CVE
CVE-2026-126187, CVE-2026-125120, CVE-2026-125119, CVE-2026-125117, CVE-2026-125116, CVE-2026-125118, CVE-2026-126539, CVE-2026-64682, CVE-2026-64670, CVE-2026-64671, CVE-2026-63660, CVE-2026-126066, CVE-2026-107372, CVE-2026-108167, CVE-2026-126128, CVE-2026-126129
CWE
CWE-94, CWE-943, CWE-1321, CWE-863, CWE-798, CWE-79, CWE-190, CWE-787
Affected Surface
- npm `react-server-dom-webpack`, `react-server-dom-parcel`, and `react-server-dom-turbopack` versions `>= 19.0.0, < 19.0.9`, `>= 19.1.0, < 19.1.10`, `>= 19.2.0, < 19.2.9`, and `19.3.0` (`CVE-2026-126187` / `GHSA-xqc2-xf4c-x3h3`, CVSS v4.0 9.5 Critical, fixed in `19.0.9`, `19.1.10`, `19.2.9`, and `19.3.1`)
- npm `mongoose` versions `< 6.13.12`, `>= 7.0.0, < 7.8.13`, `>= 8.0.0, < 8.24.7`, and `>= 9.0.0, < 9.11.4` (`CVE-2026-125120` / `GHSA-pcrw-h46h-c93h` CVSS 9.8 Critical fixed in `6.13.11` / `7.8.12` / `8.24.3` / `9.9.2`; `CVE-2026-125119` / `GHSA-gg4r-jv3p-qx3c` CVSS 7.5 High, `CVE-2026-125117` / `GHSA-8332-j7wj-wjw4` CVSS 8.2 High, `CVE-2026-125116` / `GHSA-wr5m-5jph-8m96`, and `CVE-2026-125118` / `GHSA-6972-9mcm-vhwj` fixed in `6.13.12` / `7.8.13` / `8.24.7` / `9.11.4`)
- Self-hosted and cloud deployments of Directus (`directus` / `@directus/api`) versions `< 12.1.0` with WebSockets enabled in `public` auth mode (`CVE-2026-126539` / `GHSA-97xr-jchp-xm3c`, CVSS v4.0 9.2 Critical / v3.1 8.1 High, fixed in `12.1.0`)
- Astro CMS `astro-blocks` `< 3.4.0` (`CVE-2026-64682` / `GHSA-mfcg-m7j5-7v72`, CVSS 9.8 Critical), npm `@waline/client` `<= 3.15.2` (`CVE-2026-64670` / `GHSA-crj3-q72p-ggqm` CVSS 9.3 Critical and `CVE-2026-64671` CVSS 7.2 High), Mapbox `fontnik` (`node-fontnik`) `< 0.7.7` (`CVE-2026-63660` / `GHSA-cfm6-c7rv-58xj`, CVSS 8.1 High), `fast-xml-parser` `<= 5.11.2` (`CVE-2026-126066` / `GHSA-474x-hrwr-fgx4`, fixed in `5.12.0`), and Auth0 RAG / Management SDKs (`auth0-ai-js` `CVE-2026-107372`, `auth0-ai-python` `CVE-2026-108167`, `auth0` Node.js SDK `CVE-2026-126128`, and `Auth0.AspNetCore.Authentication` `CVE-2026-126129`)
TL;DR
Between 19:37 UTC on 10 November and 05:19 UTC on 11 November 2026, NVD, the GitHub Advisory Database, and upstream maintainers disclosed 16 vulnerabilities across React Server Components, Mongoose, Directus, AstroBlocks, Waline, Mapbox node-fontnik, fast-xml-parser, and Auth0’s AI and authentication SDKs:
- React Server Components
19.0.9,19.1.10,19.2.9, and19.3.1unauthenticated RCE (CVE-2026-126187/GHSA-xqc2-xf4c-x3h3, CVSS v4.09.5 Critical): Affectsreact-server-dom-webpack,react-server-dom-parcel, andreact-server-dom-turbopackacross all19.xrelease lines (19.0.0to19.0.8,19.1.0to19.1.9,19.2.0to19.2.8, and19.3.0). When a Flight stream serializes multiple typed arrays sharing anArrayBufferlarger thanVIEW_SIZE(4,096bytes), transferring the first buffer-spanning view to a readable byte stream detaches the underlyingArrayBuffer(byteLength === 0). When the second view was written,writeChunk/writeViewChunksawchunk.byteLength === 0and returned early after the Flight framing header had already declared the original byte length, shifting the stream framing so subsequent attacker-controlled bytes in the response were decoded as Flight model and server-reference chunks. Commit0c9913ae8728also hidesResolvedModelChunk.reasonbehind an unforgeableSymbol()(RESPONSE_SYMBOL), blockskey === 'then'and non-ReactPromisemetaData.boundvalues inloadServerReference(), and isolates string, stream (prefix + 'S' + id), andBlobentries inReactFlightReplyBackingFormData.js. - Mongoose
