CVE
CVE-2026-88968, CVE-2026-88066, CVE-2026-112917, CVE-2026-103916, CVE-2026-121614, CVE-2026-123014, CVE-2026-115770, CVE-2026-62662, CVE-2026-107846, CVE-2026-44267, CVE-2026-44266, CVE-2026-44265
CWE
CWE-367, CWE-426, CWE-88, CWE-94, CWE-287, CWE-347, CWE-59
Affected Surface
- Anthropic `Claude Code` (`@anthropic-ai/claude-code`) versions `< 2.1.251` on macOS (`CVE-2026-88968` / `GHSA-5xjx-9qx6-jcrv`, CVSS 7.7 High) and `Claude Desktop` `< 1.8089.0` on Windows (`CVE-2026-88066`, CVSS 7.5 High)
- Docker Desktop for Windows with WSL2 backend `< 4.98.0` / Microsoft WSL `< 3.0.3` (`CVE-2026-112917`, CVSS 9.2 Critical) and Docker Sandboxes `< 0.51.0` (`CVE-2026-103916` CVSS 8.4 High and `CVE-2026-121614` CVSS 7.1 High)
- macOS terminal emulator `iTerm2` versions `< 3.7.7beta2` / `< 3.7.7` (`CVE-2026-123014`, CVSS 8.7 High, incomplete fix for `CVE-2023-46321`)
- Go / OIDC provider `pocket-id` (`github.com/pocket-id/pocket-id`) versions `>= 2.2.0, < 2.12.0` (`CVE-2026-115770` / `GHSA-rm8c-2cv8-jwf6`, CVSS 9.6 Critical) and `>= 1.11.0, < 2.10.0` (`CVE-2026-62662` / `GHSA-q4xm-p75h-h9p3`, CVSS 7.7 High)
- npm `bitcoinjs-lib` versions `>= 2.3.0, < 5.2.1`, `>= 6.0.0, < 6.1.8`, and `>= 7.0.0, < 7.0.2` (`CVE-2026-107846` / `GHSA-8vv3-6qpc-gpw6`, CVSS 9.3 Critical) and `@enspirit/elo` `<= 1.0.0` (`CVE-2026-44267`, `CVE-2026-44266`, and `CVE-2026-44265`, fixed in `1.0.1`)
TL;DR
Between 3 November (17:17 UTC) and 5 November 2026 (06:17 UTC), NVD and the GitHub Advisory Database published 12 vulnerabilities affecting developer workstations, AI coding agents, container sandboxes, passkey OIDC providers, and JavaScript libraries:
- Anthropic Claude Code
< 2.1.251Edit tool TOCTOU sandbox escape (CVE-2026-88968/GHSA-5xjx-9qx6-jcrv, CVSS 7.7 High) and Claude Desktop< 1.8089.0Windowsgit.exehijack (CVE-2026-88066, CVSS 7.5 High): On macOS, Claude Code validatedEdittool target paths using point-in-time pathname and symlink resolution not bound to directory file descriptors (O_NOFOLLOW/openat). A process running inside Claude Code’s Bash sandbox (such as a dependency test or build script) could race the validation window by atomically swapping an in-workspace parent directory with a symlink, tricking the unsandboxedEdittool into overwriting arbitrary user-writable files outside the workspace. On Windows, Claude Desktop< 1.8089.0spawnedgit.exeviauv_spawnwithout an absolute path, allowing a malicious repository containinggit.exein the working directory to execute code. - Docker Desktop
