out-of-bounds writes) and GNU C Library (`glibc`) `2.18` through `2.31` (`CVE-2026-122054` / `GLIBC-SA-2026-0026`)
TL;DR
Between 4 and 6 November 2026, four advisories hit foundational Linux system daemons and C libraries that underpin container base images, cloud VMs, and native dependencies:
- Portable OpenSSH
10.6p2patches"sshole"(CVE-2026-123158, CVSS 8.1 High, public PoC): Discovered by Özgün Kültekin of Wakefield (sshhole.com),"sshole"allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to log into any account whose/etc/shadowpassword field is"*"by submitting any password between 257 and 1,024 characters on Linux systems runningsshdwithmusllibc and without PAM (UsePAM no, the default on Alpine Linux, OpenWrt, Buildroot, and Yocto). Whenever at least one user on the system has a SHA-256 ($5$) or SHA-512 ($6$) password hash in/etc/shadow, OpenSSH’spick_salt()helper borrows that salt when hashing a candidate password for a"*"account (!valid_salt). Becausemusl’scrypt_sha512andcrypt_sha256reject keys longer thanKEY_MAX(256bytes) by returning0andmusl’scrypt()wrapper returns the literal string"*"on failure,strcmp(encrypted_password, pw_password)compares"*"against"*"and succeeds on the first try. On Alpine>= 3.16,rootand key-only accounts (including the defaultalpineuser with passwordlessdoason official Alpine AWS and Azure cloud images) use"*"in/etc/shadow. Fixed in OpenSSH10.6p2. - Debian and Ubuntu
apt(CVE-2026-109518, CVSS 7.7 High / Debian CriticalDSA-6607-1&DLA-4855-1): Discovered by Max Justicz (max@justi.cz),aptversions prior to3.0.4(trixie),2.6.1+deb12u2(bookworm), and2.2.4+deb11u2(bullseye) can be tricked by an on-path HTTP attacker or malicious mirror into merging two package downloads onto the same destination file via HTTP redirects andAcquire::Retriesdownload resumption (206 Partial Content). BecauseHttpMethod::DealWithHeaders()openedQueue->DestFilewithFileFd::WriteAnywithoutFileFd::Exclusive, resuming a download followed an existing hardlink and overwrote an already-verified.debpackage beforedpkginstalled it asroot. zlib 1.4security release (CVE-2026-85091/TOB-ZLIB-003,THM-ZLIB-001,TOB-ZLIB-004,TOB-ZLIB-013,TOB-ZLIB-014): Released on 4-5 November 2026,zlib 1.4patches a heap buffer overflow in non-blockinggzwrite()(CVE-2026-85091), an 8 MB out-of-bounds heap/stack write ininflateGetDictionary()past the caller’s 32 KB buffer affectingzlib 1.3.1and1.3.2(THM-ZLIB-001), a 1-byte window allocation overrun ininflateSync()(TOB-ZLIB-004), out-of-bounds reads/writes ininflatePrime()anddeflatePrime(), and a double free (block_central_name()) plus directory traversal (miniunz) inminizip.musllibc< 1.2.7(CVE-2026-107891, CVSS 8.1 High) andglibc(CVE-2026-122054/GLIBC-SA-2026-0026):CVE-2026-107891tracks multiple integer overflows inmusl’sregcomp()regular-expression compiler that cause undersized heap allocations and out-of-bounds heap writes when compiling untrusted regex patterns.
What to do now: Upgrade OpenSSH on Alpine and other musl-based systems to >= 10.6p2 (apk upgrade openssh) or set PasswordAuthentication no in /etc/ssh/sshd_config immediately. Upgrade apt on Debian and Ubuntu hosts (apt >= 3.0.4, 2.6.1+deb12u2, or 2.2.4+deb11u2, or set Acquire::Retries 0; in /etc/apt/apt.conf before running apt update && apt upgrade), and update zlib to >= 1.4 and musl to >= 1.2.7.
