critical

CVE

CVE-2026-88968, CVE-2026-88066, CVE-2026-112917, CVE-2026-103916, CVE-2026-121419, CVE-2026-121417, CVE-2026-63471, CVE-2026-63470, CVE-2026-63469, CVE-2026-63395, CVE-2026-44267, CVE-2026-44266, CVE-2026-44265

CWE

CWE-59, CWE-427, CWE-424, CWE-269, CWE-416, CWE-94, CWE-22

Affected Surface

  • Anthropic `@anthropic-ai/claude-code` `< 2.1.251` (`CVE-2026-88968` / `GHSA-5xjx-9qx6-jcrv`) and Claude Desktop for Windows `< 1.8089.0` (`CVE-2026-88066` / `GHSA-4p2j-qj3c-6x84`)
  • Docker Desktop for Windows with the x86-64 WSL2 backend (`< 4.98.0` or WSL `< 3.0.3`, `CVE-2026-112917`) and Docker AI Sandboxes (`sbx` CLI `< v0.51.0`, `CVE-2026-103916`)
  • SurrealDB `3.1.0` through `3.2.x` (`< 3.3.0`, `CVE-2026-121419` / `GHSA-pgh9-49q4-hqcx` and `CVE-2026-121417` / `GHSA-pm86-cc75-q463`)
  • PyPI `fastapi-code-generator` `< 0.8.1` (`CVE-2026-63471`, `CVE-2026-63470`, `CVE-2026-63469`), npm `isomorphic-git` `< 1.38.6` (`CVE-2026-63395` / `GHSA-9qw7-j9xw-fv9c`), and npm `@enspirit/elo` `<= 1.0.0` (`CVE-2026-44267`, `CVE-2026-44266`, `CVE-2026-44265`)

TL;DR

On 3 and 4 November 2026, NVD and GitHub Security Advisories published 13 CVEs across developer sandboxes, AI coding assistants, MCP servers, and code-generation libraries:

  1. Anthropic Claude Code (CVE-2026-88968, CVSS 7.7 High) and Claude Desktop (CVE-2026-88066, CVSS 7.5 High): Prior to @anthropic-ai/claude-code 2.1.251, the file tools (Edit, Write, Read) resolved target paths and symlinks at permission-check time without binding the check to the underlying directory inode or file descriptor. On macOS, a process running inside the Bash sandbox could swap an in-workspace directory with a symlink in the race window so the unsandboxed Edit tool overwrote arbitrary user-writable files outside the workspace. Separately, Claude Desktop for Windows (< 1.8089.0) invoked git.exe via uv_spawn without an absolute path, executing a trojanized git.exe in the opened project’s working directory.
  2. Docker Desktop WSL2 (CVE-2026-112917, CVSS 9.2 Critical) and Docker AI Sandboxes (CVE-2026-103916, CVSS 8.4 High): On x86-64 Windows systems running Docker Desktop with the WSL2 backend, an unprivileged Linux container could invoke the 32-bit socketcall syscall to bypass the default 64-bit seccomp block on AF_VSOCK, reaching host-facing services and Windows files accessible to the logged-in user. Remediating CVE-2026-112917 requires upgrading both Docker Desktop to >= 4.98.0 and Microsoft WSL to >= 3.0.3 (linux-msft-wsl-6.18.54.1). Meanwhile, Docker AI Sandboxes (sbx < v0.51.0) failed to block workspace symlinks during sbx cp, letting a sandboxed agent read or overwrite host files outside the shared workspace.
  3. SurrealDB MCP session hijack (CVE-2026-121419, CVSS 8.6 High) and KV UAF (CVE-2026-121417, CVSS 8.8 High): In SurrealDB 3.1.0 before 3.3.0, the MCP HTTP endpoint (POST /mcp) recorded BoundSubject fingerprints as (level, session.au.id()). For JWT and Bearer DEFINE ACCESS authentication, session.au.id() returned the shared access-method name rather than the individual user ID, letting any low-privilege user who learned a victim’s mcp-session-id execute MCP tools with the victim’s privileges.
  4. fastapi-code-generator (CVE-2026-63471, CVE-2026-63470, CVE-2026-63469, CVSS 9.3 Critical), isomorphic-git (CVE-2026-63395, CVSS 8.8 High), and @enspirit/elo (CVE-2026-44267, CVE-2026-44266, CVE-2026-44265, CVSS 9.8 Critical): Unescaped OpenAPI route paths, status-code keys, and operation summaries in fastapi-code-generator < 0.8.1 compiled directly into executable Python expressions inside main.py; isomorphic-git < 1.38.6 followed planted directory symlinks during two-step git.checkout operations (plus accepted .GIT and NTFS git~1 tree entries); and @enspirit/elo <= 1.0.0 allowed .constructor.constructor JavaScript sandbox escapes and unescaped #{...} Ruby shell interpolation.