< 4.98.0/ WSL< 3.0.332-bitsocketcallAF_VSOCKcontainer escape (CVE-2026-112917, CVSS 9.2 Critical) and Docker Sandboxes< 0.51.0sbx cphost file read (CVE-2026-103916, CVSS 8.4 High): On Docker Desktop for Windows with the WSL2 backend, the default container seccomp profile blocked the 64-bitsocket(AF_VSOCK, ...)syscall to prevent containers from reaching host-facing hypervisor/WSL2 services, but failed to filterAF_VSOCK(40) under the 32-bitSYS_socketcall(102) multiplexer on x86_64 kernels compiled withCONFIG_IA32_EMULATION. Any unprivileged Linux container could invokeint $0x80(socketcall) to open anAF_VSOCKsocket and reach host-facing services and Windows filesystems. Separately, in Docker Sandboxes (< 0.51.0),sbx cpfollowed symlinks created inside the shared workspace (CVE-2026-103916) and ran host-sidegitcommands without neutralizing repository.git/configsettings (CVE-2026-121614, fixed in0.50.0). - iTerm2
< 3.7.7x-man-page:percent-encoded NUL (%00) argument injection RCE (CVE-2026-123014, CVSS 8.7 High, incomplete fix forCVE-2023-46321): When macOS opens anx-man-page:link in iTerm2,iTermSessionLaunchersanitized the URL path and spawned a shell runningman. Because percent-encoded NUL bytes (%00) survivedsanitizedCommandand were later converted into whitespace during command-line splitting (and macOS’s/usr/bin/manre-runsgetoptson operands in the-kapropos branch or renders local roff files when given a/), an attacker could craft anx-man-page:URL that injected-P <command>to execute arbitrary shell commands as the logged-in user. - Pocket ID
< 2.12.0OIDC email-verification spoofing (CVE-2026-115770, CVSS 9.6 Critical) andclient_credentialsaudience escalation (CVE-2026-62662, CVSS 7.7 High): In Pocket ID2.2.0through2.11.x,SendEmailVerificationbound the verification token only toUserID(backend/internal/model/email_verification_token.go) rather than to the email address that received the message. A user could request a verification link for an email address they controlled, change their profile email toadmin@company.com, and click the link from their own inbox to markadmin@company.comas verified (email_verified: truein OIDC ID tokens). bitcoinjs-lib5.2.1/6.1.8/7.0.2duplicate Merkle-node block forgery (CVE-2026-107846, CVSS 9.3 Critical) and@enspirit/elo1.0.1JS/Ruby code execution (CVE-2026-44267,CVE-2026-44266, both CVSS 9.8 Critical): Inbitcoinjs-lib,Block.checkTxRoots()andfastMerkleRoot()duplicated the trailing hash on odd-length Merkle tree levels without checking whether adjacent input hashes were identical (CVE-2012-2459), allowing a forged transaction list with trailing duplicates to passcheckTxRoots()for the same block header. In@enspirit/elo(<= 1.0.0), the expression compiler emitted.constructor.constructormember chains directly into JavaScript output (CVE-2026-44267) and interpolated unescaped#{...}inside double-quoted Ruby strings (CVE-2026-44266).
What to do now: Upgrade Claude Code to >= 2.1.251, Claude Desktop on Windows to >= 1.8089.0, Docker Desktop for Windows to >= 4.98.0 with WSL >= 3.0.3 (and Docker Sandboxes to >= 0.51.0), iTerm2 to >= 3.7.7 (3.7.7beta2), Pocket ID to >= 2.12.0, bitcoinjs-lib to >= 7.0.2 (6.1.8 / 5.2.1), and @enspirit/elo to >= 1.0.1.
