critical

CVE

CVE-2026-88968, CVE-2026-88066, CVE-2026-112917, CVE-2026-103916, CVE-2026-121614, CVE-2026-123014, CVE-2026-115770, CVE-2026-62662, CVE-2026-107846, CVE-2026-44267, CVE-2026-44266, CVE-2026-44265

CWE

CWE-367, CWE-426, CWE-88, CWE-94, CWE-287, CWE-347, CWE-59

Affected Surface

  • Anthropic `Claude Code` (`@anthropic-ai/claude-code`) versions `< 2.1.251` on macOS (`CVE-2026-88968` / `GHSA-5xjx-9qx6-jcrv`, CVSS 7.7 High) and `Claude Desktop` `< 1.8089.0` on Windows (`CVE-2026-88066`, CVSS 7.5 High)
  • Docker Desktop for Windows with WSL2 backend `< 4.98.0` / Microsoft WSL `< 3.0.3` (`CVE-2026-112917`, CVSS 9.2 Critical) and Docker Sandboxes `< 0.51.0` (`CVE-2026-103916` CVSS 8.4 High and `CVE-2026-121614` CVSS 7.1 High)
  • macOS terminal emulator `iTerm2` versions `< 3.7.7beta2` / `< 3.7.7` (`CVE-2026-123014`, CVSS 8.7 High, incomplete fix for `CVE-2023-46321`)
  • Go / OIDC provider `pocket-id` (`github.com/pocket-id/pocket-id`) versions `>= 2.2.0, < 2.12.0` (`CVE-2026-115770` / `GHSA-rm8c-2cv8-jwf6`, CVSS 9.6 Critical) and `>= 1.11.0, < 2.10.0` (`CVE-2026-62662` / `GHSA-q4xm-p75h-h9p3`, CVSS 7.7 High)
  • npm `bitcoinjs-lib` versions `>= 2.3.0, < 5.2.1`, `>= 6.0.0, < 6.1.8`, and `>= 7.0.0, < 7.0.2` (`CVE-2026-107846` / `GHSA-8vv3-6qpc-gpw6`, CVSS 9.3 Critical) and `@enspirit/elo` `<= 1.0.0` (`CVE-2026-44267`, `CVE-2026-44266`, and `CVE-2026-44265`, fixed in `1.0.1`)

TL;DR

Between 3 November (17:17 UTC) and 5 November 2026 (06:17 UTC), NVD and the GitHub Advisory Database published 12 vulnerabilities affecting developer workstations, AI coding agents, container sandboxes, passkey OIDC providers, and JavaScript libraries:

  1. Anthropic Claude Code < 2.1.251 Edit tool TOCTOU sandbox escape (CVE-2026-88968 / GHSA-5xjx-9qx6-jcrv, CVSS 7.7 High) and Claude Desktop < 1.8089.0 Windows git.exe hijack (CVE-2026-88066, CVSS 7.5 High): On macOS, Claude Code validated Edit tool target paths using point-in-time pathname and symlink resolution not bound to directory file descriptors (O_NOFOLLOW / openat). A process running inside Claude Code’s Bash sandbox (such as a dependency test or build script) could race the validation window by atomically swapping an in-workspace parent directory with a symlink, tricking the unsandboxed Edit tool into overwriting arbitrary user-writable files outside the workspace. On Windows, Claude Desktop < 1.8089.0 spawned git.exe via uv_spawn without an absolute path, allowing a malicious repository containing git.exe in the working directory to execute code.
  2. Docker Desktop < 4.98.0 / WSL < 3.0.3 32-bit socketcall AF_VSOCK container escape (CVE-2026-112917, CVSS 9.2 Critical) and Docker Sandboxes < 0.51.0 sbx cp host file read (CVE-2026-103916, CVSS 8.4 High): On Docker Desktop for Windows with the WSL2 backend, the default container seccomp profile blocked the 64-bit socket(AF_VSOCK, ...) syscall to prevent containers from reaching host-facing hypervisor/WSL2 services, but failed to filter AF_VSOCK (40) under the 32-bit SYS_socketcall (102) multiplexer on x86_64 kernels compiled with CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION. Any unprivileged Linux container could invoke int $0x80 (socketcall) to open an AF_VSOCK socket and reach host-facing services and Windows filesystems. Separately, in Docker Sandboxes (< 0.51.0), sbx cp followed symlinks created inside the shared workspace (CVE-2026-103916) and ran host-side git commands without neutralizing repository .git/config settings (CVE-2026-121614, fixed in 0.50.0).
  3. iTerm2 < 3.7.7 x-man-page: percent-encoded NUL (%00) argument injection RCE (CVE-2026-123014, CVSS 8.7 High, incomplete fix for CVE-2023-46321): When macOS opens an x-man-page: link in iTerm2, iTermSessionLauncher sanitized the URL path and spawned a shell running man. Because percent-encoded NUL bytes (%00) survived sanitizedCommand and were later converted into whitespace during command-line splitting (and macOS’s /usr/bin/man re-runs getopts on operands in the -k apropos branch or renders local roff files when given a /), an attacker could craft an x-man-page: URL that injected -P <command> to execute arbitrary shell commands as the logged-in user.
  4. Pocket ID < 2.12.0 OIDC email-verification spoofing (CVE-2026-115770, CVSS 9.6 Critical) and client_credentials audience escalation (CVE-2026-62662, CVSS 7.7 High): In Pocket ID 2.2.0 through 2.11.x, SendEmailVerification bound the verification token only to UserID (backend/internal/model/email_verification_token.go) rather than to the email address that received the message. A user could request a verification link for an email address they controlled, change their profile email to admin@company.com, and click the link from their own inbox to mark admin@company.com as verified (email_verified: true in OIDC ID tokens).
  5. bitcoinjs-lib 5.2.1 / 6.1.8 / 7.0.2 duplicate Merkle-node block forgery (CVE-2026-107846, CVSS 9.3 Critical) and @enspirit/elo 1.0.1 JS/Ruby code execution (CVE-2026-44267, CVE-2026-44266, both CVSS 9.8 Critical): In bitcoinjs-lib, Block.checkTxRoots() and fastMerkleRoot() duplicated the trailing hash on odd-length Merkle tree levels without checking whether adjacent input hashes were identical (CVE-2012-2459), allowing a forged transaction list with trailing duplicates to pass checkTxRoots() for the same block header. In @enspirit/elo (<= 1.0.0), the expression compiler emitted .constructor.constructor member chains directly into JavaScript output (CVE-2026-44267) and interpolated unescaped #{...} inside double-quoted Ruby strings (CVE-2026-44266).

