critical

CVE

CVE-2026-129349, CVE-2026-74763, CVE-2026-74762, CVE-2026-88019, CVE-2026-129347, CVE-2026-129348, CVE-2026-129320, CVE-2026-114737

CWE

CWE-287, CWE-384, CWE-614, CWE-79, CWE-178

Affected Surface

  • Java applications using `org.apache.shiro:shiro-core` up to and including 3.0.0 with `DefaultLdapRealm` or `JndiLdapRealm` and `authenticationCachingEnabled=true` (`CVE-2026-129349`), including every 2.x release
  • `shiro-guice`, `shiro-aspectj`, `shiro-cdi` and `shiro-jakarta-ee` before 3.0.2 when `@RequiresRoles`, `@RequiresPermissions` or other authorization annotations are declared on an interface, class or superclass rather than on the implementing method (`CVE-2026-74763`)
  • `shiro-core` / `shiro-web` up to 3.0.0 with RememberMe enabled (`CVE-2026-74762`)
  • `shiro-jakarta-ee` 2.0.0-alpha through 3.0.1 with form saving enabled, the default (`CVE-2026-88019`)
  • `shiro-core`, `shiro-web` and `shiro-spring` through 3.0.1 for the lower-severity `CVE-2026-129347`, `CVE-2026-129348`, `CVE-2026-129320` and `CVE-2026-114737`

TL;DR

Between 23:28 UTC on 13 November and 05:37 UTC on 14 November 2026, Apache Shiro maintainer Lenny Primak posted eight CVEs to oss-security. All of them are fixed in releases that were already on Maven Central: 3.0.1 (23 August) and 3.0.2 (8 November). Nobody has reported exploitation, and there is no public exploit beyond what the advisories describe.

  1. CVE-2026-129349, CVSS 4.0 9.1 (critical). DefaultLdapRealm set its credentials matcher to AllowAllCredentialsMatcher in its constructor, on the theory that the LDAP bind checks the password. With authenticationCachingEnabled=true, a cache hit skips the bind, so the matcher is the only check left, and it returns true. Once a user has logged in successfully, anyone who knows their username can log in as them with any password until the cache entry expires. Caching is off by default. Fixed in 3.0.1. The 2.x line, end of life since 29 June 2026, still ships the old default in 2.2.1 and on the 2.x branch.
  2. CVE-2026-74763, CVSS 4.0 6.3. @RequiresRoles, @RequiresPermissions and the other authorization annotations were not enforced when declared on an interface, in shiro-guice, shiro-aspectj, shiro-cdi and shiro-jakarta-ee. With Guice and AspectJ, annotations on a class or superclass could also be missed. A caller could invoke a method the developer thought was protected. Fixed in 3.0.2.
  3. Six more. RememberMe logins reused the existing session ID, and session IDs were read from the URL even with URL rewriting off (CVE-2026-74762, fixed in 3.0.1). The Jakarta EE form replay after login could drop Secure and SameSite from cookies and send the saved form to an untrusted host (CVE-2026-88019). Also fixed in 3.0.2: an empty stored credential matched an empty password (CVE-2026-129347), PropertiesRealm reloads kept deleted users (CVE-2026-129348), shiro:principal tags didn’t escape output (CVE-2026-129320), and a manually built ShiroFilterFactoryBean was still case-sensitive (CVE-2026-114737).

What to do now: upgrade every org.apache.shiro artifact to 3.0.2. If you can’t upgrade today, check whether any LDAP realm has authenticationCachingEnabled set and turn it off, and move authorization annotations onto the implementing methods.

Affected packages and projects

EcosystemPackageCVESeverityAffected versionsFixed version
Mavenorg.apache.shiro:shiro-coreCVE-2026-129349 (LDAP cache accepts any password)Critical, CVSS 4.0 9.1All versions through 3.0.0, including all 2.x3.0.1
Mavenshiro-guice, shiro-aspectjCVE-2026-74763 (annotations not enforced)Medium, CVSS 4.0 6.3< 3.0.23.0.2
Mavenshiro-cdi, shiro-jakarta-eeCVE-2026-74763Medium, CVSS 4.0 6.3>= 2.0.0-alpha-0, < 3.0.23.0.2
Mavenshiro-core, shiro-webCVE-2026-74762 (RememberMe session fixation)Medium, CVSS 4.0 5.9< 3.0.13.0.1
Mavenshiro-jakarta-eeCVE-2026-88019 (form replay)Medium, CVSS 4.0 6.0>= 2.0.0-alpha-0, < 3.0.23.0.2
Mavenshiro-coreCVE-2026-129347 (empty credential matches empty password)Low, CVSS 4.0 2.3< 3.0.23.0.2
Mavenshiro-coreCVE-2026-129348 (PropertiesRealm reload)Low, CVSS 4.0 2.3< 3.0.23.0.2
Mavenshiro-web, shiro-jakarta-eeCVE-2026-129320 (shiro:principal XSS)Low, CVSS 4.0 2.1< 3.0.23.0.2
Mavenshiro-springCVE-2026-114737 (incomplete case-insensitive fix)Low, CVSS 4.0 2.33.0.1 only3.0.2

NVD published CVE-2026-129349 at 10:16 UTC on 15 November. The other seven were still waiting on NVD when this was written, and none had an EPSS score yet. The GitHub Advisory Database hadn’t picked them up either, so Dependabot won’t flag them for now.