6.13.12,7.8.13,8.24.7, and9.11.4patch five query-injection and inherited-property walk flaws (CVE-2026-125116throughCVE-2026-125120):sanitizeFilterbypasses (CVE-2026-125120CVSS 9.8 Critical andCVE-2026-125119CVSS 7.5 High):countDocuments()never ransanitizeFilteron its query filter (CVE-2026-125120), andNativeConnection#createClient()moved{ sanitizeFilter: true }fromConnection.optionsintoConnection.configwhileQuery#_castConditions()checked onlyConnection.options(CVE-2026-125119), leaving connection-levelsanitizeFilterineffective against{ $ne: null }authentication bypasses.- Inherited-property walk and prototype pollution (
CVE-2026-125117CVSS 8.2 High,CVE-2026-125116, andCVE-2026-125118):init()(document hydration),$__set(dotted path assignment), andutils.mergeClone(findOneAndReplace()and chained updates) traversed into inherited prototype methods withoutObject.hasOwn()checks. Passing{"meta.toString.call": 1}tonew Model(req.body)on aMixedfield or{"toString": {"call": 1}}tofindOneAndReplace()overwroteObject.prototype.toString.call, causing every subsequent Mongoose query in the Node.js process to fail withTypeError: _toString.call is not a function(CVE-2026-125117). Meanwhile,Schema.prototype.virtual()lacked thespecialPropertiesguard fromCVE-2022-2564(CVE-2026-125118), and discriminator lookups resolved__t: 'constructor'toObject(CVE-2026-125116).
- Directus
< 12.1.0WebSocketaccountability: nulladmin escalation (CVE-2026-126539/GHSA-97xr-jchp-xm3c, CVSS v4.09.2 Critical/ v3.18.1 High): In Directus,accountability: nullsignifies an internal system call that bypasses all permission checks, whereas an unauthenticated user has{ role: null, user: null, admin: false, app: false }. On WebSocket connections configured inpublicauth mode, sending an invalid access token causedhandleAuthRequest()’scatchblock to setclient.accountability = null, giving any unauthenticated caller full read, create, update, and delete privileges over all user-defined collections. - AstroBlocks
< 3.4.0(CVE-2026-64682, CVSS 9.8), Waline<= 3.15.2(CVE-2026-64670CVSS 9.3,CVE-2026-64671), Mapboxnode-fontnik< 0.7.7(CVE-2026-63660, CVSS 8.1),fast-xml-parser< 5.12.0(CVE-2026-126066), and Auth0 RAG / Management SDKs (CVE-2026-107372,CVE-2026-108167,CVE-2026-126128,CVE-2026-126129): AstroBlocks documentedASTRO_BLOCKS_JWT_SECRETin its README while readingCMS_JWT_SECRETin code and falling back to'cms-jwt-secret-change-me';node-fontnikoverflowed a 32-bitunsigned intwhen multiplyingbuffered_width * buffered_heighton a 680-byte font; andauth0-ai-js/auth0-ai-pythonFGA retrievers deduplicated authorization checks by(object, relation)while dropping theuserandcontextfields, leaking documents denied by Fine-Grained Authorization into RAG prompts.