What to do now: Upgrade Claude Code to >= 2.1.251, Claude Desktop on Windows to >= 1.8089.0, Docker Desktop for Windows to >= 4.98.0 with WSL >= 3.0.3 (and Docker Sandboxes to >= 0.51.0), iTerm2 to >= 3.7.7 (3.7.7beta2), Pocket ID to >= 2.12.0, bitcoinjs-lib to >= 7.0.2 (6.1.8 / 5.2.1), and @enspirit/elo to >= 1.0.1.

Affected packages and tools

EcosystemPackage / ToolCVE / GHSASeverityAffected versionsFixed versionVulnerable component
npm / CLI@anthropic-ai/claude-code & Claude DesktopCVE-2026-88968 (GHSA-5xjx-9qx6-jcrv), CVE-2026-88066CVSS 7.7 / 7.5 HighClaude Code < 2.1.251 (macOS); Claude Desktop < 1.8089.0 (Windows)2.1.251, 1.8089.0Edit tool pathname TOCTOU race and uv_spawn("git.exe") search path
Containers / WindowsDocker Desktop for Windows & Microsoft WSL2CVE-2026-112917CVSS 9.2 CriticalDocker Desktop < 4.98.0, WSL < 3.0.3Docker Desktop 4.98.0, WSL 3.0.3Default seccomp filter missing 32-bit SYS_socketcall AF_VSOCK rule
Containers / AIDocker Sandboxes (sbx)CVE-2026-103916, CVE-2026-121614CVSS 8.4 / 7.1 High< 0.51.0 (103916); >= 0.31.0, < 0.50.0 (121614)0.51.0, 0.50.0sbx cp workspace symlink confinement and host-side git config execution
macOS AppiTerm2 (gnachman/iterm2)CVE-2026-123014CVSS 8.7 High< 3.7.7 (< 3.7.7beta2)3.7.7 (3.7.7beta2)sources/SessionCreation/iTermSessionLauncher.m (x-man-page: handler)
Go / OIDCpocket-id (github.com/pocket-id/pocket-id)CVE-2026-115770 (GHSA-rm8c-2cv8-jwf6), CVE-2026-62662 (GHSA-q4xm-p75h-h9p3)CVSS 9.6 Critical / 7.7 High>= 2.2.0, < 2.12.0 (115770); >= 1.11.0, < 2.10.0 (62662)2.12.0, 2.10.0SendEmailVerification / VerifyEmail and createTokenFromClientCredentials
npmbitcoinjs-libCVE-2026-107846 (GHSA-8vv3-6qpc-gpw6)CVSS 9.3 Critical>= 2.3.0, < 5.2.1; >= 6.0.0, < 6.1.8; >= 7.0.0, < 7.0.25.2.1, 6.1.8, 7.0.2src/merkle.js (fastMerkleRoot) and src/block.js (Block.checkTxRoots)
npm@enspirit/eloCVE-2026-44267 (GHSA-33r5-xmm8-v6x5), CVE-2026-44266 (GHSA-7w38-ggh5-v542), CVE-2026-44265CVSS 9.8 / 9.8 Critical / 7.4 High<= 1.0.01.0.1src/transform.ts, src/compilers/javascript.ts, and src/compilers/ruby.ts