Affected packages and tools
| Ecosystem | Package / Tool | CVE / GHSA | Severity | Affected versions | Fixed version | Vulnerable component |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm / CLI | @anthropic-ai/claude-code & Claude Desktop | CVE-2026-88968 (GHSA-5xjx-9qx6-jcrv), CVE-2026-88066 | CVSS 7.7 / 7.5 High | Claude Code < 2.1.251 (macOS); Claude Desktop < 1.8089.0 (Windows) | 2.1.251, 1.8089.0 | Edit tool pathname TOCTOU race and uv_spawn("git.exe") search path |
| Containers / Windows | Docker Desktop for Windows & Microsoft WSL2 | CVE-2026-112917 | CVSS 9.2 Critical | Docker Desktop < 4.98.0, WSL < 3.0.3 | Docker Desktop 4.98.0, WSL 3.0.3 | Default seccomp filter missing 32-bit SYS_socketcall AF_VSOCK rule |
| Containers / AI | Docker Sandboxes (sbx) | CVE-2026-103916, CVE-2026-121614 | CVSS 8.4 / 7.1 High | < 0.51.0 (103916); >= 0.31.0, < 0.50.0 (121614) | 0.51.0, 0.50.0 | sbx cp workspace symlink confinement and host-side git config execution |
| macOS App | iTerm2 (gnachman/iterm2) | CVE-2026-123014 | CVSS 8.7 High | < 3.7.7 (< 3.7.7beta2) | 3.7.7 (3.7.7beta2) | sources/SessionCreation/iTermSessionLauncher.m (x-man-page: handler) |
| Go / OIDC | pocket-id (github.com/pocket-id/pocket-id) | CVE-2026-115770 (GHSA-rm8c-2cv8-jwf6), CVE-2026-62662 (GHSA-q4xm-p75h-h9p3) | CVSS 9.6 Critical / 7.7 High | >= 2.2.0, < 2.12.0 (115770); >= 1.11.0, < 2.10.0 (62662) | 2.12.0, 2.10.0 | SendEmailVerification / VerifyEmail and createTokenFromClientCredentials |
| npm | bitcoinjs-lib | CVE-2026-107846 (GHSA-8vv3-6qpc-gpw6) | CVSS 9.3 Critical | >= 2.3.0, < 5.2.1; >= 6.0.0, < 6.1.8; >= 7.0.0, < 7.0.2 | 5.2.1, 6.1.8, 7.0.2 | src/merkle.js (fastMerkleRoot) and src/block.js (Block.checkTxRoots) |
| npm | @enspirit/elo | CVE-2026-44267 (GHSA-33r5-xmm8-v6x5), CVE-2026-44266 (GHSA-7w38-ggh5-v542), CVE-2026-44265 | CVSS 9.8 / 9.8 Critical / 7.4 High | <= 1.0.0 | 1.0.1 | src/transform.ts, src/compilers/javascript.ts, and src/compilers/ruby.ts |
Technical analysis
1. iTerm2 3.7.7 (CVE-2026-123014): how %00 in x-man-page: URLs bypassed CVE-2023-46321 to inject man -P
iTerm2 registers as a macOS URL scheme handler for x-man-page:. When a user clicks an x-man-page:// link in a browser, chat app, or document, iTerm2 constructs a man command in iTermSessionLauncher.m. After CVE-2023-46321, iTerm2 passed the URL components through sanitizedCommand to strip shell metacharacters.
However, two behaviors combined to turn x-man-page: back into one-click command execution:
- Percent-encoded NUL bytes (
%00) decoded into\0characters that survivedsanitizedCommandand were later converted into argument-splitting whitespace when iTerm2 tokenized the command string. - On macOS,
/usr/bin/man(man.sh) re-runsgetoptson its operands in the-k(apropos) branch even after--, and evaluates the argument to-P(the pager option) via the shell, while any operand containing/is rendered directly as a local roff file.