What to do now: Upgrade react-server-dom-webpack, react-server-dom-parcel, and react-server-dom-turbopack to 19.0.9, 19.1.10, 19.2.9, or 19.3.1; mongoose to >= 9.11.4 (9.12.1 current), >= 8.24.7 (8.24.8), >= 7.8.13, or >= 6.13.12; Directus to >= 12.1.0; astro-blocks to >= 3.4.0; fontnik to >= 0.7.7; and fast-xml-parser to >= 5.12.0.
Affected packages and components
| Ecosystem | Package | CVE / GHSA | Severity | Affected versions | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm | react-server-dom-webpack, react-server-dom-parcel, react-server-dom-turbopack | CVE-2026-126187 (GHSA-xqc2-xf4c-x3h3) | CVSS v4.0 9.5 Critical | >= 19.0.0, < 19.0.9; >= 19.1.0, < 19.1.10; >= 19.2.0, < 19.2.9; = 19.3.0 | 19.0.9, 19.1.10, 19.2.9, 19.3.1 |
| npm | mongoose | CVE-2026-125120 (GHSA-pcrw-h46h-c93h), CVE-2026-125119 (GHSA-gg4r-jv3p-qx3c) | CVSS 9.8 Critical / 7.5 High | < 6.13.12, >= 7.0.0, < 7.8.13, >= 8.0.0, < 8.24.7, >= 9.0.0, < 9.11.4 | 6.13.12, 7.8.13, 8.24.7 (8.24.8), 9.11.4 (9.12.1) |
| npm | mongoose | CVE-2026-125117 (GHSA-8332-j7wj-wjw4), CVE-2026-125116 (GHSA-wr5m-5jph-8m96), CVE-2026-125118 (GHSA-6972-9mcm-vhwj) | CVSS 8.2 High / 6.5 Medium / 4.8 Medium | < 6.13.12, >= 7.0.0, < 7.8.13, >= 8.0.0, < 8.24.7, >= 9.0.0, < 9.11.4 | 6.13.12, 7.8.13, 8.24.7, 9.11.4 |
| npm / Docker | directus (@directus/api) | CVE-2026-126539 (GHSA-97xr-jchp-xm3c) | CVSS v4.0 9.2 Critical (v3.1 8.1 High) | < 12.1.0 | 12.1.0 |
| npm | astro-blocks (NauelG/astro-blocks) | CVE-2026-64682 (GHSA-mfcg-m7j5-7v72) | CVSS 9.8 Critical | < 3.4.0 (0.3.0 to 3.3.2) | 3.4.0 |
| npm | @waline/client (walinejs/waline) | CVE-2026-64670 (GHSA-crj3-q72p-ggqm), CVE-2026-64671 | CVSS 9.3 Critical / 7.2 High | <= 3.15.2 | Sanitize orig before marked() in utils/markdown.ts |
| npm | fontnik (mapbox/node-fontnik) | CVE-2026-63660 (GHSA-cfm6-c7rv-58xj) | CVSS 8.1 High | < 0.7.7 | 0.7.7 |
| npm | fast-xml-parser | CVE-2026-126066 (GHSA-474x-hrwr-fgx4) | Low (ReDoS / CPU DoS) | <= 5.11.2 | 5.12.0 |
| npm / PyPI / NuGet | @auth0/ai, auth0-ai, auth0, Auth0.AspNetCore.Authentication | CVE-2026-107372, CVE-2026-108167, CVE-2026-126128, CVE-2026-126129 | High / Medium | Prior to Nov 2026 Okta/Auth0 SDK patches | Latest @auth0/ai, auth0-ai, auth0, and Auth0.AspNetCore.Authentication releases |
Technical analysis
1. React Server Components 19.3.1 (CVE-2026-126187 / GHSA-xqc2-xf4c-x3h3): detached ArrayBuffer stream desynchronization and Flight RESPONSE_SYMBOL hardening
In React 19’s Flight protocol (packages/react-server/src/ReactFlightServer.js and ReactServerStreamConfig*.js), binary typed arrays (Uint8Array, Float32Array, Node Buffer, etc.) are serialized as length-prefixed binary chunks (<id>:<tag><hexByteLength>,<rawBytes>). Small chunks (<= VIEW_SIZE, 4,096 bytes) are copied into React’s internal currentView ring buffer, whereas chunks larger than 4,096 bytes are passed directly to the destination byte stream (controller.enqueue(chunk)).