Affected packages and components
| Ecosystem / Distro | Package / Project | CVE / Advisory | Severity | Affected versions | Fixed version | Vulnerable component |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Linux / C (musl without PAM) | Portable OpenSSH (sshd) | CVE-2026-123158 (“sshole”) | CVSS 8.1 High | 7.3p1 through 10.6p1 (when built with musl libc and run with UsePAM no) | 10.6p2 | sys_auth_passwd() in auth-passwd.c and xcrypt() / pick_salt() in openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c |
| Debian / Ubuntu | apt | CVE-2026-109518 (DSA-6607-1, DLA-4855-1, APT-2026-11-01) | CVSS 7.7 High (Debian Critical) | < 3.0.4 (trixie), < 2.6.1+deb12u2 (bookworm), < 2.2.4+deb11u2 (bullseye) | 3.0.4, 2.6.1+deb12u2, 2.2.4+deb11u2 | HttpMethod::DealWithHeaders() in methods/http.cc, methods/rred.cc, methods/store.cc |
| C / C++ | zlib & minizip (madler/zlib) | CVE-2026-85091, THM-ZLIB-001, TOB-ZLIB-004, TOB-ZLIB-013, TOB-ZLIB-014 | High | <= 1.3.2 (THM-ZLIB-001 affects 1.3.1 and 1.3.2) | 1.4 | gzwrite.c, inflate.c (inflateGetDictionary, inflateSync, inflatePrime), deflate.c, contrib/minizip |
| Linux / C | musl libc | CVE-2026-107891 | CVSS 8.1 High | < 1.2.7 | 1.2.7 | regcomp() regular-expression compiler |
Technical analysis
1. "sshole" (CVE-2026-123158): how four separate design choices over 46 years turned "*" in /etc/shadow into a 257-byte wildcard password
In Unix /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow files, setting an account’s password hash field to "*" marks the account as unable to authenticate with a password while still allowing SSH public-key logins (unlike "!", which OpenSSH treats as a locked account when PAM is disabled). In 2022 (CVE-2019-5021 follow-up commit fbe926af), Alpine Linux 3.16 changed its default root shadow entry from ! to * so key-based SSH logins to root and cloud-init accounts would work out of the box without PAM.
Four independent commits across musl and OpenSSH combined to break that invariant:
- August 2012 (
muslcommitb3c4cc12): Instead of returningNULLwhencrypt(key, salt)fails,musl’scrypt()returns a static two-byte failure token:"*". - August 2012 (
muslcommit88bf5a8a): Twenty days later,musladded SHA-256 and SHA-512 password hashing (src/crypt/crypt_sha512.c) with a hard length cap of#define KEY_MAX 256to prevent CPU denial-of-service from giant passwords. Ifstrlen(key) > 256,__crypt_sha512()returns0(NULL), causingmusl’s outercrypt()wrapper to return"*". - July 2016 (
OpenSSH 7.3p1fix forCVE-2016-6210): To stop attackers from timing how fastsshdrejects accounts without a valid password hash (pw_password = "*"),openbsd-compat/xcrypt.caddedpick_salt(). Whenpw_passwordis"*"(which failsvalid_salt),xcrypt(password, pw_password)callspick_salt(), which scans/etc/shadowviagetpwent()/shadow_pw()and copies the$6$...(or$5$...) salt prefix from the first real password-enabled account on the machine. - The collision in
sys_auth_passwd()(auth-passwd.c): When a remote attacker attempts to log in asroot(oralpine, or any"*"user) and sends a password between 257 and 1,024 bytes (MAX_PASSWORD_LEN),xcrypt(password, "*")substitutes the borrowed$6$<salt>$and callsmusl’scrypt(). Because the password exceeds 256 bytes,__crypt_sha512fails andcrypt()returns"*". Back insys_auth_passwd(),sshdcomparesencrypted_password("*") againstpw_password("*"):
--- a/auth-passwd.c
+++ b/auth-passwd.c
@@ -67,6 +68,7 @@ extern login_cap_t *lc;
#define DAY (24L * 60 * 60) /* 1 day in seconds */
#define TWO_WEEKS (2L * 7 * DAY) /* 2 weeks in seconds */
+#define MIN_PASSWORD_HASH_LEN 4
#define MAX_PASSWORD_LEN 1024
...
@@ -221,7 +227,10 @@ sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *ssh, const char *password)
* Authentication is accepted if the encrypted passwords
* are identical.
*/
- return encrypted_password != NULL &&
+ ret = encrypted_password != NULL &&
+ strlen(pw_password) >= MIN_PASSWORD_HASH_LEN &&
strcmp(encrypted_password, pw_password) == 0;
+ freezero(pw_password, strlen(pw_password));
+ return ret;
}
In Portable OpenSSH 10.6p2 (commit 4353fdc43ef6), sys_auth_passwd() requires strlen(pw_password) >= MIN_PASSWORD_HASH_LEN (4, since even traditional DES crypt(3) hashes are 13 characters long), ensuring a 1-character "*" or 2-character "*0" failure token can never match pw_password.