What to do now: Update @anthropic-ai/claude-code to >= 2.1.251, Claude Desktop on Windows to >= 1.8089.0, Docker Desktop to >= 4.98.0 alongside WSL >= 3.0.3, Docker Sandboxes sbx to >= 0.51.0, SurrealDB to >= 3.3.0, fastapi-code-generator to >= 0.8.1, isomorphic-git to >= 1.38.6, and @enspirit/elo to >= 1.0.1.

Affected packages and projects

EcosystemPackage / ProductCVE / AdvisorySeverityAffected versionsFixed versionVulnerable component
npm / CLI@anthropic-ai/claude-codeCVE-2026-88968 (GHSA-5xjx-9qx6-jcrv)High (7.7)< 2.1.2512.1.251Unbound pathname/symlink validation in Edit, Write, and Read file tools
Windows AppAnthropic Claude DesktopCVE-2026-88066 (GHSA-4p2j-qj3c-6x84)High (7.5)< 1.8089.01.8089.0uv_spawn("git.exe") CWD search-path resolution on Windows
ContainersDocker Desktop (WSL2 x86-64) + Microsoft WSLCVE-2026-112917Critical (9.2)Docker Desktop < 4.98.0 or WSL < 3.0.3Docker Desktop 4.98.0 and WSL 3.0.332-bit socketcall bypass of 64-bit AF_VSOCK seccomp filter
ContainersDocker AI Sandboxes (sbx)CVE-2026-103916High (8.4)< v0.51.0v0.51.0sbx cp host-to-sandbox and sandbox-to-host symlink traversal
Rust / DBsurrealdb / surrealdb-coreCVE-2026-121419 (GHSA-pgh9-49q4-hqcx), CVE-2026-121417 (GHSA-pm86-cc75-q463)High (8.6 / 8.8)3.1.0 to < 3.3.0 (121417 < 3.3.0)3.3.0MCP HTTP BoundSubject::from_session fingerprint and affinitypool::spawn_local KV borrows
PyPIfastapi-code-generatorCVE-2026-63471, CVE-2026-63470, CVE-2026-63469Critical (9.3)< 0.8.10.8.1Unescaped OpenAPI route path, responses dict key, and summary docstring in parser.py
npmisomorphic-gitCVE-2026-63395 (GHSA-9qw7-j9xw-fv9c)High (8.8)<= 1.38.51.38.6Leading directory-symlink traversal in git.checkout and .git tree-entry validation
npm@enspirit/eloCVE-2026-44267, CVE-2026-44266, CVE-2026-44265Critical (9.8)<= 1.0.01.0.1src/transform.ts .constructor member access and src/compilers/ruby.ts #{...} interpolation

Technical analysis

1. Claude Code (CVE-2026-88968), Claude Desktop (CVE-2026-88066), and Docker Sandboxes (CVE-2026-112917, CVE-2026-103916)

Four of the advisories target the boundary between an AI coding agent or container and the developer host:

  • Claude Code Edit tool TOCTOU race (CVE-2026-88968): When Claude Code executes commands inside its macOS Bash sandbox, the sandboxed subprocess cannot directly write outside the project workspace, whereas Claude Code’s built-in Edit, Write, and Read tools run in the unsandboxed host process after validating that the target path resolves inside the workspace. Prior to 2.1.251, that validation resolved pathnames and symlinks at check time without binding the open/write operation to the verified directory descriptor (O_NOFOLLOW / openat). A background loop started inside the Bash sandbox by a malicious test or dependency script could atomically replace a validated in-workspace subdirectory with a symlink to ~/.zshrc or ~/.ssh/authorized_keys between validation and write.
  • Claude Desktop Windows git.exe search path (CVE-2026-88066): On Windows, Libuv’s uv_spawn searches the process’s current working directory before PATH when given a bare executable name (git.exe). Opening a cloned repository containing a trojanized git.exe in Claude Desktop < 1.8089.0 executed the binary immediately on project open.
  • Docker Desktop WSL2 32-bit socketcall AF_VSOCK bypass (CVE-2026-112917): Docker Desktop’s default seccomp profile blocks socket(AF_VSOCK, ...) on 64-bit x86_64 syscalls so unprivileged containers cannot talk to internal Hyper-V / WSL2 host-integration sockets. However, on x86_64 WSL2 kernels with CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION enabled, a container process can invoke the legacy 32-bit multiplexed syscall socketcall(SYS_SOCKET, [AF_VSOCK, ...]) (int 0x80 / 32-bit ABI), bypassing the 64-bit syscall number filter and connecting to host-facing WSL2 services that expose Windows files belonging to the logged-in user. Both Docker Desktop 4.98.0 and WSL 3.0.3 (linux-msft-wsl-6.18.54.1) are required to close the bypass.
  • Docker AI Sandboxes sbx cp (CVE-2026-103916): Prior to v0.51.0, sbx cp did not prevent a process inside the AI sandbox from replacing a path inside the shared workspace with a symlink pointing to an arbitrary host path, causing a subsequent host-initiated sbx cp to read or overwrite host files with the invoking user’s permissions.