Technical analysis

1. iTerm2 3.7.7 (CVE-2026-123014): how %00 in x-man-page: URLs bypassed CVE-2023-46321 to inject man -P

iTerm2 registers as a macOS URL scheme handler for x-man-page:. When a user clicks an x-man-page:// link in a browser, chat app, or document, iTerm2 constructs a man command in iTermSessionLauncher.m. After CVE-2023-46321, iTerm2 passed the URL components through sanitizedCommand to strip shell metacharacters.

However, two behaviors combined to turn x-man-page: back into one-click command execution:

  1. Percent-encoded NUL bytes (%00) decoded into \0 characters that survived sanitizedCommand and were later converted into argument-splitting whitespace when iTerm2 tokenized the command string.
  2. On macOS, /usr/bin/man (man.sh) re-runs getopts on its operands in the -k (apropos) branch even after --, and evaluates the argument to -P (the pager option) via the shell, while any operand containing / is rendered directly as a local roff file.

Commit 314ba43920dbce08808c032e89966918090bdf8e replaces blacklist sanitization with strict character allowlists (validatedManArgument: and validatedManSection:) that fail closed and reject the entire URL if any character falls outside the allowlist:

// sources/SessionCreation/iTermSessionLauncher.m (commit 314ba43920dbce08808c032e89966918090bdf8e)
+ (nullable NSString *)validatedManArgument:(NSString *)arg {
    static NSCharacterSet *first;
    static NSCharacterSet *rest;
    static dispatch_once_t onceToken;
    dispatch_once(&onceToken, ^{
        first = [NSCharacterSet characterSetWithCharactersInString:
            @"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789_"];
        rest = [NSCharacterSet characterSetWithCharactersInString:
            @"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789_.:+-@"];
    });
    if (![self string:arg hasFirstCharacterIn:first remainingCharactersIn:rest]) {
        return nil;
    }
    return arg;
}

2. Claude Code 2.1.251 (CVE-2026-88968) and Docker Desktop WSL2 AF_VSOCK (CVE-2026-112917)

Both container and agent-sandbox escapes exploit a gap between the sandbox enforcement layer and the host kernel or parent process:

  • Claude Code Edit tool TOCTOU race (CVE-2026-88968): While Claude Code runs model-invoked Bash commands inside a macOS Seatbelt (sandbox-exec) profile that restricts filesystem writes to the workspace directory, the built-in Edit tool executes in the unsandboxed parent Node.js process. Prior to 2.1.251, Edit validated that the target path resolved inside the workspace using pathname checks before opening the file for writing. A background loop launched inside the Bash sandbox could atomically replace a workspace subdirectory with a symlink pointing to ~/.zshrc or ~/.ssh/authorized_keys between the path check and the file write.
  • Docker Desktop WSL2 32-bit socketcall bypass (CVE-2026-112917): In Docker Desktop for Windows with WSL2, AF_VSOCK sockets connect directly from the Linux VM to host-side Windows and WSL2 services. Docker’s default seccomp profile blocked socket(AF_VSOCK, ...) on the 64-bit SYS_socket (41) syscall, but on x86_64 kernels with CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION=y, a 64-bit binary inside an unprivileged container can invoke the 32-bit SYS_socketcall (102, SYS_SOCKET = 1) via int $0x80, where the domain (AF_VSOCK = 40) is passed inside a user-space pointer array (args[0]) that seccomp BPF cannot dereference. Docker Desktop 4.98.0 and Microsoft WSL 3.0.3 block the bypass across both the runtime seccomp profile and the WSL2 kernel (linux-msft-wsl-6.18.54.1).