Technical analysis

1. CVE-2026-129349: a matcher that always says yes, behind a cache

Shiro’s AuthenticatingRealm.getAuthenticationInfo() is the same for every realm. It looks in the authentication cache first, falls back to doGetAuthenticationInfo() on a miss, and then always runs the configured credentials matcher against whatever it found (3.0.0, AuthenticatingRealm.java):

public final AuthenticationInfo getAuthenticationInfo(AuthenticationToken token) throws AuthenticationException {

    AuthenticationInfo info = getCachedAuthenticationInfo(token);
    if (info == null) {
        //otherwise not cached, perform the lookup:
        info = doGetAuthenticationInfo(token);
        ...
        if (token != null && info != null) {
            cacheAuthenticationInfoIfPossible(token, info);
        }
    } else {
        LOGGER.debug("Using cached authentication info [{}] to perform credentials matching.", info);
    }

    if (info != null) {
        assertCredentialsMatch(token, info);
    }
    ...
}

For an LDAP realm, doGetAuthenticationInfo() is where the real check happens. queryForAuthenticationInfo() binds to the directory as the user, and a wrong password throws javax.naming.AuthenticationException. Because the directory does the checking, DefaultLdapRealm turned off Shiro’s own matcher in its constructor:

public DefaultLdapRealm() {
    //Credentials Matching is not necessary - the LDAP directory will do it automatically:
    setCredentialsMatcher(new AllowAllCredentialsMatcher());
    ...
}

AllowAllCredentialsMatcher.doCredentialsMatch() is a one-liner: return true;.

That’s fine as long as every login goes through the bind. Turn on authenticationCachingEnabled and the first successful login stores the user’s AuthenticationInfo in the cache. On the next attempt the cache returns it, doGetAuthenticationInfo() never runs, no bind happens, and assertCredentialsMatch() asks a matcher that accepts anything. The attacker needs a username that has logged in recently enough to still be cached. Nothing else.

The fix (commit c3cfcf7, 19 August, released in 3.0.1) deletes two lines:

     public DefaultLdapRealm() {
-        //Credentials Matching is not necessary - the LDAP directory will do it automatically:
-        setCredentialsMatcher(new AllowAllCredentialsMatcher());
         //Any Object principal and Object credentials may be passed to the LDAP provider, so accept any token:
         setAuthenticationTokenClass(AuthenticationToken.class);

The realm now falls back to the AuthenticatingRealm default, SimpleCredentialsMatcher, which compares the submitted password with the one stored in the cached AuthenticationInfo. Shiro’s advisory gives the same thing as a workaround: set a SimpleCredentialsMatcher yourself, or leave caching off.

Two practical points. First, JndiLdapRealm is the deprecated name for DefaultLdapRealm and is affected the same way. Subclasses such as ActiveDirectoryRealm extend AbstractLdapRealm, not DefaultLdapRealm, and aren’t named in the advisory. Second, Shiro’s blog post says “2.2.1 or later covers them on the 2.x line” about three critical advisories together. That holds for the two older ones (CVE-2026-49268, CVE-2026-43828), not this one. The DefaultLdapRealm constructor in the 2.2.1 tag and on the 2.x branch (last commit 7 November) still installs AllowAllCredentialsMatcher. The Security Reports page lists 3.0.1 as the only fixed version, and 2.x has been end of life since 29 June 2026.

2. CVE-2026-74763: where the annotation sits decides whether it runs

Shiro’s AOP integrations find authorization annotations through DefaultAnnotationResolver. In 3.0.1 it checked the method object it was given, and then walked the target object’s class and its superclasses, never its interfaces:

Annotation annotation = m.getAnnotation(clazz);
if (annotation == null) {
    Object miThis = mi.getThis();
    Class<?> targetClass = miThis != null ? miThis.getClass() : m.getDeclaringClass();
    annotation = getAnnotationFromClassHierarchy(targetClass, clazz);   // superclasses only
}

Java doesn’t inherit method annotations from interfaces. So this pattern, which looks right and is common in Guice and CDI codebases, had no check at all:

public interface AdminService {
    @RequiresRoles("admin")
    void deleteTenant(String id);
}

public class AdminServiceImpl implements AdminService {
    @Override
    public void deleteTenant(String id) { ... }   // reached by any authenticated caller
}

Under Guice and AspectJ the problem went further. Depending on how the interceptor obtained the Method, annotations on the concrete class or a parent class could also be missed. Shiro’s advisory sums it up as “impact depending on module and where annotations are declared”.