Under the WHATWG Streams specification, enqueuing a Uint8Array into a readable byte stream transfers and detaches the entire underlying ArrayBuffer. In ReactServerStreamConfigNode.js, ReactServerStreamConfigEdge.js, and ReactServerStreamConfigBrowser.js prior to commit 0c9913ae8728, typedArrayToBinaryChunk() returned new Uint8Array(content.buffer, content.byteOffset, content.byteLength) without slicing partial views, and writeViewChunk() / writeChunk() silently ignored zero-length chunks:
// packages/react-server/src/ReactServerStreamConfigEdge.js (vulnerable < 19.3.1)
export function writeChunk(
destination: Destination,
chunk: PrecomputedChunk | Chunk | BinaryChunk,
): void {
if (chunk.byteLength === 0) {
return;
}
...
When a server component or action response transported two typed arrays backed by the same ArrayBuffer (for example two subarray() slices of a shared buffer, or two views over the same ArrayBuffer where at least one exceeded 4,096 bytes) alongside an attacker-controlled string or buffer:
- Enqueuing the first large view detached the shared
ArrayBuffer, turning the second view’sbyteLengthinto0before itswriteChunk()call ran. - When React serialized the second view, it emitted the chunk header using the pre-detachment length, then called
writeChunk()on the now-detached view. Becausechunk.byteLength === 0,writeChunk()returned immediately without writing any payload bytes. - The Flight stream reader consumed the next
Nbytes from subsequent chunks (including attacker-controlled strings or buffers in the same response) as the body of the binary chunk, and then began parsing the middle of the attacker-controlled value as raw top-level Flight protocol lines (id:model).
To prevent stream framing injection and harden the Flight deserialization surface on both client and server, commit 0c9913ae8728 makes four coordinated changes:
--- a/packages/react-client/src/ReactFlightClient.js
+++ b/packages/react-client/src/ReactFlightClient.js
@@ -173,6 +173,9 @@ const __PROTO__ = '__proto__';
+type RESPONSE_SYMBOL_TYPE = 'RESPONSE_SYMBOL'; // Fake symbol type.
+const RESPONSE_SYMBOL: RESPONSE_SYMBOL_TYPE = Symbol() as any;
...
@@ -866,7 +869,7 @@ function createResolvedModelChunk<T>(
- return new ReactPromise(RESOLVED_MODEL, value, response);
+ return new ReactPromise(RESOLVED_MODEL, value, {[RESPONSE_SYMBOL]: response});
}
...