3. bitcoinjs-lib 7.0.2 (CVE-2026-107846) and @enspirit/elo 1.0.1 (CVE-2026-44267, CVE-2026-44266)

In bitcoinjs-lib, fastMerkleRoot() in src/merkle.js implements Bitcoin’s Merkle tree calculation (which pads any odd-length tree level by duplicating its last element) and is called by Block.prototype.checkTxRoots() to verify that a block’s transactions list matches header.merkleRoot. Prior to commit 009f165edf (5.2.1, 6.1.8, 7.0.2), fastMerkleRoot() never tracked whether two adjacent nodes at the same level had identical hashes (mutated.value = true):

--- a/src/merkle.js
+++ b/src/merkle.js
@@ -11,15 +15,19 @@ function fastMerkleRoot(values, digestFn, mutated) {
   let length = values.length;
   const results = values.concat();
+  if (mutated) mutated.value = false;
   while (length > 1) {
     let j = 0;
     for (let i = 0; i < length; i += 2, ++j) {
       const left = results[i];
       const right = i + 1 === length ? left : results[i + 1];
+      if (mutated && i + 1 < length && left.equals(right)) {
+        mutated.value = true;
+      }
       results[j] = digestFn(Buffer.concat([left, right]));
     }
     length = j;
   }
   return results[0];
 }

Without that check (CVE-2012-2459), an attacker could take a valid block with transactions [T1, T2, T3] (hashed as [T1, T2, T3, T3]) and present [T1, T2, T3, T3], which hashes to the exact same merkleRoot and passed block.checkTxRoots() with a mutated transaction list.

In @enspirit/elo (<= 1.0.0), the expression compiler allowed .constructor property access on any expression (CVE-2026-44267, fixed in commit 2136da1f64) and emitted double-quoted Ruby strings in src/compilers/ruby.ts by escaping only \ and " without escaping # (CVE-2026-44266, fixed in commit 51b869963f), so an Elo string literal containing '#{system("id")}' executed shell commands when the compiled Ruby expression ran.

Detection and remediation

# 1. Check Claude Code, Docker Desktop / WSL, and iTerm2 versions on developer machines
claude --version 2>/dev/null || true
wsl --version 2>/dev/null || true
defaults read /Applications/iTerm.app/Contents/Info.plist CFBundleShortVersionString 2>/dev/null || true

# 2. Check Node.js lockfiles for bitcoinjs-lib and @enspirit/elo, and Go/Docker manifests for pocket-id
rg -n '"(bitcoinjs-lib|@enspirit/elo)"\s*:\s*"' package.json package-lock.json pnpm-lock.yaml yarn.lock 2>/dev/null
rg -n 'pocket-id' go.mod docker-compose*.yml Dockerfile* 2>/dev/null
  1. Upgrade developer workstation tools: Update Claude Code to >= 2.1.251, Claude Desktop for Windows to >= 1.8089.0, Docker Desktop for Windows to >= 4.98.0 with wsl --update (WSL >= 3.0.3), Docker Sandboxes to >= 0.51.0, and iTerm2 on macOS to >= 3.7.7.
  2. Upgrade Pocket ID to >= 2.12.0: After upgrading, audit the users table and OIDC audit logs for accounts that changed their email address immediately prior to completing email verification (CVE-2026-115770), and review client_credentials token grants if upgrading from < 2.10.0 (CVE-2026-62662).
  3. Upgrade bitcoinjs-lib to >= 7.0.2 (6.1.8 / 5.2.1) and @enspirit/elo to >= 1.0.1: Any service calling Block.prototype.checkTxRoots() or Block.calculateMerkleRoot() on untrusted block payloads must upgrade so duplicate transaction pairs are rejected.

Timeline

  • 2026-10-28 to 2026-11-02: Anthropic ships Claude Code 2.1.251 and Claude Desktop 1.8089.0; Docker releases Docker Desktop 4.98.0 and Docker Sandboxes 0.50.0 / 0.51.0; Microsoft ships WSL 3.0.3; bitcoinjs-lib releases 5.2.1, 6.1.8, and 7.0.2; @enspirit/elo releases 1.0.1; Pocket ID merges PR #1625 and releases v2.12.0.
  • 2026-11-03 (17:17 to 20:18 UTC): NVD and GitHub publish CVE-2026-44265, CVE-2026-44266, CVE-2026-44267 (@enspirit/elo), CVE-2026-103916, CVE-2026-121614 (Docker Sandboxes), CVE-2026-112917 (Docker Desktop / WSL2), CVE-2026-88968, and CVE-2026-88066 (Claude Code & Claude Desktop).
  • 2026-11-04 (19:17 to 23:17 UTC): NVD publishes CVE-2026-107846 (bitcoinjs-lib) and CVE-2026-115770 / CVE-2026-62662 (Pocket ID); George Nachman commits 314ba43920 and f29420ae4d to iTerm2.
  • 2026-11-05 (06:17 UTC): NVD publishes CVE-2026-123014 (iTerm2 < 3.7.7beta2).

From research to remediation

Check whether this pattern exists in your codebase

Turn this research into a remediation workflow. Scan dependencies and package manifests for similar supply-chain risk, then prioritize fixes with reachability context.

References