3.0.2 replaces the lookup with a new AnnotationHierarchy class (PR #2917, 31 October). It checks the invoked method, then the same method on every superclass and interface, then the type-level annotations, and handles composed meta-annotations at each step:

-        Annotation annotation = m.getAnnotation(clazz);
-        if (annotation == null) {
-            Object miThis = mi.getThis();
-            Class<?> targetClass = miThis != null ? miThis.getClass() : m.getDeclaringClass();
-            annotation = getAnnotationFromClassHierarchy(targetClass, clazz);
-        }
-        return annotation;
+        Object target = mi.getThis();
+        return AnnotationHierarchy.findAnnotation(m, target != null ? target.getClass() : null, clazz);

The annotation closest to the invoked method now wins. That’s also a behavior change: a method-level @RequiresRoles("user") now overrides a class-level @RequiresRoles("admin") rather than adding to it (see also commit b8b883c, “method annotations override class ones, not add”). After upgrading, check any class where you relied on class and method annotations stacking.

Spring users on shiro-spring aren’t on the advisory’s module list. That module uses its own SpringAnnotationResolver, which calls Spring’s AnnotationUtils.findAnnotation() on the method, the most specific implementation and the target class, and findAnnotation() already searches interfaces.

3. CVE-2026-74762 and CVE-2026-88019: sessions and form replay

RememberMe session fixation. Shiro 2.2.0 started rotating the session ID on a normal login (CVE-2026-43827), but the RememberMe path didn’t get the same treatment. A subject rebuilt from a rememberMe cookie kept whatever session already existed. On top of that, a ;JSESSIONID= in the URL was accepted even when sessionIdUrlRewritingEnabled was false. Put together, an attacker could plant a session ID through a link and have it carry the victim’s remembered identity. 3.0.1 creates a new session on RememberMe restore and ignores URL session IDs when rewriting is off.

Form replay in shiro-jakarta-ee. When a session times out in the middle of a form, the Jakarta EE module saves the POST and replays it after the user logs in again. Up to 3.0.1 it replayed the form by opening a new HTTP connection from the server to itself. That’s how CVE-2026-58301 (fixed in 3.0.1) became an SSRF. The follow-up, CVE-2026-88019, is that the replayed request’s response cookies lost attributes such as Secure and SameSite, and the form data and cookies could still go to a host other than the application. 3.0.2 drops the network call entirely and replays through an in-container dispatch (PR #2900). If you’re stuck on an older version, set the org.apache.shiro.form-resubmit-host and org.apache.shiro.form-resubmit-port system properties to pin the target.

4. The four low-severity fixes

CVE-2026-129347. DefaultPasswordService.passwordsMatch() returned true when both the stored hash and the submitted password were empty. SimpleCredentialsMatcher did the same through its byte comparison. Accounts with an empty stored credential (half-provisioned users, accounts migrated from SSO, test fixtures that reached production) could be logged into with an empty password. The fix (commit ecd3aba):

         if (saved == null || saved.isEmpty()) {
-            return plaintextBytes == null || plaintextBytes.isEmpty();
+            return false;

CVE-2026-129348. PropertiesRealm reloads its file on a timer by default, but a reload only added and updated entries. Deleting a user or narrowing a role in the file didn’t take effect until restart. In 3.0.2 a reload replaces the loaded accounts and roles, which also removes accounts added in code with addAccount().

CVE-2026-129320. <shiro:principal/> in JSP and the Jakarta Faces equivalent wrote the principal’s toString() without HTML encoding. If usernames or display names come from self-registration or an external IdP, that’s stored XSS on every page that greets the user.

CVE-2026-114737. CVE-2026-23903 was about bypassing lowercase filter patterns by changing a static file’s case on a case-insensitive filesystem. Shiro 3.0.0 turned case-insensitive matching on by default, except in a ShiroFilterFactoryBean you build yourself, where the field still defaulted to false. 3.0.2 sets it to true (commit d53b95c). If the Spring Boot starter creates the bean for you, this one doesn’t apply.

IOCs

No exploitation has been reported, so there are no campaign IOCs. What an attempt would look like in your own logs:

  • CVE-2026-129349: several successful logins for one LDAP user, from different IPs or user agents, with no matching bind in the directory server’s logs. Directory-side failed-bind counters stay at zero while Shiro reports successes. Shiro’s debug log line Using cached authentication info [...] to perform credentials matching. followed by a success, for a session whose submitted password you know is wrong, confirms it in a test.
  • CVE-2026-74762: requests carrying ;JSESSIONID= in the path, especially followed by a request with a rememberMe cookie that keeps the same session ID.
  • CVE-2026-74763: calls to admin-only service methods from principals without the role. You’ll only see these if you log authorization decisions or audit the operations themselves.