Commit 314ba43920dbce08808c032e89966918090bdf8e replaces blacklist sanitization with strict character allowlists (validatedManArgument: and validatedManSection:) that fail closed and reject the entire URL if any character falls outside the allowlist:
// sources/SessionCreation/iTermSessionLauncher.m (commit 314ba43920dbce08808c032e89966918090bdf8e)
+ (nullable NSString *)validatedManArgument:(NSString *)arg {
static NSCharacterSet *first;
static NSCharacterSet *rest;
static dispatch_once_t onceToken;
dispatch_once(&onceToken, ^{
first = [NSCharacterSet characterSetWithCharactersInString:
@"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789_"];
rest = [NSCharacterSet characterSetWithCharactersInString:
@"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789_.:+-@"];
});
if (![self string:arg hasFirstCharacterIn:first remainingCharactersIn:rest]) {
return nil;
}
return arg;
}
2. Claude Code 2.1.251 (CVE-2026-88968) and Docker Desktop WSL2 AF_VSOCK (CVE-2026-112917)
Both container and agent-sandbox escapes exploit a gap between the sandbox enforcement layer and the host kernel or parent process:
- Claude Code
Edittool TOCTOU race (CVE-2026-88968): While Claude Code runs model-invokedBashcommands inside a macOS Seatbelt (sandbox-exec) profile that restricts filesystem writes to the workspace directory, the built-inEdittool executes in the unsandboxed parent Node.js process. Prior to2.1.251,Editvalidated that the target path resolved inside the workspace using pathname checks before opening the file for writing. A background loop launched inside theBashsandbox could atomically replace a workspace subdirectory with a symlink pointing to~/.zshrcor~/.ssh/authorized_keysbetween the path check and the file write. - Docker Desktop WSL2 32-bit
socketcallbypass (CVE-2026-112917): In Docker Desktop for Windows with WSL2,AF_VSOCKsockets connect directly from the Linux VM to host-side Windows and WSL2 services. Docker’s default seccomp profile blockedsocket(AF_VSOCK, ...)on the 64-bitSYS_socket(41) syscall, but on x86_64 kernels withCONFIG_IA32_EMULATION=y, a 64-bit binary inside an unprivileged container can invoke the 32-bitSYS_socketcall(102,SYS_SOCKET = 1) viaint $0x80, where thedomain(AF_VSOCK = 40) is passed inside a user-space pointer array (args[0]) that seccomp BPF cannot dereference. Docker Desktop4.98.0and Microsoft WSL3.0.3block the bypass across both the runtime seccomp profile and the WSL2 kernel (linux-msft-wsl-6.18.54.1).
3. bitcoinjs-lib 7.0.2 (CVE-2026-107846) and @enspirit/elo 1.0.1 (CVE-2026-44267, CVE-2026-44266)
In bitcoinjs-lib, fastMerkleRoot() in src/merkle.js implements Bitcoin’s Merkle tree calculation (which pads any odd-length tree level by duplicating its last element) and is called by Block.prototype.checkTxRoots() to verify that a block’s transactions list matches header.merkleRoot. Prior to commit 009f165edf (5.2.1, 6.1.8, 7.0.2), fastMerkleRoot() never tracked whether two adjacent nodes at the same level had identical hashes (mutated.value = true):
--- a/src/merkle.js
+++ b/src/merkle.js
@@ -11,15 +15,19 @@ function fastMerkleRoot(values, digestFn, mutated) {
let length = values.length;
const results = values.concat();
+ if (mutated) mutated.value = false;
while (length > 1) {
let j = 0;
for (let i = 0; i < length; i += 2, ++j) {
const left = results[i];
const right = i + 1 === length ? left : results[i + 1];
+ if (mutated && i + 1 < length && left.equals(right)) {
+ mutated.value = true;
+ }
results[j] = digestFn(Buffer.concat([left, right]));
}
length = j;
}
return results[0];
}
Without that check (CVE-2012-2459), an attacker could take a valid block with transactions [T1, T2, T3] (hashed as [T1, T2, T3, T3]) and present [T1, T2, T3, T3], which hashes to the exact same merkleRoot and passed block.checkTxRoots() with a mutated transaction list.
In @enspirit/elo (<= 1.0.0), the expression compiler allowed .constructor property access on any expression (CVE-2026-44267, fixed in commit 2136da1f64) and emitted double-quoted Ruby strings in src/compilers/ruby.ts by escaping only \ and " without escaping # (CVE-2026-44266, fixed in commit 51b869963f), so an Elo string literal containing '#{system("id")}' executed shell commands when the compiled Ruby expression ran.