2. Debian / Ubuntu apt 3.0.4 (CVE-2026-109518): HTTP redirect + 206 Partial Content resume overwrites verified .deb hardlinks
When apt downloads .deb packages over HTTP (or through a local caching proxy), it verifies the downloaded archive’s SHA-256 digest against the signed Packages index before handing the file to dpkg for installation as root. Since apt 2.3.2, Acquire::Retries defaults to 3, so transient HTTP errors automatically trigger a retry with an HTTP Range request (Req.StartPos > 0) to resume the partial download.
Max Justicz discovered that an on-path attacker or malicious HTTP mirror can redirect a second download item to the same URI while returning a transient error that triggers download resumption. In methods/http.cc, HttpMethod::DealWithHeaders() previously opened Queue->DestFile in place with FileFd::WriteAny (without FileFd::Exclusive), writing the resumed bytes directly through any existing hardlink pointing to an already-verified package file.
Commit 5af16a8ad0f1 fixes methods/http.cc, methods/rred.cc, and methods/store.cc by opening the existing partial file read-only, re-opening Queue->DestFile with FileFd::WriteAny | FileFd::Exclusive (which unlinks the old path first so any hardlink is broken), and copying the partial prefix into the newly created inode:
--- a/methods/http.cc
+++ b/methods/http.cc
@@ -1004,8 +1004,24 @@ BaseHttpMethod::DealWithHeadersResult HttpMethod::DealWithHeaders(FetchResult &R
auto ret = BaseHttpMethod::DealWithHeaders(Res, Req);
if (ret != BaseHttpMethod::FILE_IS_OPEN)
return ret;
- if (Req.File.Open(Queue->DestFile, FileFd::WriteAny) == false)
+
+ // If we are resuming, we first need to rescue the data we already have
+ FileFd partial;
+ if (Req.StartPos > 0 && FileExists(Queue->DestFile))
+ {
+ if (not partial.Open(Queue->DestFile, FileFd::ReadOnly))
+ return ERROR_NOT_FROM_SERVER;
+ }
+ // Open the file exclusively to avoid injection attacks by links
+ if (Req.File.Open(Queue->DestFile, FileFd::WriteAny | FileFd::Exclusive) == false)
return ERROR_NOT_FROM_SERVER;
+ if (partial.IsOpen())
+ {
+ // The exclusive open unlinked the old file; copy its content
+ // into the new one and rewind for hashing.
+ if (not CopyFile(partial, Req.File) || not partial.Close() || not Req.File.Seek(0))
+ return ERROR_NOT_FROM_SERVER;
+ }
3. zlib 1.4 (CVE-2026-85091, THM-ZLIB-001, TOB-ZLIB-004)
zlib 1.4 bundles fixes from an audit by Trail of Bits (TOB-ZLIB-*), Theorem (THM-ZLIB-001), and independent researchers:
THM-ZLIB-001(inflateGetDictionary()8 MB buffer overrun in1.3.1and1.3.2): Callers ofinflateGetDictionary(strm, dictionary, &dictLength)provide a 32 KiB (32768-byte) buffer, the maximum valid deflate window size (1 << 15). Inzlib 1.3.1and1.3.2, feeding a stream with an invalid zlib header window size followed byinflateReset()orinflateSync()leftstate->wsizecorrupted soinflateGetDictionary()copied up to 8 MB past the caller’s 32 KiB buffer.CVE-2026-85091/TOB-ZLIB-003(non-blockinggzwrite()buffer overflow): Whengzwrite()operated on a non-blocking file descriptor wherewrite()returned a partial count orEAGAIN, internal buffer state accounting overflowed thegz_statebuffer.TOB-ZLIB-004(inflateSync()1-byte window overrun): CallinginflateSync()before the stream window size was known allocated a 1-byte sliding window that subsequentinflate()calls overran.