Detection and remediation

Find the Shiro version you actually ship. Shiro often arrives transitively, through an internal platform library or a product that bundles it, so check the resolved tree and the built artifacts, not just your own build file:

mvn -q dependency:tree -Dincludes=org.apache.shiro            # Maven
./gradlew dependencies --configuration runtimeClasspath | grep -i 'org.apache.shiro'   # Gradle
grep -rn 'org.apache.shiro' pom.xml build.gradle* gradle/libs.versions.toml 2>/dev/null
find / -name 'shiro-core-*.jar' -not -path '/proc/*' 2>/dev/null   # fat jars, app servers, images
unzip -l app.jar | grep -E 'shiro-(core|web|guice|aspectj|cdi|jakarta-ee|spring)-[0-9]'

Anything below 3.0.2 should be upgraded. Pin all Shiro modules to the same version through the BOM (org.apache.shiro:shiro-bom:3.0.2) so a stray 2.x shiro-core doesn’t come in transitively.

Check for the critical configuration (CVE-2026-129349):

grep -rnE 'authenticationCachingEnabled\s*=\s*true|setAuthenticationCachingEnabled\(\s*true' \
  --include='*.ini' --include='*.properties' --include='*.yml' --include='*.yaml' --include='*.java' --include='*.kt' --include='*.groovy' .
grep -rnE '(Default|Jndi)LdapRealm' --include='*.ini' --include='*.java' --include='*.kt' --include='*.xml' .

If both match in the same application, you’re exposed until you run 3.0.1 or later. The quickest mitigation is ldapRealm.authenticationCachingEnabled = false in shiro.ini (or the equivalent setter), or ldapRealm.credentialsMatcher = org.apache.shiro.authc.credential.SimpleCredentialsMatcher. Then clear the authentication cache: restart the application, or evict the cache region if it lives in Redis, Hazelcast or Ehcache.

If you were exposed, review which accounts logged in while caching was on and treat those sessions as untrusted. Invalidate active sessions and rememberMe cookies, rotate the rememberMe cipher key (securityManager.rememberMeManager.cipherKey), and check what privileged actions were taken in that window.

Check for interface or superclass annotations (CVE-2026-74763):

# interfaces carrying Shiro annotations
grep -rln --include='*.java' -E '^\s*(public\s+)?interface\s' . | xargs grep -ln '@Requires\(Roles\|Permissions\|Authentication\|User\|Guest\)'
# modules that are affected
mvn -q dependency:tree -Dincludes=org.apache.shiro | grep -E 'shiro-(guice|aspectj|cdi|jakarta-ee)'

Until you can deploy 3.0.2, copy those annotations onto each implementing method. After upgrading, rerun your authorization tests: the “closest annotation wins” rule can loosen a method that used to be covered by a stricter class-level annotation.

Other quick checks:

grep -rn 'sessionIdUrlRewritingEnabled' .            # should be false (and is honored only from 3.0.1)
grep -rn 'shiro:principal' --include='*.jsp' --include='*.xhtml' .   # CVE-2026-129320
grep -rn 'new ShiroFilterFactoryBean' --include='*.java' --include='*.kt' .   # CVE-2026-114737
grep -rn 'PropertiesRealm' .                          # CVE-2026-129348

Timeline

  • 2026-06-14: Shiro 2.2.1 is published to Maven Central. It is the last 2.x release.
  • 2026-06-20: Shiro 3.0.0 is published.
  • 2026-06-29: Shiro 2.x reaches end of life.
  • 2026-08-19: Commit c3cfcf7 removes AllowAllCredentialsMatcher from the DefaultLdapRealm constructor.
  • 2026-08-23: Shiro 3.0.1 is published with the LDAP and RememberMe fixes.
  • 2026-10-13 to 2026-10-31: Form replay moves to self-dispatch (PR #2900, 13 October), ShiroFilterFactoryBean defaults to case-insensitive (20 October), empty credentials stop matching (21 October), and annotation resolution is rewritten (PR #2917, 31 October).
  • 2026-11-08: Shiro 3.0.2 is published to Maven Central (04:56 UTC) and tagged on GitHub.
  • 2026-11-13 23:28 UTC to 2026-11-14 05:37 UTC: The Shiro PMC posts the eight CVEs to oss-security.
  • 2026-11-14: The Shiro project blog publishes “Critical security advisories: LDAP realm and cookie fixes”.
  • 2026-11-15: NVD publishes CVE-2026-129349.

From research to remediation

Check whether this pattern exists in your codebase

Turn this research into a remediation workflow. Scan dependencies and package manifests for similar supply-chain risk, then prioritize fixes with reachability context.

References