Detection and remediation
# 1. Check Claude Code, Docker Desktop / WSL, and iTerm2 versions on developer machines
claude --version 2>/dev/null || true
wsl --version 2>/dev/null || true
defaults read /Applications/iTerm.app/Contents/Info.plist CFBundleShortVersionString 2>/dev/null || true
# 2. Check Node.js lockfiles for bitcoinjs-lib and @enspirit/elo, and Go/Docker manifests for pocket-id
rg -n '"(bitcoinjs-lib|@enspirit/elo)"\s*:\s*"' package.json package-lock.json pnpm-lock.yaml yarn.lock 2>/dev/null
rg -n 'pocket-id' go.mod docker-compose*.yml Dockerfile* 2>/dev/null
- Upgrade developer workstation tools: Update Claude Code to
>= 2.1.251, Claude Desktop for Windows to>= 1.8089.0, Docker Desktop for Windows to>= 4.98.0withwsl --update(WSL>= 3.0.3), Docker Sandboxes to>= 0.51.0, and iTerm2 on macOS to>= 3.7.7. - Upgrade Pocket ID to
>= 2.12.0: After upgrading, audit theuserstable and OIDC audit logs for accounts that changed their email address immediately prior to completing email verification (CVE-2026-115770), and reviewclient_credentialstoken grants if upgrading from< 2.10.0(CVE-2026-62662). - Upgrade
bitcoinjs-libto>= 7.0.2(6.1.8/5.2.1) and@enspirit/eloto>= 1.0.1: Any service callingBlock.prototype.checkTxRoots()orBlock.calculateMerkleRoot()on untrusted block payloads must upgrade so duplicate transaction pairs are rejected.
Timeline
- 2026-10-28 to 2026-11-02: Anthropic ships Claude Code
2.1.251and Claude Desktop1.8089.0; Docker releases Docker Desktop4.98.0and Docker Sandboxes0.50.0/0.51.0; Microsoft ships WSL3.0.3;bitcoinjs-libreleases5.2.1,6.1.8, and7.0.2;@enspirit/eloreleases1.0.1; Pocket ID merges PR#1625and releasesv2.12.0. - 2026-11-03 (
17:17to20:18 UTC): NVD and GitHub publishCVE-2026-44265,CVE-2026-44266,CVE-2026-44267(@enspirit/elo),CVE-2026-103916,CVE-2026-121614(Docker Sandboxes),CVE-2026-112917(Docker Desktop / WSL2),CVE-2026-88968, andCVE-2026-88066(Claude Code & Claude Desktop). - 2026-11-04 (
19:17to23:17 UTC): NVD publishesCVE-2026-107846(bitcoinjs-lib) andCVE-2026-115770/CVE-2026-62662(Pocket ID); George Nachman commits314ba43920andf29420ae4dto iTerm2. - 2026-11-05 (
06:17 UTC): NVD publishesCVE-2026-123014(iTerm2 < 3.7.7beta2).
From research to remediation
Check whether this pattern exists in your codebase
Turn this research into a remediation workflow. Scan dependencies and package manifests for similar supply-chain risk, then prioritize fixes with reachability context.
References
- Anthropic Claude Code Advisory GHSA-5xjx-9qx6-jcrv (CVE-2026-88968) and CVE-2026-88066
- Docker Desktop 4.98.0 / Microsoft WSL 3.0.3 Release Notes (CVE-2026-112917) and Docker Sandboxes Advisory (CVE-2026-103916)
- iTerm2 commit 314ba43920dbce08808c032e89966918090bdf8e (CVE-2026-123014: allowlist x-man-page: URL operands)
- pocket-id/pocket-id PR #1625 / commit 43aaccd5bf (CVE-2026-115770) and CVE-2026-62662
- bitcoinjs/bitcoinjs-lib commit 009f165edf (CVE-2026-107846) and enspirit/elo Advisory GHSA-33r5-xmm8-v6x5 (CVE-2026-44267)