2. SurrealDB 3.3.0: Cross-user MCP session hijack via BoundSubject collision (CVE-2026-121419)

SurrealDB 3.1.0 introduced a built-in Model Context Protocol HTTP server (POST /mcp). To prevent an attacker who learns a victim’s mcp-session-id header from replaying it with a different credential, SurrealDB’s MCP handler recorded a BoundSubject fingerprint during initialize and checked it on every subsequent request:

// Vulnerable fingerprint in SurrealDB 3.1.0..3.2.x (auth.rs:50-55 & verify.rs:403-407)
Self {
    level: session.au.level().clone(),
    subject: session.au.id().map(str::to_owned),
}

For system users (Level::Root, Level::Namespace, Level::Database), session.au.id() is the username. For record users and JWT/Bearer users authenticating through a DEFINE ACCESS ... TYPE JWT or TYPE RECORD method, however, verify.rs sets the Actor ID to the name of the access method itself (for example, "app_jwt"), while storing the per-user identity and role claims in session variables ($auth, $token).

Because every user authenticating through that DEFINE ACCESS method shared the exact same (level, Some("app_jwt")) BoundSubject, a low-privilege viewer user presenting their own valid JWT alongside an editor or admin user’s mcp-session-id passed BoundSubject::matches() and executed MCP queries inside the victim’s bound session. Upgrading to SurrealDB 3.3.0 binds the MCP session to the full caller identity and also fixes CVE-2026-121417 (GHSA-pm86-cc75-q463), where surrealdb-core KV backends passed borrowed transaction state (&Transaction, MutexGuard, rocksdb_snapshot_t*) into affinitypool::spawn_local closures that suffered a heap use-after-free if the returned future was leaked without running Drop.

3. fastapi-code-generator 0.8.1: Import-time and call-time RCE from OpenAPI specs (CVE-2026-63471, CVE-2026-63470, CVE-2026-63469)

fastapi-code-generator generates FastAPI main.py routers from OpenAPI YAML/JSON files (including remote $ref specs). Prior to 0.8.1, the Jinja templates interpolated three OpenAPI fields into main.py without escaping quotes, while post-processing the generated file with black and isort:

  1. Route path (CVE-2026-63471): Emitted into @app.get('<path>'). An OpenAPI path containing '/u/'+(__import__("os").system("id") or "")+'/x' produces valid Python that black formats cleanly and that executes as soon as the ASGI server or test runner imports main.py.
  2. Additional response status-code keys (CVE-2026-63469): Emitted into @app.get(..., responses={'<status>': {'model': ...}}), executing at module import time via '404'+(__import__("os").system("id") or "")+'x'.
  3. Operation summary (CVE-2026-63470): Emitted into a triple-quoted handler docstring """<summary>""", allowing x""" + (__import__("os").system("id") or "") + """y to execute whenever the endpoint is called.

Commit 49301dbdb821 wraps all three fields in PythonEscapedString:

# fastapi_code_generator/parser.py (commit 49301dbdb82170d7f50877419d994b05cb1fa2bc)
def _escape_single_quoted_python_string(value: object) -> str:
    return (
        _raw_string(value)
        .replace("\\", "\\\\")
        .replace("'", "\\'")
        .replace("\r", "\\r")
        .replace("\n", "\\n")
    )

def _escape_triple_double_quoted_python_string(value: object) -> str:
    return _raw_string(value).replace("\\", "\\\\").replace('"""', '\\"\\"\\"')

4. isomorphic-git 1.38.6 (CVE-2026-63395) and @enspirit/elo 1.0.1 (CVE-2026-44267, CVE-2026-44266, CVE-2026-44265)