@@ -2071,6 +2076,15 @@ function loadServerReference<A: Iterable<any>, T>(
+ if (key === 'then') {
+ return null as any;
+ }
+ const id = metaData.id;
+ if (typeof id !== 'string') {
+ return null as any;
+ }
- Detached and partial
ArrayBufferchecks (ReactServerStreamConfig*.js):typedArrayToBinaryChunk()now copies (view.slice()) any view larger thanVIEW_SIZEthat does not span its entireArrayBuffer(byteOffset !== 0 || byteLength !== buffer.byteLength), is backed by aresizablebuffer, or runs in an environment withoutArrayBuffer.prototype.detached. InwriteChunk(), ifchunk.byteLength === 0andchunk.buffer.detachedistrue, React throwsError('Cannot transport a detached buffer...')instead of emitting a truncated frame. RESPONSE_SYMBOLandloadServerReferencehardening (ReactFlightClient.js): Previously,ResolvedModelChunkstored the internalResponseobject (which holds_bundlerConfigand_serverReferenceConfig) directly onchunk.reason, where a crafted model reference could reach it. React now wrapsreasonin{[RESPONSE_SYMBOL]: response}, rejectskey === 'then'inloadServerReference()andcreateModel(), and verifiesbound instanceof ReactPromisebefore awaitingmetaData.bound.- Namespace-separated
BackingFormData(ReactFlightReplyBackingFormData.jsandReactFlightReplyServer.js): On the Server Actions reply path, stream chunks now use a dedicatedprefix + 'S' + idfield namespace, andBackingFormDatastores strings (getBackingString), streams (getStreamChunks), referencedFormData(consumeBackingEntries), andBlobs (getBackingBlob) in separate maps so a string field can never masquerade as aBlobor stream chunk.
2. Mongoose 9.11.4 / 8.24.7 (CVE-2026-125120, CVE-2026-125119, CVE-2026-125117, CVE-2026-125116, CVE-2026-125118): sanitizeFilter omissions and Object.prototype.toString corruption
Mongoose’s five 10 November advisories fall into two classes:
sanitizeFilterskipped oncountDocuments()(CVE-2026-125120, CVSS 9.8 Critical, commitb5003d3915db) and on connection-level options (CVE-2026-125119, CVSS 7.5 High, commit4bb659478be2): When developers enablesanitizeFilterto neutralize NoSQL operator objects (such as{ password: { $ne: null } }) by wrapping them in$eq,Query.prototype.countDocumentsdid not invokesanitizeFilter(this._conditions). Even worse, whensanitizeFilter: truewas passed tomongoose.connect(uri, { sanitizeFilter: true })ormongoose.createConnection(uri, { sanitizeFilter: true }),NativeConnection#createClient()(lib/drivers/node-mongodb-native/connection.js:270-272) movedoptions.sanitizeFilterintothis.config.sanitizeFilterand deletedoptions.sanitizeFilter, whereasQuery#_castConditions()(lib/query.js:2413-2423) checkedthis.model.db.options?.sanitizeFilterand neverthis.model.db.config.sanitizeFilter.- Walking into inherited properties during hydration,
$__set, andmergeClone(CVE-2026-125117, CVSS 8.2 High, commit18b5513dd463): Although Mongoose blocked__proto__,constructor, andprototype, three core traversal functions readdoc[i]orto[key]without checkingObject.hasOwn():- In
Document.prototype.$__set(called bynew Model(req.body)anddoc.set()), setting a dotted path inside anySchema.Types.Mixed({}) field such asnew Item(JSON.parse('{"meta.toString.call": 1}'))resolvedmeta.toStringto the inheritedObject.prototype.toStringfunction and assigned.call = 1directly onto that shared global function. - In
utils.mergeClone(called byModel.findOneAndReplace(filter, req.body)), passing{"toString": {"call": 1}}recursed intoto['toString'](Object.prototype.toString) and overwrote.call = 1. - Once
Object.prototype.toString.callis overwritten with a non-function, every subsequent Mongoose query across the entire Node.js process throwsTypeError: _toString.call is not a functionuntil the server restarts. Similarly, on a subdocument withstrict: false, callingdoc.set('profile.$__schema.paths.email.validators', [])mutated the shared schema validator array in memory for all documents (CVE-2026-125117).
- In
3. Directus < 12.1.0 (CVE-2026-126539 / GHSA-97xr-jchp-xm3c): failed WebSocket auth resets accountability to null (admin)
In Directus, permissions on database operations are gated by the Accountability object passed into services:
- An unauthenticated (
public) user carries{ role: null, user: null, admin: false, app: false }. - Passing
accountability: nullmeans no permission enforcement (internal system/admin context).