Detection and remediation
# 1. Check whether the host uses musl libc, what OpenSSH version is running, and whether '*' accounts coexist with $5$/$6$ hashes
ldd /usr/sbin/sshd 2>/dev/null | rg 'musl' || true
sshd -V 2>&1 | head -n 2
sshd -T 2>/dev/null | rg -i '^(usepam|passwordauthentication|permitrootlogin)\b'
awk -F: '$2 == "*" {print "star-account:", $1} $2 ~ /^\$[56]\$/ {print "sha-salt-account:", $1}' /etc/shadow 2>/dev/null
# 2. Hunt auth logs on Alpine / musl hosts for password logins to root or key-only '*' accounts ("Accepted password for")
rg -n 'Accepted password for (root|alpine|deploy)' /var/log/messages /var/log/auth.log 2>/dev/null || true
# 3. Check apt and zlib versions on Debian / Ubuntu / Alpine hosts
apt --version 2>/dev/null || true
dpkg -l apt zlib1g 2>/dev/null || apk info -v openssh musl zlib 2>/dev/null || true
- Patch or mitigate OpenSSH
"sshole"(CVE-2026-123158) immediately onmuslhosts:- Upgrade to OpenSSH
>= 10.6p2(apk update && apk upgrade opensshon Alpine Linux, thenrc-service sshd restart). - If you cannot upgrade immediately, disable password authentication in
/etc/ssh/sshd_config:echo "PasswordAuthentication no" > /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-no-passwords.conf rc-service sshd restart - Check
/var/log/messages(or your syslog collector) for any"Accepted password for <user>"event on an account whose/etc/shadowfield is"*". Because those accounts have no password set, any"Accepted password"log line for a"*"account is definitive evidence of exploitation.
- Upgrade to OpenSSH
- Safely upgrade
apton Debian and Ubuntu (CVE-2026-109518):- Pass
-o Acquire::Retries=0on the command line when downloading the patchedaptpackage itself so the vulnerable retry-resume code path cannot be triggered during the upgrade:sudo apt-get -o Acquire::Retries=0 update sudo apt-get -o Acquire::Retries=0 install --only-upgrade apt libapt-pkg* - Verify that
aptis on>= 3.0.4(Debian 13trixie),>= 2.6.1+deb12u2(Debian 12bookworm), or>= 2.2.4+deb11u2(Debian 11bullseye).
- Pass
- Upgrade
zlibto>= 1.4andmuslto>= 1.2.7: Rebuild container images and native C/C++/Rust/Python wheels that statically linkzlib1.3.1or1.3.2(particularly services that callinflateGetDictionary(),inflateSync(), orgzwrite()).
Timeline
- 2012-08-09 & 2012-08-29:
musllibc changescrypt()to return"*"on error (b3c4cc12) and capscrypt_sha512/crypt_sha256keys at 256 bytes (88bf5a8a). - 2016-07-18: OpenSSH
7.3p1addspick_salt()(CVE-2016-6210timing mitigation), borrowing a real salt from/etc/shadowwhen hashing candidate passwords for"*"accounts. - 2026-10-21:
muslannouncesCVE-2026-107891(regcompinteger overflows, fixed inmusl 1.2.7). - 2026-11-04: Debian publishes
DSA-6607-1,DLA-4855-1, andAPT-2026-11-01forCVE-2026-109518inapt(3.0.4,2.6.1+deb12u2,2.2.4+deb11u2); Mark Adler tagszlib 1.4. - 2026-11-05 (
03:01to16:17 UTC): Damien Miller announces Portable OpenSSH10.6p2(4353fdc43ef6); Özgün Kültekin publishessshhole.com; NVD publishesCVE-2026-123158(sshd),CVE-2026-85091(zlib), andCVE-2026-107891(musl).
From research to remediation
Check whether this pattern exists in your codebase
Turn this research into a remediation workflow. Scan dependencies and package manifests for similar supply-chain risk, then prioritize fixes with reachability context.
References
- oss-security (2026/11/05/2 and 2026/11/05/3): Portable OpenSSH 10.6p2 release and 'sshole' password authentication bypass (CVE-2026-123158)
- openssh/openssh-portable fix commit 4353fdc43ef646c43a8dda7025cc1a898caf1482 (avoid password authn bypass via MIN_PASSWORD_HASH_LEN)
- Wakefield Security Research (Özgün Kültekin): sshhole.com technical disclosure
- oss-security (2026/11/04/12) and Debian deity mailing list: APT-2026-11-01 / DSA-6607-1 (CVE-2026-109518 RCE in apt)
- Debian apt fix commit 5af16a8ad0f155233dfb10b7c92ad1903112ef79 (Open destination files with FileFd::Exclusive on HTTP resume)
- oss-security (2026/11/05/10) and madler/zlib v1.4 release notes (CVE-2026-85091, THM-ZLIB-001, TOB-ZLIB-004)
- NVD and oss-security: musl libc CVE-2026-107891 (regcomp integer overflows)