  • isomorphic-git directory-symlink checkout escape (CVE-2026-63395): In isomorphic-git <= 1.38.5, switching from a commit where config is a symlink (mode 120000 -> ../.ssh) to a commit where config/authorized_keys is a regular file (mode 100644) caused git.checkout to classify config/authorized_keys as a plain create operation without removing the parent config symlink. Calling mkdir("config") ignored EEXIST, and writeFile("config/authorized_keys") wrote through the symlink outside the working tree. Commit 823843d1cd19 (v1.38.6) rejects symlinked leading directories during checkout, rejects .git case/NTFS/HFS+ aliases (git~1, .GIT., zero-width Unicode variants) in GitTree, bounds applyDelta target allocations, and detects circular symref chains.
  • @enspirit/elo compiler escapes (CVE-2026-44267, CVE-2026-44266, CVE-2026-44265): Elo compiles untrusted expressions to JavaScript, Ruby, and SQL. Prior to 1.0.1, src/transform.ts allowed member access on constructor and __proto__ (CVE-2026-44267, enabling ({}).constructor.constructor('return process.mainModule.require("child_process").execSync("id")')()) and src/compilers/ruby.ts failed to escape # inside Ruby double-quoted string literals (CVE-2026-44266, enabling #{...} command execution). Commits 2136da1f64ee and 51b869963fbe block constructor/__proto__/prototype member access and escape # as \# in escapeRubyDQ().

Detection and remediation

# 1. Check Claude Code, Docker Desktop / WSL, and Docker Sandboxes versions
claude --version 2>/dev/null || true
docker version 2>/dev/null || true
sbx version 2>/dev/null || true

# 2. Check Python and Node.js lockfiles for fastapi-code-generator, isomorphic-git, and @enspirit/elo
pip show fastapi-code-generator 2>/dev/null || true
rg -n '(fastapi-code-generator|isomorphic-git|@enspirit/elo)' \
  requirements*.txt pyproject.toml poetry.lock uv.lock package.json package-lock.json pnpm-lock.yaml yarn.lock 2>/dev/null

# 3. Audit generated FastAPI main.py files for unescaped string concatenation in @app.<method>(...) decorators
rg -n '@app\.(get|post|put|delete|patch)\(.*(\+|__import__|eval|exec)' . 2>/dev/null
  1. Upgrade AI coding tools and container sandboxes:
    • Upgrade @anthropic-ai/claude-code to >= 2.1.251 (npm i -g @anthropic-ai/claude-code@latest) and Claude Desktop on Windows to >= 1.8089.0.
    • On Windows x86-64 hosts using Docker Desktop with WSL2, upgrade Docker Desktop to >= 4.98.0 and run wsl --update to reach WSL >= 3.0.3 (linux-msft-wsl-6.18.54.1). Upgrading Docker Desktop alone leaves the 32-bit socketcall AF_VSOCK path open on older WSL kernels.
    • Upgrade Docker Sandboxes to sbx >= v0.51.0 and recreate sandboxes created by earlier releases.
  2. Upgrade SurrealDB, fastapi-code-generator, isomorphic-git, and @enspirit/elo:
    • Upgrade SurrealDB to >= 3.3.0 to enforce per-user MCP BoundSubject verification and fix the affinitypool use-after-free.
    • Upgrade fastapi-code-generator to >= 0.8.1 and regenerate any FastAPI routers built from external OpenAPI specs.
    • Upgrade isomorphic-git to >= 1.38.6 and @enspirit/elo to >= 1.0.1.

Timeline

  • 2026-10-13 to 2026-10-26: Anthropic ships Claude Desktop 1.8089.0 (GHSA-4p2j-qj3c-6x84) and Claude Code 2.1.251 (GHSA-5xjx-9qx6-jcrv).
  • 2026-11-03 (15:17 to 20:18 UTC): NVD and GitHub Advisory Database publish CVE-2026-121419 and CVE-2026-121417 (SurrealDB 3.3.0), CVE-2026-103916 (Docker Sandboxes v0.51.0), CVE-2026-44265 through CVE-2026-44267 (@enspirit/elo 1.0.1), CVE-2026-112917 (Docker Desktop 4.98.0 / WSL 3.0.3), CVE-2026-63395 (isomorphic-git 1.38.6), CVE-2026-63469 through CVE-2026-63471 (fastapi-code-generator 0.8.1), CVE-2026-88066, and CVE-2026-88968.

From research to remediation

Check whether this pattern exists in your codebase

Turn this research into a remediation workflow. Scan dependencies and package manifests for similar supply-chain risk, then prioritize fixes with reachability context.

References