In api/src/websocket/controllers/base.ts prior to v12.1.0 (commit 8d4cd86783bc), when a WebSocket endpoint operated in public authentication mode and a client sent { "type": "auth", "access_token": "invalid" }, handleAuthRequest() caught the authentication error and assigned accountability = null instead of resetting it with createDefaultAccountability():
--- a/api/src/websocket/controllers/base.ts
+++ b/api/src/websocket/controllers/base.ts
@@ -381,8 +376,8 @@ export default abstract class SocketController {
} catch (err: any) {
- client.accountability = null;
+ client.accountability = createDefaultAccountability(this.accountabilityOverrides);
client.expires_at = null;
Any subsequent CRUD message (items read, create, update, or delete) sent over that WebSocket connection ran with client.accountability === null, bypassing all collection permissions.
4. AstroBlocks 3.4.0 (CVE-2026-64682), Mapbox node-fontnik 0.7.7 (CVE-2026-63660), Waline (CVE-2026-64670), and Auth0 AI / Node SDKs (CVE-2026-107372, CVE-2026-108167, CVE-2026-126128, CVE-2026-126129)
- AstroBlocks
< 3.4.0JWT secret env-var mismatch (CVE-2026-64682/GHSA-mfcg-m7j5-7v72, CVSS 9.8 Critical, commitfd83bf0b37a7): All documentation instructed users to setASTRO_BLOCKS_JWT_SECRET, while the runtime code readprocess.env.CMS_JWT_SECRET || 'cms-jwt-secret-change-me'. Even deployments that configuredASTRO_BLOCKS_JWT_SECRETsilently signed and verified admin tokens with the public fallback string'cms-jwt-secret-change-me', allowing anyone to mint a JWT withrole: "owner". - Mapbox
node-fontnik< 0.7.732-bit SDF bitmap integer overflow (CVE-2026-63660/GHSA-cfm6-c7rv-58xj, CVSS 8.1 High, PR#202): Ininclude/mapbox/glyph_foundry_impl.hpp,RenderSDF()calculated the SDF bitmap allocation size asunsigned int buffered_width * buffered_heightfrom unvalidated font bounding-box metrics. A 680-byte font file with a $65536 \times 65536$ buffered glyph wrapped the 32-bit product to0, allocating a zero-byte buffer and writing one byte per pixel across the heap. Version0.7.7caps glyph dimensions at256pxand widens buffer indexing tosize_t. - Auth0 AI FGA Retriever context conflation (
CVE-2026-107372in@auth0/aiandCVE-2026-108167inauth0-ai) and Node/ASP.NET SDKs (CVE-2026-126128,CVE-2026-126129): When filtering RAG documents through Auth0 Fine-Grained Authorization (FGA), the JS and Python FGA retrievers keyed batch check results without distinguishing differentuser,relation, or conditionalcontextvalues, causing documents denied by FGA to be included in the LLM prompt context.
Detection and remediation
# 1. Check npm lockfiles and dependency trees for React Server Components, Mongoose, Directus, AstroBlocks, Waline, fontnik, fast-xml-parser, and Auth0 SDKs
npm ls react-server-dom-webpack react-server-dom-parcel react-server-dom-turbopack mongoose directus @directus/api astro-blocks @waline/client fontnik fast-xml-parser @auth0/ai auth0 2>/dev/null || true
rg -n '"(react-server-dom-webpack|react-server-dom-parcel|react-server-dom-turbopack|mongoose|directus|@directus/api|astro-blocks|@waline/client|fontnik|fast-xml-parser|@auth0/ai|auth0)"' \
package.json package-lock.json pnpm-lock.yaml yarn.lock 2>/dev/null
# 2. Audit Mongoose codebases for connection-level sanitizeFilter, countDocuments with req.body/req.query, and schema.virtual() with dynamic paths
rg -n 'sanitizeFilter|countDocuments\s*\(|findOneAndReplace\s*\(|\.virtual\s*\(' --glob '*.{js,ts,mjs,cjs}' 2>/dev/null
- Upgrade React Server Components packages immediately to
19.0.9,19.1.10,19.2.9, or19.3.1: Any application using Next.js, Parcel, Webpack, or Turbopack with React 19 Server Components or Server Actions should updatereact-server-dom-*to the patched release for its minor line. - Upgrade Mongoose to
>= 9.11.4(9.12.1),>= 8.24.7(8.24.8),>= 7.8.13, or>= 6.13.12: If you cannot upgrade immediately, setmongoose.set('sanitizeFilter', true)globally rather than relying on connection-level{ sanitizeFilter: true }, and add apre('countDocuments')plugin that callsmongoose.sanitizeFilter(this.getFilter()). - Upgrade Directus to
>= 12.1.0and AstroBlocks to>= 3.4.0: On AstroBlocks instances that ran< 3.4.0, rotateASTRO_BLOCKS_JWT_SECRET, invalidate all existing session tokens, and audit CMS users and content for unauthorizedowneractions.
Timeline
- 2026-11-04 to 2026-11-09:
fast-xml-parserreleases5.12.0(CVE-2026-126066), and Mongoose tags6.13.11/6.13.12,7.8.12/7.8.13,8.24.3/8.24.7, and9.9.2/9.11.4. - 2026-11-10 (
16:21to23:17 UTC): React publishes19.0.9,19.1.10,19.2.9, and19.3.1(0c9913ae8728) andGHSA-xqc2-xf4c-x3h3/CVE-2026-126187; GitHub and NVD publish the five Mongoose advisories (CVE-2026-125116throughCVE-2026-125120) and the four Okta/Auth0 advisories (CVE-2026-107372,CVE-2026-108167,CVE-2026-126128,CVE-2026-126129). - 2026-11-11 (
01:17to05:19 UTC): NVD publishesCVE-2026-126539(Directus< 12.1.0),CVE-2026-63660(node-fontnik < 0.7.7),CVE-2026-64670andCVE-2026-64671(@waline/client <= 3.15.2), andCVE-2026-64682(astro-blocks < 3.4.0).
From research to remediation
Check whether this pattern exists in your codebase
Turn this research into a remediation workflow. Scan dependencies and package manifests for similar supply-chain risk, then prioritize fixes with reachability context.
References
- React Security Advisory GHSA-xqc2-xf4c-x3h3 and commit 0c9913ae8728 (CVE-2026-126187: Unauthenticated RCE in React Server Components)
- facebook/react commit 0c9913ae87283f96e868a8f1c20a3389827632d0 (PR #37842, backported in v19.0.9, v19.1.10, v19.2.9, and v19.3.1)
- Mongoose Advisories GHSA-pcrw-h46h-c93h (CVE-2026-125120), GHSA-gg4r-jv3p-qx3c (CVE-2026-125119), GHSA-8332-j7wj-wjw4 (CVE-2026-125117), GHSA-wr5m-5jph-8m96 (CVE-2026-125116), and GHSA-6972-9mcm-vhwj (CVE-2026-125118)
- Directus Advisory GHSA-97xr-jchp-xm3c and commit 8d4cd86783bc (CVE-2026-126539: Public WebSocket failed-auth accountability: null bypass)
- AstroBlocks GHSA-mfcg-m7j5-7v72 (CVE-2026-64682), Waline GHSA-crj3-q72p-ggqm (CVE-2026-64670), mapbox/node-fontnik GHSA-cfm6-c7rv-58xj (CVE-2026-63660), and fast-xml-parser GHSA-474x-hrwr-fgx4 (CVE-2026-126066)
- Okta / Auth0 Security Advisories CVE-2026-107372 (auth0-ai-js), CVE-2026-108167 (auth0-ai-python), CVE-2026-126128 (auth0 Node.js SDK), and CVE-2026-126129 (Auth0 ASP.NET Core SDK)